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ABSTRACT
This work deals with the law relating to families and 
family relationships in Lagos and the southern Regions of the 
Federation of Nigeria, including the proposed Mid-West Region. 
It is primarily concerned with customary law; but as statute 
law and principles of English law have made many incursions 
into the sphere of customary law, most of the topics covered 
have had to be treated on a comparative basis.
A unified treatment, rather than a separate investigation 
of the laws of each ethnic group in turn, is adopted because 
there is happily a remarkable degree of -uniformity in these 
laws. But any local variations that do exist are indicated in 
the appropriate places; and where, as in intestate succession 
and prohibited degrees of relationship, there are no common 
principles, the ethnic groups are dealt with individually or 
in groups falling within well defined patterns.
The thesis is in two parts. Part One is concerned with the 
extended family. Among the items discussed here are the family 
as a corporate socio-legal entity; the position of family heads 
and family councils in contemporary society; the concept of 
family property and the rights therein of family members 
considered as individuals^ and disintegration of the family.
Part Two is concerned with the elementary family or house­
hold. Chapters V-VII deal with the formation of family units
xx ix
through marriage, while Chapter XIII discusses additions thereto 
through adoption and guardianship. The two types of customary 
law marriage and the four essential requirements for a valid 
marriage are here investigated, the legal effect of the omission 
of any one of these requirements being also discussed.
Chapters VIII-X analyse the law of husband and wife - 
including a wife's membership of her husband's extented family; 
her right to his name, his citizenship, his domicil and the 
matrimonial home. The next two chapters deal with the law of 
parent and child - including illegitimacy (which does exist as a 
status under customary law), legitimation by subsequent marriage 
and by acknowledgment, the affiliation of a child to one of 
three possible families, and the vicarious liability of parents.
Finally, Chapter XIV discusses the dissolution of marital 
relations - the point being made that whereas a wife's death 
brings a marriage to an end for all purposes, a husband's death 
leaves intact the wife's status as a married woman for a .
number of purposes.
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1MODERN FAMILY LAW IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA 
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CUSTOMARY LAW)
PART ONE 
THB~EXTBNDED FAMILY
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CONCEPT OP FAMILY IN NIGERIAN SOCIETY.
The Problems (Including justification for unified
treatment of the customary laws of 
southern Nigeria.)
The problems that confront the student of Family 
Law in contemporary Nigerian society are many and difficult. 
The first (hut perhaps the least difficult of them all) is 
the question of definition. What, in the context of Nigerian 
social life, does the ferm ,ffamily” connote? In other words, 
what does the ordinary layman who is literate in the English 
language understand by f,family,f as an indigenous institution 
in his local community; is this the same as or different 
from the ordinary meaning of that term as used in England; 
what is the "ordinary meaning1* of the word "family11 in 
England anyway?
2The second problem is related to the first, and 
is a direct result of the progressive impact of Western 
culture and thought on Nigerian social and political in­
stitutions, so apparent in many departments of Nigerian 
law today. Given the ordinary meaning of 1 family" in the 
context of the traditional Nigerian society, to what extent 
would this he acceptable as an apt definition of that term 
in contemporary southern Nigerian society? In other words, 
how much of the old family concept is left, and how far 
is the family in the Western sense an established social 
fact in Nigeria today? The full significance of this 
question will become apparent in due course, for the answer 
to it could spell the difference between a treatise on do­
mestic relations and one on constitutional law!
The third problem is less fundamental than the 
other two (being true of family law in any given country or 
society), but is much more difficult to surmount in practice: 
family law is a vast subject in more senses than one. To 
begin with, it covers a vast number of topics, ranging from 
the creation and growth of the family (by marriage, births, 
adoption, guardianship and service agreements), through the 
legal mechanism of family life (i.e. the domestic relations 
of husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, 
master and domestic servant), to its disintegration - partial 
or complete - as a result of divorce or death or what may
3be called fission* In the second place, southern Nigeria 1 
is the home of dozens of ethnic groups with scores of 
languages and dialects, varied customs and "beliefs. How 
does one state family law with reference to so many ethnic 
groups: does one survey these groups one after the other,
classify them, or steam-roll them? Fortunately for the 
future of Customary Law in Nigeria, this; problem is not 
as formidable as it looks. For, while there are variations 
in detail regarding the modes of achieving given legal re­
sults (e.g. getting married or creating family property), 
the legal results themselves (i.e. the substantive laws as 
opposed to the adjectival laws) are surprisingly similar
as between the different ethnic groups, as we shall see in 
2due course. Finally, the incorporation by reference into 
Nigerial law of the current English 1&W relating to divorce
3
and matrimonial causes means that, strictly speaking,
1. We define "southern Nigeria” for the purposes of this 
thesis as the territory corresponding to the Eastern 
and Western Regions and the federal Territory of Lagos 
as defined in Chapter I, section 3» of the Nigerian Con­
stitution, I960.
2. C.f. Ajayi, "The interaction of English Law with 
Customary Law in Western Nigeria", (i960) k J#A.L.,
U0-50, 9§-HUt at p.112.
3* See the E.r . High Court Law, 1955» s.16; also s.16 of the 
High ^ourt of Lagos Law (Cap.80, Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958 Revision); and s.7 of the Law 
of England (Application) Law, 1959* of the Western Re­
gion which saves the application in the Region of imperial 
statutes relating to matters within the exclusive Federal 
list. The law relating to Christian marriages and matri­
monial causes is within that list: Item 23 in the
Schedule to s.154 of the Federal Constitution, I960.
a discussion of family law in southern Nigeria should
include a discussion of the law of 0n the subject*
It is proposed, however, to concentrate on the customary
law, only discussing English law or the relevant Nigerian
statute law insofar as it modifies, derogates from, or
supplements the rules of customary law*
Nature and ascertainment of !fcustomary law11*
Our fourth and last problem is one that is not
peculiar to family law, hut which has special significance
in that field* What is the place of customary law in the
courts, and what is “customary law*1 anyway? ^he High Court
Laws of the Eastern Region and the Western Region and the
High court of Lagos Act each provides for the application,
as a first choice, of customary law where the parties are
all Nigerians or where the justice of the case so requires,
even if one or more parties are not Nigerians, provided that
the customary law in question is not repugnant to natural!
justice, equity and good conscience, nor incompatible with
the provisions of a written law? and provided further that
the parties themselves had not previously agreed - either
expressly or by necessary implication - that the transaction
shall be governed by some law other than customary law* ^
2+. High court Law; s*22 (Eastern Region); s*12 (Western 
Region); s*27 (Lagos)* The various Magistrate Courts 
Laws, too, have similar provisions* Though they vary 
slightly in terminology, these provisions are practical­
ly identical in substance*
And customary law does not apply of course where the tran­
saction which gave rise to the litigation is one that is 
unknown to customary law*
What then is customary law, and how are its rules 
ascertained in court? There is no good definition of 
1 customary law*1 (known as **native law and custom** in the 
older statutes) in our statute books* 1he most ambitious 
attempt so far occurs in s*2 of the Customary Courts Law, 
1956, of the ^astern Region which reads -
**In this Law ••• fcustomary law1 means a rule or body 
of rules regulating rights and imposing correlative 
duties, being a rule or body of rules which obtains 
and is fortified by established usage and which is 
appropriate and applicable to any particular matter, 
dispute, issue or question***
It will be noticed that this definition makes no reference 
to any territorial limitation or to associaU on of the 
rules concerned with any local communities* It is therefore 
wide enough to include both long-established local customs 
and just-established general customs - not excluding com­
mercial customs - whether or not they had their origin in 
the social life of a Nigerian community*
The definition contained in s*2 of the Customary 
Courts Law of the Western Region is hardly more helpful 
for the purposes of a general.?' discourse. For it says
I Customary law1 includes any declaration of local 
customary law made and approved under the provisions 
of s. 78 of the Local Government Law, or the provi­
sions of Part II of the Chiefs Law."
There is no definition of ”local customary law”, and so, 
while we are told where to find some examples of customary 
law, we are left in the dark as to what constitutes custo­
mary law a3 such. A better guidance comes to us from the
definition of "custom1' given in s.2 of the Evidence Act 
of Nigeria:
III Custom* is a rule which, in a particular
district, has, from long usage, obtained the
force of law."
The only element of doubt in this succinct definition is
in the phrase, "obtained the force of law", ^his could
mean either (a) "regarded by the people of the district
generally as binding and enforceable" of (b) "recognised as
law by the courts". If (b), the question arises as to
which system of courts - customary of non-customary - we
are talking about. For not all customs which the local
people regard as binding on them and enforceable at their
5* Throughout this thesis we shall use thebword "Act" in 
place of "Ordinance" wherever the latter term occurs in 
connection with Nigeria. This is because the Designation 
of Ordinances Act, 1961 (No.57 of the Laws of the Fe­
deration of Nigeria, 1961) provides that for all en­
actments having the force of law within the Federal 
competence, "Act" shall be read for "Ordinance". Regional 
enactments are now known as Laws with a capital 11L" and 
this applies to Lagos as well in some cases.
7suit in the customary courts or tribunals are enforceable
g
in the non-customary courts. But this is a large subject 
which cannot be pursued here, as it raises a number of fun­
damental questions, some jurisprudential, others constitu­
tional* ^or example, is a custom law because it is actually 
enforced by the courts, or is it so even before it is ever 
litigated? Is a custom law because it is generally reco­
gnised as binding by the people concerned with its observance 
or non-observance (in which case all gambling would be law­
ful, and gambling debts legally binding, among gamblers), 
or because it is recognised as such by the state and its 
law-enforcement organs? What right has a superior court to 
declare a local customary law repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience, if it is perfectly satisfactory 
to the community concerned? If this power is statutory, as 
it is in Nigeria, is it not an infringement of the people’s 
fundamental human rights?
Proceeding on the bsdLs that the courts are obliged 
to observe and enforce the observance of customary law, ^ 
we will now attempt a working definition. Customary law
6. A good example in the Yoruba doctrine of legitimation 
of children by mere acknowledgment of paternity. This 
was repeatedly rejected as repugnant to public policy 
by the High uourt (W.R.), till it was finally reinstated
by W.A.C.a . in Aiake v. Pratt. 15 W.A.C.A.20.
7* Subject to the provisos already indicated.
8will be used here as a rule (ar body of rules) which the 
members of a given ethnic group recognise as binding on 
themselves, and which the courts will enforce if and when
g
called upon to do so*
Finally, given the status of customary law in the 
courts, and given a working definition of “customary law11, 
the next question is how to "identify" a given rule of 
customary law for the benefit of the members of the superior 
courts who need not be experts in that field* In other 
words, how is customary law ascertained in court? The basic 
rule is that as far as the High Courts are concerned, custo­
mary law is a question of fact to be estgb lished by evidence* 
This probably began as a rule of convenience at a time when 
the superior courts were manned by expatriate judges. It
q
was given statutory recognition first in the Evidence Act ^
and later in the various High Court Laws of the Regions*10
In the recent case of Odunsi v* 0.1 ora*11 the Federal Supreme 
12Court underlined this principle when, after reiterating 
that "native law and custom" were questions of fact in the 
High Co^ jrt, it went on to hold that findings in earlier
8* Cf* the graphic description of "native law and custom" 
as "a mirror of accepted usage" in Owonyin v* Omotosho 
(1961), 1 All N.L.R.30U.
9* Laws of the Federation (1958 Revision), Cap.62, s.11+.
10. See e.g. the High Court of Lagos Law, loc.cit.. s.67;
High Court Law (W.R.), loc.cit*. s.lU;
11. (1961) 1 All. N.L.R. 283.
lg. Per Brett, *.J. with Taylor and Bairamian, F#J.J., 
concurring.
cases on such matters were not binding as precedents. In 
another recent case, a useful rider was added when it was 
held that "Native law and custom are matters of evidence 
to be decided on the facts presented before the Courts 
in each case, unless it is of such notoriety and has been 
so frequently followed by the Courts that jddicial notice
13would be taken of it without evidence required in proof." ^
To summarise: our first and most fundamental
problem is to identify the institution (or group of in­
stitutions) generally known as the family in southern Ni­
geria, and to evaluate its legal significance in the contempo 
rary social structure. Secondly, having regard to the in­
flux of Western ideas, laws and cultures in Nigeria, we 
shall attempt to discover how far the family as generally 
understood in the Western world has become a socio-legal 
fact in southern Nigeria. A start will be made on these two 
problems in the next section below, ^he next problem is 
the fnormity of the field covered by "family law". This we 
solve by restricting this study to customary law as much as 
possible, and by attempting to discover common principles 
of law rather than describe details of procedure. To the 
question: What is customary law? we have replied with a
brief working definition. we have tried to show
13* G-iwa v. ^rinmiloku. (1961) 1 All N.L.R.29U, from the 
headnote. '^his is |h fact an abridged version of the 
provisions of s.li*(2) of the Evidence Act.
1 0
the place and importance of customary law (and the method 
of proving it in the superior courts) by a summary state­
ment of the relevant statutory provisions and a brief re­
ference to case law*
Nature and classification of family groups*
The word 1 familyu is not easy to define with any
degree of accuracy even in the context of English law from
which the term is borrowed.^ In the context of Nigerian
customary law and traditional society, it is well nigh
2impossible to define with any precision. Among tbs many
1* Bromley sums up the position in English iaw in these words, 
lfThe word ‘family1 is one which is difficult, if not 
impossible, to define precisely* In one sense it means 
all blood relations who are descended from a common an­
cestor; in another it means all the members of a house­
hold, including husband and wife, children, servants 
and even lodgers.” See his Family Law (2nd edn*, 1962) 
p*l*
2. Of the term as used among the Yoruba, Lloyd says, ”•*• it 
may connote any group from the smallest nuclear family 
of man-wife-child to several thousand persons tracing 
descent from a common ancestor through many generations:” 
Yoruba Eand Law, pp.31-32. See also Burrows, Words and 
Phrases Judicially Ibgfined (l9b3) Vol.2, pp.281-282 for 
other definitions.
1 1
reasons for this difficulty are (a) the dynamic nature 
of the family as a social institution: what "began as a
simple domestic unit rapidly grows into a complex social 
unit; (b) the tenacity of kinship:'/ties among Nigerians: 
people cherish these ties and endeavour to employ only 
such terminology as will emphasise and nourish them; 
hence (c) the paucity of vernacular terms which denote the 
various categories and depths of social groups; as a re­
sult (d) the vernacular terms - ebi, ama, ufok and the 
like - which denote roughly the idea of -^family", each 
stands for a large number of social entities/institutions 
according to context. Subject to this caveat, it may be 
sjaid that the primary meaning of "family" as used in Nigeria 
is a social institution consisting of all tine persons who 
3sra descended through the same line (the male line in a 
patrilinea^ the female line in a matrilineal, socie ty) from 
a common ancestor, and who still owe allegiance to or recog­
nize the over-all authority of one of their number as head 
and legal successor to the said ancestral founder, together 
with any persons who though not blood descendants of
the founder, ><are for some reason attached to the house-
Wave« b-ze^ n
holds of persons so descended, or^otherwise^absorbed into
3-5the lineage as a whole* ^ ^
This, unfortunately, is the primary meaning of 
"family” as popularly used in southern Nigeria* "Primary” 
because it is the institution which almost invariably springs 
to mind whenever the word "family” is used without more; 
"unfortunately” because the institutions that could fit 
into this definition vary considerably in size and genera­
tion depth - anything from two or three to a dozen or more 
generations old - depending on the frequency with which 
fissions have occurred among the descendants of one ancestor, 
while the descendants of another have held on tenaciously 
together under successive "family heads” from generation., 
to generation*^
3« An example of those "attached to the households of persons 
so descended” is persons of slave origin; while an 
example of people attached "to the lineage as a whole" 
is to be found among persons who immigrated as a group 
and were formally absorbed into an existing family group* 
U* Jones defines "extended family" as "A minimal lineage, 
i*e* a group of families descended unilineally from a 
common bounding father (or mother in a mat-ri-lineage)*” 
^Family" he defines as "A husband, wife (or wives) and 
their unmarried children"* See: Report of the Position* 
States and Influence of Chiefs and Natural Rulers in the 
Eastern Region of Nigeria* pp. v-vi* This definition is 
a little short of perfection as it does not take account 
of (a) internal fissions, and (b) absorption of strangers. 
5* In addition to the usual patrilineal and matrilineal 
groups, there are cognatic (double-descent) groups.
6. There is "fission” when a family group breaks up into two 
or Mire independent groups, each with its own head, each 
refusing to recognise the authority of the head of any 
of the other units, not even of the person who, but for 
the split, would be the legal successor of the ancestral 
founder.
It may be objected that this definition is wide 
enough to include units such as villagea and towns, ^ (which 
traditionally were not merely social but essentially poli­
tical units), since these too are based essentially on com­
mon ancestry. It may also be objected that the extended 
family is really a political unit (as opposed to a mere 
social group which a family is supposed to be) in the tra­
ditional society, so that we are stepping beyond the realm 
of family law into that of constitutional law by discussing 
it at all. The answer to the first objection is that our 
definition carefully leaves out an essential element of a 
political unit, viz. territorial association. The members 
of an extended family need not belong to a common territory, 
nor need they share a common political head such as a king 
or chief. It is enough that they recognise one of their 
number as head, and that they meet and/or share in common 
activities, rights and interests as a group, if and as the 
need arises, The answer to the second objection is really 
a development of the first. The term "extended family" is 
used in popular language to denote two types of legal en­
tities, one territorially based, the other not. As a political
7. In Nigeria the word "town" is used in popular parlance 
for the unit known to social anthropologists as a 
"village group". What the Englishman knows as "town" 
is called a "township" or "urban area" (the latter 
especially in official documents).
8(or more accurately, perhaps, socio-political) unit, the 
extended family may "be defined as the smallest sub-division 
of a traditional society, consisting of all the persons who 
are descended unilineally from a common ancestor, who live 
and function as a group, occupying a common territory and 
recognizing one or more of themselves as their political 
head or governing body as the case may be - together with 
persons who, though not blood descendants of the said 
ancestor, have been absorbed into the group* This latter 
unit is obviously narrower in connotation than thei first: 
the requirement of common territory means that, as marriage 
is virilocal, women cease to be members of their maiden 
family (understood as a political unit) as soon as they 
marry, but retain their family membership (in the sense 
of a social unit) in spite of marriage, as we shall see*
The fault, then, is not in our definition but 
in the inherent ambiguity of the term 11 family” itself as 
used in the coutry. This ambiguity is magnified many times 
by the addition of the word "extended” to form the popular 
phrase "extended family, because, as already indicated, 
this extension is on two planes: a family extends terri­
torially as its population grows; at the same time it 
grows in generation depth as present members die and are 
succeeded by their issue. But so long as the distinction
8* For reasons, see Obi, Ibo Law of Property (1963)# p*ll«
■between the "extended family" as a social and as a poli­
tical group ismkept in mind, no great difficulty will he 
experienced as a result of this ambiguity.
The second major connotation of the word "family"
is the unit consisting of a man and his wife or wives with
their unmarried children and any other dependants such as
9wards and domestic servants. To this unit we shall give 
the name "elementary family".^ It must he warned, however, 
that the term M&ementary" is a little misleading, for it 
suggests that a family so described is the smallest pos­
sible social unit with any legal significance. This is 
not so. The elementary family itself may (in the case of a 
polygamous family, for example) be composed cf two or more 
sub-divisions or branches corresponding to the number of 
women by whom the father of the family has had children.^
9. Other meanings of "family" include (a) a man and his wife 
or wives with all their unmarried children plus their 
married sons and their wives and issue - the grandparental 
family/household; (b) a man and his wife or wives with 
all their children, including the children of his mar­
ried daughters. To either of these may be added dependants
if any. 1he difference between (a) and (b) is that (b) 
includes married daughters while (a) does not. Both 
exclude married daughters1 issue, but may include issue 
of unmarried daughters.
10. It is also known as a Household.
11. The children of one mother in a polygamous family are
said by the Yoruba to belong to one omoiya, and by the 
Ibo to belong to one useku, as distinct from the obahan 
(Yoruba) or the obi (Ibo). Cf. Lloyd, op.cit.. pp.279-61.
We say "women by whom the father of the family has had
children" advisedly because in those societies where a
child of an unmarried mother can be "legitimated" and
affiliated to the family of his natural father, a child so
affiliated is deemed to constitute a family branch (or
12house) on his own, in just the same way as the children
of one wife between them constitute one branch in a poly-
13gamous family. ^
The difficulty of finding a concise and satis­
factory definition of "family" is due to a number of 
fadbrs as we have seen. Among the factors already mentioned 
are (a) the fluidity of the social structure: what starts
off as a small homogeneous group consisting essentially of 
a man and his wife and children soon grows into a complex 
body of separate but inter-related sub-units in the course 
of a few generations; it would require an extremely elastic 
language with an extraordinary range of vocabulary ^  to 
keep pace with such a social phenomenon; (b) the widespread 
reluctance of West Africans to employ terms which might 
indicate remoteness in their blood ties with their kinsmen;
12. Cf* Lloyd, Yoruba Family Property, p.296.
13* For the moment we shall regard as "polygamous" any 
family which contains children born of different 
mothers, whether these were married concurrently or 
successively or perhaps not at all. 
ll+* Or a‘Ministry of Social Nomenclature" charged with 
the duty of making up new names for new groups of 
a given generation depth as they come into being.
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hence the use of words like "brother11, "sister", "father"
or "mother" (or their vernacular equivalents) to designate
cousins, nephews, uncles, aunts, step-parents or remoter
relations - even among well educated people; (c) variations
in sod. al structure even within the same ethnic group.
Our statute looks provide no clear guide in this
search for definitions. For there is no general definition
of the term "family" anywhere (e.g. in the Interpretation
Act); what definitions there are, were made ad hoc for the
purposes of a given enactment. Iwo examples will more than
suffice to show the futility of searching for a guide in
this sphere. Section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Law, 1956,
15of the Eastern Region defines an "immediate family" in 
these words:-
"•immediate family1 means the -
(a) wife or wives;
(b) husband;
(c) parent, which shall include father and mother, 
grandfather and grandmother, and stepfather and 
stepmother;
(d) child, which shall include son and daughter, 
grandson and grand-daughter, and stepson and 
stepdaughter, of a deceased person;
(e) brother and sister, which expression shall
15* No.16 of 1956, as amended by No.21 of i960.
include half-brother and half-sister; and
(f) nephew and niece of a deceased person
who were under the age of 16 at the time of 
the death of the deceased and who were 
being maintained by him*"
Prom this it will be seen that in addition th his wife (or 
wives) and children, a person’s "immediate family" includes 
his parents and grandparents, his brothers, sisters and 
grandchildren, as well as his nephews and nieces if these 
are his dependants#
The (Federal) Workmen’s Compensation Act, ^  on 
the other hand, defines ’’family*1 by implication in these 
words:-
S#3* ” ’member of the family* means -
(a) when used in relation to a native ^  any 
one of those persons mentioned fl>n one of the 
columns in the 1st Schedule according as the 
family is based on the paternal or the maternal 
system;
(b) when used in relation to any person not
being a native: wife, husband, mother, father,
grandfather, grandmother, stepfather, step­
mother, son, daughter, grandson, grand-daughter
16. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1958) Revision), Cap# 
222.
17* ’’Native** is defined by the Interpretation Act to be a 
Nigerian and to include a "native foreigner" which in 
turn means a member of an indigenous African tribe#
stepson, stepdaughter, brother, sister, half- 
brother, half-sisteri*
The 1st Schedule lists the following persons as members of 
the family in a "paternal system": "mother, father, wife,
son, daughter, brother, sister, fatherfs father, father’s 
brother"# For a "maternal system", it lists: "mother,
father, wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, mother’s 
mother, mother’s brother, mother’s sister, sister’s son, 
sister’s daughter, mother’s sister’s son, mother’s sister’s 
daughter#" The difficulty of formulating a satisfactory 
definition of "family" from these two statutory provisions 
will have become obvious by now.
Neither popular usage therefore nor statute 
books provide any clear indication of what the word "family" 
stands for in general terms. But it should not be imagined 
that this vagueness is in any way peculiar to Nigerian law 
or Nigerian society. A brief digression will show that the 
position is no better in the English legal system and po­
pular usage. Generations of eminent English judges have 
fought a losing battle in an attempt to find a clear and 
concise definition of that term down the centuries# Nor have 
academic lawyers and text-book writers had any better luck.
As Earl Jowitt has said, "In English law the word family
18is a popular and not a technical expression." In
18. dictionary of English Law (1959)* p.781+. This state­
ment is taken from Burt v. Hellyar (1872) L.R.lU Eq>l60.
2 0
popular usage, Bromley tells us, it has a good number of 
19meanings.  ^ Let us take a quick look at one or two
attempts at a judicial definition by English courts. In
R. v. Darlington. Kenyon, L.C.J. defined a manfs family as
”those persons who reside with him, of whom he is the pater
20familias or head11. This definition excludes children
who have married and set up homes of their own. In 1836
the Master of the Rolls, Lord Langdale, had this to say by
way of definition of a family, 11 Under different circumstances
it may mean a man’s household, consisting of himself, his
wife, children and servants; it may mean his wife and
21children, or his children excluding the wife." In Re 
Terry’s Will, Ramilly, Master of the Rolls, said that "the 
primary meaning of the word ’family’ is ’children’, and ... 
there must be some peculiar circumstance ... to prevent that 
construction being given to it. In ordinary parlance, the
22 mword ’family’ means children.” The same learned
judge said in another case, ”The cases on the meaning of the
word ’family’ are very numerous, and its meaning depends
on a variety of circumstances. Sometimes it means
19. Family Law (1962), p.l. See also Re Perowne [1951]
2 All E.ft.201, at p.202, [1951] Ch." 7&5, at p.788.
20. (1792) Nolan, 12ft, at p.128.
21. Blackwell v. Bull, 1 Keen, 176, at p.181.
22. (183ft; 19 Beav. 580, at p.581.
heir-at-law, at other times it means next of kin.” ^  
Finally, V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r  Hall, faced with the question 
whether or not an illegitimate child could take in a testa­
mentary gift to a family, had this to say in Humble v.
2UBowman -
tfThe ... question is whether the word “family" can 
be held to include the illegitimate; child ....
I look upon the dictum of James, £.J., in Lamb v.
25Eames ... as an authority that, under the descrip­
tion ’family1 in a power of appointment, a natural 
child may be included# Although the word ’family1 
may ordinanrily mean children and nothing else, it 
is, I think, not unreasonable that a natural child 
who has been treated and recognised as a child by the
26parent should be so included."
The word "family" is, therefore, no more precise and certain 
in the law of England than it is in the law of Nigeria,
statute or customary. But however difficult of precise
23« Elgood v. Cole (1869) 21 L.T.80, at p.81. Jessell, M.r# 
also said that the primary meaning of "family" is 
"children": See Pigg v. w.arke (1876) 3 Ch.D.672, at
p*67&« And in Price v. Gould"Tl950) 1^3 L.T.333, at 
p.33U), Wright J., said that though the primary meaning 
of "family" is "children", this is susceptible of a 
wider interpretation. He held that family included 
brothers and sisters in the case before him.
2b. (1877) k7 L.J. Ch. 62.
25. (1871) 40 L.J. Ch. UU?.
definition, the family is perfectly capable of a rational 
and systematic analysis as far as its functioning and the 
legal relationships of its members inter se and vis-a-vis 
others are concerned. To this task we shall now turn.
CHAPTER TV/O 
FUNCTIONING OF THE EXTENDED FAMILY*
1* The Family as a Corporate Body*
In traditional southern Nigerian society the 
extended family may he said to have a legal personality.^ 
This implies that it has a name by which it is known, that 
it has permanence, and that it can acquire rights and in­
terests and he subject to obligations and duties. The fa­
mily is usually named after its founder, and this name it 
continues to bear throughout its legal existence. It is 
a permanent institution in that, though its members live 
and die, though its heads come and go, and though its size 
in terms of population and geographical distribution may 
vary from generation to generation, yet the group itself 
lives on under its original name, Vfaether a family can 
in law outlive its last member is an open question, but 
it can (and not infrequently does) predecease its members.
This it does when it breaks up as a result of what we have
2described as fission, A family can acquire rights and 
interests in its corporate name. It can, for example, 
acquire rights in property. This it does in a number of
1. Cf. Lloyd, op.cit., pp.32 et.seq.
2. On the meaning and process of ^fission11, see Lloyd, 
ibid., p.35.
ways, including purchase, lease and gift. Strange though
it may sound, the family can he a beneficiary under a will,
and can succeed on intestacy* ^hese Jatter points will be
examined in greater detail at a later stage. Suffice it
to say here that in some societies (e.g. among the matri-
lineal and mixed-descent societies of the upper Cross River 
Obnbuna
basin and the ttbanr Hill district) the family itself succeeds 
to the greater part of the intestate estate of its deceased 
members, the distribution of such property being in the 
absolute discretion of the family head ; that in all so­
cieties the family succeeds to the property of one of its 
constituent branches where (as sometimes happens) the 
latter dies out; and that in certain circumstances it is 
the extended family that is intended as beneficiary ^ under 
a will which creates part of an individual^ estate as 
"family property". As a legal person the family could sue 
and be sued in its own name, the family head acting as its
alter ego in such a case. Finally, the doctrines of corporate
5
and vicarious liability apply to the family. The corporate
body is liable for the wrongful acts or omissions of its
alter ego; it is also liable for the wrongs of other
3. For a somewhat similar rule under Akan law (Ghana), see 
Allott, Essays in African Law (i960), p.23U.
On the creation of family property by will generally, 
see Coker, Family Property among the Yorubas, pp. 69 ff*
5. At all events in the traditional society.
6. I.e. the family head or the family council.
persons when the wrongful acts are authorized by it either 
expressly or hy implication Indeed, the family was
in the past responsible for the criminal acts of its members
as well as for their civil wrongs against strangers, at any 
rate where the wrong-doer himself either would not or could
Q
not pay the penalty.
Prom the legal responsibility of the family as 
a corporate entity (direct and vicarious^) must be dis­
tinguished the moral obligation, which the members of a fa­
mily often feel, to give aid and counsel to one of their 
number who is in difficulty of any kind. In the former
case, the injured party has an action in law to have the
wrong righted. In the latter (moral obligation) the member 
in difficulty has no legal action to compel help from the 
family as a body or from its members as individuals. Thus 
the family would be liable for a trespass committed on a 
third party’s land by the family head or the family council 
acting on its behalf. So, too, will it be for a trespass 
committed against a third party by one of its tenants (or 
Servants) acting upon its authority (express or implied).
But a member, for instance, who has lost his trading capital
7• An act is authorised by the family as a corporate body if
it is authorised by the family head or the family council
8. On group responsibility generally, see &lias, The Nature
Of African Customary Law (1956), pp.87-92 and 137* See 
also Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria. Vol. Ill, p.630 
on the Ibo.
9* Responsibility is direct when due to the act or omission 
of the family’s moving spirit or alter ego, as above 
explained; it is vicarious when due to the act/omission 
of any other person.
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by theft, or his house in a fire, has no legally enforceable 
right to call upon his family to help him raise fresh capital 
or build a new house, though in normal circumstances they 
will feel morally obliged to do so.
The legal significance of this distinction may 
be illustrated as follows: Suppose that the family head
or some wealthier member of the family, acting expressly 
on behalf of the family, (a) pays a reasonable compensation 
to the injured party in a trespass case, or (b) gives 
financial aid to the member in difficulty. Then in case (a) 
members can be compelled against their will to make a fair 
contribution towards reimbursing him; but in case (b) 
no one can be so compelled against his will. It must not 
be thought from this illustration that members are liable 
where the alleged obligation is to non-members, but are 
not liable where it is to fellow members of the family.
For the injured party in the trespass case may well be a 
fellow member, as where the family council wrongfully orders 
a member’s house to be burnt down, on the ground that he had 
refused on request to remove it from a site on the family 
land. In a case like this, the family as a legal entity 
is liable to the same extent as if the injured person 
were a stranger. But in practice the actual damages payable 
will be reduced by the amount of contribution which would 
be due from the plaintiff as a member had the action been
taken by a stranger.
2. ORGANS OF THE FAMILY
As a corporate body the extended family has two 
vital organs without which it cannot enter into legal re­
lations with the outside world, involve its members in 
legal obligations to others or to one another, or even con­
duct its own internal affairs, '^hese are a family head and 
a family council. The former was, in traditional society,
and to a large extent is still in modern society the oldest
1male member of the family. The latter is composed of the 
heads of the various branches of the extended family, hence 
the name "family elders" which is sometimes used for that 
body.
The family council is to the family what a Board
of Directors is to a company, while the family head may be
likened to a company’s Managing Director. It may be said
in general terms that there is a clear demarcation of
functions as between the head and the council, ^oughly
speaking, the family head represents the family in all
2its deailings with the outside world so that, in strict 
legal terms, no transaction with strangers carried out in 
the name of the family is valid unless done by him or by
1. See the next section below for a more detailed examination 
of the law relating to succession to this office.
2. I.E. in matters concerning the family as a body.
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a person duly authorised hy him. ^o his province also 
falls the day-te-day administration of the family’s pro­
perty (such as granting short leases and accepting sur­
renders of such leases), and the settlement of minor 
internal disputes. On the other hand, all major policy 
decisions (e.g. to sell or partition fanily property) are 
taken hy the council (of which he is a member and at whose 
meetings he generally presides).
How far a family head can hind the group hy his 
act where the transaction involves a major policy decision 
which would normally require consultation with and approval 
hy the council hut was in fact done at his sole initiative, 
will appear in the succeeding pages. Conversely, we shall 
see later the circumstances, if any, under which the council 
has a right to assume the role of the family head in in­
ternal or external relations, or else hestow upon another 
member the rights and powers which properly belong to the 
family head.
An examination of the law relating to these two 
organs of the family will reveal the many interesting 
rules that govern the internal working of the family, and 
to this task we shall now address ourselves.
A. The Family Head
The family head is, as already indicated, the 
legal successor of the founder of the extended family and
the living symbol of the groupfs solidarity* As will be 
expected in a territory the size and population of southern 
Nigeria with its dozens of languages and scores of dialects, 
this functionary is known by different names in different 
societies. The *bo of the Eastern Region, for example, call 
him the Qkpala, while the Western Ibo know him as Diokpa. 
Among the Yoruba he is variously known as Baie and Olori 
ebi* The Efik call him the Ete ufok, while the Kalahari
c
1 3aw call him the Polo Dabo. But by whatever name he is 
known, the legal rights and functions of the family head 
are substantially the same in all the societies covered 
by this treatise. ^
5• ^he names olori ebi (Yoruba), ete ufok (Efik) and
•polo dabo (Kalahari Ijaw) can all be translated literally 
as 0father of the family11. The Ibo name okpala and 
the Yoruba bale both mean ”the first-born son1 in the 
Biblical sense.
6. For further details on the social (not necessarily legal) 
rights and functions of the family head, see C.K. Meek, 
Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe (1937) pp.10ij.-lll; 
P.u'. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law H9&2), pp.251 et. seq.;
C.O. Omoneukanrin, Itsekigi Law and Custom (19^2), passim:
D. Forde and G-.I. Jones, The ^bo and ibibio-Speaking 
Peoples of bouth-Eastern Nigeria (l930)» pp.71-73 (ibi- 
bio); G-.^ .A. Coker, family Prope'rty among the Yorubas 
11938) pp.lii-6-135; S.H.'c.Obi, Ibo Law of Property 
(1963 )t PP* l8-2ij. and passim.
7* Even where the same person is both family head and 
political chief, his rights and powers in relation to 
his family are no greater than those of ordinary family 
heads. Cf. Lloyd, op.cit., pp.8U ff.
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The law relating to the office of family head 
may conveniently he discussed under the following heads:
(a) Succession to the office;
(h) Legal I functions; and
(c) Legal rights*
(a) Succession*
Before considering the rules governing the replace­
ment of deceased family heads, one important coveat must 
first he given , as this is a source of confusion among 
writers on the subject* The law relating to succession to 
the headship of an extended family differs considerably 
from that which governs the selection of a new head forr 
an elementary family at the death of its founder. In the 
latter case, the law is mainly concerned with providing a 
new father, husband and property owner* Not unnaturally, 
therefore, the law allows the founder considerable latitude 
in choosing who shall take care of his domestic establish­
ment and property* Hence his right to appoint (orally or 
by a written will) any of his children, brothers, sisters
Q
and (in exceptional cases) even strangers as the head of 
his own immediate family. It is for the same reason, too, 
that the Courts, if called upon to adjudicate on the choice
8. ^.g. a trusted slave, in the olden days. Note, however, 
that though a stranger by descent, a slave was some­
times absorbed into the family by an owner during his 
life.
of such a new head, are reluctant to appoint a person who
has no interest in the estate of the deceased. Thus in
Sogbesan v. Aflebiyi. Butler ^loyd, J. said,
"It would to my mind he altogether contrary to the
conceptions of native law and custom as well as
to good sense to appoint a person who himself is
given no interest in the family property to act
as head of the family, a position which involves
g
the management of that property."
This, .property consideration need not affect the choice of 
a head for the extended family, for the administration of 
property may only he an insignificant part of his functions 
in certain families. Indeed the duty of looking after 
family property may he assigned hy general consent to some 
other person or hody of persons as a special land authori­
ty; in some cases, there may he no property to administer 
at all. But whether or not there is property to manage? 
the head of an extended family has no power to appoint his 
successor.
(i) Who may Succeed.
In traditional society the oldest male member of 
an extended family automatically became its new head at
9. (19U1) 16 N.L.R.26, at p.27* See also Coker, op.cit.,
?p.ll+6 et seq. All the terms used in this passage head, family, family property) refer to the elementary 
family. But see Coker, op.cit., p.220 for apparently 
contrary views.
10. See Thomas, Anthropological Report 
on the Ibo-speaking peoples of 
Nigeria, Part I, p773; Forde (ed.), 
Efik traders of Old Calabaar, p.13; 
Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, pp. 37, 282.
the death of the incumbent of that office#1^ No family 
meetings were required; no wfces were taken; and there 
was no formal installation# Except in the matrilineal and 
mixed-descent societies of Yako and Afikpo areas respectively 
women had no right to be family heads#
In modern times, however, the succession rule 
has been altered by most societies in favour of admitting 
women to this office# In practically all societies, too, 
automatic succession by the oldest man has given place to 
selection, by the family, of the person best suited personal­
ly for the post#"**1 It is perhaps only among the patri­
lineal, areas of Iboland that women are still barred from
12family headship. The position today is then that, parts 
of Iboland apart, the rightful successor to a family head­
ship is the oldest member thereof (male or female), but 
that the family is nevertheless entitled to select any of 
its number if of the opinion that the oldest member is not 
fit for the post, or that there is another member whose 
personal qualities make him pre-eminently suitable for the 
office. 15
11. See Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration in Nigeria 
and the Cameroons (1957). p.129: Meek# Law and Authority 
in a Nigerian ’-i-ribe (1937)» pp.IOU-IIU;" ^orde# Efjk 
Traders (ante)# p#lU; Omoneukanrin, op.cit#, p.31;
Lewis v# Bankole (1908) 1 N.L.R.82; Inyang v# Ita (1929)
9 N.L.R.SU#
1 2. Even among patrilineal Ibo societies, it not infrequently 
happens today that wealthy influential women establish 
themselves as de facto (though not de .jure) family heads.
1 3. Ibo law has a different set of rules for succession to
the headship of an extended family in its other connota­
tion of a socio-political group. Jn this case, the gene­
ral^ principle is that succession is by the oldest male 
member of the most senior branch of the family^in ques­
tion • Note that these two groups are not identical 
except in name. See further, Obi.op.cit#♦ pp.lol^-2#
The legal right of women to succeed automatically 
as oldest members or he selected for personal qualities 
is necessarily qualified hy practical considerations. The 
first is that as marriage is everywhere virilocal, a woman 
will almost certainly he living away from the vast majority^ 
of the family hy the time she becomes the oldest living 
member. Since family meetings (including the rather fre­
quent meetings of the family council) are normally held in 
the house of the family head, it follows that a married 
woman would not make a suitable head: a family will not he
happy to hold its meetings in "foreign" lands (i.e. their 
married sister’s matrimonial home), nor could the affairs 
of the family he satisfactorily conducted hy an absentee 
head.
The selection of a new head is done hy a meeting 
of family elders. In strict legal theory, a selection is 
valid and binding on the family as a whole if made hy a 
majority of the elders. But in practice discussions and 
consultations go on continually until a new head acceptable 
to all branches is found, failure to choose a person who 
has the willing support of member branches is a first step 
towards disintegration. For the aura of sacrosanctity that, 
in the past surrounded the family head ( and other tradi­
tional functionaries as well) and the fear of retribution
lft. Viz. the male members plus their households.
from departed ancestors, should he he disobeyed or slighted, 
are rapidly dispersing (if not completely gone) in most 
societies today.
The process of evolution from primogeniture
to selection hy family members and the need for unanimity
in auch selections are graphically illustrated hy Berkeley,
16J. in Inyang v. It a and others * in these words -
"Before the Government came to Calabar, and
established law and order, it is certain that
It)the headship of a house M belonged as of right 
to the senior male member of that house. But he 
took it at his peril. If he failed to find support 
within the family only two courses were open to him. 
Either he went into exile or else he stayed and 
was put to death. In either case the succession to 
the vacancy devolved on the next senior male, if he 
chose to take it up. Human nature is much the same 
all over the world, and it is absolutely certain 
that there must have been occasions on which the 
next senior male, knowing that he had no chance of 
winning the support of the family, had sufficient 
intelligence to stand aside rather than risk such 
perilous promotion. Thus we see, even under a
15. 9. N.L.R.82+, at p.85.
16. This is the popular word for an extended family among 
the Efik.
system of strict primogeniture, the will of the family 
functioning as an important factor in placing a man 
in the headship, and in maintaining him there or re­
jecting him therefrom."
(ii) Disputed Headship arid the Courts.
Most cases of disputed family headship are set­
tled either by a meeting of family elders or else by a 
general meeting of as many members as can attend. Should 
settlement out of court be impossible, however, a difficult 
point of law could arise, for it may well be that no court 
of law in the land has jurisdiction over such cases. Before 
Regionalization, there were the Appointment ana Deposit! on 
of Chiefs Act,^ the CfcjeJ^ ftaincy disputes (Preclusion from 
Courts) Act, and the proviso to s.12 of the GUpreme Court 
Act (No.23 of 19U3) which between them had the effect of 
taking all chieftaincy disputes out of the jurisdiction of 
the courts. Gj.nce Regionalization, there have been Regional 
enactments to the same effect.^ If, therefore, family 
headships are regarded as falling within the general rubric 
of "Chieftaincies",^ then all disputes concerning succession 
to them would be outside the jurisdiction of the courts, and
1. Laws of Nigeria, 19U8 Revision, Cap.12.
2. No.30 of 19W.
3. See the Chiefs Law (w. Region), s.2U (1959 Revision, Cap. 
19); Recognition of Griefs Law, i960 (E.Region, No.9 of 
i960), ss.6, 7 and 8.
!+• Family heads are popularly known as "Chiefs" among the
Efik, the Yoruba, the Kalahari and the Okrika. Among 
the Ibo, too, the more influential ones are sometimes 
called chiefs.
r» r> 
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will have to be settled in accordance with the rules laid 
down in the relevant statutes.
Who then is a 11 chief”; in particular, does that 
term include a family head, as above defined, in law as 
distinct from popular usage? Section 2 of the Chiefs Law 
(Western Region) defines "chief" as ,fa person whose chieftain­
cy title is associated with a native community and includes 
a minor chief and a recognised chief." But "native commu­
nity" is not defined, and so it is impossible to say whether 
or not an extended family bears that meaning. The Recogni­
tion of Chiefs Law of the Eastern Region is even less 
helpful here, as it does not define the term "chief" at all. 
The Interpretation Act of the Federal parliament defines
"chief" as "any native whose authority and control is re-
£
cognised by a native community"• It is arguable that a 
family (in the sense under discussion) is not a "community" 
since its members do not all live within a separate and 
distinct territory. If this contention is valid, then 
a family head is not a chief within the meaning of the
Chieftancy legislations. On the other hand, it can be
argued that a substantial part of a family (viz. its male 
members and their households) do occupy a distinct terri­
tory as a rule, and so do constitute a community, whose 
head would therefore come within the meaning of "chief"
6 . Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (Cap.89 of the 1958
Revision), s.3*
unless where otherwise indicated.
If then a family head is a chief as above defined, 
cases involving succession to that office ^ cannot he en­
tertained hy any court of law, hut must he settled in ac-
Q
cordance with the provisions of the Laws in question.
If, on the other hand, a family headship is not a chieftain­
cy in law, the next question is this. Should it he classified 
as (a) a hare title or honour, (h) a title coupled with 
property rights, or (c) a family status? If it is no more 
than a hare title or honour, the courts (at all events the 
High Court) will not entertain an action concerned solely
with succession to it. This was the decision of the Full
9
Court in Adasii v. Hunvoo. In the course of his judgment 
Griffith, J. said -
"If the claim is to a hare dignity ar honour without 
material benefit incident thereto, I am strongly of 
opinion that this court would he well advised to exercise 
its discretion and decline to entertain plaintiff’s 
application." 10 
Speed, Acting C.J., was even more emphatic. He said -
"Now what is the chieftaincy? I say without hesitation
7. As opposed to cases involving dispute as to any property 
which goes with the office, e.g. regalia. See on this
s.6 (37 (E.R.), and Proviso to s.24 (b) (W.R.).
8. Cf. Coker’s masterly discussion: op.cit., p.147*
9. (1908) 1 N.l.R.75* Great caution is required in reading 
this and similar cases between members of the Ijaw group 
of societies; for there the head of an extended family 
is almost invariably called a ^hief.
10. 1 N.L.R.75, at p.78.
that it is a mere gignity, a position of honour, 
of primacy among a particular section of the native 
community and that as such the court has no juris­
diction to decide upon it#” ^
The writ in the Adan.ji case read simply -
!,The Plaintiff1 s claim is to establish his title to 
the Chieftaincy of Fiyento in Badagry".
Now, s. 11 of the Supreme Court Act which set up the
superior courts (and which is substantially reproduced in
12the current Regional High Court Laws ) gave the Supreme
Court (the equivalent of the Regional High Courts of today)
the same powers as were vested in the High Court of Justice
in England by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875• And so
the Acting Chief Justice explained why the Court must decline
jurisdiction thus -
MI do not think that it can be reasonably contended
that the High Court of Justice in England could enter-
13tain such a claim as is made in this action11 (viz. 
to establish title to a position of honour or dignity 
without more).
If, still assuming that family headship is not a 
chieftaincy within the meaning of the Chiefs Laws, if
11. 1 N.L.R.75, at p.79*
12. See the High ^ourt Law (w.R.), loc. cit.. s.8; the 
High ^ourt Law (E.R.), loc.cit.. s.loTl); and the 
High ^ourt of Lagos Law (Laws^ of the Federation,
1958 Revision, Cap.80), s.10.
13« 1 N.L.R.75* at p.79* Por other cases on "bare titles’* 
see Qkupe v. Soyebo (1937) 3 ^.A.C.A.151* and Cnpnye v. 
Obanye (l9U5)> 11 W.A.C.A.60.
family headship is a title coupled with land and/or other 
rights, the courts will still not have any jurisdiction to 
entertain an action founded on a mere succession claim.
The High Court can enquire into the legality of a person’s 
claim to family headship or the validity of his selection 
therefor if, but only if, that enquiry is merely incidental 
to a dispute over property or other rights attached to the 
office.^ Thus in Qnonye v. Obanye ^  the Plaintiff’s 
claim was for (a) a declaration that he was the head of 
his family; (b) a declaration that 1 as such head (Okpala) 
he is entitled to all the rights attached to that office 
according to native law and custom and is proper represen­
tative according to native law and custom of the family”; 
and (c) an injunction restraining the Defendants from
"further interference with the Plaintiff’s rites in Okpaja-
16ship”. The High Court dismissed the claim on a preli­
minary objection that it had no jurisdiction. On appeal
to the West African C0urt of Appeal counsel urged, inter
17alia, that this was not a bare^title. ”He asks us”, 
said Baker, Ag. 0f Nigeria delivering the W.a .C.A
judgment, ”to say that the word ’rights’ in the claim
111. As was the case in the Privy Council case of Laoye v.
Oyetunde (19U2) 10 W.A.C.A.k. Note, however, that the
title in that case appears to be a political one.
15. (1945) 11 W.A.C.A.60.
16. To which the case had been transferred from the Native 
Court.
17* The head, he said, signed leases in respect of family 
land, for example.
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included frites1 and that a claim of property is attached."
Nevertheless, the ^ourt held that they were "satisfied that
the only issue was a "bare title" and that "no consequential
19relief" was claimed# 7 The explanation for this view seems
to he that even if property and administrative rights
were attached to the office, there was in fact no dispute
over any specific property, neither was it shown that the
Plaintiff was actually prevented from exercising any of
20his customary rights hy the Defendants#
If*finally, family headship is construed as a 
family status, the position would he different. In that 
case the ^ustomary Courts (provided there was one in the 
area concerned) would have original jurisdiction, while the 
Magistrates and High Courts would have appellate jurisdic­
tion. ^his is because s.13 of the High Court Law and s.17 
of the Magistrates Courts Law (hoth of the ^astern Region) 
as well as the Proviso to s#9 of the High C0urt Law of the 
Western Region expressly har these respective Courts from
18. 11 W.A.C.A.60, at p.61.
19. 11 W.A.c .a .60, at p.63.
20. Plaintiff in this case should have acted on the hroad 
hint dropped hy Speed, Ag. C.J. in the Adanji case
(1 N.L.R 75f at p.79) - "It may he that the chieftaincy 
carries with it hy native law and custom some or many 
rights and privileges which might he made the subject 
of an action at law. It may he that upon a claim 
differently stated the court might have been forced to 
decide incidentally the question whether or no the 
plaintiff had been duly elected Chief Piyento according 
to native law and custom."
exercising original jurisdiction in matters affecting
r* 21"family status" where a Customary Court has jurisdiction.
,(b) Legal Functions of the Family Head.
The functions of a family head were both delicate 
and onerous in traditional society.^- He had a duty to re­
present the family or any of its members in disputes in­
volving strangers. Indeed he could sue or be sued in his 
own name in such cases. He exercised quasi-judicial powers 
in respect of disputes involving members of the family, 
including those between husband and wife. He gave the final 
approval to all marriages into or out of the group, and took 
part in the more important parts of the negotiations. As 
a rule too, he was responsible for the equitable adjustment 
of land rights as between members in addition to at least 
supervising the day-to-day administration of the family 
land generally.
21. Non-customary courts can exercise original jurisdiction 
in such matters if (a) there is no Customary Court in 
the area or (b) the case is transferred to them from 
a Customary Court. 
tl For a general survey, see Elias, Groundwork of Nigerian 
Law, esp. pp.325-326. On the Yoruba, see ^jisafe, Laws 
and Customs of the Yoruba People, pp.61-62; Lloyd,
Yoruba Land Law, esp. pp. 18. ho# 83-4 and 251; Coker, 
Family property among the Yorubas, pp.134-5» 146-155*
On the J^ fik and Ibibio, see For de and Jones, The Ibo and 
Ibibio-Speaking Peoples of ^outh-Eastern Nigeria, pp.
72-3. On the Vako, see Forde, "Government in Umor"
(1939) 12 Africa 129-161, esp. p.131; Talbot, The Peoples 
of Southern Nigeria, pp.677-8. On the Urhobo see Hubbard, 
The Sobo of the Niger Delta, p.39* On the Ibo, see Meek, 
Law and Authority ..., pp.6l-2, 104-114; Basden, Niger 
Ibos, pp.121 and 151; Thomas, Anthropological Report.... 
Part I, p.73; Obi, Ibo Law of Property, pp. 18-24, and 
authorities cited there. See also halogun v. Balogun 
(1935) 2 W.A.C.A.290, esp. 294-305.
In the modern society, the family head still 
enjoys much social prestige. But his legal functions have 
largely disappeared. As far as arbitral/arbitration pro­
ceedings are concerned, it is no-ilonger one of his functions 
to represent members of the family in matters which affect them 
in their private capacities. This means that while he aay 
still volunteer or be persuaded to represent a member in a 
private dispute which is being settled by arbitral proceedings 
on the traditional lines, the family head is no .longer in 
duty bound to do so by reason only that he is such a head.
Any adult member of the family can now appear in his own 
case; infants are represented by their immediate parents 
or guardians as the case may be.
As regards judicial proceedings in the regular 
courts, it can be said with a large measure of confidence 
that a family head no longer has the right which attached 
to his predecessors in office to represent anyone outside 
his own immediate family, even in the Customary Courts. The 
Customary Courts Law of the Western Region specifies the 
persons who, with the permission of a Customary Court, may 
appear before it on behalf of a party. These are "the 
husband, wife, guardian, servant, master or inmate of the 
household of any party, who shall give satisfactory proof
2. S.28 (U): Laws of the Western Region, 1959 Revision,
Cap.31•
that he or she has authority in that behalf.”^ Nothing is 
said of the family head as such (though he may appear as a 
party’s master, husband or guardian if he happens to be one) 
And so, in view of the time honoured rule of construction - 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius - it would seem to 
follow that neither a family head nor anyone else not 
expressly mentioned here could represent any party in these 
courts•
As for representation in the Regional High Courts, 
it would be contempt of court for anyone who is not autho­
rised in that behalf to institute or defend lfany proceeding 
in the High c0urt in the name or on behalf of another per­
son ... knowing himself not to be so authorised11 ^he 
basis of representation in these courts is, therefore, autho 
rization. Now it is arguable that authorization may be 
express or implied, and that a family head may be said to 
be authorised by implication by virtue of his general po­
sition as traditional spokesman for his people. While 
admitting that there is some force in this argument, one 
must point out two weaknesses in it. First it would take 
a liberal judge to construe the word ltauthorised" to include 
11 authorised impliedly by customary law1 which is really what 
the contention boils down to. Secondly, it is not unreason­
able to suppos^ that the legislature inserted this provision
3. Cf. s.32(1) of the Customary Courts Law, No.21 of 1956, 
of the Lastern Region which is identical in substance. 
k. High uourt of Lagos Law, s.82. Cf. Customary Courts Laws, 
ss. 32(1) and 28(l*)(a) of the Eastern and Western Regions 
respectively.
deliberately to prevent representation by traditional 
heads or any other functionaries, as that power is. .obviously 
open to abuse.
The traditional judicial (or quasi-judicial) fun­
ction of the family head has also suffered a virtually 
total eclipse. As already pointed out, he used to settle 
disputes; and he often enforced his decisions by a number 
of means, viz., moral pressure, threats of divine visita­
tion or, in extreme cases, economic and/or social ostracism 
(assuming of course that he had the moral support of the 
bulk of the family on the matter). He can no longer 
compd appearance before him; neither can he now enforce 
his decision by his own direct act. This is because there 
;are statutory provisions to the effect that no person or 
body of persons may hold judicial proceedings except as a 
duly constituted court of law, though any one may act as
5
an arbitrator between willing parties in civil disputes.
Two interesting points arise from these statutory 
provisions. The first i3 that the decision of a family 
head regarding intra-family disputes will not now have to 
depend on family backing for its efficacy. If we regard 
him as an ordinary arbitrator, then his award can be en­
forced by legal action in the appropriate court by the
5. See s.56(l), (2) of the Customary Courts Law (W.R.), 
and s.10Cl), (2), Customary Courts Law (E.R.).
6 Tsuccessful party* he second point, which applies to the 
Western Region hut not to the Eastern Eggion, is that 
Customary Court Members are not allowed to act as arbitra­
tors there. And so if a family head also happens to be a 
court member, he is barred from arbitration in intra-family 
(as he is barred from all other) disputes* Section 62, 
sub-section (2) is in these words -
1 Any person, other than a member of a customary 
court, adjudicating as an arbitrator upon any 
civil matter in dispute where the parties thereto 
have agreed to submit the dispute to his decision 
shall not be regarded as exercising judicial 
powers for the purposes of paragraph (a) of sub­
section (l) of this section." ^
The function of the family head as manager or 
caretaken of family property remains intact in modern 
society. Where such property consists in part or in whole 
of house rooms, he has almost unfettered discretion in 
the allocation of these rooms to members according to need.
6. Ror a more detailed and scholarly discussion of this 
problem of arbitration in relation to traditional 
authorities, see Allott, Assays in African Law (I960), 
pp*123-lUl* See also Matson, "The Supreme C0urt and 
the Customary judicial process in the Gold Coast"
(1953) I.C.L.Q.U7.
7* Customary courts Law, loc*cit*, s.62 (2). Contrast s.10
(2) of the Customary Law: "Nothing in this section
contained shall be deemed to prohibit any person from 
adjudicating as an arbitrator upon any civil matter in 
dispute where the parties thereto have agreed to submit 
the dispute to his decision".
He also has the final word in the yearly allocation of 
farm land to members. It is he who grants leases and 
other (short) tenancies to non-members, and who is res­
ponsible for the collection of rents or other dues there­
for. As an ancillary to this function (of manager or 
caretaker) he has a right to bring action for and on behalf 
of himself and his family whenever this bbcomes necessary 
in connexion with the family property. Bven where, as 
sometimes happens, the family as a body appoints another 
person as caretaker, court actions are still taken by the 
head.8
(c) Legal Rights of the Family Head.
Many rights and privileges were attached to the 
office of a family head in the traditional society, but 
many of these are now lost. He had a right to summon 
meetings of the family Council as well as general family 
meetings, and to compel attendance thereto.^ If any other 
member wanted a meeting held, he had to ask the head to
8. Cf. Coker, op.cit., pp.95-6. Action may be against
strangers or fellow members, e.g. to recover possession 
from a member for attempted alienation.
1. Cf. T h o m a s ,  Anthropological Report Part I, ante, p. 73*
On his rights generally, see Porde and Jones, op.cit., 
p.72 (the Ibibio including the^hnang); Lloyd, op.cit., 
pp.81+* 251 Meek, Law and Authority, ante, pp.lOU-lll
Basden, Niger Ibos, p. 121; Coker, op. cit. , pp.li+lj- ff,
151 ff.
summon one. It was the right and privilege of the head to 
preside at all family (and Family Council) meetings and to 
announce their decisions. He was entitled to periodic 
tributes and gifts in kind from other members. He had to 
be consulted before a stranger was brought in to occupy 
any part of the family land or otherwise make use of it.
On final apportionment or alienation of the family property, 
his consent was an absolute essential to validity. It was 
a serious wrong to insult or slight him, and where the 
miscreant was a fellow member, the head could impose a fine 
on him. Finally, he had to approve any proposed marriagg 
into or out of the family.
Many of these rights have disappeared. The fami­
ly head can no longer lawfully demand tributes or any 
other gifts from the other members; he can no longer 
impose a fine on a member who insults him (though he probab­
ly has a civil action in the Customary ^ourts against anyone 
who insults him); he still summons family meetings, but 
has no means known to the law of enforcing attendance.
It may be said that it is in connexion with the 
family land that the legal rights of the family head are 
still of great importance. In those societies (such as 
among the Yoruba) where there is a family house, the head 
has a right to reside in the best rooms therein if he can 
go into possession without undue hardship to a member or
members in occupation. Among the Ibo where family hoaaes 
are not common, the head as a rule has exclusive possessory 
(beneficial) interests in part of the family farm land, but 
only if he also happens to be the head of the socio-political 
group of the same name. In that case, he is entitled to 
that portion of the family holding known as ani isi (lit. 
"head land").
But the above constitute the limit of his exclusive
beneficial, interests in the family house or farm land as
the case may be. His other rights are, as noted in connexion
with his functions, hinged on his position as caretaker for
the family property. We shall deal with this subject in
greater detail in the next Chapter. Here it must suffice
to indicate in a few words the more salient^ (positive as
well as negative aspects) of his position. He is the
proper person to initiate proceedings against anyone in
unlawful possession of the family property or any part
2
thereof, be he a fellow member or a stranger. He lias also 
a right to sue for trespass or other wrong committed afeginst 
the property; to sue for the recovery of rents due; to 
negotiate and grant leases and accept surrenders thereof.
2. Umana v. Ewa (1923) 5 N.L.R. 2i+; Inasa v. Qshodi (1930)
10 N.L.R.U; Taiwo v. Sarumi (1913) 2 ^.L.R.103;
Bassey v. Oobham (192U) 3 N.L.&.90; Manuel v. Manuel 
(1926; 7 N.L.R. 101. Cf. Koran v. ^okyi (l9&l)
7 W.A.C.A.78. Also Buraftmo v. Gbamgboye. 15 N.L.R.139.
But he has nonright to dispossess a member without just
cause - dispossession being justified if brought about by
serious misconduct on the part of tbs person in possession
3
or by greater family needs. He has a right to be consulted
before any valid alienation of the family property can be
made: indeed he must not only be consulted but must give
his .consent to the transaction. He has no right to sell
family property without the consent of all family branches;
but he has a right to recoup himself of expenses necessarily
incurred for and on behalf of the family as a whole, and
Uthis by selling part of its property where necessary.
Finally, while he is not accountable for the rents and
profits of family property at the suit of junior members,
5
he is probably so liable at the suit of the Elders.
B. FAMILY COUNCILS
In the traditional society Family Council 
was an important, plenipotentia^ organ which may be described 
as a miniature local government council, improvecmnt society,
3* Manuel v. Manuel. 7 N.L.R.101.
4# A good example is when he has had to perform the funeral 
expenses of an impecunious dffieased member; another is 
when he has had to recover or preserve family property 
by legal action. &11 this is predicated on the assumption 
that the members were told of the intended transaction but 
either could not orr.would not help with the necessary 
expenses•
5« Cf. coker, op.cit., p.152, note 50.
court of law and privy council rolled in one. For it 
made rules and regulations for the guidance of its members 
in their dealings among themselves and with strangers; it 
jsried cases of misconduct (legal or moral) including involving 
members; it took steps to alleviate cases of hardship or 
misfortune befalling members; and it advised the family 
head in his more important dealings with the outside 
world. Many of these functions have passed away, but 
enough still survive to justify a brief examination of this 
aspect of social life.
(a) Composition and Meetings.
A family Council consists of the heads of the 
various branches that compose an extended family, with the 
eldest member - the family head - as its president. Et 
used to be an all-male body, but since v/omen can now be fa­
mily branch heads, it may be a mixed assembly of both sexes. 
Its president may even be a woman. By definition, every 
constituent branch is entitled to representation at meetings 
of this Council, but decisions taken therein are not neces­
sarily void because one or more such branches are not in 
fact represented at a given meeting; since a branch head 
sometimes asks to be excused from attending, while expressing 
his willingness to be bound by any decisions made. Again, 
though only branch heads are legally entitled to be present, 
yet a Council meeting is not unlawfully constituted by
reason only that some junior members were present during 
its deliberations* Junior members may lawfully attend such 
meetings on three grounds: first because they were especial­
ly invited to attend (e*g* to give the Council the benefit 
of their special knowledge), or, secondly, because they 
were delegated to represent absent branch heads, or thirdly 
because they asked to be, and were, allowed to attend* A 
Council meeting will not be vitiated by the absence of a 
branch head if he had been given reasonable notice thereof 
but nevertheless failed to attend or to send a representative 
A fortiori, the validity of a meeting is not affected where 
a branch head had been given reasonable notice but refused 
to attend or send representation*
The above special circumstances apart, a family 
Council meeting is only fully efficatious if attended by 
all the branch heads. It is popularly said that a branch 
is not bound by a Council decision (or resolution) taken 
at a meeting of which its head had not been given reasonable 
advance notice and at which, as a result, it had not been
■7
represented* This may be construed as meaning that such 
a resolution is merely voidable at the instance of the 
branch that was not represented* But it is submitted that
6. What is reasonable in any given case is a question of fact
7* A representative can only be lawfully appointed by or with 
the approval of the branch head himself* Were this not so 
other -^ lders could easily by-pass a difficult-to-convince 
branch head*
it can only mean that the resolution/decision is void ah 
initio* The reason why it is void is not that it was not 
a unanimous decision, for unanimity is not essential; it 
is because the meeting itself was improperly constituted.
A possible objection to this submission is that, it has been 
held in a number of cases that a sale of family property 
without the consent of some members whose consent is neces-
o
sary is not void but voidable. Indeed, it has been re­
peatedly held that other things being equal, the consent
of a majority of the members is all that is required for a
9
valid sale of such property* But these arguments are ir­
relevant* In the first place, decisions to sell family 
property are not taken by the Family Council but by a ge­
neral family meeting. Secondly, even if such decisions are 
taken by the Council, there is a fundamental difference be­
tween a majority decision by a lawfully constituted meeting 
(which is valid) and a decision (whether unanimous or not) 
by a meeting which is improperly constituted and which, 
ex facto* cannot take any valid decisions.
Family Council decisions are made on the basis of 
majority votes (or acclamation). The various family branches 
are each entitled to one vote, and this even if more than 
one member of a given branch happens to be present at a
8* See e.g. Aganran v* Plushi (1907) 1 N.L.R.67; Mankg v* 
Bonso, 3i-W.A.C.A.62.
9* See Adewunyln v* Ishola (1958) W.R.N.L.R.110, per 
Ademola C.J.
given meeting.^ The family head is only entitled to one 
vote, and that in his capacity as a branch head: he has no
casting vote as president of the Council. A majority de­
cision made by a properly constituted meeting is binding 
on the family as a whole.
(b) Functions
As already indicated, a family Council used to be 
an important body with traditional powers to make rules for 
the guidance of all members in matters spiritual and temporal. 
They levied contributions on members for such things as 
funeral expenses; marriage expenses for their young men 
who had to be provided with wives either to prevent their 
particular descent line from dying out or else to try and 
infuse some sense of responsibility into them and so stop 
them wasting their life and youth; and aid for deserving 
cases such as victims of trade depression, bad harvest, 
fire or theft. They settled disputes between members, in­
cluding those between husband and wife, bringing all their 
collective pressure to bear on the errant ones.
10. Cf. Lev/is v. Bankole, 1 N.L.R.82 at p.104. See also 
Coker, op.cit.. pp.l33-4«
11. The only course open to dissatisfied members is to 
censure their branch head for casting his vote in favour 
of such a measure without due consultations behind the 
scenes. In the past, a branch whose head opposed a 
given measure of great importance and who felt very 
strongly about the matter would, in extreme cases, secede 
from the parent body. Today such a branch might try 
getting the decision reversed in court on the ground, 
for instance, that it was not in the best interest of 
the family as a whole.
In contemporary society, some of these functions
are still performed hy the Family Council. It still settles
disputes "between its members. But this it does, not as of
right "but at the request or at least with the consent of the
12parties concerned, and on the basis of arbitration.
It still advises the family head on matters concerning the 
family before he takes important steps in both his internal 
and external relations. But though he is usually guided bjr 
their wishes and advice, he is not bound to follow them 
(except, of course, where their consent is necessary under 
customary law ^). It can still raise loans - on the se­
curity of the family property - for the education or advance­
ment of deserving members. And finally, the Council still 
takes an active part in the management and control of the 
family property, inspecting it for necessary repairs, drainage 
and erosion control. For this they have a right of entry 
at all reasonable times
3. Disintegration and Loss of Famjiy Membership.
(a) Loss of Membership by Individuals
In the olden days a person lost his family member­
ship by renouncing all his rights and interests in the fa­
mily property, declaring his intention never again to accept
12. See the discussion on the arbitration powers of the family
head on pp. ante.
13* Perhaps the only occasion when this consent is ever
necessary is in relation to the alienation of family 
property. But here the consent of all "important" members 
not just Famiiy Fi^ers> is required: Esan v. Faro (19^ 4-7)
12 W.a .C#a .135.
li+. Cf. Coker, op.cit.♦ pp.l31-U> on the Yoruba.
or recognise the authority of the family head, abandoning 
his home (at all events where he lived on the family land), 
and permanently attaching himself to another family (usual­
ly that of his maternal uncle). This course was naturally 
only adopted as a last resort, following a protracted pe­
riod of acute discontent due to intolerable oppression 
in the hands of the family head or other members of the 
family.1
Conversely, the family itself could, in the past, 
terminate a person*s membership thereof for one of several 
reasons: because he was an incorrigible rogjie, a wilful
murderer, a coward in war, a traitor to his people, or a 
person given to incestuous relations. A decision of this 
magnitude was always taken either by the Family Council 
after the fullest possible consultations behind the scene, 
or by a general meeting of as many members of the family 
as could be assembled for tbe purpose.
In modern society, it is still open to a member 
to sever all connexion with his family if he so desires, 
and to attach himself to another family or else move into 
one of the big urban areas where the traditional family 
either does not exist or is fast breaking down. Presumably
1. There were, however, a few cases (especially among the 
Ibo) where married women found they had to sever kinship 
ties with their maiden familiesnas the only way to keep 
alive or to bear children and keep them alive: so quoth 
the diviner!
2. A determination ofnmembership was usually followed in ap­
propriate cases by an act of physical expulsion from the 
territory occupied by the bulk of the family.
a male member ( and a fortiori, a married female member) 
can now sever bis family ties without having to abandon 
his home. This he can certainly do if his home is in an 
individually owned house standing on an individually 
acquired piece of land. (Whether he is an owner-occupier 
or a mere tenant in a third party’s house makes no dif­
ference for our present purposes.) In that case, all he 
need do is to renounce his membership of the family as 
well as his interests in its property. But a strong evidence 
of such renunciation is necessary if it is to be accepted 
as permanent and irrevocable. It is important to emphasise 
this point since many a man has in recent years attempted 
to evade payment of family assessments by declaring himself
for ever cut off from his family while not having the slightei
intention of effecting any permanent break in fact.
Where a member residing in a family house re- j
nounces his membership of that family, it can safely be !
J
said that he ipso facto loses his right of possession in j
respect of his home. While a member, his right of occu-
3pancy only exists during good behaviour. A fortiori, if 
he ceases to be a member, he ceases to have a locus standi 
in the family house - as of right. A much more difficult 
legal point would arise where a person renounces his family 
membership while continuing to reside on the family land
3. For what constitutes r,bad behaviour” generally, see 
Report of the West African Band Committee 19^8, p.2i+3; 
Arigbe v. Adeoye. 5 -^.L.R.33: &tim v« Eke» 16 N.L.R.q-3;
Inasa v. Qshodi. 15 N.L.R.90.
but in a hotsse which he had himself built or purchased#
It is a notorious fact that a member who lawfully builds^ " 
a house on family land entirely with his own material and 
with his own or hired labour, is the exclusive owner thereof# 
It is, on the other hand, equally well known that in a case 
like this, all that the member owns is just the building as
g
a chattel# It would seem to follow from these two princi­
ples that the family as landowner has a right in these cir­
cumstances to demand that the ex-member shall remove his 
house from the family land# Alternatively, he may be asked 
to pay an agreed ground rent as the price of his continued 
occupation of the site in question.^
Whether a family has a right to expel any of its 
members in modern society is an entirely different question. 
It would certainly be unlawful physically to drive a member 
away from his home even if this happens to be part of the 
family house. ..To begin with, it would constitute the of­
fence of ^Unlawful assembly" if three or more members of the 
family got together with the object of physically removing 
a man from his home, there being no doubt that this is con­
duct likely to lead to a breach (or fear of a breach) of
k• I.e., with the permission of the family in the first place
5. Cf. N.T. Brooke, "Legal aspects of Land Tenure in Nigeria"
(19U6) 5 African Studies, 211-220, at p.215; Lloyd, 
op.cit#» p.8l.
6. Cf. Omolowun v. Qlokude (1958) W.R.n .L.R.130.
7* Two other possibilities are (a) that the Family will agree
to purchase the house ibt its own use, and (b) that, 
failing any satisfactory arrangement, the house is just 
left to decay.
the peace, And it would constitute the offence of "riot*1 
as soon as the assembled party makes any move to execute
g
their purpose. In any case, and whatever the number of
people involved in the operation, it would be the offence
of "forcible entry"^ for members of the family to enter "on
land which is in actual and peaceable possession of another"
in order to drive him out of it. Being in lawful possession
is not given as a necessary element of this offence; neither
is it material that the family has a right of entry in
normal circumstances ,’L0
It can safely be concluded, therefore, that the
family no longer possesses the right to expel any of its
11members by physical force. It is also submitted that it 
can no longer expel a member in the sense of disowning him 
and denying him the right to participate in its social life.
In our view, this is an important aspect of a person’s 
civil rights. If this be so, it would be a violation of 
one of the fundamental human rights guaranteed by s.21 of 
the i960 Federal .Constitution, for the family to interfere 
with that right in any way other than by the normal process 
of legal action. According to s.2l(l),
"In the determination of his civil rights and
8. For unlawful assembly and riot, see ss.6 9 and 70 of the 
Nigerian Criminal Code (Cap,^2 of the Laws of the Federa­
tion of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958 Revision).
9* S.81 of the Criminal fcode, loc. cit.
10. Ss.282, 292 and 293 give a person in peaceable possession
wide powers of defence against unauthorised persons 
entering the land.
11. It is instructive to note that by virtue of 3.26(1) of the 
Constitution, the Federal Government cannot expel a Ni­
gerian citizen from the country. Can a family do so fromu 
its territory?
obligations a person shall he entitled to a 
fair hearing within a reasonable time by a 
court or other tribunal established by law 
and constituted in sucja manner as to secure 
its independence and impartiality#1*
A decision of the Family Council (or indeed 
a family general meeting) will, therefore, no: longer suf­
fice; there has to be a decision of a duly constituted court 
of law. More important still, the traditional grounds for 
the expulsion of a member will no longer, in our submission, 
be entertained by the courts. For insofar as these are 
criminal offences (e.g. persistent stealing or incestiious 
relations), there are prescribed (and exclusive) punishments 
for them in the Criminal Code; insofar as they are mere
social disgrace to the family, they are not punishable of- 
12fences today. Again it may well be that such interference 
with a member’s right to participate in his fanily’s social 
life would be a violation of another of his fundamental 
human rights, this time under s.22 (l) of the Federal Con­
stitution. This subsection provides that "every person 
shall be entitled. to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence.1 There is no definition 
of "family" for the purposes of this or any other sub-section
12. Cf. Apico v, Fagbemi and E.F.P. (1961) 1 All N.L.R. i+00, 
where it was held that to convict and punish a woman for 
the (apparently customary law criminal; offence of 
adultery was a breach of her fundamental human right 
under s.21 (10) of the Federal Constitution, the con­
viction not being under a "written law."
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of Qhapter HI, ^  and so there is nothing to suggest that 
the extended family shall be excluded from the connotation 
of that term*
There is yet another argument in favour of the 
contention that the family no longer possess the right to 
expel its members. Such expulsion entails loss of property 
rights on the victim’s part where, as is usually the case, 
there is family property to consider. In the first place, 
it would be contrary to equity and natural justice (at all 
events as conceived by people traned in the common law 
system) to let a family deprive a man and his posterity 
of all rights in the family property as a result of of­
fences not necessarily connected with such p r o p e r t y I n  
the second place, such expulsion might involve an act ana­
logous to compulsory acquisition of property rights without
fu 'L
adequate compensation, and so would run foul of s.30(1) 
of the Federal Constitution. It is arguable that this sub­
section was designed to deal with compulsory acquisition of 
property and property rights by local and central government 
authorities, and therefore has no application to cases of 
the type under consideration here. But it is submitted that
13* The Copter on Fundamental Human ^ights.
1U. It may be suggested that there is nothing inequitable in 
a rule which grants to the family the same right as is 
possessed by clubs, age-grade and improvement societies. 
To this it may be replied that membership of a family 
is much more fundamental and all-embracing. It is more 
like citizenship, and it should be noted that s.26(l) 
of the Federal Constitution makes it unlawful for the 
Federal Govt, (or anyone else) to expel a citizen from 
its territory.
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where a family withdraws all rights in its property from
£
one of its members, the other members acquire/greater measure
15of interests than heretofore as a direct result* There 
is, therefore, no fundamental difference between "compulsory 
acquisition" by a local or central government authority for 
the benefit of the community as a whole, and what may be 
called "compulsory deprivation” by the family for the bene­
fit of its other members*
(
To sum up: $he family can no longer lawfully
expel any of its members in the sense of actually driving 
him away from his home, for this would involve it in one 
of several criminal offences. Secondly, the family can no 
longer expel a member in the sense of cutting him off from 
participation in its social life, for this would be unlawful 
interference with his civil rights* Thirdly, the family 
no longer has the right to divest a member of his rights and 
interests in the family property except by the normal process 
of civil litigation, for to do so would once ggain constitute 
unlawful interference with his civil rights and might even 
amount to compulsory acquisition of property rights without 
compensation. Nor’has any;;court ofilaw the power to authorise 
such divesting ot property rights on any of the traditional 
grounds, for the latter are now either crimes for which 
other penalites are prescribed under the general law, or 
else they are non-punishable (because ibn-giaiutory) social 
wrongs•
15« So do their posterity.
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Where, however, a member in exclusive possession
of a specific portion of the family property commits a
breach of one of the customary conditions of his tenure,
the family has the right to apply for, and the courts the
power to make, an order of forfeiture of that v portion
16against the member concerned* This is of course a different 
thing from forfeiting a person’s entire rights and interests 
in the family property as a whole*
(b) Lissintegration of the Family*
The extended family is said to disintegrate comple­
tely when it breaks up into as many separate and independent 
units as it had primary branches, the latter permanently 
withdrawing their recognition of the family head for any
purposes whatever**** This process is inevitably accompanied
2by partitioning of the family property among the branches* 
Among the many factors that lead to this process 
of disintegration are (i) disagreement over the selection 
of a new family head; (ii) discontent with the family head
16* On these conditions and their breach, see Adogun v* Fag- 
bola, 11 N.l.R.110; Onisiwo v* Gbamgboye, 7 W.a*C.~A*69> 
esp*at p*70; Ashogbon v* Oduntan* 12 N~"l.R.7» esp. at 
p*10. On forfeiture generally, see Byamba v* Holmes,
5 N.L.R.83; and Etttav. Efoft , 16 N,L.R.h3* See also Coker, 
op.cit*, p.103, and Obi, op.cit* * p.118.
1. The family head may, however, and usually does continue 
to be head of his own branch.
2. There is partial disintegration when one or more branches 
sever their connexion with the parent body while the 
latter continues to function as a composite whole. There 
is also the process (most commonly enoountered in chiefly 
societies) whereby the family cleaves into two factions 
each supporting one of two rival candidates for a chief­
taincy. Cf. Lloyd, op.cit., p.35*
for the time being in office and his general management of 
the group’s affairs, (iii) the pressure of population on 
residential and farming facilities which sometimes makes it 
necessary for the family to dispose of its property so that 
its constituent branches could move out to fresh grounds; and 
(iv) the impact of Western culture which is progressively 
reducing the social and economic importance of traditional 
social groupings generally by replacing them with such 
bodies as local government authorities, provident societies, 
commercial and industrial companies, business partnerships, 
farm settlements and the like. In the final analysis, these 
organizations are designed to deal with the same social and 
economic problems which the large-scale kinship groupings 
were evolved to tackle by centuries of experience.
In the case of a complete disintegration, difficult 
legal questions usually do not arise. For everyone concerned 
accepts it as inevitable that the family property shall be 
partitioned and that the office of family head shall cease 
to exist (i.e. as far as the wider group is concerned). But 
when there is partial disintegration - when one or two 
branches "secede" or when the family breaks up into two 
rival factions - thorny legal problems can arise, ’^irst 
there may be disagreement as to whether or not the family 
property should be partitionedL* This, however, can be easily 
resolved by recourse to the courts. Once it is established 
that the family can no longer hold together as a corporate
body, the courts will have no difficulty in coming to the
conclusion that natural justice requires the partitioning
3of its property* Secondly, each of the two factions into 
which the family may have broken might claim that it is 
the family and its new head the family head. This would 
raise .anew all the questions of jurisdiction already discus­
sed, in addition to provoking litigation on where the title 
to the family property now liea, and whether or not the said 
property should be partitioned. An easy way out .of this 
tangle from the point of view of the courts would be to declare 
that as the two factions can no longer hold together as one 
family, they must be deemed to desire an end to the parent 
body, a partition of its property, and the emergence of two 
new social groups. But the problem of nomenclature will not 
thereby be resolved: which party now possesses the right to
be known by the old family name? This may be of great impor­
tance where the family is also a chieftaincy family. It is 
tempting to suggest a solution on democratic lines: the
faction with the greater number of branches in it should 
retain the family name. But a moment’s reflection will re­
veal the possible injustice of this, ^or it could mean 
that the minority, who by the ordinary rules of selection 
were, but for the disintegration, entitled to have their 
nominee recognised, may lose not only that chance but also
3« This is implied in the decision of Butler Lloyd, J. in 
Bajulaiye v. Akapo, Hi- N.L.R. 10.
their right to the family name itselfI The only safe con­
clusion to draw from all this is that no a priori decision 
can he made on these problems: each case must be decided*
as it arises and in the light of the surrounding circumstances
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C H A P T E R  III
PROPERTY AND THE EXTENDED FAMILY
The Concept of Family Property
"Family property" may be defined as any form of
property the radical title to which vests in the family
as a corporate body. It should be pointed out right
away that this indigenous institution^" has nothing in
2common with joint tenancy or tenancy in common or any 
other form of tenure found ih English lat-sfc * If an analogy
1. Cf. Foster-Sutton, P., in Young v. Young (1955) W.A.C.A.
Civil Appeal No.3631 (Cyclostyled Report) 19-24, at p.21.
2. For a masterly discussion of the whole subject of Family
Property and its distinction from the English concepts 
of joint tenancy and tenancy in common, see Coker, op. 
cit., pp.40-66.
3. A distinguished British writer has suggested a similarity
between family property and the pre-fetidal system known 
as gavelkind and found in Kent, Hackney and Stepney in 
South-east England: Lloyd, o p. cit.. pp.78-9* But it
is submitted that gavelkind had a number of character­
istics which the family property lacks, and that this 
makes any comparison of the two systems inappropriate. 
According to Earl Jowitt, gavelkind tenure was subject 
to a widows dower or a husbandTs curtesy; also "an 
heir in gavelkind at fifteen years could make a contract 
and sell his estate for money" - Dictionary of English 
Law, pp.858-9* As we shall see later, family property 
is not the subject matter of inheritance, nor can anyone 
sell his estate therein at fifteen, fifty or any other 
age.
must be found in English law, this may be sought in the
law relating to corporations. It is a well-known principle
of English law that property can vest in a corporate body
(a corporation sole such as a Bishopric or the office of
the Postmaster-General, or a corporation aggregate such as
an ordinary trading company), ownership thereof lying not
in the incumbent or the members for the time being, as the
case may be, but in the corporation itself as a legal person.^-
In much the same way, ownership of family property vests
in the legal abstraction known as the family, and not in
its members for the time being. In the apt words of one
writer, "Each member of the family is nothing more than a
member of the community to which the property belongs.
This is not a partnership but a corporation". As was said
6in the celebrated Am.odu Tj.jani case, membership of the 
family as a land-owning corporate entity comprises the 
living, the dead and the unborn.
The basic characteristics of family property, may be 
summarised under three heads. First, it belongs, as already 
indicated, to the family as a distinct, perpetual legal 
entity. Secondly, the members for the time being do not
4. See Salomon v. Salomon (1897) A.C.22 (H.L.)
5. »N.T. Brooke, "Some legal aspects of Land Tenure in
; Nigeria" (1946), 5 African Studies 211-220, at p.215.
v. ^tePrioan Studios, 21-1—30, at
6. Ainodii Ti janl v. Secretary. s>. Nigeria (1921) Z'A.C.^QQ (P.Rj
7 8 . 9possess any separate, disposable, attachable or heritable
interests therein. Thirdly, the fact that this property is 
vested in a body corporate implies that no transaction 
affecting interests therein is valid unless done by or with 
the consent of the family itself^ acting through its alter 
ego, which for some purposes is the family Head and for 
others the family Council. This rule is, however, subject 
to two provisos. A court of competent jurisdiction can 
authorise a dealing (e.g. a mortgage or sale) if the over­
all interest of the family or the justice of the case requires 
thatthis should be done. Similarly, where the family sleeps 
on its rights, it will be estopped from upsetting an other­
wise unlawful transaction if to do so would involve injustice
11to an innocent third party.
Family property may be classified into chattels
(including money), economic trees or plants, houses and 
12land. "Family houses" are a regular feature of customary 
tenure among the Yoruba and some riverine societies in the
7. Buraimo v. G-bamgboye, 15 N.L.R. 139; Caulcrick v. Harding,
7 N.L.R.48.
8. Miller Brothers v. Ayeni, 5 N.L.R.40;
9. Sogunro-Lavies y. Sogunro. 9 N.L.R.79*
10. Adagun v. Fagbola, (or Lasisi). 11 N*L.R*110; Oshodi v» 
Aremu, 14 W.A.C.A.83.
H. Aganran v. Olushl I.N.L.R.66; Marks v.Bonso. 3W.A.C.A.62.
12. It will be seen in due course that houses are not
necessarily part of the land on which they stand, and so 
should not be discussed under the general rubric of "land."
Eastern Region (e.g. Calabar), and to these places our 
discussion on that form of property must be understood to 
be confined. All the other forms of family property are 
common to all societies.
Creation of Family Property
There are many ways whereby family property is created
1in the first place, or subsequently added to. These
include the operation of law, written wills, nuncupative
wills, gifts, purchases and occupation by the family of 
2vacant land.
(a) By Operation of Law
It is a well known principle of customary law that
where a man dies intestate his land as a rule becomes family 
3property. What is not so well known is that only a limited
1. We can do no more here than summarise the basic rules
relating to the creation of (and additions to) family 
property, as a detailed examination of the subject is 
outside the scope of the present work and should 
properly belong to a treatise with land law as its 
main focus.
2. For a more detailed treatment, see Elias, Groundwork of
Nigerian Law, pp.327 and 335; Coker, op.cit., pp.69^83# 
220-4; Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, pp.78-86; Lloyd, 1 Some 
notes on the Yoruba rules of Succession and' on fPamily 
Property111, (1959) 3 J.A.L. 7-32. Forde and Jones, The 
Ibo and Ibibio-speaking peoples of south-eastern Nigeria, 
p.2l; Meek, .band. Tenure ana hand Adminisxraxion m  
Nigeria and the Cameroons. p.184- Also Ogunmefun v. 
Ogunmefun. 10 N.L.R.82. On the position in Ghana custom­
ary law, see Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law 
in Ghana. pp.34-45.
3. Cf, Verity, C.J. in Awgu v. Nezianya. 12 W.A.C.A.450, at
p.451. “
class of land could be created into family property. And 
what is even less well known is that this rule requires a 
number of conditions precedent for its operation.
"Family property" can only be created out of individually 
owned property. It is immaterial how the latter was acquired
in the first place: it may have been carved out of virgin
forest, purchased from a third party, received as a gift, 
or acquired by the holder as his own share of the land of 
his wider family which had been permanently partitioned.^
But the property must be individually owned, by which is 
meant that the holder must possess exclusive, alienable and 
inheritable interests therein.
Again, for family property to arise by operation of
law, its owner must have died intestate. More important
still, the deceased must have founded a "family" as recognised
5by the local customary law, and at his death this family 
must contain two or more persons entitled to inherit on his 
intestacy. Being survived by a sole heir will not bring
4. A member has an "absolute right to his partitioned
portion" of family land: Balogun v. Balogun. 9 W.A.C.A.78
5. This, at all events, was the rule in the traditional
society. The raison dTetre for the very concept of 
family property was people’s desire down the centuries to 
preserve their land for posterity and so perpetuate their 
own memory while providing posterity witji a lasting basis
for unity, and a place to build and/or grow food crops
upon. Take away a man’s family, and the need for "family 
property” disappears entirely.
6. Cf. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, pp.28-30 and 78.
7the rule under discussion into operation, neither would 
it be enough that the deceased left a male issue and any 
number of females in a patrilineal society, (The position 
is of course different in matrilineal societies,)
It may be objected that in principle there is no reason
why a person who is survived by one son should not be
presumed to leave his property to his progeny for ever just
as does his brother who is survived by two or more sons.
This can easily be answered with the aid of one simple
negative test. Under customary law, a sole son-and-heir
can dispose of his inheritance as freely as he can his own
individually acquired property, either inter vivos or by 
7will. One of several heirs has no such right. This, it 
is submitted, is because in the latter case the property is 
turned into family property by operation of law. Unless 
and until therefore the heirs concerned agree on distribution
(more technically, partition), none of them has any separate
8rights or interests to dispose of.
It may also be objected that as daughters have now as 
much inheritance rights over their father!s property (e.g. 
among the Yoruba)^ as do sons, family property will arise
7. But see Lloyd, op.cit.t p.30, where it is said that opin­
ions are divided on this question.
8. See Caulcrick v. Harding♦ 7 N.L.R.48, and Sogunro-Davies
v. Sogunro, 9 N.L.R.79*
9. See for instance Salami v. Salami (1957) W.R.N.1.R.10.
whether the owner is survived by several sons or several 
daughters or any combination of the sexes. But this argument 
confuses the establishment of a perpetual legal entity known 
as the family which the founder is presumed to endow with 
his disposable property on the one hand, and the inheritance 
rights of children or other issue on the other. It is one 
thing to say that the law has come to recognise the right 
of women to inherit their father’s property on equal basis 
with men, and quite another to hold that female issue alone 
(or indeed any number of female plus just one male issue) 
can in law constitute a self-perpetuating body corporate 
with its chief base in the territory of itsfbunder - the 
latter being at the root of. family property as an institut­
ion. In other words, to say that women have now acquired 
a right to share in the property of a lawfully constituted
fam4-l-y -as if---they--w9re--full members—th e-re of -is not—the
family as if they were full members thereof is not the same 
as to say that women alone can constitute such a family in 
a patrilineal society such as ours, where marriage is 
virilocal, where children are affiliated to the husband’s 
(not the wifete maiden) group, and where the ultimate goal
of every normal woman not irt. the Holy Orders is still to 
get married and bear children for her husband and his group.
One final prerequisite for the creation of family
property by operation of law which we shall touch upon here 
is that the disposable land of the deceased must be subject 
to the customary law of succession. This excludes the Lagos 
property of persons married under the Marriage Act of Nigeria, 
for s.36(1) of that Act brings their disposable property 
under the pre-1914 law of England relating to intestate 
succession to personalty. It also excludes any property 
which the deceased might have left anywhere in the Western 
Region, if he contracted a non-customary form of marriage.
This is because s.49 of the Administration of Estates Law,
19599 of that Region provides a new set of rules for 
distributing the estate of persons so married - on the lines 
of the current law of England. Finally any property in the 
Eastern Region must be excluded if its owner had contracted 
a "Christian1 marriage anywhere provided that succession to 
his property can be shown to fall within the rule in Cole 
v. Cole.^
We shall now state the rules governing the creation of 
family property by operation of law, taking the above points 
into consideration. Where a person dies intestate leaving 
two or more children or remoter issue who are deemed by the 
local customary law as capable of perpetuating his line of
9. (1898) 1 N.L.R.15
descent and therefore of constituting a self-generating 
corporate body, his individually owned land, houses and 
insignia of office, if any, will in general become family
in
property, and will vest^the corporate body so constituted. 
Where the deceased did not found a family as above described, 
his disposable property will, in certain circumstances, 
accrue to the wider group of which he was a member, and will 
in that sense become family property. A close examination 
of this second rule will, however, show that it is concerned 
with making additions to existing family property rather 
than with creating one where none existed before.
(b) By Act of Parties
One of the many ways in which family property is created 
(or added to) is by will, which may take the form of either 
a formal document of the English type1 or a solemn oral 
declaration by the propositus * Other things being equal, a
p
will is just as effective as intestacy and may indeed 
succeed in turning land into family property where intestacy
1. On the creation of family property by will see Coker v.
Coker, 14 N.L.R.83; Caulkrick v. Harding. 7 N.1.R.48;
G-eorge v. Pa.iore, 15 WTl Tr TT; Shaw v. Kehinde, 18 N.L.R.
129; Sogbesan v. Adebiyi, 16 N.h.R.26; Ali T7 Ali.
5 W.A.C.A.94 and 8 W.A.C.A.1; Young v. Young, W.A.C.A. 
Civil Appeal No.3631 (1953); and xtie"“S’i<5ffa Leone case 
of Timbo v. Jallow, 14 W.A.C.A.339*
2. But see G-iwa v. Ottun, 11 N.L.R.160 and Young v. Abina,
6 W.A.C.A.180, where the courts inferred, from the word­
ing of the will and the documents connected with the land 
respectively, an intention not to create family property.
would have failed. Any landowner who has legal capacity to
make a will at all can create family property out of his
land by means of a written will. In principle, too, there
is no reason why any person of full age and sound mind could
not achieve this objective by means of a nuncupative will.
*5But a Gold Coast case (as she then was), Re Otoo, has held
that by contracting a marriage under the local Ordinance a
person lost his legal capacity to make a valid oral custom- 
4ary will. And there is a long line of Nigerian cases 
beginning with the celebrated decision of Griffith, J., in 
Cole v. Cole (already cited) whose general tenor is that 
where a person contracts a "Christian" marriage, he must be 
deemed to be so completely Anglicised as to be outside the 
realms of customary personal law. It is submitted, however, 
that whatever might be said of the presumed intentions of 
persons contracting "Christian" marriages in colonial days, 
it would be wrong today to presume that a Nigerian who 
contracts this form of prestige marriage thereby intends 
of necessity to adopt English law as his personal law, just 
as it would be wrong to suggest that a Yoruba man who contracts 
a Moslem marriage intends to adopt Islamic law as his personal
3. (1927) Div. Ct. 1926-1929* p.84; cited in Allott, Essays
in African Law, p.256.
4 . Called samansew in Akan law.
5law.
The circumstances in which people prefer to turn 
their land into family property by will rather than leave 
the metamorphosis to the operation of law may be classified 
under four heads. The first is where statute, law provides 
that in the event of intestacy succession shall be governed 
by some law different from the customary law. Examples of 
this are persons whose intestate estate would fall within 
the provisions of s.36(1) of the (Federal) Marriage Act or 
s.49 of the Western Region’s Administration of Estates Law, 
1959 (already cited). A^kin to this is the case of persons 
whose intestate succession is governed by English law in 
accordance with the principle of Cole v. Cole. Persons 
coming within the operation of English law in these circumst­
ances can only create family property by will. And, in 
view of the doubts expressed above regarding the legal 
capacity of such persons to make a valid oral will, the only 
certain method of doing this is by a formal will of the 
English type.
The second class of cases concerns persons whose intest­
acy would, under the local customary law, result in their
5* See in re Ala.vo, Adm-Cen. v. Tunwase (18 E.L.R.88) where 
it was held that no such intention was to be presumed in 
the case of an Ijebu (Yoruba) Moslem. See also Lloyd, 
Yoruba Land Law, p.27, f.n.l.
children having no rights or interests in their land, as
sometimes happens in the matrilineal and mixed-descent
societies of the upper Cross River and the Obuhura Hill
6districts of the Eastern Region. In these societies the 
only sure way to create family property for the benefit of 
one’s progeny is by will.
The third class of cases relates to people who have
reason to fear that as soon as they are dead their land
would be sold (away from the family) by their children, and
who therefore wish to forestall any such sale by fortifying
the customary law on the subject. An interesting example
7
of this is to be found in Jacobs v. Qladunmi Brothers, 
where a testator made a devise in the following terms -
"I give and devise my said dwelling-house
... to all my children ... It being my intent 
and express wish that the said property shall 
not on anji account whatever be alienated or 
sold by any of my said children or any of his 
or her issue and that the,same shall always 
remain and be retained as ’family property’ in 
accordance with the native laws customs and 
usages prevailing in Lagos ...u
6. See Eorde, Marriage and the Family among the Yak5, p.45;
Chubb, Ibo Land Tenure (,2nd edn .) paras.40. 41; Talbot
In the Shadow of the~ush, p.314.
7. (1955) 12 N.L.R.l.
Dismissing counsel*s submission that the effect of this 
clause was to constitute the testator’s children tenants in 
common under English law, Graham Paul, J. said, inter alia -
“I hold that under the will the property in 
question became a ’family property* as 
effectively as if the children had succeeded 
to it under native law and custom on intest­
acy.
It may be argued.that Jacobs v. Oladunmi Brothers and 
other High Court decisions to the same effect can no longer 
stand having regard to the West African Court of Appeal
Q
decision in Young v. Abina. In this latter case a testatrix 
devised her house to A, "his heirs, executors and administr­
ators upon trust to hold the same as family property for 
the use and benefit of all his relatives and the same should 
on no account be sold or partitioned by him them or any of 
them." She also appointed executors under the will, who 
duly proved. After her death, the executors mortgaged the 
property to a third party. Later still, A (the trustee 
under the will) sold and conveyed the same property to yet 
another party. A*s children thereupon brought an action 
against him as trustee, the surviving executor as mortgagor, 
the personal representative of the mortgagee (now deceased)
8. 12 N.L.R.l, at p.2.
9. (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 180.
and the purchaser. They (children/plaintiffs) claimed -
(a) that the executors had no power to grant the mortgage,
(b) that the sale and conveyance by their father, A, was
void,and
(c) that the alleged mortgagee was liable to render account
It was common ground that the mortgage was ultra vires 
the executors and so void unless the (English) Land Transfer 
Act, 1897, applied to Nigeria by virtue of s.14 of the 
Supreme Court Ordinance then in force.^ If, however, the 
L.T.A. did apply to Nigeria, the executors were well within 
their legal rights in executing the mortgage, for that Act 
provides that where real.estate was vested in any person 
with no right of survivorship in any other person, then at 
his death such realty shall vest in his personal represent­
ative as if it were personalty, any devise thereof notwith­
standing. The effect of this provision would be to stultify 
the attempt by the testator in the instant case to create 
family property out of his land, by making that land freely 
alienable by his personal representatives, viz. the executors.
The V/est African Court of Appeal (reversing In re Sholu1  ^
held 1hat the Land Transfer Act, 1897, applied to Nigeria.
They also held that customary law did not apply to the 
instant case because, in their words:
10. This section incorporated into Nigerian law such statutes
of the U.K. parliament as came under the generic term 
"statutes of general application".
11. 11 N.I.E.37.
"We have as exhibits in this case a Will, two 
Indentures of mortgage and a conveyance on 
sale, all of them couched in the jargon of 
the English conveyancer, all of them highly 
specialised documents to which the Land
12Transfer Act was designed to apply generally.1
It was therefore further held that the executors had power 
to dispose of the property in question by mortgage or sale.
It is submitted, however, that the reasons given in
the passage just quoted are only relevant insofar as they
refer to the will, and even in that connexion need not be
fatal. The form of a will and the technicality or otherwise
of the language in which it was drawn up are admittedly
some internal evidence from which a court is entitled to
infer which system of law (English or customary) a testator
intended to govern his devise. But surely this internal
evidence should not be taken to over-ride the testator1s
express intention? Yet this was the effect of the Court
of Appeal's construction of the will in the instant case.
What could be more express than a devise to A "to.hold the
same as family property for the use and benefit of all his
relatives"? A more recent decision of W.A.C.A. itself in
13the Sierra Leone case of Timbo v. Jallow shows that the
12. 6 W.A.C.A*180, at p.184*
13- (1953) 14 W.A.C.A.339* See also Young v. Young, ante»
another W.A.C.A. decision.
use of a will drawn up in English could he effectual in 
creating family property. As for the mortgage indentures 
and deed of conveyance and their jargon, it should be pointed 
out that these documents all came into existence long after 
the testatrix's death, by which time the house was (for all 
that anyone knew) already family property. Why they should 
in effect be deemed retrospectively to thwart the testatrix's
14
intention is hard to see.
It is submitted, with the greatest respect, that the 
decision in Young v. Abina is bad ]aw. It is only justifiable, 
if at all, on its own complicated and peculiar facts. In 
any event, the Abina case is easily distinguishable from 
Jacobs v. Oladunmi Brothers. The testator in the latter 
case was creating family property for his own elementary 
family; in the former case the testatrix was trying to 
create one, not for her issue, not even for the family group 
of which she was herself a member, but for the use and 
benefit of a third party's elementary family. In the second 
place, the testatrix in the Abina case introduced into her 
will the novelty of appointing a trustee for the family
14. Note that even where a testator's intention is not
expressed in the will itself, the court is entitled to 
take into consideration the widespread practice among 
property owners of creating family property within the 
society in which the deceased lived and made his will: 
Coker v. Coker (1938, 14 N.L.R.83.
property she was trying to create. This need not be fatal
in her case as she did no more than appoint the founder and
natural head of the intended beneficiary^^family) to take
charge of the property - a function which devolved on him 
15anyway. It need not be fatal at all even if a person
16other than the family head was appointed as trustee. But 
it does provide a point of distinction between the two 
cases under review. A point worthy of note is that it 
appears from their conduct that both the trustee and the 
executors understood the limitation in the will to be some­
thing other than an attempt at creating family property.
For the trustee had mortgaged the property and the executors 
subsequently sold it, in either case without consulting the 
other members of the family - a process which they must have 
known to be necessary if the property involved was family 
poperty. This is not to say that the conduct of the living 
is necessarily material in the construction of the wills 
of the dead. Neither does it follow that any construction 
placed on a testamentary disposition by personal represent­
atives should be taken into account in deciding the legal 
effect of such a disposition. But if it be shown that all
15. It is arguable though that the rights and duties of a
trustee are radically different from those of an ordin­
ary family head in relation to property under their 
charge. See further below.
16. As will shortly appear, it has been held in Young v. Young 
- a W.A.C.A. decision - that family property was effect­
ively created under a will which also appointed a trustee 
for the said property: (1953) W.A.C.A. Civil Appeal No.363L
o n O *>
the people concerned with the,administration of this property- 
regarded the limitation in the will as an outright gift to 
A on trust for the present members of his family, this might 
justify an inference that that was the testatrix1s true 
intention as they understood it in the course of their 
ordinary contact with her in her life time.
Be that as it may, it is hoped that enough has been 
said here to show that Young v. Abina differs substantially 
in its facts from Jacobs v. Qladunmi Brothers and the other 
High Court cases already referred to, and so does not affect 
the principle established by them.
The fourth and final set of cases where the will is 
used to create family property concerns people who wish to 
extend rights and interests in their property to persons 
(such aw children born illegitimate) who would otherwise be 
excluded from it by the law of intestate succession. A
17case in point is the Sierra Leone case of Timbo v. Jallow 
already referred to. There a testator made the following 
devise -
"Jo my natural sons. (A and B) my house and 
premises at Jenkins Street in which I at 
present reside. The property is to be 
used as family property and is in no Wise, 
to be sold.H
17. 14 W.A.C.A.339•
He was survived by other children besides A and B. Among 
the questions that arose for decision were: (a) whether the 
devise created joint tenancy or tenancy in common; (b) if 
neither, whether family property had been effectively created; 
and (c) if so, which family the testator had in mind - his 
own (elementary) family or the families of A and B. The West 
African Court of Appeal held in effect that neither joint 
tenancy nor tenancy in common was created; that family 
property had been effectively created; and that when the 
testator said, "The property is to be used as family property” 
he must have meant his own family, not that of A or B. The 
devise was therefore to the testator's issue (including A 
and B) as a family unit. In the result, A and B acquired 
the same rights and interests in their natural father's house 
as they would have done if they were born legitimate members 
of his family.
It is not necessary that a testator should say in
express terms that he intended to create family property.
Provided that the words used in the devise, when construed
against the general background of local practice and law,
evince a clear intention to create family property, the court
18will give effect to this intention. Thus in Coker v. Coker 
an Egba made a limitation in the following words -
18. (1938) 14 N.L.R.83.
"I leave and bequeath my present dwelling-house 
to the whole of my family or blood relatives
19and their children's children throughout....'*
Carey, J., in holding that this devise created family property,
said that the duty of the court in all cases concerning the
construction of wills was to ascertain the true intention of
the testator insofar as this was possible. In this task, he
went on, the court was entitled to take into consideration
the common practice among the Yoruba of Lagos of creating
20family houses out of their property.
To round off this survey of the methods whereby family 
property is created in the first place or added to subsequently 
In the days when vast stretches of woodland lay -uncultivated 
and ungrazed, when communities with more land than they were 
probably ever going to need were quite happy to let others 
help themselves, families not infrequently moved en bloc to new 
sites where they set up permanent homes and farms. Tracks 
reduced into possession by individual effort became the exclu­
sive property of such individuals. At their death, the land 
became family property for their respective elementary families 
Areas reduced into possession by community effort became pro­
perty of the immigrant family as a whole, and remained so till 
ultimately partitioned among the constituent branches of that 
family. In much the same way, a family in modern times some­
times purchases land with funds contributed by its members,
19* "Throughout" was presumably intended to mean "for ever".
20. 14 N.L.R. 83, at p.86.
or out of the proceeds of existing family property. This 
practice is on the increase in our modern urban areas. Again, 
where the last surviving member of a given family branch dies 
intestate, any separate property that was vested in that 
branch accrues to the parent family group. In the same way, 
where a family branch abandons its holding (which it does 
either by moving permanently to a new site or merely by 
manifesting its intention never again to use the land in 
question), such land goes to the parent group as family 
property. Finally, property may be given gratigjto a family 
group. This gift may be made inter vivos or by will. The 
West African Court of Appeal case of Young v. Young is 
really a case of testamentary gift to a named family. There 
the testatrix, Elizabeth John, devised her property in 
these words -
"Unto the said Benjamin A.A. Young his heirs 
executors and administrators upon trust to 
hold the same as family property, for the 
use and benefit of all his relatives and 
the same should on no account be sold or 
partitioned by him them or any of them!®®^
The West African Court of Appeal^cheld
20a, (1953) W.A.C.A. Civil Appeal No.3631 (Cyclostyled 
Report) p.19*
Note the similarity in wording between this limitation and 
that in Young v. Abina♦ ante. Note also that the property 
in Young v. Young was alienated after the testatrix’s 
death by a deed of conveyance. And yet the two decisions 
were diametrically opposed to each other. .
20c, Foster-Button, P., Verity, C.J., and Coussey, J.A. In the
Abina case the Court comprised Kingdom, Petrides and 
Graham Paul, C . J. J.
that this devise converted the property in 
question into family property for the use 
and benefit of the immediate family group 
of which Benjamin Young was a member.
Neither in Young v. Abina nor in Young v. Young did the
West African Court of Appeal discuss (a) the effect of
appointing a trustee for a piece of property on the validity
or otherwise of a clause (in a will) which purports to create
such property as family property; (b) the validity or
otherwise of such appointment, assuming that family property
has been created in spite of it; or (c) the position of
such a trustee vis-a-vis the family head. The idea of a
trustee in the technical sense of that term is completely
21axien to the concept of family property. It brings in
its train the possibility of conflict between the traditional
claims of the family head and the "English1 law claims of 
22the trustee. This in turn makes for dissension and friction 
among the sympathisers of the two rival functionaries, with
obvious danger to continued family unity. It is submitted,
therefore, that had that issue been raised, the Court would
have been justified in pronouncing against the creation of
family property in the above and similar cases. As it is
21. Cf. Coker, op. cit., p.76.
22. I.e. where the trustee does not also happen to be the
family head. This happy coincidence occurred in Jacobs
v. Qladunmi Brothers (ante.).
perhaps too late in the day to urge this point, however, 
we shall assume that the fact of appointing a trustee in 
itself does not affect the validity of a clause aimed at 
creating family property.
If then the appointment of a trustee does not vitiate 
an attempt to create family property, is the appointment 
itself rendered nugatory by the creation of family property, 
or is there a possible intermediate position? Coker simply 
dismissed such a trustee as 1 a redundant figure in the scheme 
of a family property. Whether we interpret| "redundant'1 
as meaning that there is a bare trustee without trust property 
or that the attempt to appoint one was abortive, the result 
is the same - there is no place for a trustee in the law of 
family property. Were it otherwise, the result would be 
that part of the property of a given family vests in one 
person as trustee and therefore owner of the legal estate,^ 
while the rest remains under the control of the family head 
as caretaker and manager thereof. The resulting chaos where 
several trustees appointed under different wills in respect 
of different pieces of property exist concurrently can be 
easily imagined. The answer to the third question posed
23. hoc, cit.» p.76; a view which we respectfully share *
24. As opposed to the beneficial interest which belongs to
the family.
above must therefore be that a trustee qua trustee has no 
rights or interests in family property as against the 
ordinary family head*
This proposition derives some support from a recent
25decision of the federal Supreme Court in Qdunsi (Chief
2 6O.jora) y. Qjora and Others. It was there held that in the
absence of proof of customary law to the contrary, only the
recognised head of a given family (in that case, also a
White Cap Chief) had any power to manage and, subject to
27the usual consents, dispose of family property* Now while
there is customary law to the effect that a family can
appoint people of its choice to manage its property (e.g. 
among many Ibo societies), there is no customary law any­
where to the effect that a testator can appoint a trustee 
for family property or any part of it even if such property
was a gift from him to the family. A testator can only
create or add to family property; he cannot in law dictate 
to the family who shall control or manage its property.
This latter function is exclusively the concern of the local 
customary law in the absence of any family arrangement to 
the contrary.
25. Brett, Taylor and Bairamian, P.J.J.
26. (1961) 1 All N.L.R.283.
27. So runs the headnote, though this is more implied than
expressed in the Courtfs judgement. Note that the case 
is concerned with the rival claims of two "chiefi* - one 
a family head by succession, the other a family head by 
selection, both being members of the same family.
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Rights of Individual Members in Family Property
In analysing the nature of family property in the
foregoing pages, we considered incidentally the negative 
aspects of the individual member's rights and 'interests 
therein. We saw that these rights and interests are non- 
proprietary, non-alienable (with minor reservations) and 
non-heritable. We shall now attempt a more detailed examin­
ation of these as,well as the more positive aspects of 
such rights and interests. For ease of exposition, we 
shall classify family members.under four heads:-
(a) Members by birth - I. Adult males;
(b) Members by birth - II. Females;
(c) Members by birth - III.Minors;
(d) Members by marriage, i.e. married women and widows.
(a) Members by birth - I. Adult males;
Under this head we shall examine the rights and interests
of all ttie men (including the head in his capacity as an
ordinary member) v/ho are members of the group by virtue of
being born into it and who are recognised as adults by the
local law relating to minority and initiation into manhood.
It will be convenient to classify these rights into seven
categories, viz. -
(i) right to the natural produce of the land;
(ii) right of ingress, 
farm land and res
both
(iii) right to annual farm plots;
(iv) right of exclusive occupation (both farm and resident­
ial land);
(v) right to be consulted;
(vi) right of disposition (inter vivos and at death); and
(vii) right to intestate succession.
(i) Natural Produce of Family Land.
For the purposes of this section we shall use the
term "natural produce" to include the fruit of such things
as the oil palm, the oil bean and the breadfruit tree; 
timber from timber trees; and rents and profits from the 
land.itself. It might sound a little incongruous to include 
rights in rents and those in fruit and timber under one 
head. But as these rights are governed by the same legal 
principles, it will be convenient to discuss them together.
I'he general rule is that every adult male member of 
the family is entitled to collect the natural produce of 
the land for his own use and benefit. Thus he can cut 
down palm nuts, tap palm wine, cut timber or grass or other 
building materials, fish in the family ponds or hunt on 
the family land. These rights are founded on the twin 
maxims of customary law relating to communal land tenure, 
viz. that a member is entitled to maintenance for himself 
and his household out of communal property, and that a man
ISis entitled to the fruit of his labour. J The member is 
not under any duty to inform the family head or the other 
members, still less obtain their consent, before exercising 
these rights.
But to this general rule there are two qualifications. 
In the first place, the family, as the owner of the radical 
title in family property has a right to impose restrictions 
on its user, or indeed to make regulations ousting the rule 
as above stated. If such restrictions or regulations exist 
in any particular case, they will of course bind the 
members. The point to emphasise here is that the existence 
of such restrictions or regulations is a matter to be 
proved in court, the onus being on the party asserting 
their existence to make good the assertion. The second 
qualification is to the effect that the individual member 
is only entitled to help himself to so much of the natural
15. For rights in communal property generally, see Meek,
Land Tenure and Land Administration in Nigeria and the 
Cameroons,"pp. 129-59; Meek. Law and Authority i n ~  
Nigerian Tribe, p.100 ff; Elias, Nature of African 
Customary Law, PP. 8 5- 7; Elias, Nigerian Land Law and 
Custom, pp.142-58; Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, pp.79-82; 
Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom and the Edo- 
speaking Peoples ..., pp.44-4 6; Ajisafe. op. cit..
Ch.4, esp. para.21; Omoneukanrin, op. cit.. pp.87-88; 
Forde and Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio-bpeaking Peoples 
of south-eastern Nigeria, pp.21-3, 75-6; Coker, op. cit., 
pp.21-2, 25-7; Talbot. In the Shadow of the Bush. 
pp.262-7; Obi, Ibo Law of Property. PP.43-4T 49-50,
60-2; Forde, Yoruba-speaking Peoples ..., pp.25-6.
produce of family land as he requires for his ordinary 
domestic use, such as domestic consumption, house-building 
for himself or for his dependants, or for the purchase of 
such necessaries like tobacco, articles of clothing and the 
like. If he wishes to exploit this produce for commercial 
purposes, he must first obtain the consent of the family.
The next question is the meaning of the term "natural 
produce1 of the land. Part of the answer is implied in 
the discussion above. In the case of fruit and timber trees, 
it means those that were not planted by man, that is trees 
growing wild on family land. Most palm and timber trees 
come under this description, but cocoa, rubber and cashew 
tree3 do not, as a rule. In the case of fishing and hunt­
ing rights, the rule under discussion only applies to wild 
game outside game reserves and to fish in natural pools or 
streams. This is almost too obvious to need stating, but 
not quite. For the point may be made that if a member turns 
a family pool into a gold-fish pond, or breeds rabbits on 
the family reserve, or grows cocoa on part of the family 
farm land - in each case without the consent of the family 
- he does so at his own peril, so that other members may 
help themselves at will. But this is not so; for the rule 
that a man is entitled to the fruit of his labour operates 
in these cases to ouat the family "rights of common". (We
shall see later that the family has some other remedy 
against the land-grabbing member).
This brings us to the question of rents ‘and profits.
A member has no right to grant any interests in family land 
either gratis or for an economic rent, without family 
consent. But if he is allowed to make such a grant in 
respect of that portion over which he has been allowed to 
exercise exclusive beneficial rights, he is entitled to 
the proceeds of the grant. Thus if a member is allowed 
to build a dwelling house on part of the family property 
or to establish a cocoa farm or a palm ^thereon, he is 
entitled to obtain money on the security of such a house, 
farm or plantation for his own benefit; if he leases this
farm or plantation aC a rent, he is entitled to these rents.
Finally, a member who receives his usual annual allocation 
of farm land has a right to make a lease thereof to a 
stranger (though with the consent of the family), in which 
case he is entitled to the rents received from his lessee.
16. Cf. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, pp.300-301 (in re pawning
of cocoa farms on family land), and 321-325 (in re 
obtaining credit on security of parts of family land 
occupied with family consent, by a member).
(ii) Rights of ingress. egress and regress.
Rights under this head are of legal interest in two 
principal sets of circumstances. The first is an obvious 
one. If, as stated in the last section above, members have 
a right to reap the natural produce of the land, it is only 
reasonable that the law should ggve them the right to enter, 
upon such land for that purpose, and this it does. The 
second set of circumstances arises where parts of the 
family land are exclusively occupied by some members or by 
strangers. The question therefore sometimes arises what 
right, if any, other members have to go on the land. Can 
members not residing in the family house (usually occupied 
by the head for the time being) enter the house to attend 
family meetings, to inspect the state of repair, or to 
find out for themselves whether the actual occupier at any 
given time was the member allowed to reside there or his 
lessee?
The question whether or not members had a right to
enter the family house for the purpose of attending family
17meetings arose in the leading case of Lewis v. Bankole , 
and there the learned Chief Justice affirmed that every 
member had this right. The court said in effect that who­
ever was entitled to attend a family meeting was also, ipso
17. (1908) 1 IT.L.R. 82
96
18facto, entitled to enter the family house for that purpose. 
If, that is, it was a general meeting, every member was 
entitled to enter upon the family compound and into the 
family house, for the purpose of attending it. If it was 
what might be described as an executive meeting which only 
branch family heads were entitled to attend, then they alone 
would have the right of entry. On the further question 
whether members were entitled to enter the family compound 
to view the state of repairs, Osborne, C.J., said that 
members of the family council (usually representatives of 
the various branches of the family) were entitled to do so. 
This is only reasonable, since this council, led by the 
family head, is often charged with the duty of administer­
ing and generally caring for the family property.
But the learned Chief Justice qualified these rights
by stating that they were exercisable subject to the right
of resident members to a quiet enjoyment of their holdings.
19In the later case of Thomas v. Thomas , members ' right of 
entry was described as one of reasonable ingress and egress.
18. 1 R.L.R.82, at p.105. It will be noted that these
meetings are usually held in the family house.
19- (1932) 16 N.L.R.5.
The inference is that the right can only "be exercised at 
reasonable hours, at reasonable intervals of time and perhaps 
also by a reasonable number of persons at a time. (This 
rule as to quiet enjoyment which is recognised by the custom­
ary law everywhere but perhaps nowhere formulated in words 
is, incidentally, the foundation of the principle that a 
member in actual and lawful occupation of a portion of 
family property is entitled to exclusive rights of user 
over self-planted trees thereon. For example, the person 
actually cultivating a portion of the family farm land for 
the season has exclusive beneficial rights over palm trees 
standing on it, in the absence of a local regulation to 
the contrary. To grant to all other members the right to
enter the farm and harvest or tap these palms would in
20many cases lead to damage to growing crops .) The pract­
ical effect of the rule which guarantees right of entry to 
members is that the family head has no power to keep an - 
unwanted member out of a family meeting which he is otherwise 
entitled to attend, by refusing him the right of entry to 
the meeting place.^
20. On this rule see, Meek, Land Law and Land Administrat­
ion ..., p.133 ff;
1. This ’meeting place1’, as we have seen, is usually the 
house of the family head, which in turn is usually 
part of the ancestral family house or compound.
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(iii) Right to annual Farm Plots.
All members of the family are entitled to be allocated
plots out of the family farm land, if any, from year to
year according to need or to some pre-determined principle
of allocation. In legal theory it is the duty of the
family head to decide what parts and how much of the family
holding shall be brought under cultivation for the current
season. In theory, too, it is his duty to allocate plots
to the members. In practice, both these functions are
performed by the family council of which he is a member
and president. Indeed, in parts of the Eastern Region (e.g.
among many Ibo societies) these functions are usually
2adelegated to a distinct land authority. Whatever the 
local arrangement, the important point to observe in this 
connexion is that no member has a right to cultivate any 
part of the family farm land other than that allotted to 
him.
The member^ right to these annual allotments is 
restricted to his ordinary farming needs. What these 
"ordinary farming needs1 consists in will vary with individual
2. See generally Lloyd, op. cit., pp.78-80; Meek, Land
Tenure and Land Administration etc., p.133; Obi, op. cit., 
pp.60-1; Elias, Nigerian Land Law and Custom, pp.157-8. ,
2a. Consisting of the members of one particular age-grade, or 
a number of persons selected for their personal qualities.
farming habits and ability, among other factors. Perhaps 
it would be mol?& convenient to say what they are not rather 
than what they are. Stated simply, the individual member 
has no right to be given plots from the family land for 
commercial farming, such as large-scale cattle breeding 
or cocoa growing. If he wants land for these purposes, he 
is liable to be treated as a stranger, and may be charged 
an economic rent. Most important of all, his request may 
be refused with or without reasons given; if it is refused, 
he has no legal remedy against the family. The customary 
law relating to annual allocations is apt to elude and 
confuse the unwary observer, and perhaps can be summarised 
again with advantage. If the family decides to allocate 
the farm land or part of it for the current season, every 
eligible member is entitled to a share. Members normally 
become eligible on attaining manhood according to local 
rules and usage. They cease to be eligible (permanently 
or temporarily) if they cease to be members or fail to 
discharge their financial and other duties as members, as 
where a member refuses to pay his assessment for the funeral 
ceremonies of a deceased member or for a court action to 
which the family is a party.
In traditional society, if a member needed more than 
his fair share of farm land for the current season,.he had
a right to be given more plots from other parts of the family 
holding. He had no right to cultivate any more without 
family consent; but then the family had no right to refuse 
his reasonable request in this connexion. Today, with the 
commercialization of land and increasing population pressure, 
more and more families are successfully resisting requests 
for additional farm plots for the odd member. Cases are
known to the present writer where members have had to pay
economic rent for additional plots cultivated on the family 
holding.
(iv) Right of Exclusive Possession
Sometimes a family member is allowed to occupy a portion
of the family land either for farming or for residential 
purposes. The permission might have been given by the 
founder himself9 or by the head for the time being on behalf 
of the family and with its consent. The grant here may be 
for ordinary domestic user or for commercial purposes. Two 
main points fall for consideration in this connexion. The 
first is the nature of the grantee!s interest, including 
the security of his tenure. The second is the nature of 
the interest, if any, retained by the family itself in the 
land so occupied, including its right to recover such land.
As a preliminary observation, it should be stated that the
rules we are about to discuss are applicable whether the 
subject matter of the grant is farm land, a building site 
or just a room in the family house. The location of the 
land in question is also immaterial: the rules apply to 
property in a rural as well as that in an urban area. But 
as will appear later, different principles apply where the 
land granted is to be exploited on a commercial basis.
S e c u r i t y  o f  T e n u r e .  In granting exclus­
ive possession of part of its holding to one of its members, 
the family, acting through the family head (usually assisted 
by the family council) has a right to impose conditions 
under which the land shall be held. A common example of 
this in contemporary society is a permission to occupy a 
room in the family house so long as the member-grantee 
collects rents from tenants in other rooms and generally 
looks after the family property. In traditional society 
it was common to grant a dwelling house in the ancestral 
compound on condition that the grantee would look after an 
ageing member, usually the family head or the widow of a 
deceased family head. Whatever form the conditions take, 
they are binding on the grantee and the family alike. As 
a result, the family has no right to determine the grant 
so long as the conditions are fulfilled. On the other 
hand, the grantee forfeits his right of occupation if he
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fails to perform his part of the bargain.
The nature of the conditions which the family has a 
right to attach to a grant to one of its own members is, 
however, limited where the grant is for normal residential 
purposes or peasant farming. It can stipulate what acts 
the grantee must or must not do if he wishes to retain 
possession. But it cannot make a grant of this kind on the 
condition that it shall be determinable at the family’s 
pleasure and without any fault on the part of the grantee.
?or it is a fundamental principle of customary law that a 
family member shall not be deprived of his home or means 
of support unless he has given just cause. But this limit­
ation does not apply to a grant of land required for 
commercial purposes. This point arose in the case of Manuel 
v. Bob Manuel. There the family had granted a portion of 
family land to one of its members on the clear understand­
ing that he had a right, if he wished, to develop it for 
commercial purposes, but that the grant was to be determined 
if the family required the land for other purposes. Counsel 
for the tenant argued that the general principle set out
A
above should apply to the instant grant, and so the alleged
3. (1926) 7 N.L.R.101.
4. I.e. that the family could not impose a condition to the
effect that the grant could be revoked even if the tenant
had been guilty of no wrongful act or omission.
condition was nugatory. To this contention, Webber, J., 
replied in his judgement:
"There is ... a vast difference in the tenure of 
a member of a family occupying family land for 
dwelling purposes and that of a member of a 
family occupying land for purposes of trade.
In the former case the land is practically 
inalienable provided the usual native laws as 
to conduct or abandonment are not transgressed, 
but as for land given for business purposes, 
different considerations apply, and it is quite 
within the native rule to add a condition to 
the terms of the tenancy that it can be determ- 
ined if the family require the land."-'
In the absence of express conditions (these, it should 
be pointed out, are not very common), the law implies a 
number of conditions and guarantees in every grant by a 
family to one of its members. In favour of the family there 
is first the condition that the tenant shall not alienate 
his interests in the land without the consent of the family. 
If this condition is broken, the family, acting through its
5. 7 U.L.R.101, at p. 102. "Inalienable1 in this passage
was obviously intended to mean "irrevocable". It is
also apparent that the learned judge was thinking of
both express and implied conditions, for which see
below. The family’s action was dismissed on another
ground, viz. that it did not in fact require the land
concerned'.
bead, is entitled to revoke the grant and initiate proceed­
ings to recover the land. Thus in Adagun v. Fagbola alias 
£
Lasisi a member was given a portion of the family land under 
the normal customary tenure. Without the knowledge or 
consent of the family, he purported to mortgage the land 
to a third party. The family head thereupon sued for 
recovery of the land on the ground that, by alienating his 
interests therein, he had forfeited his tenure. This claim 
was upheld by the court (Kingdom, C.J.).
In this respect, it makes no difference that the
tenant had improved the property in question. Family
property does not cease to be so by reason only that a
7member has improved it. If a member builds on a piece
of family land he occupies with its permission, he has a
right to sell the structure (as chattel, perhaps) but not
7awith the land on which it stands. Here we see a conflict 
between the rule that a person is entitled to the fruit of 
his labour and the rule that family property can only be 
alienated with the consent of the family. Another condition 
in favour of the family is that no length of occupation will
6. (1932) 11 N.L.R.110. See also Buraimo v. Crbamgboye
(1940) 15 N.L.R.139* where it was also held that This 
rule had been proved.so often in court that it needed no 
proof any more.
7. Shelle v. Asa.jon, (1937) 2 Fed. Sup. Ct. 65 ( =
Selected Judgements of the Federal Supreme Court of 
Nigeria)*
7a. Qmolowun v. Olokude (1958) W.R.N.L.R.130.
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ever ripen a member's tenancy into ownership.
In favour of the tenant there is the condition/guarantee 
that so long as he continues in possession and is of good 
behaviour, he cannot be dispossessed by the family. As 
Webber, J., said in the Bob'Manuel case, his grant is 
practically irrevocable. There is also an implied guarantee 
that he shall be left in quiet possession. Hence other 
members not in residence in the same house (or not occupying 
other farm plots which can only be reached across his own) 
have no right of entry thereon, against his will. This is 
of course subject to the exception that if the land in 
question is the traditional family house, members are 
entitled to attend meetings therein, and members of the 
family council are in addition entitled to enter so as to 
view the state of repair.^
It may be argued that this customary tenancy in effect 
deprives the family of its land for an indefinite period 
of time, since they have to wait till the tenant either 
abandons possession or commits a breach of one of the 
conditions already discussed. This is true but only up to 
a point. The occupier's tenancy is only thus secure as
8* Cf. Winkfield, J., in Lewis v. Bankole, ante, at p.92;
judgement read by Packard, J. Bee also Shelle v. Asajon. 
ante, at p.67, per Jibowu, Ag. F.C.J., as he then was.
9* Lewis v. Bankole, 1 U.L.R.82, at p.105, per Osborne, C.J.
long as the property remains family property. But the 
family has a right to partition it or permanently alienate 
it once the necessary consent has been obtained. This may 
be done even if part of the property is in individual 
occupation.
(v) Right to be consulted.
In strict legal theory, every member of the family 
should be consulted personally before any dealings in family 
property or any interests in it are undertaken. Strictly 
speaking, too, any transactions done without such full 
consultation is voidable at the best, if indeed it is not 
void ab initio. But anything like full consultation is 
never practicable if only because some members are too 
young or too ill to understand what they are being consulted 
about, while others are too far away from home at any given 
time to be reached in time. Customary law, therefore,
Q Q
provides for consultation by pro%y.y as it were. Thus, 
infants are "consulted” through their parents or guardian; 
absent members are consulted through their more immediate 
relations resident locally. So far, the law accords with 
common sense and expeditiousness. But should every adult
Indeed it dispenses with consultation altogether where 
the transaction in question is of little importance, e.g. 
short-term leases. These can be done by the family head 
or his authorised representative without any prior 
consultation with other members.
and mentally capable member within easy reach be consulted?
If any of them are left out, what is the legal position as 
regards the validity of the transaction carried out: is it
valid, void or voidable?
The answer to this question will depend on the nature 
and magnitude of the transaction and the existence or other­
wise of agreed proceedings in any given family. On matters 
of ordinary day-to-day management of family property, no 
consultations are required. The family head (or the appointed 
land authority, if any) is, by virtue of his office, 
empowered to manage such property and make minor adjust­
ments in intra-family claims and rights. He thus has a 
right to grant short leases (such as annual leases of parts 
of the family farm land, or monthly leases of urban house 
rooms), to allocate and re-allocate rooms or farm plots 
to members, to collect rents, accept surrenders of leases, 
and to effect necessary repairs. Transactions of this type 
carried out by him are valid and binding on the family 
although there had been no consultations with other members.
Any transaction, however, which involves alienation 
of family property on a permanent or long-term basis requires 
(as we shall see later) a prior consent of the family as a
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whole. It is in these circumstances (e.g. sales, long-term
plantation leases, mortgages or pledges) that the individual
member has a right to be consulted. This principle has been
litigated in scores of cases and accepted as a fundamental
principle of the institution of family property. Thus in
the Yoruba case of Adedubu v. Makanjuola.^  the head of an
Ibadan family sold and conveyed a portion of his family's
land to a stranger without consulting some of the members.
There was some evidence in the trial court that the head
could sell without any consultations; (in other words that
members had no right to be consulted at all). The learned
trial judge accepted this evidence in the face of the
purchasers own sworn admission in these words,
”1 knew that the land was family land.
I know that no Magaji (family head) 
can sell family land without consent 
of the family;"^c
He also disregarded the family head!s own pleadings which
by necessary implication admitted that he had no such right.
For paragraphs 5 and 7 of his defence sought to establish
that the sale was done with the consent of "all senior and
principal members", while paragraph 6 denied in strong terms
the allegation that he had not consulted the other members.
9b. (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 33; Other cases on the subject include 
Adewuyin v. Ishola (1958) W.R.N.L.R. 110; Esan v. Faro 
(1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 135 5 Onasanya v. Shiwoniku (1960)T"~ 
W.R.N.L.R. 166; Buraimo v. Gbamgboye (1940) 15 N.L.R. 139* 
9c. 10 W.A.C.A. 33, at p. 35.
9d. Ibid., at p.34.
1 0 fl
The West African Court of Appeal rejected both the learned 
judge1s finding of "fact” and the evidence on which it was 
based, and held that such a startling proposition could not 
be entertained. The case was remitted to the court below 
nfor further consideration on the basis that the Court was 
bound by the express admission of the Defendant that no 
Mogaji can sell family land without the consent of the 
family. If^ e
Qf
In Onasanya v. Shiwoniku the High Court of the Western 
Region held that family consent was essential for a valid 
partitioning of family property. And so, here too, the 
individual has a right to be consulted. We shall see later 
that every member need not consent, for a majority decision 
is enough. Hut here we are only concerned with the question 
of consultation. It is submitted that an important element 
in the individual’s rights in family property is a right to 
be consulted in advance of any major transaction involving 
the ownership or long-term possession thereof. It may be 
objected that there is no essential difference between the
9e. 10 W.A.C.A.33* at p.36. Rote that the headnote to this 
case is misleading because it says that "the consent of 
all the members of the family is necessary to such a 
sale.1 All members need not be consulted.
9f. (1960) W.R.N.L.R.166.
right to be consulted and the necessity for consent* This 
objection is easily answered if one may draw a little analogy
with company law. Certain general meetings (e.g. those 
called to discuss changes in the constitution of the company, 
removal of the chairman, alteration in share capital and 
the like) require for their validity that notice thereof 
shall be given to every shareholder not later than seven to 
fourteen days in advance. In other words, every shareholder 
has a right to be notified of the meeting. But unanimity 
is not essential for the validity of a meeting which is 
itself lawfully constituted. A bare majority may be enough.^ 
In the same way, a major decision (as above described) taken 
without consulting the members will be void ab initio. But 
given full consultation, a majority decision may be valid and 
binding on the family as a whole. What exactly is the nature 
of this right to be.consulted? Personal consultation is 
neither required nor possible for all persons. It is enough 
that the heads of the constituent branches have been person­
ally consulted. This is usually done in a family council 
meeting summoned for that purpose. It is then the duty of 
each branch head to inform his immediate subordinates of, 
and collect their views on, the proposed transaction. As a
9g. See Grower. Modern Company Law, pp.454-9; Halsbury1 s
Laws of England (3rd edn., Hailsham), Vol.6, pp.332-7.
rule, this is normally done in branch meetings. As a result 
of these branch meetings, the branch heads generally vote 
(at a subsequent council meeting of the whole family) in 
accordance with the expressed wishes of the members of their 
respective branches. (These wishes may be unanimous or 
merely those of the majority).
We may sum up the position by saying that for ordinary 
everyday management of and minor transactions in connexion 
with family land, the individual member has no right to be 
consulted. But as regards permanent alienation, final 
partitioning among members and even temporary but long-term 
dispositions, he has a right to be consulted in advance.
If he happens tc be a branch head, he must be consulted 
directly; if he is not, he still must be consulted, but 
it is enough that this is done by proxy - through his own 
branch head. A major transaction made or decision taken in 
connexion with family property without such full consultation 
is void. The question of consent is another matter, and 
will be discussed more fully later.
(vi) Right of disposition.
The right of a member tenant is merely one of exclusive 
possession and user as above described. He has no right to
alienate the land itself or his interests in it without the 
consent of the family. Any attempted unauthorised alienation 
is void, and in addition renders him liable to an action for 
recovery of the land at the instance of the family head.^
His interest in the property is not attachable by his judge­
ment creditors.^ He cannot pass it down to his children 
either inter vivos or by will. After his death, his widow 
and children, if any, are entitled to remain on the land
during good behaviour, but do not thereby inherit it or the
12right to collect rents on it. If a member tenant lets 
rooms he was allowed to occupy to third parties, without 
the consent of the family, the head, not the tenant himself, 
has the right to collect rents from such third parties.^ 
There are, however, circumstances in which a member tenant, 
can collect rents from his sub-tenants for his own benefit.
A member may be so old or infirm that he is not able to 
earn his living. To help him, the family might permit him 
to sub-let parts of the family house or farm land in his 
occupation, and to keep the rents or other payments received
10. Buraimo v. G-bamgboye, 15 N.L.R.139; Shelle v. Asa.jon,
ante; Adagun v. Ragbola. ante; Caulcrick v. ifarding,
7 N.L.R.48.
11. Miller Bros, v. Ayeni» 5 N.L.R.40.
12. Sogunro-Davies v. Sogunro, (1929) 9 N.1.R.79; Dosunmu v.
Dosunmu (1954) 14 W.A.C.A.527.
13. Shelle v. Asa.jon, ante.
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therefor. A young member was often allowed, in traditional 
society, to sub-let farm land or other portions of family 
property so as to raise funds for a contemplated marriage, 
title-taking expenses or similar prestige undertakings. The 
point to emphasise here is that in all such cases, the 
express consent of the family is required for the sub-letting 
and so, indirectly at least, for the member1^ keeping the 
proceeds thereof. It may be objected that this subject 
(i.e. right to collect and retain rents from sub-tenants) 
is of no legal importance since it is clearly a case of being 
permitted to do so. .but this objection overlooks the 
nature of the consent or permission itself. As we shall see 
later, such a permission is valid and binding on all members 
even if obtained on a narrow majority vote. Hence it might 
mean in fact that some, perhaps many, members are being 
deprived of the income of family property against their will.^
(vii) Right to Intestate Succession.
There is nothing like succession to family property or 
any part of it as far as the individual member is concerned.
If there is succession at all, it is by one generation of 
the family after another. But even this idea is not tenable
14. This raises anew the whole question of corporate owner­
ship versus individual rights into which we cannot enter 
here.
since the family is one perpetual socio-legal entity.
However that may he, the individual member does not succeed
to rights in the property as a whole: he becomes entitled
to such rights by virtue of his membership of the family and
quite often in the life time of his parents. One has only
15to remember the old maxim nemo est haeres vivffntis J to see 
that any argument in favour of succession is untenable. 
Neither does the individual inherit that portion of the 
family property which his father (or mother) had been allowed 
to occupy exclusively during his/her life time. Children 
are invariably allowed to continue in possession after their 
parents1 death in these circumstances. But this is not the 
same as saying that they inherit that land or any interests 
therein. To begin with, they have no right to alienate 
their interests whether permanently or for a limited period 
of time - without the consent of the family. Secondly, 
there is nothing peculiar about the rule which says that 
such children shall be left in possession on the same terms 
as their deceased parent. This is true of practically all 
cases of gratuitous customary tenure, especially where
15. No one can be heir during the life of his ancestor:
Coke on Littleton. 22b.
16kinship ties bind the tenant to his landlord.
We may summarise our discussion under this heading by 
saying that the children of a member tenant, and a fortiori 
his widows, do not inherit their father!s tenancy; they 
are however entitled to remain on the land on the same terms 
as their father in accordance with the normal rules of 
customary tenancy where the parties involved are kinsmen.
(b) Members by birth - II. Females.
In the past, there was almost complete uniformity on
the subject of the law relating to women!s rights in family
property. Apart from the matrilineal Yako of the upper
Gross River basin and the mixed-descent societies in and
around Afikpo, all in the Eastern Region, the customary law
everywhere in southern Nigeria denied women any direct
17rights in such property. ' But some societies have come a 
long way away from this discrimination against women. As 
a result, it may be said that southern Nigeria can now be 
divided into two main groups of societies, viz. those in
16. Bee generally, Lloyd, op. cit., pp.89-92, esp. 91;
Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration ,... pp.140 ff. 
Obi, op. cit. , pp.107-114, and the authorities cited 
there.
17. Bee Coker, op. cit., p.155 (Yoruba); Omoneukanrin,
op. cit.. p.8? (Itsekiri); Porde and Jones, op. cit.. 
pp.22-3 (ibibio, including Efik).
which women have and those in which they have no interests, 
as of right, in family land. The former are found in the 
north-east and the south-west, while the latter occupy the 
rest of southern Nigeria.
In addition to the Yako of the Obubttttt Hill districts
and the Ibo of Afikpo (and Ohafia) already referred to, the
Yoruba of today give to their women virtually equal rights
and interests in family property as their men.*^’^ , This
right was held as long ago as 1937 to be well settled and
20beyond argument in Sule v. A.jisegiri. But two points of 
interest must be mentioned here. The first is that almost 
all the reported cases dealing with the Yoruba law on this 
subject concern the final partitioning of the property in 
question or the distribution of the proceeds of sale thereof.
It would be interesting to speculate on what course the 
stream of judicial decisions would have taken had the issue 
before the courts been the normal annual allocation of 
family farm land for cultivation purposes. One would not 
be surprised if the decisions confirmed the traditional 
discrimination against women, in view of the fact that, as
18. For the gradual recognition of women’s rights in family
property among the Yoruba, see Coker, op. cit.. pp.155-162 
and the^ cases there cited.
19. For a practical limitation on women’s land rights, see
Elias, Groundwork ...., p.328.
20. (1937) 13 N.1.R.146, £er Butler Lloyd, J.
7a rule, men are responsible for the maintenance and general 
well being of family members* In this connexion it should 
also be noted that, as Elias has rightly said, women are "not 
usually given any farm land in the general allotment.”^ In 
practice, women have to make a request to the family head 
(or the land authority, as the case may be) if and whenever 
they require a piece of farm plot for their own use. Since 
the law now accords them a right to the land on equal terms 
as the men, female members* request for such farm plots 
could not lawfully be turned down. (Neither, in point of 
fact, is the request of their counterparts in other societies 
refused except in abnormal circumstances, such as where the 
woman concerned is of such bad character that she is a 
social disgrace to her family). The other point to note is 
that practically all the reported cases concern disputes 
over house rooms in urban areas, especially in Lagos, where 
there has been acute housing shortage for the better part 
of a century. There could be little doubt but that even 
the Customary Courts would have been prepared to declare 
that women have always had equal rights in the family land 
with men, if the choice before them was between this and 
permitting the male members of the family to turn their 
sisters and widowed sisters-in-law into the street in the
1. Op. cit., p.328
name of customary law. In the societies under consideration, 
the fact that a female member has married out of the family 
does not affect her right to a share in the family property: 
she has a right, for instance, to come hack to it on leaving 
her husband. In these societies too, if family property 
is sold, female members are entitled to a share of the 
proceeds of sale, wherever they happen to live at the time. 
What a married woman cannot do is to bring her husband to 
live on the land of her maiden family without the consent 
of that family. If a man is allowed (or suffered) to live 
with his wife on part of her family property, he is liable 
to be evicted at his wife’s death. For as he is not a 
member of the family, the security of tenure which the 
customary law affords members is not available;to him. His 
position is even weaker than that of a man residing with his 
wife in her ante-nuptial private house. It has been held 
with referred to Ibo law that in a case like the latter, the 
woman's maiden family, not her husband or his family, is 
entitled to the house.^
In the other parts of southern Nigeria, women have no 
direct rights in family property. But they do have a right,
2. Gf. Carey, J., in Coker v. Coker (1938) 14 N.1.R.83, at
p.86.
3- Cf. evidence of the chiefs re-stated in Lopez v. Lopez.
(1924), 5 N.L.R.47* at pp.49-50, being evidenc e origin­
ally given in Omoniregun v. Sadatu in 1888 (unreported).
4. Hwugege v. Adigwe (1934) 11 N.L.R.134.
as wqrds or dependants, to reside on such, property. They 
cannot be turned out of any rooms in their actual occupation 
without satisfactory alternative accommodation being provided 
for them. These rights are suspended when they leave the 
family to be married elsewhere or for other reasons. But 
they retain the right to return to their maiden family and 
to be given living accommodation if, for instance, their 
Carriage breaks up or their husbands die. In these societies, 
female members must ask for any farm plots they wish to 
cultivate. Their request is normally not refused; but if 
it is, they have no legal remedy against the family. On a 
final partitioning of the family property, women have no 
right to be considered. It is considered unnatural for a 
woman to remain permanently unattached (by marriage) to a 
man and his family. Customary law, therefore, did not make 
any provisions for a state of affairs whereby adult women 
would live as spinsters among their own people. Neither did 
customary law envisage the growth of cosmopolitan urban areas 
where people from abroad could acquire permanent residential 
sites without being absorbed into the local indigenous social 
groups. Hence there was no provision for the transmission 
of interests in family property through women to their 
husbands or their children. To grant such a right would be 
to undermine the very foundation of indigenous socio-political 
organization and kinship solidarity, by permitting strangers
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to own and occupy parts of the family land without in law 
belonging to the village or town in which the land is 
situated, and without owing allegiance to its political head 
(or authority).^ It was perhaps this consideration that 
prompted Pennington, J., to declare in 1924 that:
f1A decision that women are entitled to share in the 
landed property under native law and custom would 
strike at the very root of native ideas on the 
subject of family property.1
'The extent of a woman’s interest in family property in 
ttie areas under consideration may, therefore, be said to be 
a bare right to be allowed to reside on the family property 
before marriage, and to return to it if she loses her 
husband or her marriage. More particularly, this right 
consists in a recognised duty on the family to give her a 
living accommodation commensurate with her age and position 
in life, having regard to what is at the family’s disposal. 
There is no duty on the family as such to build her a house 
or otherwise acquire rooms for her. That is the duty of her 
parents or guardian. The duty on the family is to let her 
occupy a room or rooms in the family house if she has no 
other accommodation and there is a room available. Altern­
atively, she has a right to demand of the family the allocation
5. Cf. Coker, op. cit.. pp.126, 155 ff.
6. Lopez v. Lopez (1924) 5 R.L.R.47, at p.50.
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to her of building space, still assuming that there is 
available space for this purpose and that her immediate 
household cannot meet her need in this respect, finally, as 
already indicated, she has a right to retain a family house 
or room in her possession till a satisfactory alternative 
is provided, even if the family requires her present room 
for other purposes.
This duty on the family to provide its women members 
with living accommodation is more stringent than its duty 
to give them farm land. In the latter case, women have no 
enforceable right as against the family, for the latter*s 
duty is social, not legal, in character. In normal circumst­
ances, requests by women members for farm plots for ordinary 
use are not refused. But should they be refused, there is 
no legal remedy open to the injured party.
The interests of women members in family property in 
the areas under discussion are coterminous with the continuat­
ion of the property concerned as family property. If the 
family decides to partition its holding permanently or to 
alienate it outright, it is under no obligation to consult 
the wishes of its women members. Indeed, the property may 
lawfully be partitioned or sold in spite of the fact of its 
being occupied by a woman. In that case, her interest lapses, 
and she becomes the responsibility of her parents or guardian
as regards living and farming facilities. This, however, 
is not as unfair to the women as it sounds. Family land is 
partitioned per stirpes and sub-divided in the same way.
This means that the first division is into as many parts as 
the family has branches. Each branch then partitions its 
share into as many parts as it has sub-branches or households. 
This ensures that, as far as building sites and farm land are 
concerned, there is something of the former family property 
which a given household can make available to its women 
members. It would have been otherwise if the partitioning 
were done per capita among the men, for that would mean an 
immediate end to the group family principle and so weaken, 
if not destroy, the inbred sense of responsibility which 
men feel towards women relations as members of their family 
units.
(c) Members by Birth - III. Minors.
In discussing the question of minority, there is a 
tendency among some writers on African customary law to 
confuse contractual capacity with capacity to hold legal 
interests in land. Most systems of law deny minors capacity 
to make valid contracts (except in special circumstances); 
so does the customary law of southern Nigeria. Different legal
systems adopt different expediencies in dealing with the
more difficult problem of property rights. English law, for
example, has tried to overcome this difficulty by separating
legal estate in land from beneficial interests therein, and
providing that whereas infants can hold the latter, they
cannot hold the legal estate. This dichotomy is made
possible by the concepts of trusts and settlements. Confronted
with the problem of joint tenancies and tenancies in common
where one of the holders is an infant and the others are of
full age, English law extended the application of the trust
principle so that in such a case the adult co-owners are
deemed to hold the property in trust for sale for themselves
and the infants. And £o guarantee a fair share of the
property to the infant co-owner in such a situation as this
there is the equitable rule that, exceptional circumstances
apart, a trustee must not benefit from his position as 
7trustee.
The customary laws of southern Nigerian societies also
7. See Halsbury1 s Laws of England (3rd, Simond's edn.), Vol. 21, 
esp. pp.151-158; Keeton~on Trust. (5th edn.), pp.45-46; 
Hanburyfs Modern Equity (7th edn.), p.261 and Ch.14;
Underh'i 11fs rusts and Trustees (11th edn.), pp. 113-116;
See also the law of Property Act, 1925, ss.19-22, 35 
(s.19(2) deals with the situation where some co-tenants 
are infants and the others of full capacity); the Settled 
Land Act, 1925, s.27 (where all tenants are infants).
deny contractual capacity to infants (minors) as a general 
rule, but allow them to hold land acquired for them by 
persons of full capacity. Thus both in traditional and in 
contemporary society, minors are often given plots of land 
by parents anxious to evade the rules of intestate succession, 
or desirous of advancing particularly promising children, or 
as a means of evading excessive income tax. As customary 
law does not distinguish between legal estate and equitable 
interest, and since no further act or formality is required 
to vest the radical title of such property in the infant on 
his attaining majority, the conclusion seems justified that 
the radical title passes to an infant donee at the time of 
the initial gift.^
Even if an infant is incapable legally of holding the 
radical title in land, there is no reason in principle to 
suppose that he cannot hold rights and interests in family 
property, for as we have seen, the radical title to such 
property is in the family itself as a corporate entity. And 
so we submit that in the sbsence of special local rules to 
the contrary, minors are entitled to rights and interests in
Q
family property on the same basis as adults. Minors are
8. A contrary view is expressed in Coker, op. cit., p.163, and
in Elias, G-roundwork, p.328.
9. Cf. Coker, op.cit., p.163; Elias, op.cit., p.328. Elias says
that where an infant has an interest in land, "an adult
relative ... will hold it for the minor on trust until his
attainment of puberty or so soon as the minor is capable
%nd ready to cultivate or use the land profitably."This
seems to confirm the contention here, viz. that aminor.can 
hold land m  law. Capacity to hold cannot depend on ability
t ^ ^ l ^ ^ ^ ^ a b l e ^ . u s e .  Besides, minors do take over thiir
not normally given farm plots during the annual allocation; 
nor are they given separate rooms in the family house. But 
this is not because they have no rights or interests in the 
property, but because'they have no need for separate allot­
ments of their own and are physically unable to work or care 
for farms or rooms as the case may be. After all, adult 
males resident abroad are not normally given annual farm 
plots or house rooms - and for much the same reasons.
The true test for determining who are and who are not 
entitled to rights and interests in family land is, in our 
submission, to be found in the answer to the question who 
are entitled to shares in the event of a final apportionment 
of the property or the proceeds of the sale thereof? Apport­
ionment is always done per stirpes, that is, in this connex­
ion, among the various branches that constitute the family."^ 
Sub-division within the branches is also done on the same 
principle, and so on down to a partitioning between the 
individual members of the elementary family. Now if minors 
had no rights in family land, it seems to follow that a 
branch or sub-branch with only minors for members will be 
disregarded for the purposes of a final apportionment, just
10. Dawodu v. Danmole (1962) The Times for July 26th, P.O. 
decision, Lords Lvershed, Jenkins and Guest. upholding 
the Nigerian Supreme Court decision: (1958; 5 Ped. Sup.
Ct. 46.
as branches or sub-branches with only female members are 
disregarded in those societies where women have no rights 
in family property. But it is yet to be suggested that a 
branch will be passed over^these purposes simply because it 
has no adult males. It is interesting to note in this 
connexion that, as regards the property of an elementary 
family, it has been held that a person’s rights and interests 
therein are not affected by his minority, any more than it 
is affected by his absence from the country,^ It is sub­
mitted that this is equally true of rights and interests in 
the property of the extended family. As Ajisafe, writing 
as long ago as 1924, has said,
"Every member of a family or clan has his own share 
of family land, which must be partitioned to him, 
if he so desire it. But it must be proved that he 
is capable of working it before such partition is 
made.”12
We may summarise the legal position by saying that minority 
per se is no bar to the holding of rights and interests in 
land; that male infants everywhere and female infants as 
well in the societies where women are entitled to rights in 
family land, have basically the same rights in such property
11. Salami v. Salami (1957) W.R.N.L.R.10.
12. A.K. Ajisafe, The Baws and Customs of the Yoruba People
(London & Lagos, 1924, Routledge etc.), p.7* ^Partition” 
is perhaps used here in the sense of periodic allotment 
and not final apportionment.
as adult members; that since periodic allocations are 
usually made according to actual need, minors are not normally 
considered for these allocations; that even so, they are 
entitled to be considered on the same basis as adult members 
if they have genuine need and/or are capable of making use 
of the land; and that on the final partitioning of the 
property, they are entitled to as much a share as adult 
members on the familiar principle of division per stirpes.
(d) Members by Marriage.
Under this head we shall discuss the rights and 
interests of (i)married women and (ii)widows^in the properly 
of their husband’s (or late husband’s) family. The modern 
customary law on this point is straightforward and uniform 
and may be stated in a few sentences. A married woman (as 
well as a widow) has some legal rights and interests in the 
property of her husband’s family. During her husband’s life 
time, she has a right to live with her husband in the family 
house or in his own house on the family land. This, in our 
submission, is not merely because the law permits a husband 
to bring his wife onto such property, but because she is 
regarded by the customary law as a member of her husband’s 
family forihis and some other purposes. In other words, her
right is derived from her membership of the family concerned 
and is co-extensive with that membership which, as will 
appear later, may continue after her husband’s death. If 
she deserts or divorces him, however, she loses her right
this, in our view, is because she thereby loses her member­
ship of the family by "abandonment
If on her husband’s death a widow wishes to remain 
attached to his family, she can either stay on as* unattached 
or re-marry within the family. In the latter case, she 
retains her rights in the family property a propos her new 
husband on the same basis as she did in the life time of 
her deceased spouse. If, on the other hand, she chooses to 
remain in the family, but unattached, her legal position in 
the past would depend on whether or not she had a child 
surviving. In Yorubaland, it v/as immaterial whether such a 
child was male or female. If she had any child surviving, 
she was entitled to retain possession of any part of the. 
family property which she or her late husband exclusively 
occupied or made use of. Thus, she would be entitled to 
occupy the matrimonial home even if this was in fact part of
13* Cf. Coker, op. cit.. pp*159-162; Elias, op. cit., p.328
Lloyd, op. cit.. p.298 and passim; Obi, op. cit.,
13to occupy or cultivate any part of this property.  ^ But
the family house.^ She would also have a right to cultiv­
ate any part of the family farm land which for some reason 
her husband used exclusively to cultivate in his life time. 
Among the other societies of southern Nigeria, however, the 
rights described here attached to a widow who had. a son (or 
sons) surviving, but not to other widows.
In the case of a childless widow (among the Yoruba)
or one with no male child living (in other societies), there
was no protection in law. For customary law tool£ it for
granted that a childless (or son-less) widow would like to
re-marry and try to fulfil her major social function in life,
viz. procreation. In legal theory, therefore, such a widow
had no locus standi in the family if she elected to remain
a feme sole. But in actual practice, she was seldom if ever
ejected from her home, or deprived of the use of family farm
plots which she used to cultivate with her husband. As Coker
has said, what authority there is (indeed what evidence of
normal practice there is) supports the proposition that even
a childless widow was entitled to live on the family property
15for as long as she liked.  ^ This in our submission, is now
14. This did not apply to family houses occupied by Chiefs
by virtue of their chiefly office. See Lloyd, op. cit.» 
P*
15. Op. cit., p.160. Cf. Lopez v. Lopez (1924) 5 N.L.R.47,
at p.49.
the general law in southern Nigeria, from all available oral 
evidence.
It must be pointed out, however, that whether a widow 
occupies a portion of the family property as of right or as 
a matter of grace, she does not thereby acquire any dispos-
16able, inheritable or attachable interests in such property.
16. Cf. Oloko v. G-iwa (alias Ekun), (1939) 13 N.L.R.31; 
Sogunro-La v 1es v. Sogunro (1929) 9 N.L.R.79.
PART TWO 
THE ELEMENTARY FAMILY
CHAPTER k#
NATURE, COMPOSITION AND GENERAL FUNCTIONING 
Definition#
This Part will he devoted to an examination of 
the law relating to the formation, functioning and dissolu­
tion of the elemefciary family# We defined this institution 
earlier on as a domestic unit consisting of a man and his 
wife or wives, his unmarried children, andjother dependants 
if any# ^here is an unusual measure of agreement among 
writers on Nigerian social institutions in this respect, 
though different writers chose slightly different names 
for the same group. Jones, for instance, defines a family 
as "A husband, wife (or wives) and their unmarried children11 
Porde preferred the term "household11, which he defined as 
"a group usually consisting of a married man with one or
more wives and children and occasionally an adult dependent
2
such as a widowed mother or disabled brother#1 But
1. Report on the Position* Status and Influence of Chiefs 
and Natural Rulers in the Eastern Region of Nigeria# p. v 
2# "Government in Umor. A Study of Social Change and Pro- 
blems df Indirect Rule in a Nigerian V i l l a g e  Community", 
(1939) 12 Africa, 129-61, at p.130.
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elsewhere the same writer uses the term " domes tic family11,
and thisiihe defines as a social unit which usually consists
of "a man, his wife or wives and his unmarried children, and
any other persons such as his mother or younger brother who
3
may form a basic part of his economic unit.” Bradbury and 
Lloyd in their book on the Edo and the Itsekiri define a 
,!nuclear or compound family1' as a unit made up of a man and 
his wife or wives and their children.^" finally, Harris, 
writing on social change in Lagos, defines a "household" 
in these words, "Each married man, with his wives and un­
married children, and any other kin - such as his widowed 
mother or a young unmarried brother - for whom he was res- 
ponsible, would form a sepaid:e household*" Schwab's 
definition is in similar forms.
These definitions all agree on the usual compo­
sition of an elementary family, viz. a man, his wives and 
children (with or without other dependants). But it must 
be emphasised that the word "family" is not a term of art, 
and is sometimes applied to husband and wife alone (where 
there are no children of the marriage), to a man and his 
children alone (where he is a widower) and to a woman and
3. The ^oruba-speaking Peoples of ^outh-western Nigeria, p.10 
km The Benin Kingdom and the -^do-speaking Peoples of South­
western Nigeria together with a section on the Itsekiri 
(Eorde, ed.), p.27*
3* Family and Social Change in an African City. p.lU*
6. Kinship and lineage among the foruba" (1955) 25 Africa, 
p.365*
i o r?,
1  (J
her children (where she is a widow).
Types of Elementary Families.
An elementary family may be homogeneous or 
composite. It is homogeneous when its father and founder 
only had children by one wife; and composite when he had 
children by more, than one wife. A typical composite family 
is that of a polygamist. Here each wife is entitled to be 
given her own separate house or room(s) in which she lives 
with her children, domestic servants and dependent rela­
tions if any, free from interference from any other wife, 
and only subject to the over-all supervision and control 
of her husband.^ But not all composite families are po­
lygamous. A man may never have had more than one wife
at a time; nevertheless, if he contracted a number of
anil
marriages in succession^had hhildren by two or more of them, 
his family would be a composite one. Similarly, where a 
man had some children by one marriage and some others from 
one or more irregular unions, his family will be classified 
as composite, provided his personal lav/ allows of the af­
filiation of the latter set, of children to his family, and 
that they have been so affiliated (e.g. by bfeing acknowledged)
1. Cf. i^rdener, "The kinship terminology of a group of 
Southern Ibo," (195U) 2b Affica 85-99* at p.87* ^orde, 
"Government in Umor ...." (1939) 12 Africa 129-61, at p. 
130; ^'orde, Marriage and the family among the Yakg in 
South-eastern Nigeria, p.99! Lloyd, ’/Some notes on the 
Yoruba rules of succession and on ^Family Property1 1 
(1959) 3 J.A.L.7-32, at p.10; Ward Marriage among the 
the Yoruba, p.38; and ^gharevba, Benin Law and Custom,
pp.11-12.
The constituent parts of a composite elementary 
family are known by so many different names. even within 
the same ethnic group that we shall.adopt,a neutral English 
term here, and call them "branches”. A branch, as already 
indicated, may consist of a wife and her children (with or 
without other dependants) considered as a unit, in a poly­
gamous family. This is the ordinary meaning of the term as 
used by Nigerians. But it may also, consist of the children 
of a deceased or divorced wife, or the natural children 
of a married man by his mistress. One child is enough to 
constitute a branch, provided he has a different mother 
from the rest of his father’s children. Nor does it make 
any difference that such a child’s mother had not been 
married to his father, so long as he has been duly acknow­
ledged by the latter in accordance with the local customary 
law. ^he curious result of the last two principles, is that 
a man who has only married once in his life (and may indeed 
have been legally incapable all along of contracting another 
marriage on account of his subsisting "Christian" Marriage), 
can still be the founder and father of a composite family. 
For each child he has by a different woman (wife, mistress
or casual acquaintance alike) is regarded as a separate
3branch of his own. As Lloyd said on this point in
2. E.g. Qmoiya (Yoruba), usekwu, mkpuke (Ibo).
3- Cf. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Lav/, p.296#
connection with intestate succession among the Yoruba,
"The child of a concubine ranks as one stock provided that
the father recognised the child by maintaining him ...
Chiefs and informants were insistent’ that if a man had
six children by a faithful wife and six more from fleeting
liaisons with [six different] lovers, there would be seven
stocks, each entitled to a n  equal share of the estate." ^
Finally there is an obsolescent (if not obsolete) practice
found mainly among some Ibo and Ijaw peoples, whereby two
wives and their children together constitute one family
branch. This occurs when a childless wife pays the marriage
expenses of another woman, with her own funds, in her
husband’s name and raises children by her - with the help
of her husband or another man employed for the purpose.
Both the children and their mother would belong to the
house of the childless wife, and together with her would
5
form one branch of the husband’s family. (The modern 
practice is that a childless wife provides her husband with 
the wherewithal to pay for a new wife and raise children 
by her. With the birth of such children, the childless wife 
is deemed to have fulfilled her duty to society. But these 
children would not count as members of her branch in a case
U* Eloyd, loc.cit., p.296.
5. Cf. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, p.275;
Esenwa, "Marriage customs in Asaba division" (T9U8)
13 Nigerian Field, 71-81 at p.7b; Talbot, Tribes of 
the Niger Delta (Izaw), pp.195-6; Talbot, Peoples of 
Southern Nigeria, Vol. Ill* p*^ -39«
of this type)•
Seniority in the family.
A point of considerable importance which is often 
overlooked by writers on customary law and social life 
generally is seniority as between (a) wives, (b) children 
and (c) branches or houses in a composite elementary fami­
ly. The importance of this principle can be shown by means 
of three examples drawn from every-day life. V/hen the father 
of a composite family dies intestate so that his estate 
falls for distribution per stirpes, priority of choice of 
shares is governed by the seniority of the constituent 
stirpes. Again, v/hen money, provisions, farm plots or 
benefits of any kind are to be shared out among the wives 
of a polygynist, priority of choice of shares is strictly 
in accordance with seniority. In the same way, priority 
of choice of shares as between children in such a family 
depends on their seniority inter se. Since this seniority 
is calculated on a slightly different basis as between 
wives, children and family branches, we shall consider 
these groups in turn.
(a) Wives:
The seniority of a wife is governed by the date 
of her marriage into the family, and not by the date of 
her birth or the date of her previous marriage to another
man.^ Thus a girl of eighteen will "be senior in law to a 
woman of thirty if, "both being married to one and the same 
man, the former became his wife before the latter. (This 
raises the question of v/hen a woman actually becomes a 
man’s wife in law, a question we shall discuss at some 
length in the chapter on marriage.) But there are two 
exceptions to this rule. Where a widow re-married within 
her late husband’s family, she retains her marriage date 
with the deceased man as if that union had never been dis­
solved. 1(We shall see in the section on "widow inheritance” 
that the first marriage is actually dissolved in some 
societies.) Also, where tv/o women are married into the 
same family on the same date, as occasionally happens, se­
niority is determined by reference to their dates of birth.
1. Cf. ^lias, Groundwork of Nigerian Law, p.296; Marris,
on.cit.. p. 15; Parkinson, ftNote on the Asaba People (Ibos) 
of the Niger”, (1906) 36 J.R.A.l. 312-214, at p.316*
2. The same principle also governs seniority as between 
women married into a given lineage group such as an 
extended family or a village, with this additional re­
sult. If a woman married a member of a group, Say in 
1950, was divorced from him in 19&2, and married another 
member of the same group on first January 1963, s -^e would 
rank below any other woman who married into that group 
before 1963* In these cases, and once more excluding 
the case of widows re-marrying within their late 
husband’s family, seniority depends on the date of
the current marriage.
(b) Children,
Seniority as between a man&children is determined 
by the date of their birth,,as a general rule. It has 
nothing to do with the seniority of their respective 
mothers. Thus the last wife of a polygamist can be the 
mother of his eldest child, who will in due course take 
his father’s place as family head (unless expressly re­
jected by the other members, as we have seen). This rule, 
however, only applies to children who were born legitimate. 
(We shall see later that legitimacy under customary law 
differs substantially from the concept of the same name in 
hnglish law.^ Suffice it here to say that a child is a 
legitimate child of the man to whom his mother was law­
fully married at the date of his birth or conception)
The seniority of a child who was born illegitimate but was 
later acknowledged by his natural father is reckoned from 
the date of such acknowledgement - more accurately, from
the date of the-'first proved act bf acknowledgement. This
2rule was recognised by implication in Young v. Young 
where it was held that a child who was born illegitimate 
and later acknowledged by his natural father had no right 
to challenge the validity of a sale and conveyance of what 
was family property, since the sale took place before the
1. Cf. In re Aflelabu and Apemu: Lawal, ^kun .and others v. 
Younan & £>ons and others, (1961) 1 All x,i.L.k#2k5f at 
*p350p^ s7c7)
2. 11953.) V*.A.C.A. Civil Appeal, No.3631*
first proved act of acknowledgement and therefore before
3
he was legally a member of the family. If membership of 
such a child in the family dates from his acknowledgement, 
the inference seems inescapable that his seniority vis-a-vis 
other children of his father will be determined with re­
ference to the date on which he was acknowledged, not the 
date on which he was born. In other words, his seniority 
in the family will depend on the date of his legal birth 
into that family, not on the date of his natural birth 
into the world.
A somewhat similar principle governs seniority 
of children who were born illegitimate but were later le­
gitimated by the subsequent marriage of their mother and 
their natural father. If the marriage was done under 
customary law, the child*s seniority will be reckoned with 
reference to the date of his acknowledgement or the date 
of his parents* marriage, whichever is the earlier. This 
follows of necessity from the last principle above. If, 
however, it was a "Christian1* marriage, the Legitimacy Act 
of 1929 ^ will apply. Section 3(1) of this Act provides, 
in respect of persons whose father is domiciled in Nigeria, 
that legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium shall operate 
from the date of the commencement of that Act or the date 
of the marriage, whichever is the last. The effect of this
3. Loc.cit., at pp.23-U*
k* Laws of the federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision, Cap.
103« See also Legitimacy Law (w. Region), 1959 Revision,
Cap.62.
sub-section is that an illegitimate child born before the
Act came into force became legitimated as from the date of
5the commencement of that Act, provided he was still living 
at that date. (Posthumous legitimation was not contemplated 
by the Act.) A child born illegitimate after the com­
mencement of the Act will, if his parents ultimately got 
married to each other, become legitimate with effect from 
the date of such marriage• A propos the other children 
of his father, therefore, such a child’s seniority must be 
calculated from the date of his parents1 marriage.
An intriguing point of conflict of laws arises 
from the fact that statute lav/ and customary law recognise 
different operative dates for legitimation by acknowledgement 
and by subsequent marriage respectively. Suppose that a 
man has a child from an illicit liaison with a concubine, 
and that he acknowledged this child soon after he was born. 
Suppose that he later marries the child’s mother under the 
Act. Prom which date should the child’s legitimation be 
calculated: the date of the acknowledgement, or the date
of the marriage? This problem seems impossible of logical 
solution. The acknowledgement was obviously lawful and 
effectual v/hen it was made, and so the child’s legitimate 
life should begin to run from the date of that event. On 
the other hand, the Legitimacy Act is unequivocal in its
5. I.e. 7th October, 1929*
provision on this point. "Bate of legitimation" is defined
6in s.2 as either the date of the commencement of the Act 
or the date of the legitimating marriage. Section 3d) 
provides that !l... where the parents of an illegitimate 
perdon marry or have married one another ••• the marriage 
shall, if the father of the illegitimate person was or is 
at the date of the marriage domiciled in Nigeria, render 
that person, if living, legitimate from the commencement 
of this [Act] or from the date of the marriage, whichever 
last happend."
The dilemma is apparently complete. And yet one 
of these conflicting rules must yield place to the other.
It is tempting to suggest that the customary rule must do 
so, for it is inconceivable that the clear and unambiguous 
words of a statute should be regarded as otiose by reason 
of the existence of a rule of customary law. But a moment’s 
reflection will reveal the great weakness of this suggestion. 
For it is difficult (to say the least) to see how a statnta 
which a chjld acquired as a result of his natural father’s 
lawful act (viz. the acknowledgement^) could subsequently 
be nullified by another lawful act of the father's (viz. 
the marriage). There is however, a perfectly simple solu­
tion to this problem - a solution which turns out to
6. Viz. 7th October, 1929*
7. Note that semble a man who is married under the Marriage 
Act can lawfully and effectively legitimate his natural 
child by acknowledgement; Alake v. Pratt (1955) 15 
W.A.C.a . 20* Of thisy more later.
uphold the customary law hy interpreting the provisions of
the Legitimacy Act against the general background of Nigerian
social life. It will he recalled that s.3(l) speaks of the
parents of "an illegitimate person" marrying each other.
But a child hho has been duly acknowledged is no longer "an
8illegitimate person", and so does not fall within the
provisions of that Act. Unlike the position in England.
where a person born illegitimate remains so till legitimated
9by the subsequent inter-marriage of his parents, the po­
sition in Nigeria is that a child ceases to be illegitimate 
on being acknowledged by his putative father. It is there­
fore submitted that an acknowledged child Is not covered 
by s.3(l) of the Act. If this be right, then the seniority 
of a child who was born illegitimate but whose parents 
later married each other would be calculated as from the 
date of his acknowledgement or the date of the marriage, 
whichever first occurs.
One final point deserves brief mention here. There 
was in the traditional societies of southern Higeria an 
almost universal rule to the effect that male children had 
priority in law to female children, irrespective of their 
relative ages. In any given polygamous (or composite) fa­
mily, therefore, there were at least three hierarchies - one 
for sons, one for daughters and a third for wives. ^  There
8. Cf. In re.Aremu and Adelabu. (196l) 1 All N.L.R.2U5 at 
p. 2.30*
9* Barring the possibility of legitimation by special Act 
of Parliament.
10. There might be others for slaves, domestic servants and 
other persons attached to the family.
is everything to be said for a rule which decreed that, 
in the nature of things, daughters and wives alike were 
junior to sons as family members, at a time when responsi­
bility for the defence and general welfare of the family 
was the responsibility of men only. But as women now play 
an increasingly active role in the family - paying for the 
education and advancement of its younger members, helping 
to build or maintain the family house out of their own in­
come, giving financial support to the aged, the disabled 
or the indolent members - it is only fair that the law should 
give them a measure of social up-grading commensurate with 
their altered economic position in the family. It is for 
this and similar reasons that the courts in some places, 
and the people themselves in others, are beginning to place oil
immbers of the family on equal footing in matters like an­
il 1?joyment of rights in family property, intestate succession
l^and selection for family headship. ^ One of the most 
interesting examples of this legal evolution being given 
judicial recognition is to be found in Ricardo v. Abal
11. See e.g. bule v. Ajisegiri. 13 N.L.R.li+6;
12. Cf. Salami v. Calami (1957) W.B.N.L.R. 10.
13* See ^eek. Land Tenure and Land Administration in Nigeria, 
pp. 129-30; Meek. Law and Authority, -p. 106; Omoneukanrin, 
Itsekiri Law and Custom, p.31; Partridge, "Native Law 
and Custom in Fgbaland", 10 J.A.S. U23, Llhyd, Yoruba 
Family Law. p.83« See "Family, Property" ante.
(by Momo as Next Friend and Guardian add litem), which held, 
on the evidence of local chiefs called by the female party, 
that the principle of male seniority whereby a man had 
priority over an older woman by reason only of his sex, was
mnot known to Yoruba law*
As for the relative seniority of children and
wives inter se as members of the family, the general rule
seems to be as it was succinctly put by Lloyd in connection
with Yoruba law -
"Within the descent group a wffe is senior in rank 
born
to members^after her marriage into the group and
15junior to those born before it •*.."
To this may be added what has just been said, viz. that in 
the case of persons who were born illegitimate but later 
became members by legitimation, the material date is the 
date of their parents1 subsequent marriage to each other 
or the date of their acknowledgement by their natural 
father as the case may be - in ether words, the effective 
date of legitimation*
11+. (1926 7* N.L.R.58.
15» Yoruba Land Law, p.281+« This rule, houwever, has
little practical legal (as opposed to social) importance. 
It is difficult (but by no means impossible) to visualise 
a situation in real life in which property or other legal 
fights fall for distribution and choice per capita 
among wives and children as members of a given family*
(c) Branches
The branches or segments of a composite family 
rank in order tot seniority according to the relative age 
of the eldest child in each branch* This means that if, 
for example, the eldest (or only) child in each of, say, 
four branches of a man!s family are aged 18, 15 11+ and 10
years respectively, these branches will rank i n .seniority 
in that order* It will be seen that seniority of branches 
within a family is completely independent of.the seniority 
of the women who brought them into existence. This is be­
cause while, ex hypothesi, a man!s children are members of 
his family, the mothers of these children need not be: 
they may have left the man following a divorce, they may 
have died, they may be no more than resident concubines 
with no, legal status in the family at all, or they may be 
non-resident mistresses. It follows that while a mother may 
be part of a family branch as a domestic unit (and so should 
be included in its definition),her presence or membership 
is not necessary for its existence as a legal entity.
A question of considerable importance and difficulty 
is how far it is right to state the principle under consi­
deration in terms of ’’children" sumpliciter, as opposed to 
"sons" or ’’daughters" for patrilineal and matrilineal so­
cieties respectively. T0 take the.case of daughters first, 
-dven in the matrilineal societies of the hastern Region,
matriliny does not play any imp2>:rtant part in the grading 
of (elementary) family branches* As far as rights and 
interests in this type of family and its property are con­
cerned, Y/omen have no priority over men. This., is perhaps 
because the legal life of an elementary family, as opposed 
to an extended family, owes its origin to some man as its 
father, founder and natural head.'1' It is only natural that, 
as themselves potential elementary family founders, sons 
should have pride of place as against their sisters. (We 
shall see in due course that in the distribution of a man’s 
self-acquired disposable property on intestacy, his.sons are 
preferred to daughters as a rule, even in matrilineal and 
mixed-descenisocieties.)
If then the law does not give precedence to 
daughters over sons anywhere in our area of study, does it 
Accord them equal rights with sons as regards seniority of 
family branches of which they are the eldest children? This 
raises anew the question (already discussed) whether or not 
daughters alone could in law constitute a family for the
1. Pace Talbot (In the Shadow of the Bush, p.97) who says 
that among the matrilineal societies of ^koi, it is not 
men but women who are regarded in law as family heads. 
This proposition, as will be shown presently, involves 
an element of confusion between a descent group (which 
is matrilineal and non-territorial) and a domestic family 
(which is territorial and, insofar as it involves succes­
sion rights at all, is patrilineal). In a matrilineal 
society a composite elementary family is not one descent 
group; for the members of its various branches belong to 
different descent groups, viz. those of their respective 
mothers. The founder, head and cementing factor in such a 
family is, therefore, the husband and not his chief wife 
cr any other wife.
purpose of creating family property by operation of law.
It will be recalled that we contended that although women 
now possess equal rights with men in family property in some 
societies, this does not necessary justify the proposition 
that women alone can in law corstitute. a family. To acquire 
a right to participation in existing family property is one 
thing; to constitute a family in which property can vest 
is quite another. But as the.law on this point is not yet 
clear, we can do no more here than give two alternative pro­
positions. If a man’s children by a given woman cannot in 
law constitute a family branch unlesstone of them at least 
is a male, then a branch must be as old as its eldest (or 
only) male member, and will rank in seniority accordingly.
If, on the other hand, absence of a male child is no bar to
its formation, then a branch is as old as the oldest child
2
therein, irrespective of sex.
It should be noticed that for the present purposes
the material age of a child is computed with reference to
the date on which he became a lawful child of his father.
2. The following statement by Lloyd seems to imply that sex 
is not material on this point in Yoruba law. 'The child 
of a concubine ranks as one stock provided [he has been 
acknowledged]. Chiefs and informants were insistent 
that if a man had six children by a faithful wife and 
six more from fleeting liaisons with [six different] lovers 
there would be seven stocks ..." (Yoruba Land Law, p.296.) 
But this inference need not be justified, as the author 
does not appear to have adverted to the question of the 
sexes of these children and.their effect on the formation 
of family stocks.
In the case of children who were horn legitimate in the 
first place, this would he the same as the date of their 
birth. For a child who was born illegitimate but was le- , 
gitimated bybthe subsequent marriage of his parents to each 
other, it would be the date of such marriage. And for 
children who were legitimated by acknowledgement, the ma­
terial date would be the date of the first proved act of 
acknowledgement; this, as we have seen, is the effective 
date of legitimation.
Finally, the branches of a composite elementary 
family will, for certain purposes, retain their relative 
seniority positions for as long as they exist as legal en­
tities. The effect of this deceptively simple rule can best 
be illustrated by reference to apportionment of family 
property, for which it was probably designed. If the three 
branches (B.l, B.2 and B.3) of a composite family who rank 
in that order partition their family property per stirpes 
(as they almost invariably do), choice of shares will be 
made in the same order, irrespective of the relative ages 
of the oldest surviving members thereinrat the date of ap­
portionment. -^ven if the oldest liviing member of B.l is 
only 20 years of age while his opposite number in B.3 is 
25, the first choice still belongs to B.l. But for this 
rule to operate there must be at least one surviving issue
3« Cf. Young v. Young, ante
(within the lineage) of that first child who initially gave 
B.l its seniority by being the founder’s eldest, son or 
eldest child as the case may be. As this rule is of greater 
practical importance in connexion with grand-parental and 
extended families, however, it need not detain us here.
Head Wives.
It is generally accepted that a man’s first wife
(of* if dead, the most senior surviving wife in order of date
of marriage) is entitled to great respect not only from the
junior wives but also fiom the husband himself and all his
1 ^children irrespective of sex. Her position carries with 
it a considerable amount of prestige, and qualifies her 
for the title of "mother" or its vernacular equivalent, for 
example iyale (Yoruba), Okhuo Odion (Bini) or anasi (Ibo). 
But these rights are essentially social in character, not 
legal: they cannot, for instance, constitute a ground for
action in the customary courts to say nothing of magistrates 
and superior courts. There are, however, four points that 
seem to deserve brief mention here, as they savour of legal 
rights. In the past, it was at once the right and the duty
1. See generally, Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, pp.97S* 
Basden, Niger Ibos. pp.228-9; Talbot, Tribes of the 
Niger Delta, p.196: Talbot, The Peoples of Southern
Nigeria, Vol. Ill, p.i+Ul (iboY, and p• (Bkoi/Yako);
Forde, Carriage and the Family among the Yako in South­
eastern Nigeria, p.99: Delano, The Soul of Nigeria, p. 
Ik 3 \ Ward, Marriage among the Yoruba, p.i-i-l* Fgharevba, 
Benin Law and Custom, p.lU: Parkinson, "Note on the Asaba 
People (Ibos)of the Niger” (1906), 36 J.R.A.I., p.316.
of the first wife to represent the junior wives in a dis-
2pute between a husband and all his wives as a body. But 
though she still does this on occasion, she can no longer 
do so as of right, in the teeth of opposition from the 
other wives. On the other hand, she is no longer under any 
Hegal obligation (though she usually considers it her moral,, 
duty) to perform this function.
The second point is that in parts of Iboland, 
when a polygynist takes an qzq title, his first (or most 
senior surving) wife as above defined has a right to assume 
a new title-holder's name, and to wear the.usual regalia
-Z
(or other symbols) of membership of this exalted society.
The third point concerns the matrilineal Ekoi peoples of the ;
Upper Cross &iver and the Obubura Hill District of the Eastern
Region. According to Talbot, in a polygamous family it is
"the chief wife, not the husband [that traditionally]
h
was regarded as head of the house." If, as seems un­
likely, this statement is intended to mean that the "chief 
wife" is the head of her own branch of the polygamous family, 
it is quite unexceptionable. But if it means that such 
a wife is or has ever been regarded as head of the entire 
composite family, we can do no better than confront the
2. Cf. Delano, op.cit., p.ll|3*
3* Basden, Mger Ibos, pp.228-9*
U. In the Shadow of the Bush, p.97*
author with a statement by another distinguished antrho-
pologist who has made a special study of the same peoples.
"The first married or the senior existing wife has no formal
5superiority or prerogative." A slight element of over­
emphasis there may be in this latter statement, but in 
our submission, it is much nearer the true legal position 
than Talbot’s.
The fourth and final point is one that has a 
large measure of legal significance, and concerns the law 
relating to damages adultery. It is always considered 
a much more serious wrong to commit adultery with a person’s 
first wife, where he is a polygamist. And to commit adultery 
with the first wife of a chief,- a priest or, among the Ibo, 
an qzq title-holder is indeed a very grave offence against 
the husband. T^e damages recoverable in these cases were 
correspondingly higher than those payable in respect of 
adultery with second or subsequent wives.
Acquisition and Loss of Membership.
A person acquires membership of an elementary 
family by marriage, by birth in wedlock, by birth out of 
wedlock followed by marriage or acknowledgement, by adoption, 
by being accepted as a ward or as a resident domestic 
servant. These topics will form the subject matter of the
5* ^orde, Marriage and the family among the YakO ..., p#99* 
Note that the names "Ekoi" and "Yakb" cover practically 
the same societies.
next three chapters. Obviously it is only possible in this 
thesis to examine the more important legal principles in­
volved, as a detailed examination of any one of them 
could easily provide sufficient material for a separate 
thesis. And so all we can do here is to examine the e s ­
sential legal requirements for, and the legal incidents of 
a valid marriage (including engagement and betrothal); thfe 
concept of illegitimacy; legitimation (either by subsequent 
marriage or by acknowledgement); the basic rules relating 
to adoption, guardianship and domestic service employment.
Family membership is lost by marriage (in the 
case of a child), by divorce (in the case of a wife), by 
a child renouncing or being renounced by his father/guardian, 
by termination of a service employment, and of course by 
death in all cases. These topics will be discussed in the 
chapters dealing with divorce and the inter-relationship 
of parent and child, guardian and ward, and master and 
domestic servant respectively.
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C H A P T E R  V
AGREEMENTS TO MARRY - I 
Nature, formation and incidents
Terminology
There are many points of difference between an agree­
ment to marry which is governed by customary law and one 
that is governed by the general (English) law: the parties
are different, so are the modes, the permissible ages, the 
resulting legal obligations and the remedies available to 
one party where the other cannot or will not fulfil their 
part of the bargain. In view of these differences, and to 
avoid possible confusion of thought, we propose to employ 
here two different terms, viz. "betrothal1 and "contract 
to marry11'*’ respectively according as the agreement falls 
under one system of law or the other.
Definitions
Betrothal may be defined as a formal agreement under
--------- C*
2 3 -customary law between a woman, and/or her family on/one
________________ -n___________
1. Occasionally "engagement" will be used (for brevity) with
the same meaning as "contract to marry".
2. "Man" and "woman" are used here to include a child of any
age.
3. "Family" is used here to denote the (immediate) lineage
group of which the man or woman in question is a member.
We shall see later that, in the final analysis, this means 
no more than the parents or guardians of the spouses-to-be
hand and a man and /or his family on the other, whereby the 
woman's family agree to give her in marriage to the said man, 
the man and/or his family, for their part, undertaking to 
have the woman as wife, to pay any agreed bride price (dowry) 
and generally fulfil the usual obligations of "in-laws".
Betrothal is "formal" in more than one sense of the 
word. First, it is normally a formal expression, before one 
or more witnesses, of a prior informal agreement between the 
prospective spouses or their families to marry or be given 
(and accepted) in marriage as the case may be. Secondly, 
the transaction normally follows a fairly well-defined 
procedure or form in any given society, and is everywhere 
sealed, as it were, with commensaltty of one kind or another. 
(The usual victuals are kola nuts or some other fruits and 
nuts, drinks and a good meal, in that order).
A contract to marry, as the name implies, is a legal 
obligation between a man and a woman to take each other as 
husband and wife by one of the methods prescribed by the 
general law. This is, in essence, a transaction between the 
prospective spouses as individuals, not between their 
respective families.
Parties to the agreement
A. Betrothal
As a general rule, the parties to a betrothal are the
families of the prospective spouses, and not the prospect-
1—8ive spouses themselves. ~ In the olden days, an infant
1. On betrothal generally, see: Phillips (ed.), Survey of 
African marriage and family life, esp. pp.121-8, 201-6, 257-62; 
Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, African systems of kinship and 
marriage, esp. p.322ff; Elias, The Nigerian legal systemri963)
pp.290-1.
2. On the Edo, see: Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit., pp.48-9 and 
156; Thomas, "Marriage and legal customs of the Edo-speaking 
peoples" (1910-11) 11 J. Camp. Leg.(n.s.) 95; Bradbury and 
Lloyd, op.cit., esp. pp. 48-9# 80, 156; Egharevba, op.cTtT, 
p.15.
3. On the Efik and Ibibio: Talbot, Peoples of southern Nigeria, 
Vol.Ill, p.451; Talbot, Life in soutEern Nigeria, p.2Q5;Talbot 
(D.A.), Woman's mysteries of a primitive people, p.885 Forde 
and Jones, op.cit'., esp. p.77; Cotton, ,rThe CaTabar marriage 
law and custom"^(1905) 4 J.A.S.427-8; Simmons, "Sexual life, 
marriage and childhood among the Efik" (I960) 30 Africa, 161;
4. On the Ibo: Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, 69-70;
Basden, Niger Ibos, 215-£Q;Efceghe, A short history of Abiriba, 
pp.46-7; Talbot, Peoples^!!!, (ante)“ 440ff; Esenwa, "Marriage 
customs in Asaba Division" (19481 13 Nig.Field, 76; Green, Ibo 
village affairs, p.161; Meek, Law and authority .., p.268 ff.
5. I jaw (inc. Kalahari): Talbot, Peoples of s.Nigeria, III, 
p.438; Talbot, Tribes of the Nige~Delta, p. 180; Kammer, 
"Marriage custom of Bakana, New Calabar1, ^1910), 16 W.Eq.
Afr. Dioc. Mag. pp.58-9*
6. On the Itsekiri: Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit., pp.l90ff? 
Omoneukanrin, op.cit., pp.40-1.
7. On the Yakft (Ekoi): Talbot, Peoples.Ill (supra), p.454 ff./ 
Forde, Marriage and the family among tne~^7akb, pp.14-9;
0. On the Yoruba: Forde, The Yoruba-speaking peoples, p.28; 
Delano, The soul of Nigeria, p.l£l; Ward, Marriage among the 
Yoruba, p.11; Kasunmu, loc.cit., p.4; Rev. Johnson, History of 
the Yorubas, p.114; Coker, op.cit., pp.231-3; Partridge,
"Native law and custom in Egbaland" (1911)> 10 J.A.S.422-33* 
at p.425. •
could lawfully be betrothed without his knowledge (as where 
he was too young to understand the significance of the 
proceedings), or prior consent (as where he was a long way 
away* from home at the time), or even in spite of his object­
ion. In modern times, however, while infant betrothal is 
still lawful in many societies, and may be done without his 
knowledge if the infant in question is too young to be told, 
betrothal is in the vast majority of cases done with the 
active co-operation of the prospective spouses.
The persons who normally take part in a betrothal as 
representatives of the two families are the prospective spoused 
parents (especially the father), their family heads, grown-up 
brothers and uncles (viz. paternal and maternal uncles in 
patrilineal and matrilineal societies respectively). But the 
parents of the spouses-to-be, indeed their fathers alone, can 
and sometimes do represent their respective families. While 
this is unusual and not unnaturally frowned upon as socially 
undesirable, it is quite lawful. This being so, it may be 
said that in the final analysis, the essential parties to a 
betrothal are the parents of the spouses-to-be, or their 
guardians•
The one exception to this rule is that a man of mature 
age - in particular, a widower or a married man who wants a
second or subsequent wife - may, and often does, negotiate 
and conclude a betrothal without participation or inter­
vention by any member of his family. It would be idle to 
speculate on whether in doing this he is in fact contracting 
for and on behalf of his family even if he has no such 
intention.
One final point on parties to a betrothal is that in 
these days of extensive travel, with children separated from 
their parents and near relations by vast distances, the 
practice is growing of distant relations acting as special 
marriage guardians for infants and adults alike, and so 
deputising for parents at their request or at the request of 
the prospective spouses.
B. Contract to marry
Under the general ("English") law, the essential parties 
to a contract to marry are the prospective spouses themselves, 
not their parents or families.
It may be objected that where the spouses-to-be are 
infants (in this case, persons under 21 years of age), any 
purported contract to marry would be void, since the proposed 
marriage could not lawfully take place without parental consen
g
or its statutory equivalent, and since the agreement is 
unenforceable anyway. To the first part of this objection 
it may be replied that there is no necessary connexion between 
parental consent as affecting legal capacity to contract a 
valid marriage, and legal capacity to enter into a binding 
contract to marry. This can easily be seen from the fact 
that where one of the prospective spouses is an adult and 
the other a minor, the latter has no capacity to marry with­
out the necessary consent, but he does have a right of action 
against the other party for a breach of promise.^ The 
contract is, therefore, not void in the accepted sense of 
that word.^ As to the second part of the objection, the 
fact that a promise of marriage cannot be enforced against 
an infant arises, not from absence of parental consent, but 
from a general policy of English law (common*^ and statutory^
9. In certain circumstances the necessary consent may be given 
by a Regional Governor, a judge of the High Court or an 
administrative officer: s.20 of the Marriage Act, ante.
10. Cf. Bromley, op. cit.» p.16.
11. Cheshire and Pifoot, The Law of Contract (5th edn.), p.545 
Bromley, ibid.
12. See Cheshire and Pifoot, ante, pp.355-41.
13* See the (U^K.) Infants Relief Act, 1874, which has been 
held to apply to Nigeria as a statute of general application: 
Labinjoh v. Abake (1924) 5 N.L.R.32 (Pull Ct.). This case 
actually refers just to the colony (both parties being natives 
of Lagos); but the Act will in all probability be held applic­
able generally, and has in fact been re-enacted by the W.Romon 
legislature as part of that Regionfs law.
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to protect infants from contractual liability in all but a 
few cases. (An infant's promise of marriage will not be 
rendered enforceable against him even if consented to by his 
parents). In spite of an infant's incapacity to marry with­
out parental consent, therefore, he can enter into a contract 
to marry.
Consents
The question of consents will be dealt with under two 
heads, viz. parental consent and consent of the prospective 
spouses themselves.
The customary law in our area of reference does not 
envisage parental consent to a betrothal. Where a prospective 
spouse is a man and is sui juris (i.e. neither a minor nor an 
adult dependant in law), he has legal capacity to be betrothed 
to any woman of his choice without parental consent, if he so 
desires.^" But where a spouse-to-be is an infant male or a 
female of any age, the proper party to their betrothal is 
their family. This is also true of dependent adult males, 
as in the case of mentally sub-normal persons. In these 
cases, therefore, the question of parental consent does not
1. There are overwhelming social reasons why such consent ts-
is almost invariably sought and obtained, but more of this 
later.
2. We have seen that in the final analysis, "family'* here
really means "parents" in all normal cases.
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really arise: either the parents are essential, not merely
consenting, parties to the betrothal agreement, or they 
have nothing to do with it in law.
Nor does ’’English” law require parental consent to a
contract to marry. As we shall see in the chapter on
marriage, a minor requires parental consent to his/her
marriage because there is a statutory provision to that 
3
effect. But there is no corresponding legal requirement for 
parental consent to a minor’s contract to marry. As for 
parental consent to such a contract where the parties thereto 
are no longer minors, there is some judicial authority to 
the effect that no such consent is required. This is found 
in a decesion of \vraddington, Asst. J., in Alice Ugboma V. 
James Morah^ where an exchange of promises made during 
infancy was later renewed in adult life. The defendant 
argued, nevertheless, that a woman had no capacity under the 
local customary law (Ibo) to enter into a contract to marry 
without her parents’ consent. Since the plaintiff had not 
obtained such consent, the argument continued, she had not 
given valuable consideration for the defendant’s promise,
3. Marriage Act, s.18 (parental consent) and s.20 (consent by
a Governor, a High Court judge or an administrative 
officer).
4. (1940) 15 N.L.R.78.
and so no contract had been made. Dismissing this argument, 
the learned assistant judge said -
"It cannot possibly be argued that where the parties
are of age the withholding of consent by their
parents is a bar to their contracting a Christian
marriage. Parties can undoubtedly contract a
valid marriage under the Marriage (ActJ without
their parents’ consent, if they are of age. It
cannot therefore be a defence to this action to
say that plaintiff lacked the necessary capacity
to make a valid promise to marry defendant unless
5
her parents consented to him."
It is also arguable that by expressly providing that parental 
consent shall be obtained where "either party to an intended 
marriage, not being a widower or widow, is under twenty-one 
years of age" the legislature must have intended to exclude 
all other cases from this requirement. If this be so, and 
in view of the decision in the Morah case, it is safe to 
conclude that parental consent is not required by law for 
the formation of a valid contract to marry, as opposed to 
actually contracting the marriage itself - even if the 
mutual promisors are both infants.
Betrothal Age
Under the traditional customary law, a person of any
5- iUid*, at p.81.
6. Marriage Act, s.18.
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age could lawfully "be betrothed to any other person of the
opposite sex, whatever their respective ages.^ In other
words, neither infancy nor extreme old age could affect the
legal capacity of a prospective spouse to become betrothed;
for, as already indicated, betrothal could be effected by
parents or guardians for and on behalf of their children or
wards as the case may be. But though valid at its inception,
this contract (or perhaps more accurately, this status) can
be repudiated by the infant on attaining marriageable age
- usually at puberty - or at any time thereafter. It is not
clear whether an infant has (or ever had) the right or the
legal capacity to repudiate a betrothal at his sole volition.
But on balance of probabilities, he had no such right or
2capacity in the traditional society. As a rule, his 
objection to a marriage arranged for him by his parents or 
guardian, had no effect on the validity of such marriage if 
carried out in spite of his objection; any purported 
repudiation of his betrothal must, therefore, have been 
nugatory. Again, repudiation of a betrothal usually carried 
(and still might carry) with it an obligation to refund 
payments made by or on behalf of the prospective husband on
1. But see Teniietan, "Marriage among the Jekri tribes .
(1938), 13 Nigeria 75-8, at p*76, where the average 
betrothal age for theltsekiri is said to be 16.
2. He probably now has. But of this, more hereafter.
account of the betrothal or the intended marriage (e.g. a 
thanksgiving payment, i.johun, among the Yoruba, or part 
payment of the bride price). It also involved (and still 
involves) the return of certain classes of gifts made to the 
bride-to-be or members of her family. Few girls could 
afford these repayments at the age of puberty in the tradit­
ional society. This being so, it is unlikely that the 
customary law would have made provision for repudiation by 
girls at their own initiative.
The customary law relating to betrothal age in the 
Eastern Region has now been altered by statute, so that no 
one may now be betrothed or "engaged" under any system of 
law, below the age of sixteen. Section 3(1) of the Age of 
Marriage Law, 1956, of that Region provides as follows on 
the point -
"A ... promise or offer of marriage between, or in
respect of, persons either of whom is under the
2age of sixteen shall be void.1 
Section 6(2) provides that no court shall take cognizance 
of, inter alia, any promise of marriage avoided by that Law.
(It will be seen later that by completely ousting the jurisd­
iction of the courts over matters connected with marriage
2. Laws of the Eastern Region, No.22 of 1956.
5* Ibid. See also s.68(35) of the Local G-ovt. Law (W.R.), which
authorises local authorities to make bye-laws regulating
child betrothal.
agreements avoided by s.3* this Law makes it impossible to 
recover by court action any money paid or gifts made under 
or in respect of any such agreement).
Engagement age under "English" law
As we have seen there could be a legally binding contract 
to marry between two persons (of the opposite sex) one or 
both of whom are infants - that is, persons under 21 years 
of age. Where both parties are infants, neither of them can 
enforce the contract against the other during the defendant's 
infancy. Nor can he do so after the defendant has attained 
majority. This result flows from the fact that a contract 
of this type cannot be enforced against an infant, and not 
that an infant cannot himself enforce it. He can.
Where one of the parties is an infant and the other an 
adult, the law is heavily loaded in favour of the infant.
In the first place, he can enforce this contract (by which 
is meant that he can recover damages in an action for breach 
of promise, not that he could obtain a court order for 
specific performance) either during his infancy or after he 
has attained majority, subject to the law relating to limit­
ation of actions. In the second place, he has a legal right
to avoid the contract at any time during his infancy, or 
within a reasonable time after coming of age. Finally the 
adult party cannot enforce the contract against the infant 
party either during the latter1s infancy or after he has 
attained majority. It makes no difference that 1he infant 
actually ratified the promise after he had reached the age 
of 21.^ So long as he has not made a new promise since he
came of age, any statements or conduct of his which amounts
to no more than a ratification of the old promise could not
involve him in legal liability to the adult party.
All this results from a curious admixture of the pre- 
1874 common law on infants1 contractual capacity and the 
provisions of the Infants .Relief Act of that year. The 
promise to s.l saves all contracts which an infant could law­
fully enter into at common law, and which, if enfc&recfa 
would have been valid at common law. Contracts in consider­
ation of marriage as well as contracts to marry come under 
this head. Section 2 makes unenforceable any ratification 
by an adult of any promise he might have made in his infancy. 
Ratification in adult life of a promise to marry made during 
infancy is caught by this section. The result: the infant
4* Coxhead v. Mullis (1878) 3 C.P.D.439*
5, On the distinction between making a new promise and merely 
re-affirming the old, see Northcote v. Poughtv (1879)
4 C.P.D.385, at p.391; Holmes v. Brierlev (1888) 4 T.L.R. 
647; Ditcham v. Worral (1880) 5 C.P.P.410; and joxhead 
v. Mullis. ant£.
promisor has the hest of both worlds. It should be noted
in conclusion that the Infants Relief Act applies to Nigeria
as an English statute of general application which was in
6force on 1st January, 1900, and has in fact been re-enacted 
by the Western Region parliament as Cap.49 of the 1959 
Revision.
formation of betrothal and contract to marry (procedure)
In this section we shall take a closer look at the 
process whereby an agreement to marry comes into being, with 
a view to delimiting the point of time at which such an
i
agreement acquires the force of a legally binding contract. 
Betrothal (customary law) and ordinary engagement (’’English” 
law) will be examined separately, with reference to “the 
ages of the prospective spouses in each case.
(a) Betrothal
The principal stages in the creation of a contract 
of betrothal under customary law where the spouses-to-be
6. Jjabin.ioh v., Abake (1924) 5 N.L.R.32
are both of age may be summarised as follows,^ First the 
man makes an exploratory approach to his future wife, usually 
through the agency of a mutual friend or relation. If she 
returns an encouraging word, the husband-to-be would then 
make his intentions known-to the woman’s father or guardian, 
again through the first agent, as a rule. If, after the 
necessary investigations into the family background and 
personal qualities of the prospective husband, the woman’s 
father/guardian approves of the match, he sends word back to 
the former through the usual channels. -Next a day is fixed 
for a meeting of representatives of the two families concerned,
in the house of the woman’s father/guardian or some other
1. On the formation of betrothal relationships, see Basden,
Among tbe Ibos"of Nigeria, pp.69-70; Meek, Law and Author­
ity » p» 268 ff; Green, Ibo Village Affairs, p. 161; Talbot, 
(bribes of the Niger Delta, pp. 179-89; Talbot, Peoples of S« 
Nigeriaffijpp.243-4* 445-6; Cotton, loc.cit., pp.427-8; 
Simmons^ loc . cit. , p. 161; Partridge, Cross River natives, 
p.254; Forde, Marriage and the Family among the Yakb, 
pp. 14-19; Forde^ ’’Double descent among the Yakb " in 
African Systems of kinship and marriage (ed. Radcliffe- 
Brown and Forde j , p.322 ff; Forde, *’Yakb marriage” (1940)
40 Man 57; Bradbury and Lloyd, op. cit., p.49; Egharevba, 
Benin Law and Custom, p.15; Omoneukanrin, op. cit., 
pp.40-1; Johnson, op. cit., pp.113-4; Thomas, "Marriage 
and legal customs of the Edo-speaking peoples of Nigeria” 
(1910-11) 11 J. Comp. Leg. (n.s.) pp.95-6; Kasunmu, 
loc. cit., p.4; Coker, op. cit.. pp.231-3 (quoting from 
and commenting on Re Sapara(l91lT R.G.C.Rep.607). Welch, 
"The Isoko Tribe" (1954; 7 Africa 160-73, at p.171. See 
also Survey of African Marriage and Family Life (ed. 
Phillips), loc. cit., for more general discussions.
place of his choice such as the house of his family head. 
During this meeting the husband-to-be makes his formal 
marriage proposal, sometimes personally but more often through 
the lips of his father, guardian or family head.
The chief point of legal interest here is that whether 
the prospective husband proposes in person or by proxy (on 
this formal occasion), he does so in the absence of the 
woman concerned. At this stage, she is called in to the 
meeting and asked in blunt language whether she would accept 
the man as husband. She indicates her consent in one of the 
conventional methods - she may nod, smile and shy away, 
blush (invisibly if very dark) and drop her gaze onto the 
floor, curtesy low or, exceptionally, express herself in 
words. If for any reason the woman is not available at this 
joint family meeting, she utters her consent through her 
father or guardian. But by far the most romantic mode of 
signifying consent occurs as follows. The woman is called 
in, told of the marriage proposal, given a glass of drinks, 
shown the suitor and asked to indicate her decision on the 
matter in hand. She takes a sip (if a teetotaller, she 
simulates a hearty sip) and hands the drink to her future 
bridegroom. He drinks, and she withdraws from the meeting.
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(In the absence of the suitor himself, his father or guardian 
may deputise in this. It should be emphasised that neither 
spouse-to-be need be present at this meeting; nor indeed 
is it necessary that they have ever seen or written each 
other. The entire negotiations could be done by proxy with­
out in any way detracting from the legal validity of the 
resulting agreement).
The necessary consents have now been secured, but there 
is no betrothal yet. The bride price (dowry or marriage 
consideration) must next be agreed upon. This takes one of 
two forms: either the sums payable are determined and the
mode of payment agreed (e.g. so much before the "wedding” 
and the balance "payable when able"), or payments are expressly 
waived by the woman’s father or guardian. The husband-to-be
(or his deputy) then makes the customary "thanks-giving"
2 3payments. This may be payable to the woman’s parents, the
woman herself,^ or those taking part in the betrothal
c CL
ceremony, or to all these. Finally, there is^ /commensal* theal 
- the usual victuals being drinks bought for the occasion by
2- 1 .iohun (Yoruba), ego onu nwanyj (Ibo); iwanrien omo (Bini). 
3* E.g. among the Yoruba, see Johnson, op. cit.t p.114.
4. E.g. among the Yak6 etc. of ttie Cross River, see Partridge,
loc. cit., p.254.
5. E.g. among some Ibo societies; see Meek, Law and author­
ity ..., p.268. Ditto, Itsekiri societies, see 
Omoneukanrin, op. cit.t p.40.
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the prospective husband (or his parent/guardian) and a good 
meal specially prepared by the woman*s parents/guardian.
This brief survey omits a number of steps which are 
considered either obsolete or obsolescent (such as consulting 
oracles and sacrificing to the family gods), or which have 
too little bearing on the law of betrothal to be worth 
mentioning (e.g. the often interminable exchange of visits 
between members of the two families concerned, or the 
exchange of oaths of friendship found in places).
To sum up: the essential steps in a betrothal where
the spouses-to-be are both adults are (a) consent of the 
woman*s family as represented by her father or guardian,
(b) the consent of the woman herself, usually expressed in 
public on a formal occasion, (c) agreement on the quantum 
of bride price payable, or express waiver thereof, (d) pay­
ment of a betrothal fee, and (e) commens aiity., Finally, 
it should be emphasised that, as a rule, all negotiations 
and most payments are made through or in the presence of a 
mutually recognised intermediary.
6. A person is an "adult*1 if he has attained the prescribed
age and gone through the necessary initiation proceedings, 
if any, in accordance with the local customary law govern­
ing passage from minority to majority for his sex. The 
age is usually puberty which is approximately 14 for 
girls and 16 for boys, and not 21 as under the general 
("English") law.
Where one of the prospective spouses is an infant (as 
understood by the local customary law), the betrothal 
procedure just outlined has to be modified in at least one 
fundamental aspect. The infant's consent is neither sought 
nor given. On the other hand, his protest against the 
proposed match may lawfully be ignored, since by reason of 
his tender age an infant is not supposed to know his own 
mind, let alone decide what transactions are beneficial to 
him and what are harmful. A father (or guardian) consents 
to a proposed betrothal for his infant child (or ward), not 
as his authorised agent (as is the case with absent adults) 
but by virtue of a parent's inherent power to conclude a 
valid contract on his child's behalf if of the opinion that 
the transaction is for the benefit of the infant.
It should be remembered that infant betrothal is no 
longer a legal possibility in the Eastern Region if the 
infant is under the age of sixteen years, on account of the 
provisions of s.3 of the Age of Marriage Law, 1956. This is 
true also of any societies in the Western Region where infant 
betrothal has been made unlawful under a local authority bye- 
law made pursuant to s.68(35) of the Local Government Law.
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(b) "Engagement” under "English" law (mode)
As already remarked, no formalities or symbols are 
required for the formation of a binding contract to marry; 
nor are parental consents required by law. It is now custom­
ary in many places for a man to present his prospective 
bride with an engagement ring or a Bible or both,^ and to 
organize an engagement party to mark the event. These 
articles and festivities may have considerable evidential, 
social, sentimental or prestige value, and probably have.
But as far as formation of a valid contract to marry and 
liabilities thereunder are concerned, they have no legal 
significance whatever. All that is required is proof of an 
exchange of promises (or a conditional offer of marriage by 
one party followed by fulfilment of the condition by the
other party) with an intention thereby to create a legal 
2relationship.
As just indicated, the two principal modes of forming 
a contract to marry are as follows. Firstly, a mutual exchange 
of promises with the necessary intention. Here each party*s 
own promise is their consideration for the other!s promise.
Such an exchange may be oral or written, announced or
1. Cf. Elias, The Nigerian Legal System, p.293, footnote 4.
2. Cf. Bromley, op. cit., pp.16-29, esp. at pp.16 and 19.
clandestine, uttered before an assembled crowd or in the
seclusion of a desert island. The other mode consists in
a promise to marry if the promisee would do a specified act,
followed by the performance of that act. Thus in the old
3
case of Harvey v. Johnston a man promised to marry a woman 
if she would come over to Ireland for that purpose. She did 
not stop to make promises, but made the trip to Ireland. It 
was held that she was entitled to damages from the promisor 
in a breach of promise action; for by making the trip, she 
gave valuable consideration for the promise.
Legal incidents of betrothal
For convenience we shall consider separately the legal 
incidents of betrothal insofar as they affect the prospect­
ive spouses and their respective families inter se and 
vis-a-vis third parties.
(a) Effect on the betrothed woman
Betrothal to a woman means a change of status to a 
considerable extent, She loses her sexual freedom^" (in most 
societies), for she would be guilty of a wrong against her 
husband-to-be if she had sexual intimacy with another man.
, I , , I........  I —  ^  ■■■■■■ , !■■■          — — — — — — — —
3. (1848) 6 C.B.295.
1. On the Efik law on this point, see Simmons, loc. cit., at 
p.161.
Such a lapse, if discovered, would be a good ground for the
fiance to repudiate the agreement and recover any payments
2
he had made in consideration of the proposed marriage. She
is precluded, during the continuance of the betrothal, from
accepting another suitor's hand in marriage. She is expected
to behave (subserviently) towards her prospective husband
and his family in much the same way as a wife does to her
husband and his family, on pain of having the betrothal
a
terminated at their instance. According to Ward, a man has 
an action for damages against any other man who entices his 
fiancee away - under Yoruba law. If this is so, it would 
seem that after betrothal a woman comes under the construct­
ive custody of her husband-to-be. This view derives some
an
support from a statement by Talbot about the Oru(/lbo group)
that if an unwilling fiancee runs away to another man and
is harboured by him, the latter is liable for damages at the
5
prospective husband's suit.
A betrothed woman is entitled to periodic gifts in 
money or in kind from her man, and has a right to break off 
the betrothal if he falls short of expection in this respect
2. Cf. Talbot, Life in^s. Nigeria (Ibibio law). He says else­
where that where a betrothed woman becomes pregnant per 
alios, her fiance is entitled to recover any dowry paid 
and claim the woman for wife: Tribes of the Niger Delta, 
pp.181-2 (Isokpo law).
3. Cf. Ivleek, Law and ■ authority in a Nigerian tribe, p. 268 (IBo3aw)
4- Marriage among the Yoruba, p.20.
5. Peoples of southern Nigeria* Vol. Ill* p.447.
- on the ground that he is mean by nature. In the past, too, 
a husband-to-be was under an obligation to make his prospect­
ive bride certain gifts which were specified in quantity and 
qualify, at a number of local feasts and events. While this 
is still done in a number of places, the modern practice is 
to commute such compulsory "gifts" into a lump sum payable 
at the same time as the bride price. For the Eastern Region 
there is now a statutory upper limit to the sum payable under 
this head, viz. £5, which includes similar "incidental"
payments due to the woman's parents and relations. Finally
betrothal entitles a woman (at all events in the more sophist­
icated societies) to move about freely in her fiance's 
company without moral opprobrium, and to visit and stay with 
his family as often and for as long as she pleases, subject
to her own family's consent.
In view of these rights and obligations attaching to 
a woman by reason of her being betrothed to a man, it is 
tempting to suggest that there is little if any real differ­
ence between a betrothal and a marriage proper. This suggest­
ing has repeatedly been made by writers and litigants alike.
As an extreme example of the former we may cite a blunt 
statement by Basden on the effect of betrothal in Ibo law -
6. Limitation of Dowry Law, 1956, s.3(b). The term used in 
this Law is "incidental expenses".
"... after a long palaver, the amount to be paid
as dowry (head-money) is fixed.
"From the moment that the first instalment of the 
do?/ry has been paid the girl is reckoned as the 
man's wife. There are no such intermediated 
words as 'betrothal' or 'engagement'.
We are not told what the position is between the fixing of 
the bride price payable and the payment of the first instal­
ment thereof - two events that are not infrequently separated 
by a period of many months or even years. In any case,
o
though single words there may not be for these concepts, the
Ibo do distinguish in descriptive phrases as well as in 
practice between betrothal and marriage. And as will appear
later, the legal incidents of these two tXjpe^  * cj~ s ta tu s  a r
substantially different.
The confusion of betrothal with marriage among litigants 
can be seen in Edet v. E s i e n , ^ an Efik case of 1932, and In 
re Intended Marriage of Beckley and Abiodun.1^ a case 
decided at Kaduna in 1943 and involving a Lagos Yoruba couple. 
In Edet v. Esien a man claimed a woman's three children by 
her husband on the ground that before she married the said 
husband, she was betrothed to the plaintiff11 who had paid
7. Among the Ibos of Nigeria, p.70.
8. But see Elias, The Nigerian Legal System, p.293, fn.4,
where nkwa is said to be the Ibo word for "engagement".
9. 11 N.L.R.47•
10. 17 J5T.L.R.59.
11. The headnote to this case is grossly misleading, as it 
gives the impression that the plaintiff was actually married 
xo the woman concerned.
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her parents part of the agreed bride-price, and that this 
money was never repaid to him. As the Commissioner of the 
Provincial Court found the evidence on the relevant customary 
law inconclusive, the High Court (Carey, J.) dismissed the 
plaintiff's claim on the ground that it would be contrary to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience to grant custody 
of another man's children to the plaintiff simply because 
his instalment on their mother had not been refunded. In re 
Beckley and Abiodun a man entered a caveat against the
proposed Ordinance marriage of his son to a girl of his
1
choice, on the ground that the youngman was already married
to another woman under customary law. It turned out in
evidence that the alleged marriage consisted of no more than
a performance by proxy (which is perfectly lawful) of the
12idana ceremony. Ames, J., as he then was, held that
performance of the idana ceremony did not of itself constitute
a marriage under Lagos Yoruba law so as to preclude the
youn^man from contracting an Ordinance marriage with another
woman. This reason, in our submission, is the right one on
which the decision in the Esien case should have been based,
cLoc*birin(>,
rather than the bogey of "natural justice, equity and good \ 
conscience."
The differences between the legal incidents of a
12. This is the betrothal ceremony: Elias, Nigerian Legal 
System, p.294.
The differences between the legal incidents of a 
betrothal and those of a marriage will become self-evident 
after we have discussed the latter. Here it must suffice 
to say that betrothal has none of the following incidents 
which attach to marriage; (a) betrothal gives a man no right 
to any child born of his fiancee during the betrothal period, 
even if he is in fact the natural father of such a child. It 
is true that he can acquire that child as his by acknowledging 
him (in many societies), but it is submitted that he has no 
right to do so if the woman's family want the child to 
remain in that family. In any case, a right to acknowledge 
is open to any natural father who ha3 a child by an unmarried 
mother, and so has no necessary connexion with betrothal.
(b) Betrothal does not in law confer on a man the right to 
have sexual relation with his wife-to-be. An attempt to have 
connexion with an unwilling girl (or against her family's 
express instruction, even where she is willing) would be a 
good ground for her (or her family as the case may be), to 
repudiate the marriage agreement. (There are not many girls 
or families these days, though, who insist on pre-marital 
chastity), (c) In most societies, if a betrothed woman dies 
before the actual marriage, she is considered a loss to her 
family who will have to refund any bride-*price already paid,
17 a
1 2if her would-be 'husband or M s  family so demands* 9 * The 
death of a woman after ter marriage, on the other hand, is 
considered a loss to her husband who has no claims against 
her family in respect of any bride price paid in considerat­
ion of the marriage.
(b) Effect on the prospective husband
Por the prospective husband, too, betrothal involves
a certain amount of change of status. For he thereby acquires
a number of rights and obligations a propos his bride-to-'be,
her family and third parties. In the first place (and there
is almost complete unanimity among the earlier writers on
this point), a man had an action for damages against anybody
•5
who had sexual connexion with his betrothed one.
1. According to Polarin, only half the bride price already
paid is recoverable among tte Egba (Yoruba): op. cit. ,p.32«
2. No refund is due under Itsekiri law, according to
Omoneukanrin: op^ cit., p.43. But it is not clear
whether he was speaking of bride price paid or merely 
betrothal expenses incurred.
3. Cf. Basden, Niger Ibos, p.226; Talbot, Peoples of s.Nigeria
Vol.Ill, p.447 (Ibo), p.673 (Ekoi); Talbot, Life in 
s. Nigeria, p.217 (Ibibio); Omoneukanrin, op. cit., p.50 
(Itsekiri); Kasunmu, loc. cit., p.21 (Yoruba generally); 
Polarin, op. cit., pp.25, 26 and 34 (Egba - Yoruba), who 
says that parents too are actionable if they were privy 
to their daughter’s liaison: loc. cit.» at p.25.
8 0
To what extent, if at all, this represents the current 
customary lav/ it is difficult to say.^ In this day and age 
when more and more people choose their partners in marriage 
long after puberty, when an ever-growing number of marriages 
are preceded by a period of courtship and emotional attach­
ment at least co-extensive with the betrothal period, cases 
of sexual aberration during this period must be few and far 
between. Again, with the high degree of freedom of choice 
now open to prospective spouses, and with the comparative 
affluence of bridegrooms-to-be which makes it easier and 
quicker than ever before to raise the necessary capital for 
the bride price and other marriage expenses, most people 
would sooner abandon whatever themight have paid as bride 
price and seek fresh grounds for their matrimonial ambitions 
than engage in expensive legal battles over a woman who is 
loose enough in morals to succomb to this type of temptation 
during her betrothal period. ±$e that as it may, there is a 
strong case for the view that a man has an action for damages 
against another man who has seduced his betrothed one. The 
gist of this action, as in adultery, is, to adapt the picture-
15
sque words of McCardie, J., in Butterworth v. Butterworth,
4. There is an attractive suggestion (see Kasunmu, loc. cit.,
p.21) that this right of action still exists in Yoruba 
law. But as no authority is given for this statement, 
it is not much help to our case.
5. (1920) P.126, at p.142.
the prospective husband's injured feelings, shattered hopes 
of marital honour, matrimonial bliss and family life generally
After betrothal a man and his family have a large say 
- not infrequently the final say - in his future wife's 
education, apprenticeship or training in market technique 
as the case may be. Very often a prospective husband likes 
to take over the financial burden of his fiancee's education 
etc., so as to be able to control its nature and scope. This 
he has a right to do. In the same way, a man has a right 
(which is often exercised) to remove his prospective bride 
from her parents' control (but with their consent) to be 
brought up in a family of his choice (usually but by no means 
invariably that of his aunt or other near relation). This 
usually happens where the wife-to-be is still very young at 
the time of the betrothal.
A prospective husband places himself under an obligation
to pay the agreed bride price in full, with other customary 
7
incidentals, on pain of having his wife recalled by her 
family at any time in the future, the fact that he has paid 
a substantial part of the said bride price or indeed that 
the marriage has actually taken place notwithstanding. He 
is also under a duty (unless protected by statute as, in
■ f c — ■— — — — —  n m n  I — i ^ — — — — — ^
6. Cf. Ekeghe, op. cit., pp.47-8.
7. Cf. Partridge, loc. cit., p.425.
theory, he is in the Eastern Region) to render labour services 
personally or by hired hands, and to give financial help on 
reguest to his future parents-in-law according to their need
o
and his means. To refuse unreasonably to do so would 
entitle those parents to terminate the betrothal on grounds 
of the man’s meanness. As we have seen, there is also a 
duty on the prospective husband to make periodic gifts in 
cash and in kind to his fiancee, with a similar sanction for 
unjustified failure to do so.
For their part, the woman’s family bind themselves to
give her in marriage to her betrothed ’’husband” on the terms
agreed, on pain of having to refund any bride price paid so
far (which they may well have spent) even before she has
found another suitor. They also impliedly undertake to help
preserve their daughter’s chastity, and will be liable at the
prospective husband'^ suit for refund of any bride price and
customary incidentals so far received if she becomes pregnant
per alios and the man decides to terminate the betrothal -
a
as he has a right to do.
8. Cf. Ajisafe, op. cit., p.55; Porde in African Systems of
Kinship ..., p.352; Porde, Marriage and the Family among 
the Yak 6, p. 16; Thomas, ’’Marriage and Legal Customs of the 
Edo-speaking Peoples of Nigeria”, loc. cit., p.95; Talbot, 
Tribes of the Niger Delta, p.179 ff•
9. Cf. Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, pp.181-2, esp. pp.
181-2 where he says that double the actual amount of the 
bride price paid is recoverable among the Isokpo and other 
Ijaw societies in the Port Harcourt area.
Finally, in our submission, besides making a betrothed 
woman’s family (and not herself personally) liable for 
repayment of any bride price etc., already paid if the 
arrangement falls through, the fact that betrothal is an 
agreement between families rather than between individuals 
has another unsuspected result. If the affianced man dies 
before the proposed marriage takes place, another member of 
his family has a right, if otherwise acceptable, to step 
into his shoes and carry on from where he left off, any 
payments made so far being credited to his account. The 
resulting marriage is not a levirate marriage: the woman
is the new suitor's lawful wife from the inception of the 
marriage, and any children thereof will be his just as if 
the woman was originally betrothed to him with her family’s 
consent. The full significance of this will become apparent 
when it is realised that had the betrothed woman chosen to 
marry outside the family of her deceased fiance, as she is 
perfectly entitled to do, her next suitor would have had to 
go through the whole process de novo. For betrothal, unlike
marriage proper in some s o c i e t i e s can repea-ke(i any
10. E.g. among the Yoruba: see Rev. Johnson, op. cit.. p.116; 
but see also Elias, Nigerian Legal System, p.293 where the 
impression is given that even for a "married” woman (i.e. a 
widow or divorcee) the usual stages are not omitted but merely 
telescoped into one process with "less formal and more insubst­
antial” ceremonies.
11. There is a Yoruba rule that a man cannot "inherit" (i.e. 
take over as wife) a widow of his junior brother or other kin: 
Coker, op. cit., p.38, a rule which is just an example of the 
more general rule that a family member cannot inherit from a 
member who is junior to him in age: Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, 
p.293* There is no information on the question whether or not 
this rule applies to taking over a betrothed woman. Perhaps
it does.
number of times in respect of an unmarried woman/"
The question of who is entitled to a child conceived 
during his mother*s betrothal will be discussed later under 
MAff illation**.
C H A P T E R  VI 
AGME^NTS_TO_MARRY- : : - - I I
Breach of the agreement and remedies therefor
Introduction: Jurisdiction and law applicable
The law on the respective jurisdictions of customary 
and non-customary courts in actions for breach of marriage 
agreements is more than a little obscure in the two southern 
Regions.^ The position, however, appears to be as follows.
If the broken agreement was for a customary marriage, original 
jurisdiction would belong exclusively to the customary courts 
- provided there is one in the area - and the matter can only 
come before the non-customary courts on appeal or by way of 
transfer from the appropriate customary court. Conversely, 
an action for a breach of promise can only be tried by a non- 
customary court where the intended marriage was to be a 
"Christian'’ (i.e. monogamous) marriage. In this case, how­
ever, the question of what customary payments and Blow much
bride price already paid should be refunded by the woman’s
2
family will have to be referred to the customary courts.
1. As there are no customary courts in the Pederal Territory
of Lagos, this problem of jurisdiction does not arise there
2. This is the usual practice in divorce proceedings. It will
be remembered that most Christian marriages are preceded 
or accompanied by payment of bride price - quite often by 
a full-dress customary marriage as well.
Where, owing to the curious provisions of s.19(a) of the 
Eastern Region’s Customary Courts Law, 1956 (Ho.21 of 1956), 
the Customary Courts have no jurisdiction over one or both 
of the parties as persons and the non-customary Courts have 
no original jurisdiction because the proposed marriage was 
to have been under customary law, the action must be brought 
in the local Customary Court in the first place and then 
transferred to the High Court. We shall now take a closer 
look at these three propositions.
Section 13 of the Easterh Nigeria High Court Law, 1955,
3(as amended)^ and the Proviso to s.9(1) of the Western
4
Nigeria High Court Law provide, in similar terms, as follows:
"Except in so far as the G-overnor may by order other­
wise direct and except in suits transferred to the 
High Court under the provisions of the Native Court 
Ordinance or the Customary Courts Law, 1956, the 
Court shall not exercise original jurisdiction in 
any cause or matter which is subject to the jurisd­
iction of a Native Court or Customary Court relat­
ing to marriage, family status, the guardianship 
of children, or the inheritance or disposition of 
property on death."
3. See Official Document No.15 of 1961.
4. Of the same year: Laws of the 'Western Region of Nigeria,
1959 Revision, cap.44.
5. This is s.13 of the E.R. enactment. The wording of s.9(1)
differs somewhat from this, but the effect is the same.
The effect of this, in our submission, is to oust the original 
jurisdiction of the HiJ^ h Court on matters relating to an 
agreement to marry under customary law (betrothal), as an 
action founded on such an agreement obviously comes within 
the jurisdiction of the Customary Courts. And while a legal 
purist may doubt that betrothal relates to "family status",^ 
there is little doubt but that it comes within the ambit of 
"any cause or matter ... relating to marriage."
Where a plaintiff claims damages - whether special or
general - for an alleged breach of promise to contract a 
n 7Christian marriage, she must bring her action in a non- 
customary court (usually the High Court, since the damages 
claimed are almost invariably in excess of the highest claim 
over which a magistrate has jurisdiction). This is because, 
in our submission, an action for a breach of contract to 
marry (more usually: breach of promise) is an action which 
is unknown to customary law. To begin with, the contract
6. The point has already been made that betrothal has to do
with status, for it raises the question how far a woman 
becomes a member of her fiance's family. Legitimacy, which 
raises the question of a child's membership of his putative 
father's family, was held to be a matter of family status 
in Briggs v. Briggs (1957) 2 E.R.L.R.6 (Palmer, Ag. J.).
7. A man, too, can sue; but he seldom ever does, probably
because he would find it more difficult to prove damage 
than would a woman.
itself differs radically from its counterpart under customary 
law, being, unlike betrothal, a contract between two 
individuals who represent no one but themselves* Then again 
customary law knows nothing of damages for breach of a promise
o
to marry* If this view is correct, then obviously a breach 
of promise action, given that the promise was to contract a 
Christian marriage, falls outside the jurisdiction of the 
Customary Courts.
The crucial question in an action of this type is, 
therefore, the intention of the parties* If it be shown in 
evidence that the parties intended a Christian marriage as 
the ultimate goal of their agreement, it must be presumed 
ipso facto that they also intended that "English'* law, not 
customary law, should regulate their contractual relationship*
Q
Thus in Alice Ugboma v. James Morah there was ample evidence 
from the youngman's correspondence with his fiancee that their 
mutual promises referred to a Christian marriage. The High 
Court assumed jurisdiction and applied English law tempered, 
as to the quantum of damages, by Ibo customary law which 
recognises no such damages for a bare breach of promise.^
8. See dictum of Waddington, Asst. J., in Ugboma v* Morah,
ante * See also under '’Remedies", infra.
9. (1940) 15 N.L.R.78.
10. "Bare” because pregnancy had not been brought about as
well by the defendant.
It should be pointed out that in the Morah case, counsel
produced evidence of intention to contract a Christian
marriage (and therefore an intention to be governed by English
law), not with a view to giving jurisdiction to the High
Court, but to take advantage of that system of law which
gives a right to damages to a disappointed promisee^. It
appears from the report that everybody concerned - the bench,
the bar and the litigants - assumed from the parties' standard
of education and position in life generally that they were
subject to English law in these matters, not customary law.
11In a similar case decided seventeen years later by the 
High Court of the Western Region, Irwin, J., held simply that 
the law applicable in the instant action was English law.
Ho reason was given for this choice of law. Presumably the 
learned judge was influenced by the parties' apparent mode 
of life and sympathy for Western culture generally.
A natural sequel to the two propositions just discussed 
is that where a contract to marry under English law is 
accompanied by a customary law betrothal, the question of 
damages for breach of promise, return of engagement rings and 
similar gifts, and rescission of settlements made in contempl­
ation of marriage will be decided by the High Court; while,
11. Uso v. Iketubosin. (1957) W.R.N.L.R.187.
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on the other hand, the question of repayment of betrothal 
fees and bride price will have to be settled by the Customary 
Courts. It is arguable that once it is proved that the 
proposed marriage was to be a monogamous one, the High Court 
should be legally competent to determine all questions aris­
ing between the parties in connexion with it, (a) to prevent 
multiplicity of actions, (b) because there is only one trans­
action, viz. an agreement to contract one particular marriage, 
the betrothal being merely a local modification of a formal 
engagement to marry as done in English society, and (or 
alternatively), (c) because the betrothal merges into the 
contract to marry, the latter being the operative transaction 
as manifest from the parties' intention. The question of 
what bride price, betrothal fees and other customary dues 
already paid that should be refunded in accordance with the 
appropriate customary law should then be determined with the 
help of expert witnesses, as in other cases involving the 
application of customary law by the High Court. This, in our 
submission, is a cheaper and more expeditious course than 
the present practice of splitting the case between two 
different systems of courts.
Finally,it is possible in the Eastern Region to come
12upon a jurisdictional no-man's land in betrothal cases.
12. This, as will appear later, is also true of divorce and 
other matrimonial causes governed by customary law.
This is because of a curious provision in the Customary Courts 
1*5Law, 1956, v section 19 of which reads in part as follows -
"The following persons or classes of persons shall be 
subject to the jurisdiction of customary courts:
(a) persons of African descent, provided that the 
mode of life of such persons is that of the 
general community and that such persons are 
in their country of origin subject to African 
customary law however that customary law may 
be modified or applied*”
There is no definition of "general community”, which makes 
it difficult to give any intelligible construction to this 
part of the section. Was the word "community” intended to 
refer to a village, a town or an entire ethnic group occupying 
the same territory? Does it include such semi-cosmopolitan 
towns like Owerri, Onitsha, Diobu, Awka and Oguta, for inst­
ance? If yes, what would be the "mode of life” of such a 
community: in other words, what would be the common denomin­
ators of the professional, business, paid labour and peasant 
farming elements of such a community? How many communities 
of today,^ however defined, are homogeneous as to their 
mode of life? Assuming that complete homogeneity is not 
necessary, how much of a given community would constitute the 
"general community" - one-half, three-quarters, seven-eighths?
13. Laws of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, No.21 of 1956, as 
subsequently amended.
14. Or in 1956, for that matter.
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In any case, what is "mode of life" - possession of car, 
mopeds, bicycles or other mechanical means of transport; 
ownership of radio and television sets; membership of 
recreational clubs; or the wearing of any particular type 
of clothing?
This proviso was obviously intended for the benefit of 
a tiny minority of professional men and women, successful 
businessmen and politicians who would certainly consider it 
infra dignitatem to submit to questions and cross-examinations 
in the hands of semi-literate Customary Court judges (or 
worse). But it is so sweeping in terms (at face value) and 
yet so obscure in meaning that it creates more problems than 
it solves. As the above questions suggest, a strict construct­
ion would reject the paragraph under discussion as too 
uncertain in its connotation. A liberal construction, on the 
other hand, could lead to absurd results. For example, it 
would deny the local Customary Court jurisdiction in an action 
by a village schoolmaster to recover bride price and trousseau 
money which he had given to his prospective father-in-law and 
bride respectively, the former ("father-in-law") being the 
local Court messenger, the girl being the local mid^wife, and 
the three of them being the only sophisticated people in a 
predominantly peasant village community. For if, as is likely,
the girl's father leads a life that is different from that 
of the "general community", he would he outside the jurisd­
iction of the court at which he serves as a messenger. So 
too will the girl herself, on proving distinguishable "mode 
of life".
In any case, the effect of this proviso is that while 
s.15 of the High Court Law, 1955, confers exclusive original 
jurisdiction on Customary Courts over certain causes, the 
proviso to 8.19(a) of the Customary Courts Law, 1956, denies 
the said Courts any jurisdiction on the same subjects by 
excluding their jurisdiction over certain persons. The 
practical solution is fairly simple: the action is initiated
in the appropriate Customary Court and then transferred, on 
application, to the High Court. This is hardly satisfactory 
in view of (a) the long waiting lists in the High Court today, 
and (b) the prohibitive cost of High Court litigation.
The above discussion on the respective jurisdictions of 
Customary and non-Customary Courts rests on the proposition 
that, in the eyes of the customary law, betrothal confers on 
the prospective spouses concerned a status which is the same 
in kind (while differing in degree) as that conferred on 
spouses by marriage proper, and is, therefore, a matter of 
family status. The reasons for this view will already have 
become apparent in the preceding pages; but it is so funda­
mental to the whole discussion that one feels impelled to 
bring together the various strands of the argument in support, 
before we take our final leave of the subject.
Betrothal confers on a man (or his family acting on his
behalf) the right to bring his fiancee into his house and to
live with her as man and wife in all but one respect, viz.
15sexual intercourse,  ^without incurring social disapproval
16or moral reproach of any kind. During her stay under his
roof, he is under as much obligation to clothe and provide
for her maintenance as is a married man to his wife - the
17sanction being the same. From the moment of betrothal, a
man ov/es a duty of labour service or, alternatively, financial
aid to his prospective parents-in-law if and as required, and
18according to his ability. In the traditional society when
there was greater scope for self-help in the matter of redress 
for civil injury, a man had a right to inflict reasonable 
corporal punishment on his fiancee’s seducer - anything from 
a spit in the face to a gruelling round of horsewhipping.
15. But see Sporndli, loc. cit., at p*118.
16. At all events as soon as any part of the bride price has 
been paid and accepted. Cf. Basden, Among the Ibos of 
Nigeria, p.70.
17- Cf. Cotton, loc. cit., p.427. fhe "sanction11 is loss of 
the fiancee in the one case and of the wife in the other.
18. Cf. Forde, Marriage and the family among the Yak6, p.16; 
Forde in African Bystems of Kinship and Marriage, p.322; 
Ajisafe, op. cit. , p. 5 5l 'Ihomag, ante, in 11 J. Comp.
Leg. (n.s.j, p.95.
-Coday, as we have seen, he has an action for damages against
19 20sued a seducer, or anyone who entices away his bride-to-be.
He has a right to decide on the type and duration of ttie
woman’s future education, apprenticeship or professional 
21training. And, according to one school of thought, he is
entitled to any child born of his fiancee during the period
22between betrothal and marriage. Obviously then betrothal 
is much more than a mere agreement to marry, and is only a 
short step below the marriage status.
Betrothal: Termination and Remedies
Betrothal comes to an end in one of three principal 
ways, namely when the proposed marriage is actually solemnised 
(in which case betrothal becomes functus officii), when on$ 
of the parties repudiates the agreement, or when either of
19. Kasunmu, op. cit. , pp.4 and 21; Omoneukanrin, op. cit.t
p.50; Eolarin, pp.25 and 54; Talbot, Life in s.Nigeria, 
p.217; Simmons, loc. cit. , p.161; Talbot, Peoples ...
Ill, pp. 447 and 675; Basden Niger Ibos, p.226TI
20. Cf. Ward, op. cit., p.20.
21. Cf. Ekeghe, op. cit., p.48.
22. Basden, Niger Ibo, p.220; Thomas, Anthropological Report,
Part I, p.68; Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, p.185. 
But see also Sporndli, loc. cit., p.118; ^orde (fn.18 
supra) p.115; Marriage .... Adoptive Bye-Laws (W.R.) 
1958, ante, s.15; Kasunmu, loc. cit., p.43.
the prospective spouses dies. The first of these is so 
obvious that it need not detain us here. The other two we 
shall examine briefly under four heads; (a) who can rescind 
the agreement; (b) on what grounds can this be done; (c) 
what are the legal remedies open to the injured party and 
(d) the effect of death on betrothal. Under (c) will also 
be discussed the incidental question: who can bring an action
for such a breach, and against whom?
(a) Who can rescind
We saw earlier on that the parties to a betrothal in 
the eyes of the customary law are the families of the prospect­
ive spouses or, occasionally, an adult suitor personally (being 
sui .juris) and his prospective bride*s family. In principle, 
therefore, only these families (or the said adult suitor, as 
the case may be) ha*®'legal power to repudiate the agreement.
In other words and excepting the case of the lone suitor, 
neither of the people actually betrothed to each other has a 
right or the power to repudiate their betrothal.'*' But as 
children can no longer be compelled against their will to 
marry a person chosen fur them by their families, they can 
effectively bring the betrothal to an end by refusing to go
1. They are not necessary parties to the agreement, neither 
is their consent required in law. Cf. Kasunmu, op. cit.,
p.26.
on with the match, in which case their families will have
2
to formally terminate the agreement.
(b) On what grounds
There are really no "grounds*1 on which betrothal may 
be terminated by the parties, if by "grounds’* is meant facts 
about the plaintiffs or their conduct which will justify 
repudiation and which the defendants must prove in order to 
escape liability for damages in the event of litigation. A 
party has a right to repudiate the agreement for any reason 
at all or indeed for no reason given. The usual reasons for 
this coarse of action, however, are, on the part of the 
woman's family, that subsequent investigation has revealed 
a history of crimes or some dangerous disease (such as epilepsy, 
leprosy or tuberculosis) or improvidence or cruelty to wives 
in the man's family; that the man has shown himself up as 
mean by nature; or merely that the prospective bride has 
changed her mind, so that her family are no longer in a 
position to carry out their side of the bargain however 
willing and anxious they might be to do so. The usual
2. See Bradbury and Lloyd, op. cit.,p.!56; Basden, Among the 
Ibos of Nigeria, p.69; Folarin, op. cit., p.26; Omoneukanrin, 
op. cit. f p.43; A.jisafe, op. cit. , p.73; Basden, Niger Ibos, 
p.2±7. On repudiation in West Africa generally, See Hair in 
Phillips' Survey of African Marriage and Family life, pp.121, 
123 and 124.
3. Cf. Folarin,op. cit., p.24; Basden, Niger Ibos, p.217.
reasons why a man (or his family) brings his betrothal to a
premature end include those given above; ^ that the prospective
bride has proved to be indolent by nature, is of a sickly
4
disposition, has become pregnant per alios, or is lascivious; 
or that later investigation has shown her family to have a 
bad record of broken marriages or laxity of morals.
(c) Remedies
To anyone trained in English law the most striking 
feature of a breach of promise action under customary law is 
that general damages cannot be claimed or recovered. For a 
simple breach of marriage agreement (by which is meant a 
breach that is not accompanied by pregnancy), the only remedies 
open to the parties are these. The would-be husband (or his 
family) can maintain an action for recovery of any betrothal 
payments made or bride price already paid. Either party can 
bring an action to recover any gifts made to the other party 
provided that the said gift can be shown to have been made 
and accepted - expressly or by necessary implication - as the 
donor's advance contribution towards the cost of setting up
4. Cf. Talbot, Life in southern Nigeria, p.217*
5. This list is by no means exhaustive. For example,
"adultery” by the woman or indeed by the man (pace 
Folarin, op. cit., p.26) would do; for at this stage 
either party is at liberty to change their mind.
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and equipping the matrimonial home. These rules hold true 
howsoever the betrothal came to be terminated. In other 
words, the same action is available whether the betrothal was 
terminated by death of one of the would-be spouses,^ or by 
the unlawful act of one of the parties to the agreement.
This is because the object of such an action is not recovery 
of damages for wounded, feelings or lost chances, but restitut­
ion of gifts made or property transferred for a consideration 
that has failed - to adapt a pet jargon of the English law 
of contract.
Another striking feature of this type of action is that 
there are hardly any defences to it. All that the plaintiff 
has to do is show that he made the gift or payment in question, 
to make out a prima facie case. If the claim is for recovery 
of payments made, all that is necessary is to show that the 
payment was lav/ful when made. Thus in the Eastern Region, 
any payment in excess of £30 would be unlawful as bride price, 
and so irrecoverable. Where 11 incidental expenses" are payable 
by the prospective husband, the maximum bride price payable
■ I      ■ .M . i  ■ ■! ■■■■■■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■ ■
6. Contra Omoneukanrin, op. cit., p.43, who maintains that 
among the Itsekiri, r,No claim was made in case of dissolut­
ion by death'1. But it is not clear whether this statement 
was intended to refer to re-payments upon death before or 
after the intended marriage. Nor is it clear whose death 
the author had in mind - that of the would-be husband or 
of the would-be wife. In any case it appears that the 
author was thinking of the traditional, not modern law.
or recoverable is £25, and the maximum "incidentals1 is £5.
In other cases the maximum amount payable or recoverable is 
7
£30. In the Western Region the sums recoverable will depend 
on whether or not the Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children
o
Adoptive Bye-Laws Order 1958, has been adopted by the local
government body in the area. If it has, the sums payable and
those recoverable must not exceed those set out in Schedules
A and B (i.e. Schedules to s.3(1) and s.8 respectively of the
q .
said Adoptive Bye-Laws^). If the Bye-Laws have not been 
adopted locally, any customary payments made (including the 
bride price) can be recovered. It should be emphasised that 
gifts made out of mere affection or ostentation are not 
recoverable, while those made in accordance with customary 
requirements or with a view to setting up and furnishing the 
matrimonial home are."^
It will be seen from this brief examination that, at all
events when a betrothal is terminated as a result of the act
^  - ■ - ■   —  - - - -   — - - - -  T
7. Limitation of Dowry Law, 1956 (B.R.), s.3* See also s.5 
which precludes any court’s jurisdiction in suits concern­
ing payments or other transactions made in breach of s.3.
8. W.R.L.N.456 of 1958. (Date of commencement - 27th
November, 1958).
9. These Schedules, but not the main provisions, may be varidd 
by any local government body: s.15.
10. Cf. Kasunmu, loc. cit.t pp.24-5.
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or default of one of the parties, there are only two possible 
defences open to the defendant. If the action is for recovery 
of a gift, he can plead that the said gift was made as a mark 
of affection and without any intention that it should be 
returned if the intended marriage failed to come to fruition.
If this is proved, the defendant will succeed. In the case 
of an action to recover bride price or betrothal fees already 
paid, the plaintiff will fail pro tanto if it be proved that 
the payments in question were above the permissible maximum 
under the Limitation of Dowry. Law, 1956, or the Marriage,
Divorce and Custody of Children Adoptive bye-Laws, ±958, as 
the case may be. In all other cases, the plaintiff will be 
entitled to judgement under customary lav;. It may sound, strange 
that a defendant, for example a would-be father-in-law, should 
be able to resist an action for recovery of bride price and 
similar payments made to him, on the ground that the said 
payment was made in contravention of some statute law, when 
in point of fact he was himself privy to the alleged contra­
vention. But this seems to be the effect of the two pieces 
of legislation under review. 8.8 of the Marriage, Divorce 
and Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-Laws, ante, reads:
"On the ... breaking of a contract of marriage,
... the maximum amounts which shall be recover­
able ... shall be those specified in Part B of
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the Schedule hereto.1 
Section 9 provides -
"All other claims or debts by one spouse against the 
other shall be recoverable in a separate suit as 
debts when supported by valid documents."
By using the words, "by one spouse against the other" 
the legislator obviously intended to emphasise that no more 
than the sums set out in the said Schedule could be recovered 
by way of customary gifts, under any circumstances. Bor bride 
price is not paid to or recovered from the bride herself. By 
limiting the right of action for debts arising out of betrothal 
to the would-be spouses themselves, therefore, s.9 makes 
certain that the parents (or family) of the would-be bride 
could not be sued in this way, in respect of any bride price 
paid in excess of the statutory maximum. Again, by inserting 
the words, "when supported by valid documents", the legislator 
ensures that no action could ever be brought against the 
would-be bride herself for repayment of any customary payments 
made to her over and above the statutory maximum. ^  Bor any 
such payments have to be set down in writing to be recoverable;
11. Part A of the Schedule to the above Adoptive Eye-Laws of 
the Western Region, and the customary law in most societies 
provide for payment of certain sums to prospective brides 
on a number of occasions. See items (iv)-(vi) of the said 
Schedule, Part A.
while it would he a criminal offence, punishable by lfa fine
of £25 or, in default of payment, to imprisonment for three
months" under s.3(2) of the said Adoptive Bye-Laws to make the
extra payments in the first place. And so, nobody would dream
of executing a document in support of this type of payment
unless it is strictly within the law. From the practical point
of view, too, the effect of s.9 is to make most gifts by one
prospective spouse to the other virtually non-recoverable by
legal action. Not many people would like to evidence their
12gifts by "valid documents" in these circumstances.
The Limitation of Lowry Law, 195£, of the Eastern Region 
(ante) is more precise and direct in this respect. S.4 makes 
it a criminal offence to receive or ask for, give or offer, 
incur or promise any dowry or expenses in excess of the figures 
set out in s.3 (already given above). E.5 bars the courts 
from entertaining suits or making decisions that would in 
effect violate the provisions of s.3, which would happen if, 
for instance, judgement were to be given for the recovery of 
payments made to a woman^ family, in consideration .of marriage
***        I......................... ..■■■■■I . . ..I. Ill   I , -i II. |„ 4
12. Note that this discussion only applies to those areas of 
the Western Region where the Marriage ... Adoptive Bye-Laws 
Order, 1958, has been adopted by the local government body. 
This has not been a popular measure, for as far as can be 
discovered, only 7 such bodies have adopted it up to the 
end of 1962. These are the Irrua-Ewu, Ijero, Odo-Etin, 
Irepodun, Ikeja and Egba Odeda District Councils and the 
Ikorodu Divisional Council, in that order.
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where these exceed £50.
i'o round off, it should he observed that under customary
law (untrammelled by natural justice, equity and good
conscience), it makes no difference to a party*s right of
action for recovery of betrothal payments and bride price,
whose act or fault has led to the termination of the betrothal.
In other words, it is immaterial that the agreement was
repudiated by the defendant as a result of the plaintifffs
wrongful act or omission, or indeed that the plaintiff himself
had brought it to an end. In both cases, the right of action
exists for the benefit of either party. Bor as already stated,
the gist of the action is restitution of money paid or property
transferred: the question of moral blame does not arise, The
only difference is that in some societies, for example parts
of Iboland, v/here the would-be husband or his family was
morally responsible for the dissolution of the betrothal, he
has to wait till the woman finds a new suitor out of whose
13payments the outgoing suitor would be reimbursed.
< ■    ' ■ i r -  i i .  n ,    .         n . . . . .  ■ . . . . . . .
13. On remedies for breach of marriage agreement under custom­
ary law, see: Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, p*69; 
Ekeghe, op. cit. , p.48; Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, 
pp.180-2 (He says that in Owerri-if a betrothed girl ran 
away and refused to marry her fiance, “the latter could claim 
back double dowry": p.180); Ajisafe, op. cit.t p.73;Bolarin, 
op. cit., pp.24-6, eup. p.24; Bradbury in Bradbury and Lloyd 
op. cit., p.156; Omoneukanrinp op. cit. , p.43; obiter dictum 
of Waddington, Asst. J., in Ugboma v. Morah, ante: Kasunmu, 
op* cit.. pp.24-30; and more generally, Phillips (ed.), 
burvey of African Marriage and Family Life, esp. pp.121-4. 
bee also Talbot’s Peoples of s. Nigeria. Vol.Ill, pp.449-50.
In the traditional society the proper person to sue for 
repayment of gifts and payments made in connexion with 
betrothal and marriage generally was the would-be bride’s 
father or guardian, who was himself often represented by the 
head of the wider family of which he was a member. He was 
sued not only for the betrothal fees and bride price which were 
his by right, but also for any gifts or payments due to or made 
to the woman concerned. To this there was an exception in 
the matrilineal and mixed-descent societies. There, bride 
price and similar customary dues were paid (directly or through 
the woman’s father/guardian) to the prospective bride’s 
maternal uncle or her maternal grandfather if still living.
In this case, it was the uncle or grandfather as the case may 
be who was liable for repayment if the marriage agreement 
fell through.^
In modern society, however, while parents or guardians
are still sued for all payments and gifts as a rule, the
practice is growing of joining the would-be bride herself as
a party, in respect of any payments or gifts - especially gifts
- made directly to her. We say ’’directly" advisedly because
where, as often happens, payments or refundable gifts are made
to the woman through her father or guardian, it is t'he latter 
---------------------------------------------------------- IT”
14. Por references, see under ".Repayment of Bride Price on 
Divorce".
15that is usually sued and not the woman herself.
It remains to say a few words on breaches of marriage 
agreement accompanied by pregnancy, as opposed to what we have 
described as simple breaches. Where a man brings about his 
fiancee’s pregnancy and then repudiates the agreement, he may 
be compelled to go on with the marriage or else pay an agreed 
compensation to her family. This rule, however, is not 
peculiar to betrothed persons. Any man who causes an unmarried 
woman’s pregnancy is faced with the same choice more or less, 
the difference between the cases of people who are and people 
who are not betrothed being that the latter may be rejected as 
sons-in-law and so compelled to pay damages even if they 
offered to marry the woman concerned.
As a rule, a man who repudiates his marriage agreement 
after causing his fiancee’s pregnancy loses all claims to 
repayment of any gifts, fees or bride price already paid for 
her. If this is not enough compensation, he may still be sued 
for more damages if he persists in his refusal to marry the
Vvvvfv
woman in question. It is theoretically possiblej^to recover 
part of such payments and gifts after allowing for adequate 
compensation to the injured family. But as the measure of the 
damage done is the amount of bride price and other financial 
benefits to which the woman’s family is entitled to from her
15- A payment is still ’’direct1 even if made through the special
marriage middleman. Indeed all returnable gifts and payments 
had to pass through him in the traditional society, ana often 
still do pass through him today.
husband (or his family), nothing already paid could rightly 
ever be said to exceed the amount of damages recoverable.
It goes almost without saying that where a betrothed 
woman becomes pregnant per alios, her fianc6 has a right to 
break off the match and bring an action for immediate refund 
of his gifts and bride price. He may, on the other hand - and 
quite often does - decide to forgive her and go ahead with the 
marriage. In that case all further payments are suspended and 
the marriage festivities and ceremonies are reduced to the 
absolute minimum, with a view to expediting the marriage and 
halting the spread of the shameful news which is regarded as 
a great family scandal everywhere. But in our submission, it 
would be wrong to say, as some writers liave done, that where 
a betrothed woman becomes pregnant by another man, her prospect­
ive husband is entitled to take her away as wife without ever
16having to pay any more bride price for her. It would be
more erroneous still to suggest, as at least one writer has
done, that in a case like this the fiance is entitled to take
the woman as a glave wife and recover whatever bride price he
17has already paid. The rule, in our submission, is that the
16. This is said to be the case in and around Isokpo, an Ijaw 
group near Part Harcourt: Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Helta,
p.181.
17. Talbot, loc. cit., p.182.
obligation to pay or to complete the agreed bride price is
18suspended, not obliterated. The woman’s family can still 
demand the balance outstanding, or re-call their daughter 
from her husband’s home at a later date. And this they do if 
they think she still has a good chance of finding another 
suitable husband.
(d) Effect of death on betrothal
If a betrothed woman dies before the intended marriage, 
there is an end to the betrothal. Her family is neither 
obliged nor expected to offer the disappointed fiance a 
substitute bride. There is nothing in law, of course, to 
prevent a family from finding such a substitute if they 
particularly like the fiance in question, or if they consider 
marriage relationship v/ith his family especially desirable. 
Similarly, if the prospective husband dies, the betrothal 
comes to an end, though again there is nothing to stop his 
fqmily from substituting a new suitor in his place if the 
woman and her family consent. In either case, as already 
indicated, there is no need to go over the grounds already 
covered: the two families having first agreed to be fTin-lawsu,
negotiations or preparations for marriage may continue at the
18. Cf. Thomas, p.68 of work given in the next footnote, infra.
point where they were interrupted by the death in question.*^
On the question of what gifts and payments are recoverable
where betrothal is terminated by the death of one of the
would-be spouses, there seems to have been a fairly widespread
rule in the traditional society that no repayments were asked
for or made. Writing about the Owerri Ibo, Talbot says, "If
the fiancee dies before marriage, the dowry already paid is
2
forfeited ...1 Of the people of Okigwi Division, the same 
author says,^ "Should she £i.e. the fiancee]} die before 
marriage, the dowry is not refunded, except among the Ohonhaw 
Ngwa who do so if the girl has never been to her fiance’s 
house.” Egharevba says of the Bini, "Should a betrothed girl 
die before her marriage, it is contrary to Benin law and 
custom for the parents to refund the dowry".^
In contemporary society, however, the rule is that a 
man (or his family as the case may be) has a legal right, 
which he sometimes waives in whole or in part, to recover the 
bride price or other customary payments made in respect of his 
would-be bride if the latter dies before the proposed marriage.
1. Gf. Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Ibo-speaking 
Peoples of Bigeria, Part I, the Ibo of the Awka neighbour­
hood," p. 66.
2. Peoples of southern Nigeria. Vol.Ill, p.446.
3- Ibid., p.449.
4. Benin Law and Custom (1946), p. 19.
We find this modern position clearly implied in another state­
ment of Egharevba's on Bini law when he said, "In the good old 
days people were not so particular to get their money hack," 
presumably, that is, as they are today* "If a girl died before
marriage, and her dowry had already been paid, the parents
5were not necessarily obliged to refund the dowry." Of the 
Bgba (Yoruba), Folarin says that only half the dowry already 
paid is recoverable.^ But Ajisafe, writing of the Yoruba as 
a whole (in 1924) says, "On the death of a betrothed girl the
parents shall return or refund to the fiance moneys and the
amount spent on goods by him on her behalf," though, he added, 
the right may be waived.
The reason for this change in the law is not hard to see. 
In the days of old, "bride price" was usually paid not in
o
cash but in the form of labour services. At that time there
Q
was no market price for hired labour. And so, in the event 
of a betrothal falling through, it would be impossible to 
compute the services rendered so far by or on beaalf of a
5. Benin Law and Custom (1946), p.21.
6. The Laws and Customs of Egbaland, (1959)> P*32.
7. The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People, p.61.
8. Grown-up suitors rendered such services in person, while 
the family of an infant suitor did so with the help of "paid" 
labour (see the next footnote).
9. Hired labour was paid for in kind - usually one or more 
good meals and a drink for a man, one or more meals and 
sundry presents to a woman. The quantity and quality of the 
"payment" depended of course, on the payer1s means, the 
nature of the worfe done, and the abilxty of the worker.
suitor in terms of money - apart altogether from the practical 
difficulty of recording and finding a satisfactory basis for 
the computing of such varied services as working on the farm, 
providing a sick or aged parent with a good supply of fire­
wood, helping with house-building and giving a hand in process­
ing palm oil, "pounding” the yam foofoo (fufu) or running 
errands at all hours of the day or night. At the early stages 
of the transition from labour services to cash payments, the 
sums payable were small enough to be overlooked without undue 
hardship to the fiance or his family. But as bride price 
soared with the influx of ready cash during the second World 
War - even long before this in some places like Awka - it was 
only natural that men should insist on repayment, and that 
the law should change accordingly.
Breach of promise action under English law.
There is a wealth of literature on the English law relat-
1
ing to actions for breach of promise. Here we shall only 
           ^
1. Bee, e.g., Bromley, op. cit. » pp.16-29; Powell, "Frustration 
of a promise to marry" in 14 Current legal Problems, 100 ff; 
the current editions of Hokes and Cross on Evidence; all the 
standard works and textbooks on the law of Torts, Contract 
and Divorce. The case law is simply legion.
concern ourselves with those aspects of the law which raise 
special problems owing to the inherent difficulty of synthesiz-
in physical distance and basic philosophies as those of Nigeria 
and England, These problems we shall briefly examine under 
five main heads:- (a) the nature of "breach of promise", in 
particular to what extent, if at all, a person is liable for 
breach of promise if he agreed to contract one type of marriage 
and subsequently decided to proceed with another type; (b) 
recovery of damages; (c) recovery of gifts made by one party 
to the other during the. period of their engagement; (d) defences; 
and (e) the effect of death. Where necessary, the points of 
departure between English and customary law rules will be 
recapitulated by way of emphasis.
(a) Breach of promise: its nature and legal remedy
A person commits a breach of promise to marry another
2
when he fails or refuses, without lawful justification, to 
carry out his undertaking in that behalf; when he creates a 
situation which makes it legally impossible for him to fulfil 
the promise; or, more generally, when he does an act which 
clearly negatives any intention on his part to carry out his
ing legal principles derived from
2. On "lawful justification", see (c) defences, post.
side of the contract, A simple case of failure, as opposed
to positive refusal, to carry out one’s undertaking would be
where a lady’s repeated requests to ’name the day” are ignored
in silence, or where one of the parties fails to turn up on
the wedding day. Joining an institution for voluntary celibates
would be a clear indication not to go on with one’s contract 
3to marry. Again, where a person who was engaged to A goes
and marries B, he would thereby render himself legally
incapable of fulfilling his promise to contract a Christian
marriage with A. This, incidentally, was the situation which
4arose in Uso v. Iketubosin.
This last point calls for a closer, albeit brief, examin­
ation. What would be the legal position where a man who is 
engaged to marry Miss A under the Marriage Act goes and marries 
Miss I) under customary law during the currency of his agreement 
with A? Would this constitute a breach of promise or not, in 
view of the fact that polygamy is legally permissible and 
socially commendable? The short answer to this question is 
that a subsisting customary marriage is as effective a bar to
. . .  i    - ■ ■ ■ -----------------------------  .  .    ,   j n  i. q ;,
3- ’’Voluntary” in the sense that members do not take a vow of 
perpetual chastity, and may leave the institution at any time, 
they wish. Going into a monastery or nunnery where such a 
vow is taken would be to place oneself in a position wherein 
it becomes legally impossible ever to carry out the marriage 
contract.
4. (1957) W.N.L.R.187.
a Christian marriage as is a subsisting Christian marriage; 
therefore, to contract a customary marriage in these circumst­
ances would be to render oneself legally incapable of contract­
ing the proposed Christian marriage, and so would constitute 
a breach of promise. This is because s.33(l) of the Marriage 
Act provides that -
11... no marriage in Nigeria shall be valid ... where 
either of the parties thereto at the time of the 
celebration of such marriage is married by native 
law or custom to any person other than the person 
with whom such marriage is had.1
S.47 of the same Act provides a penalty in these words:
"Whoever contracts a marriage under the provisions 
of this Ordinance {[now Act}, or any modification 
or re-enactment thereof, being at the same time 
married in accordance with native law or custom 
to any person other than the person with whom such 
marriage is contracted, shall be liable to imprison­
ment for five years."
It should be noted in passing that it is equally impossible
to contract a valid customary marriage during the subsistence
of a Christian marriage, the penalty for any such purported
7
marriage too being five years imprisonment. Therefore, a man 
who is betrothed to one woman under customary law and marries
5. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1958 Revision), Cap.115*
6. Ibid., s.35.
7. Ibid., s.48.
another under the Act would he guilty of constructive repudiat­
ion of such betrothal even if in actual fact he is ready and 
willing to complete the customary marriage.
The other question which arises from the phenomenon of
dualism in our marriage law is this. Would it be tantamount
to a breach of promise if a person is engaged to be married
to another under the Marriage Act but later changes his mind
so that while he now refuses to contract a Christian marriage,
he is nevertheless ready and willing to contract a customary
marriage with the other person concerned? Enough has been
said above to show that an agreement to marry under customary 
s>o
lav/ differs^fundamentally in character and legal incidents 
from one to marry under the Act, that they are not inter­
changeable one with the other. Moreover, the actual marriage, 
when completed, would have different legal incidents as well 
as social significance in the two cases. It would therefore, 
in our submission, be a breach of promise to switch over from
a contract to marry under the Act to a statement of willing-
8ness to marry under customary law, and vice versa.
■?.  —    — — — ----
8. It may be objected that since Christian marriage is patently 
more advantageous to a woman than is customary marriage, a 
change of promise by her fiance from the latter to the former 
type of marriage wouJ-d not constitute repudiation of the 
betrothal, mit it must be remembered that a Cnristian 
marriage involves a greater loss of freedom on a woman*s part, 
being much more difficult and expensive to dissolve: Hence 
the "vice versa** above.
A curious case which shares something of failing to turn 
up for the wedding on the appointed day and retracting from a 
promise to marry under the Act, in favour of (presumably) a 
customary marriage, is Martins v. Adenugba.^ A man took his 
fiancee to a Registrar*s Office to get married. On arrival, 
he asked her to wait outside the office, while he went in 
alone. When he emerged from the office, he took her away to 
a church to have their “marriage** blessed by the priest, as 
is usual among people who contract a “court** as opposed to a 
“church** marriage. The girl thought she had been duly married, 
so did the priest who accordingly proceeded to bless the 
“marriage”. After the blessing, the couple repaired to the 
"matrimonial" home and lived as man and wife for a time.
Three ye^rs later, the parties having separated, the "wife" 
petitioned for divorce, only to discover in court that she 
never was married under the Act so that there was no marriage 
for the High Court to dissolve. Whereupon she sued her “husband" 
for a breach of promise to marry, or in the alternative for 
fraudulent misrepresentation or for deceit.
Brooke, Acting C.J., held on the authority of Beyers v. 
G-reen -^Q that this form of action was the right one to adopt,
9. (1946) 18 N.L.R.63 (Lagos, Supreme Court). The case was 
undefended.
10. £1937} All E.R.613.
and that the woman was entitled to recover. There is no clear 
indication in the report which of the alternative claims 
judgement was given upon. It was assumed without discussion 
that the law applicable to the case was English law, presum­
ably on account of the fact that the parties went to the 
Registry in the first place. Given that the proper law of 
the case was English law, there could be no doubt but that 
the defendant was guilty of deceit, having led the plaintiff 
to believe that his going into the Registry Office while she 
stood outside the door constituted a perfectly valid "court" 
marriage - she was obviously quite innocent of the law and 
procedure relating to this type of marriage. If, however, 
the couple had already contracted a customary^marriage as 
most (perhaps all) other Lagos Yoruba of their day did, then 
it is arguable that this was not necessarily a case of deceit 
or fraud but a genuine case of a man changing his mind about 
a Christian marriage (after having a word of advice, who 
knows, at the Registry) and deciding to have his customary 
marriage blessed in church (as is sometimes done) instead.
Not that this would make any difference to the defendant*s 
liability. For as we have seen, the two types of marriage are 
so radically different from each other that a change of heart 
in circumstances such as the present would clearly constitute
2,8
a "breach of promise. Bu^if it could "be shown that the 
defendant had merely changed his mind in favour of letting 
their customary marriage stand alone (still assuming the 
parties were already married under customary law), the 
quantum of damages recoverable may well he considerably less 
than it would if there had been sheer calculated fraud.
(b) Recovery of damages.
We have seen that the object of an action for breach 
of promise to marry under customary law is to recover payments 
and gifts already made, irrespective of the parties' guilt or 
innocence. This is not the case in English law, whose object 
in this type of action is to award damages to the innocent 
party as recomperise for any mental injury (including ordinary 
wounded feelings) and for any social, material or pecuniary 
loss arising as a direct (not remote) consequence of the breach
1. "Material” and wpecuniary" are used here to denote two
different types of loss. "Material1 losses range in 
denotation from the comfort of chaffeur-driven limous­
ines and luxury country homes with servants galore to 
inheriting a comfortable bank belance on intestacy. 
"Pecuniary" losses relate to actual financial losses 
through, for example, the purchase of wedding rings and 
dresses which became useless as a result of the breach 
of contract.
2of contract, and to punish the guilty party* ihese damages 
can be classified under two main heads, viz. general and 
special. General damages may further he classified into 
compensatory and ppltx&tive. And special damages may he either 
compensatory or merely restitutional.
(i) General damages. By compensatory general 
damages we mean a sum of money, usually substantial in amount, 
which the plaintiff recovers as a solatium for the loss of 
the defendants consortium as a spouse and, in the case of a 
female plaintiff, the chance of attaining the status of a
*5
married woman. In other words, general compensatory damages 
are aimed at placing the plaintiff in the position she would 
have been in but for the defendant's breach of promise - that
2. This difference in juridical objectives probably reflects 
differences in social environment and psychology as between 
English and traditional Nigerian societies. Polygyny made 
marriage a dead certainty for every woman of normal dispos­
ition and health (physical and mental). Early betrothal, 
which was the norm, ensured that women were either married 
or jilted early enough in life to find other suitable 
husbands. Eo much for social environment. Openly to admit 
disappointment at the loss of a particular marriage prospect 
(which would be the effect of pleading injured feelings in a 
breach of promise action) would be a family disgrace, for it 
would mean a public declaration of lack of confidence in the 
girl's personal attractions and in her family's ability to 
raise desirable wives-to-be. Many lovers still suffer in 
silence in the Western world for this reason.
3. Eor a succinct statement of the English law, see Bromley, 
op. cit., pp.23-8.
is insofar as money can do this. Among the factors which a 
Court takes into consideration in assessing damages of this 
type are the related questions of the plaintiff's present age 
as compared to her age when the contract to marry was entered 
into; the length of the engagement period; the parties' 
emotional attachment to each other all through this period, 
with the resulting loss or rejection of other desirable matri­
monial targets; and the present marriage prospects of the 
plaintiff, having regard to her age and present circumstances.
A
In Uso v. Iketubosin the parties became engaged in 1947, when 
the lady plaintiff was about twenty years old. In 1957 the 
defendant married a third party, whereupon the plaintiff sued 
him for damages. Irwin, J., held that in assessing general 
dqmages at £600, the Court was taking into consideration the 
plaintiff's present age, which was 30 (and so, by implication, 
her considerably diminished matrimonial prospects), as well 
as the parties' stations in life.
In an earlier action before Waddington, Asst. J., in the 
Onitsha High Court, it was held, as we have seen, that in 
assessing damages the Court must take cognizance of the fact 
that under the customary law of the parties there was nothing 
like an action for (general) damages. This point was not
4. (1957) W.N.L.R.187.
5. Ugboma v. Morah, ante.
discussed or indeed adverted to at all in Uso v. Iketubosin.
The whole question of how far the courts should admit custom­
ary lav; principles so as to modify the usual incidents of a 
given transaction which is otherwise governed hy English law, 
is, without doubt, a difficult one. On the one hand, it is 
only reasonable to expect that the received English (or other 
foreign) law should be interpreted and applied subject (or at 
least with reference) to existing fundamental legal ideas and 
social practices in the receiving country. But it is arguable, 
on the other hand, that to carry this principle to its logical 
conclusion would lead to the apparently odd result that a 
person could have the best of two worlds in personal law 
matters, to the detriment of the other party or parties to a 
given transaction. Thus, for instance, a man would be free 
to adopt the English form of marriage for prestige or other 
reasons, while escaping the normal legal incidents of such a 
union, to the detriment of his wife. There is great force in 
this argument which, incidentally, rests on the time-honoured 
doctrine that a person is deemed to intend the natural conseq- 
uences of his intentional act. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that the principle under consideration (viz. that merely 
to adopt one system of marriage/engagement does not necessarily
6. Of. R. v. Sheppard (1810), R. & R. 169; R. v. Philpot 
(1912), 7 Or. App. R. 140; Hosegood v. Hosegood (1990) 66 
T.Jj.R.735; Mane ini v. D . P ♦ P . (.1942) A . G .1.
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imply an intention to adopt a foreign law a® onefs personal 
law) has been accepted without demur as regards Yoruba Moslems 
contracting marriage according to Moslem rites. Thus on the 
question of which law should govern the intestate estate of an 
Ijebu Yoruba woman who was married by Islamic rites, Brooke,
*7
J., held in re Alayo, Administrator-General v. Tunwase that
the law applicable was not Islamic law but Ijebu customary
law, as there was no evidence before the referee or the Court
in this case that "an Ijebu who married according to Muslim
rites and died without issue and intestate had £ever] had his
or her property distributed in accordance with Maliki law.
The same is the result if we substitute Mohammedan for Maliki 
0
law." On the position in Customary Courts, Lloyd says -
MI have seen no case in which a customary court has 
followed Moslem law in preference to Yoruba law ...
Pious Moslems often arrange marriages partially 
following Moslem law and usage, but such marriages 
are recognized by the courts as customary law 
marriages.
If this be true of people contracting what are ostensibly 
Islamic marriages, why should it not be true of those
7. (1946) 18 N.L.R.88. See also Ayoola v. Rolawiyo (1942).
8 W.A.C .A . 39 •
8. 18 N.L.R.88, at p.92.
9. Yoruba Land Law, p.27, fn.l. No great importance should 
be attached to the phrase "partially following Moslem law,1 
since this is also true of persons contracting Christian 
marriages.
contracting Christian marriages?
Phillips1 reading of the basic intention of the Act is
certainly right when he says that -
"So far the pVTarriage^ Ordinance seems to evince an
intention to place both the spouses and their
offspring outside the sphere of native law and 
c u s t o m , a s  far as intestate succession to property is
concerned. This was part of the civilizing mission of the
British in Nigeria. But whatever the position where the local
legislature makes a statute modelled on some English statute,
as in the case of the Marriage Act, the Courts have no
corresponding right to apply unmodified rules of English
common law to transactions between two Nigerians, carried out
in Nigeria against Nigerian social background. This is the
position with agreements to marry under the Act. He shall
have more to say on the presumed /apparent intention of the
legislature in enacting the above Act when we come to deal
with intestate succession. Suffice it here to say that on
the equally hallowed principle of English construction of
statutes - that the legislature must be presumed to intend
the least possible change in the common law - and equating 
       —  -  ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■ - ■       ■■■■—   ■ ... ■ ...   — «
10. "Conflict between statute and customary law of marriage 
in Nigeria." (1955) 18 M.L.R.73, at p.74*
the introduction of English law into a society previously 
regulated by customary law with the enactment of statute law 
on a subject previously regulated by the common law, there 
should be a presumption in favour of doing as little violence 
to the customary law as possible. I’he great weakness of this 
proposition, however, is that to permit English law to be 
modified by a large number of different customary laws might 
be xo modify it out of existence, as a unifying'force. Be 
that as it may; but there is uniformity in the customary law 
throughout our area of reference to the effect that general 
damages are not recoverable in an action for breach of promise 
to marry. And so, in our submission, there is everything to 
be said for the decision in Ugboma v. Morah. viz., that the 
Courts should take that fact into consideration in assessing 
damages.
So much for the compensatory aspect of general damages. 
Such damages may also be |hifiitive, in which case they are 
increased in proportion to the "injury to the plaintifffs 
feelings, reputation and health and will be less if the 
defendant can show extenuating reasons for his conduct.
One of the most frequently pleaded aggravating circumstances
11. Bromley, op. cit., p.24, based in part on a statement by 
Phillimore, L.J., in Quirk v. Thomas, (1916) 1 K.B.516.
is that in reliance upon the defendant's promise the plaintiff
allowed him to seduce her, with a shattering effect on her
12feelings, her pride and her future matrimonial prospects.
(ii) Special damages. These, as already indicated, 
may he restitut.ional or compensatory. As pleaded in our 
Courts, the former include claims for the recovery of gifts 
such as sewing machines, or clothing given hy one party to 
the other for use during their courting period. They also 
include claims for recovery of pledges of good faith such as 
rings and keepsakes of one kind or another. Damages of this 
type we designate as "restitutional" because the items claimed 
for are usually ordered to be returned to the donor in specie 
(though he may be given the option of returning its value in 
money).
Compensatory special damages, on the other hand, are 
those awarded in respect of money spent, or financial loss 
sustained, by the plaintiff as a direct result of the defend­
ant's breach of promise. The former include money spent on 
(a) durable articles intended for use on the wedding day or 
in the matrimonial home, and which, in the nature of things, 
become useless if there is not going to be a wedding: wedding
rings and dresses, bouquets and carnations, furniture and
C ■ 1 ' ■ j ' Clt$(7
12. Bromley, op,. cit.» p.24,Lbased in part on a statement by 
Phillimore, L.J., in Quirk v. Thomas. (1916) 1 K.B.516.
trousseaus,^  as well as forfeited deposits on new flats are
obvious examples of these; or (b) refreshments and other
forms of entertainment for the wedding day: wedding cakes,
drinks and non-recoverable deposits on halls or brass bands
readily spring to mind in this connexion. The other classes*
include (c) financial losses due to the fact that the plaintiff
gave up his contract of service or changed his position
adversely in reliance upon the defendant’s promise;"^ and (d)
frustrated hopes of a settlement or even of intestate
17succession as a widow or widower.
The practical significance of the distinction between 
’’general" and "special" damages is quite considerable. At 
common law (and this, as we shall see presently, is the position 
in Lagos and the Eastern Region today) the general rule 
regarding survival of action for breach of promise to marry
T O
was that actio personalis moritur cum persona. Nevertheless
14. On trousseaus as part of special damages, see Halsbury’s 
Laws of England (3rd edn.), V”ol.l9> P-773-
15. Ibid.
16. E.g. where the defendant had promised to settle property 
on the plaintiff after the marriage. Cf. Bromley, p.25.
17. ohaw v. Shaw (1954) 2 Q.h.429, where a woman recovered 
£1000, being 2/3 of the net estate of a man who had deceived 
her into marrying and living with him for 14 years by 
stating, contrary to the truth, that he was a widower at
the time of the marriage.
18. Gf. Bromley, p.26. Bor details see textbooks on the law 
of torts.
the Courts recognised this exception to the general rule, viz.
that a subsisting cause of action survived for or against a
person’s estate if it was for special damages. Both this
rule and the exception to it have been stated and re-stated
by generations of English judges among them such judicial
luminaries like Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in Chamberlain v.
Williamson,^  Lord Esher, M.R., in Pinlay v. Chirney,^
21ihillimore L.J., in Quirk v. Thomas and Denning,- L.J., (as
22he then was) in the post-common law case of Shaw v. Shaw.
It is also submitted that the distinction drawn above
between "restitutional" and "compensatory" special damages
has more than a little practical significance. Where in an
action a claim is made for damages coming within the former
category, the plaintiff will fail if it could be shown that
(a) the article in respect of which the claim is made is still
23
in the plaintiff’s possession; ■ or (b) that the article in
19. (1814) 2 M. and S.408.
20. (1888) 20 Q.B.D.494; a Court of Appeal decision.
21. (1916) 1 K.b .516, another C.A. decision.
22. (1954) 2 Q.B.429; also C.A. See also, Bromley, p.26,
and Halsbury*^ Laws of England, Vol.l9t p.771 fn. (b) and 
p.774. (3rd edn.).
23. Uso v. Iketubosin, ante.
24question was given to the defendant as a mark of affection,
as an introduction to the defendant’s acquaintance or in order
25to gain her favour. On the other hand, a claim which 
properly falls within the second category of special damages 
(i.e. compensatory) will not fail merely because the article 
concerned is still in the plaintiff’s possession, or was never 
given to or even shown to the defendant. In other words, 
"restitutional special damages” are concerned with articles 
and gifts which are equivocal in nature: they may or may not
have been bought or given in contemplation of marriage. Thus 
a gift of an expensive sewing machine, gold wrist watch or 
diamond necklace could equally be shown to have been made as 
a result of a transitory infatuation, or as a placatory offer 
for wounded feelings between lovers with no matrimonial 
intentions, or as an investment in one’s future spouse and 
matrimonial home. In this last case, it is recoverable; in 
the other cases, it is not. ’compensatory special damages”, 
on the other hand, relate to articles, expenses or damage to 
the plaintiff’s estate which, in the nature of things, point 
unequivocally to the proposed marriage. A wedding ring has 
but one story to tell; so has money spent on veils and
24. Uso v. Iketubosin, ante.
25* Young v. Burrell (1576) Cary 54; Robinson v. Cumming 
(1742} 2 Atk. 409. 3ee also Halsbury, op. cit., Vol.18, 
pp.590-1.
wedding dresses. Take away the marriage, and these articles 
become a road loss in the plaintiff’s hands. They are no 
less a loss because they are still in the purchaser’s possess­
ion.
(c) Recovery of giftn
So far we have considered the recovery of gifts by one 
prospective spouse to the other as an item under the general 
heading: Special damages, for this seems to be the practice
among our legal practitioners - insofar as it is possible to 
discover any pattern from the few cases on breach of promise 
to be found in the la?/ reports. We shall now attempt an 
examination of the same question from a slightly different 
angle. And here we shall include in our discussion the 
question how fqr, if at all, gifts made to an engaged couple 
by third parties can be recovered, and for whose benefit.
The general rule at common law is that all gifts of 
whatever kind which are made in contemplation of marriage are 
recoverable (a) from both parties where the engagement is 
terminated by mutual consent or frustrated by the death of 
one of the parties; and (b) from, but not by, the party who
wrongfully repudiated the agreement to marry. Thus in the 
old case of Robinson v. Cumming (ante) it was held that a
-i .. '
1. See generally, Halsbury, op. cit., Vol.19, p.774.
2. Cf. Bromley, p.28.
donee who unlawfully broke his promise to marry must return
any gifts made to him in contemplation of the marriage. In
3
Jacobs v. Davis, Shearman J., decided in 1917 (i.e. before 
the introduction of statute law in this field in 1934) that 
a woman who broke off her engagement without justification 
must return the engagement ring. But in Cohen v. Sellar.  ^ i
decided in 1926 but still under the common law, McCardie, J., 
held that where a man wrongfully broke his promise tojrrarry, 
he had no right to recover the engagement ring from his ex­
fiancee.
Gifts from third parties are governed by the same rules
as far as recovery is concerned: provided they were initially
made in contemplation of marriage, they are recoverable under 
the same circumstances. On the termination of the engagement, 
the would-be spouses are each entitled to those items which 
were given (or presumed to be given) to the couple jointly for 
his sake, to use a popular expression. In practical terms 
this means that where it is not clear to which party a particuter 
gift was directed or intended by the donor, then it will go 
to the party whose friend or relation, as the case may be, 
made the gift.5
3. D-9171 2 K.B.532.
4. [19261 1 K. B.536. Bee also, Halsbury, Vol.19, p.774.
5. Halsbury, op. cit., Vol.18, p.391* We shall return to this 
subject in the chapter on Divorce. Meanwhile it should be 
noted that the above rules are subject to contrary intention 
/arrangement by the parties or donors as the case may be.
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(d) Defences
We shall begin with two pleas which, are most commonly 
raised in breach of promise actions, but which are really 
more in the nature of denial that there ever was a contract 
to marry than defences. The first is that although promises 
were exchanged, there was no intention at any moment to enter 
into legal obligations. A moment's reflection will show 
that this plea is not as ludicrous as it sounds. It is not 
uncommon, for instance, for two young people who find them­
selves physically attracted to each other to become "engaged" 
on an impulse and without really giving the matter any serious 
thought; or merely to have the opportunity of meeting each 
other at will and without parental interference; or, if 
living in a small provincial society, so as to stave off 
public censure. Such an understanding is seldom if ever 
expressed in words. Again, in our modern society where young 
men and women will do practically anything for the fun of it, 
it is important that the intention of the parties at the 
material time should be carefully investigated, having regard 
to all the circumstances, if we are to avoid frivolous, 
vexatious or, worst of all, "gold-digging" litigation. One 
is inclined to agree with Bromley when he says with reference 
to "unofficial" engagements, that in his submission, "there
is a presumption against the parties’ intending to be legally- 
bound.
The other so-called defence is absence of corroboration 
where one party alleges a contract to marry and the other 
denies the allegation. In such cases, and to prevent gold- 
digging actions, the Courts insist on corroboration of the 
plaintiff’s allegation. This, however, is not very difficult 
to secure, since the defendant’s letters or even conduct in
2certain circumstances will provide the needed corroboration, 
how to true defences.
It is a good defence that since entering into the 
contract, the defendant discovered that the plaintiff was 
in fact unfit for marriage - morally, mentally or physically. 
The operative words here are ’since”, ”in fact” and ’unfit”. 
The unfitness must have come to the defendant’s knowledge 
after the contract came into being, either because the cause 
of the unfitness arose after the engagement, or because he 
was completely unaware of its existence at the material time. 
Secondly, the alleged unfitness must exist in fact. It is
1. Op. cit., p.19*
2. For details, see Halsbury, op. cit., Vol.19, p*770, and 
textbooks on the law of evidence.
3. If its existence was known to him before he entered into 
the contract, he must be presumed to have waived it: 
Bromley, op. cit., p.22.
not enough that the defendant believed honestly and on
reasonable grounds that the plaintiff was unfit while in
4fact she was not. Then again the plaintiff may be unfit 
for marriage by reason of (a) physical infirmity such as 
tuberculosis or leprosy; or (b) mental illness such as 
insanity and, perhaps, acute bouts of uncontrollable temper 
or of prolonged periods of depression; or (c) moral infirm­
ity such as laxity in sexual morality or persistent tendency 
5to steal. On this it should be noted that for any factor 
to operate so as to render a party "unfit" and so provide 
the defendant with a good ground for breaking off the 
engagement, it must be such as to make the plaintiff unfit 
to be a husband or wife at all. It is not enough that he/sfie, 
turned out to be less wealthy than the defendant had believed. 
For while this would make him/her a poorer "catch" than 
expected, it need not impair his/her quality as a spouse.
Lastly a word on infancy as a defence.^ We have seen 
that the Infants Relief Act, 1874, of England was held to 
apply to the Colony of Lagos as a statute of general applic-
7
ation in Labinjoh v. Abake, a decision of the Full Court
4. Jefferson v. Paskell, (1916) 1 K.B.57, (C.A.).
5. On defences generally, see Bromley, pp.21-3.
6. On infancy as a defence in the law of England: Halsbury, 
Vol.19, p.768.
7. (1924) 5 R.L.R.32.
comprising Combe, C.J., Van der Meulen and Tew, JJ. It is 
only reasonable, therefore, to say that it applies not only 
to the Federal Territory of Lagos as at present constituted 
but also the two southern Regions of the Federation. As far 
as the Western Region is concerned, however, all doubts have 
now been removed because the English Act has been re-enacted 
locally as the Infants Law, being Cap.49 of the 1959 Revision.
The Act (in both its English and local forms) defines 
an infant as a person under the age of 21 years (with certain 
irrelevant exceptions relating to married infants). Now, it 
is a notorious fact that in Nigerian indigenous societies, 
infancy ends long before a person attains the age of 21 - 
usually at puberty; but sometimes a little before or a little 
after, where initiation ceremonies are required to end infancy 
and usher the initiate into manhood or womanhood. The quest­
ion whether the meaning attached to the word "infant" in the 
Infants Relief Act should be modified to accord with local 
(Lagos Yoruba) concept of infancy was canvassed in Labinjoh 
v. Abake (ante). The Divisional Court (the then equivalent 
of a High Court of today) held that such modification was 
necessary and that infancy ended at puberty. The Full Court 
(the early counterpart of the Federal Supreme Court of today 
as a Court of appeal), reversed this decision and held that
the Courts were not entitled to make such a modification.
In our submission, this was the right decision to make. 
"Infancy" has, therefore, the same meaning under the general 
law as it has in the law of England in this respect.
The result of English case law on the scope of the 
Infants Relief Act, 1874, insofar as it concerns promise to 
marry may be summarised thus. In 1878, it was held by Lord 
Coleridge, C.J., and Lopes, J., that the Act applied to a 
promise of marriage. This was in Coxhead v. Mullis,8 which
Q
wqs followed in Northcote v. Doughty the following year.
In both these cases the Court was asked to say that s.2 of
the Act did not apply to a contract to marry - this being
the section which provides that
"No action shall be brought whereby to charge any 
person ... upon any ratification made after full 
age of any promise or contract made during 
infancy whether there shall or shall not be any 
new consideration for such promise or ratification 
after full age."^
It is therefore a good defence that the alleged promise was
made by the defendant during infancy, or that it was merely
ratified after he came of age.^
8. (1878) 3 C.P.D.439 (=Com. Pleas Div.)
9. (1879) 4 C.P.D.385: Denman and Lopes, JJ.
10. This (s.2 of the English Act) is s.5 of the W.R. Infants
Law.
11. Coxhead v. Mullis, ante.
If, however, the defendant has made a new promise since
he attained his majority, instead of just ratifying the old
childhood promise, the Act does not apply and so he will be 
12liable. Whether a promise or act was a new promise or a 
mere ratification of the old is a question of fact to be 
proved by evidence. But no question should be left to the 
jury (where there is one) on this score unless there is
1^5
evidence on which they could properly base a finding. No
general rules could be given as to what does or does not
constitute a new promise. But asking a girl to “name the day”
has been held to be,"^ while declining to be released from a.
promise following a change of the plaintiff’s father’s
fortune for the worse and merely continuing amorous relations
15was held not to be enough.
(e) Effect of death of a party
If either of the parties dies while the contract to marry
still subsists, the contract is automatically frustrated.^
All gifts made in contemplation of the marriage lapse, so to
12. Ditcham v. Worall (1880) 5 C.P.D.410. Per Denman and 
Bindley, JJ., with Lord Coleridge, C.J., dissenting.
13. Holmes v. Brierley, (1888) 14 L.T.(n.s.)70.
14. Ditcham v. Worall, ante.
15. Holmes v. Brierley, ante.
1. Cf. Bromley, op. cit., p.25, footnote (r).
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speak, and may be recovered in an action by or against the
deceased party’s personal representative, in the absence of
2
agreement to the contrary* And as already indicated, 
marriage payments and customary gifts made under customary 
law in contemplation of a duplicated marriage also become 
recoverable unless waived. The same principle also governs 
the refund or recovery of payments and gifts, as the case 
may be, made in contemplation of marriage where the contract 
to marry had already been terminated by mutual consent before 
the death occurred. In this case, too, gifts and payments 
made in contemplation of marriage may be recovered for the 
benefit of or against the estate of the deceased party.^
When we turn to the question of how far, if at all, an 
action for breach of promise which accrued to a party 
during his life time will survive him for the benefit of his 
estate, and vice versa, we are confronted with more than a 
little uncertainty and diversity as between the different 
parts of southern Nigeria. In the Western Region, the 
position is now governed by statute law - the Administration 
of Estates Law, 1959 - as regards deaths occurring after the
2. On this see McCardie, J., in Cohen v. Sellar, ante.
3. Halsbury, op. cit., Vol.19, p.774. Whether a gift is 
made "in contemplation of marriage" or not is a question
of fact. But enough has been said in the section on class­
ification above to indicate to which category a given item 
will probably be held to belong.
C%y , (\
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23rd of April, 1959* But there is, as far as one can see, no 
legislation in force on the subject in the Federal Territory 
of Lagos or in the Eastern Region. There is no English 
statute of general application which was in force on the 
first day of January, 1900, to consider in this connexion, 
as the position was regulated in England by the co§unon law 
up to and including the 25th of July, 1934: the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of that year only governs 
cases relating to deaths after July the 25th. The current 
law on the subject in Lagos and the Eastern Region is, there­
fore, the common law of England as at July 25th, 1 9 3 4 This 
law may be summarised as follows.
7/here one of the parties to a contract to marry dies 
subsequent to a wrongful termination of the said contract, 
any right of action that might have accrued to or against
4* The common law is not applied with reference to any
reception date in Nigeria, for s.45(1) of the Interpretat­
ion Act and s.14 of the High Court Law which respectively 
provide for the application of English law in Lagos and 
the Eastern Region make it quite plain.that the date - 1st 
January, 1900 - only refers to statutes of general applic­
ation. The former says inter alia:
"... the common law of England and the doctrines of 
equity, together with" the statutes of general 
application that were in force in England oh the 
1st day of January, 1900, shall be in force in 
Lagos ..." S.14 of the High Court Law and s.40 of the 
Magistrates Courts Law of the Eastern Region are identical to 
this, except that they both omit the phrase "together with", 
putting in its place the single word "and".
him dies with him, except to the extent of any special damage
5of a pecuniary or property nature. In other words, where 
the party in "breach has died, the surviving party can sue his 
personal representative, hut only for special damages which 
flow from the deceased’s breach of contract. Conversely, if 
it is the innocent party that has died, his personal represent­
ative can maintain an action for similar damages against the 
party in breach, for the benefit of the deceased’s estate.
But in neither case are general damages, whether compensatory 
or exemplary, recoverable. This then, in a nutshell, is the 
position in Lagos and the Eastern Region.
The law of the Western Region relating to survival of 
causes of action in this respect is contained in s.15 of the 
Administration of Estates Law, 1959 (No.23 of 1959)-^ Section 
15(1) provides that, with three specified exceptions,^ all 
causes of action subsisting against or vested in a person 
dying after July 23rd, 1959, shall survive him, and may,be 
brought against or for the benefit of his estate.
If a cause of action thus survives and is taken up for 
the benefit of a deceased person’s estate, then:
5. Cf. Halsbury, op. cit., Vol.19, p.771, footnote (b), Brom­
ley, op. cit. , p. 26. For judicial decisions and obiter 
dicta, see Finlay v. Chirney, ante; Chamberlain v. William­
son, ante; Robinson v. Cummings, ante; Quirk v. Thomas, 
ante; and the conflicting views of singleton and Denning, 
L.J.J., in Shaw v. Shaw, ante.
6. Laws of the Western Region, 1959 Revision, Vol.l, Cap.l.
7. Actions for defamation, seduction or for inducing one 
spouse to leave the other.
(a) damages to be recovered shall not include exemplary
damages;
(b) if the action is for a breach of promise, damages
recoverable "shall be limited to such damage, if 
any, to the estate of that person as flows from 
the breach of promise to marry".8
If, on the other hand, the action is against the estate of a
deceased person, the better view is that the surviving party
can recover as much as he would have done had the other party
Q
not died. But the plaintiff in such a case has to act 
promptly, and may indeed find that the other party’s death 
has barred any action against his estate. This is because 
s.15(3) provides that the action shall be barred by the 
wrongdoer’s death unless either -
(a) proceedings were already pending in court at the time
of his death; or
(b) the cause of action arose within the last three years
immediately before his death and proceedings are taken 
within six months of his personal representative’s 
taking out representation.
The effect of this sub-section is to shorten the normal period
of limitation in these cases by two-and-a-half years, other
things being equal: The innocent party has 6 years in which
to bring his action for breach of promise. But if, for
instance, the party in breach dies after 4 years of the
8. S.15(2).
9 . Cf. halsbury, op. cit., Vol.19, p.771, fn.(b), and Bromley, 
op. cit., p.26, on s.l of the 1934 Act on which the above 
section was modelled.
breach, the action is barred. Even if the guilty party dies 
only a few weeks after the breach (and so, well within the 
statutory 3-year period), the injured party will have his 
right of action barred if he fails to initiate proceedings 
within 6 months of the personal representative’s taking out 
representation.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CUSTOMARY LAW MARRIAGE
Definition
Marriage as known to customary law may be defined
as the union of a man and a woman for the duration of the
woman1s life, being normally the gist of a wider associa-
1 2tion between two families or sets of families. ■'
’union* is employed here in the sense of a per­
manent association of two human beings that are legally and 
physically distinct, not as a fusion of two such beings into 
some mystic or metaphysical entity - an obsolescent 
concept which found its way from the Bible, through ec­
clesiastical law into ’Christian marriage’ law, leaving, for 
instance, some aspects of English law of crime, evidence 
and torts riddled with anomalies, as we shall see.
In spite of the fact that customary law permits polygyny, 
marriage is still a union of ’a man and a woman’, not, as
1. On the nature and objects of marriage under customary 
law, see Phillips, Purvey of African Marriage ..., pp. 
XIII-XVII; Basden,"'Among the lb  os ...» pY6o; Temie- 
tan, ’Marriage among the Jekri ...’ (1936) 13 Nigeria,
P •779 ^hornas, Anthropological Report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples ..., p.FO; Delano,'' An African looks at marriage, 
p.26 ff.; Kasunmu, loc.cit., p.8. On uniformity, 
see Ajayi, ’The interaction of English lav/ with customary 
law ... (i960) I4. J.A.L.112.
2. On ’woman - to --woman’ marriage, see below.
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is often said, between a man and one or more women. To 
think of marriage in terms of one man and one or more 
women is to confuse its basic nature with one of its 
characteristic incidents, a negative one in. this case, '^or 
a polygamist is a man who has entered into two or more se­
parate marriage contracts concurrently with as many women, 
not one who has entered one marriage contract v/ith two or 
more women considered as a legal entity. In other words, there 
are as many marriages co-existing in a polygamous house­
hold as there are wiyes. To postulate the converse of this 
would be to imply that the various contracts are simulihiieous 
in their inception and inter-dependent on each other for 
their existence, so that they either stand or fall 
t oge the r.
Customary law regards marriage as co-extensive 
v/ith the life of the wife. This implies two things, 
first, the death of the husband does not necessarily ter­
minate the marriage because, as we shall see later, a 
woman may retain the status of a married wojjan for a 
number of purposes in spite of her husband’s death.
Secondly, the fact that divorce is possible, sometimes
easy, even without judicial intervention, does not alter
the position. A marriage is intended to be of indefine^^--
duration, measurable, if at all, only by reference to
the wife’s natural span of life. And that is the true meaning
of a ’union for life1 even in Qhristiandom, now that the
2kh
old ecclesiastical ban on divorce lias lost its force in se­
cular lav/ in many, perhaps most, Christian1 states.
Again, it is common knowledge that marriage under 
customary law is more than a contract between tv/o individuals, 
being more in the nature of an association of two families.
But as we saw in the first chapter on betrothal and will see 
again shortly, an adult male who is sui juris may marry with­
out the knowledge, consent or intervention of his family. In 
such a case, too, even active family opposition to the mar­
riage has no effect on its legal validity. It follows, there­
fore, that a marriage need not always be accompanied by inter- 
family contract. Hence the use of the word formally1 in our 
definition. Finally, the phrase, * or sets of families’ in the 
definition is intended to reflect the usual practice in matri- 
lineal societies whereby a marriage contract is between a boyfe 
(paternal) family and his mother’s maiden family on one hand, 
and their opposite numbers on the girl’s side. It happens not 
infrequently that while a boy’s family has to consent to his 
proposed marriage, it is his maternal uncle (or his family) 
who undertakes to pay the bride price and other customary 
payments. Similarly, while a girl’s family are the right 
people to consent to her marriage and receive her bride 
price in the first place, it is sometimes her maternal 
uncle (or his family) who ultimately gets the bulk of the 
said bride price and who binds himself to refund it in
the event of divorced
Types of customary marriage.
No less than fifteen types of 'marriages1 have 
been recorded in southern Nigeria and, allowing for dif­
ferences in language or in spelling as between different 
writers, at least twenty-two words and phrases have been 
employed in designating them! A great many of these 
possess mone of the legal characteristics of marriage, 
at all events from a lawyer's point of view, and some of 
them are obsolete anyway. We shall now take a quick look 
at them one after the other, if only to eliminate some of 
them from our list.
The first is what has been described as woman - 
to - woman marriage.^* This, as we have seen, is a devise 
whereby a childless wife tries to perform her supreme service 
to society while entrenching her position as a beneficial
3. Of. Forde, Marriage and the Family among the Yako in 
South-eastern Nigeria, pp.45, 50, 53> 72. According to 
Forde, the girl's maternal uncle gets from two-thirds 
to four-fifths of her bride price: ibid., p.45. Uncles'
rights are now said to be successfully and progressively 
challenged by brides' fathers: ibid., ;pp.45-6.
1. Meek, haw and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, p.275?
Esenwa, loc. cit.» p.74; Talbot, Tribes of the Niger 
Delta, pp.l95-£>? Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, 
p.439 and 431. Meek and Esenwa speak of the Ibo; 
while Talbot speaks of the Ijaw in the first three pages 
given, and of the Ibo in the fourth.
member of her husbands family, by paying for a new wife on
behalf of her husband or by providing him with the necessary
funds for a new marriage, with a view to raising children
2
for her husband by proxy so to speak. In our submission, 
this is not a marriage between one woman and another. The 
fact that the bride price and other customary dues were 
paid by a woman is immaterial. After all, many mothers 
make these payments for and on behalf of their sons of any 
age; so do fathers, guardians and maternal uncles. And 
yet anyone is yet to suggest that in these latter cases 
the legal husband is not the man on whose behalf the marri­
age payments were made, but his mother, father, guardian or 
uncle as the case may be - these being merely his benefactors^ 
In those cases where, as Meek rightly says, unmarried women 
sometimes 'marry' other women, the fact is that these women 
actually effect such marriages in the name of their deceased 
fathers - a sort of 'ghost marriage* said to be encountered
2. But see Meek, who says that 'Even an unmarried woman#
may marry another woman by paying a bride price...' tbid.
3. Note that where B pays the marriage expenses in respect
of W on behalf of her son, W is sometimes referred to in
popular parlance as B's wife; the legal position being 
different of course.
in East and Central Africa. We are therefore driven to the 
conclusion that there is no difference in kind (as distinct 
from procedure) between the so-called 'woman - to - woman1 
marriage and the regular man - to - woman marriage.
The second reported type of ^marriage' is 'concu­
binage'.^ This statement, to a legal mind, is a contradic­
tion in terms, for concubinage is the very negation of mar­
riage. It satisfies none of the essentials of a valid 
marriage, except for parental consent. Nor has it the legal 
incidents of a marriage as between the 'spouses' themselves* 
as regards their issue, or a propos third parties. We 
must therefore exclude it from our discussion which is on
marriage and its legal incidents. As with concubinage, so
5 6
with 'friendship marriage,and with 'marriage by consent' .
Next comes a miscellany of 'types' of 'marriages' 
which only need mentioning by name to be declared unsuita­
ble for inclusion in a treatise on modern: family law.
7
Under this head we have 'slave marriages' which went out
4. Esenwa, loc-cit., p.75* See also Williamson, ^ Changes in 
the marriage system of the Okrika Ijo'1 (1962) 32 Africa 
53-60, at p. 57. His account of Lekeria sime (living to­
gether) differs but little from Esenwa',s mgba (concubinage).
5. For which see Temietan, ante, p.77. Friendship (ukun)
marriage, says the author, is unsatisfactory, for the
'wife' 'can be dispensed with at any time:' ibid.
6. Per Johnson, op. cit., p.116.
7. Talbot, Tribes of theNiger Delta, p.189 ff.
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with the slave trade; ’marriage by purchase’ (insofar as 
’purchase1 has its primary meaning in that phrase^ insofar 
as it connotes no more than payment of bride price, we shall 
come back to it presently); matrilocal marriages;^ marriages 
initiated by throwing periwinkle shells;”^  and ’marriage by 
e x c ha ng e .M a t fi l oc a l  marriages must have falleiln into 
desuetude since Thomas wrote; for our enquiries have so 
far not disclosed the existence of any such marriage in the 
District in question (Asaba). But there are traces in 
this area of a form of marriage (which is more prevalent 
among the Ishan further west,) in which a couple* may start 
by living apart-each among their own family - though a 
man who is very fond of his wife might prefer moving 
over to her family, while one who is not in a financial 
position to pay for his wife’s hand in marriage by 
cash and so has to discharge his obligations by labour 
services, may have to do the same if only to save himself 
long journeys to and from his wife’s family. This will
be discussed in a little more detail shortly. There is 
also in this area what we have called concubinage above 
(following Esenwa). This latter is not marriage. The
8. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria. Vol.Ill, p.U25«
9« Elias, Groundwork of Nigerian haw, summarising Thomas, 
Law and custom of the Ibo of the Asaba District, Pt# IV, 
Ch. IV.
10. Isamu gbein. See Williamson, ante, p.67*
11. Peoples of Southern Nigeria, ^ol.III, pp.Ui4.O-l.
former may be 'trial marriage1 or 'residence according to 
convenience,' but not matrilocal marriage.
Williamson himself says that the periwinkle- 
throwing marriage is now obsolete. Even if it were not, 
it is not really a 'type' of marriage but just a method 
of initiating proceedings for a marriage relationship: viz 
by throwing a perwihkle on a pregnant woman's belly, there­
by declaring an intention to marry the child in the womb 
for oneself or one's infant relation if it turns out to be 
a baby girl. On the same footing is 'exchange marriage.' 
This, too, was not a different type of marriage - just a 
convenient made of paying for marriage without the use of 
money: A gives his sister or other kinswoman in marriage
to 3 in return for B's own sister or kinswoman.
Next, Moslem marriage. Whatever the arguments 
for and against classifying this as a separate type of marri­
age in general, there seems no point in doing this in respect 
of southern Nigeria. For as we have seen, that two Moslems 
in these societies contract a marriage according to Moslem 
rites does not involve them in a relationship which is 
intrinsically different in substance or in legal incidents
12from marriage under the local customary law of the parties.
12. In re Alayo, ante; Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, p.27* f.n.l. 
For this reason, Kasunmu's interesting treatment of the 
incidents of Moslem marriage (pp.95-6) would seem out of 
place in Yoruba law.
Again there is an institution known among some Edo-speaking 
peoples as the Arewa (or arhewa) ^  and among the Y/estern Ibo 
as the Idegbe"^. This may be described as the status of a 
woman who remains unmarried in her deceased father's com­
pound with the object of raising sons (or other children) 
who would then succeed to her father’s property. But as
Bradbury says, there is no evidence that she is married to 
15any one man.  ^ We may add that the very idea of an arewa
or idegbe implies the absence of a marriage, leaH there be
doubts or disputes as to the affiliation of any children
b o m  to the woman concerned. These, too, will be excluded
in our classification and more detailed study of customary
16marriages in southern Nigeria.
In our submission, therefore, then&is only one 
type of customary marriage in the bulk of southern Nigerian 
societies, 1.^. among the Yoruba, the Ibo, the Ibibio
13. E.g. the Ishan: Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit., p.8;
Thomas, in (1910) IQ J.A.S., ante, pp. 7-8;- Bradbury's 
and Thomas's spellings.
14. Rowling, Notes on Land Tenure in Benin... (1st edn.), 
para.99*
15. Bradbury and Lloyd, ante, p.80. Of. 'wife of the village' 
among the Lele of Kasai (per Tew) in Phillips' Survey,
p.90.
16. This elimination process is not a criticism of the writers 
referred to atove. It only serves to underline the 
basic difference in approach and emphasis between anthrop­
ologists, sociologists, historians and lawyers writing
on social institutions.
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(including the Annang and the ^fik) and the ^koi (Yako).
In these places, customary marriages are indeed contracted 
in a wide variety of ways as regards preliminary procedures, 
marriage ceremonies and what may be called inductto in domum 
(a form of fgiving away1)* But the end product, the resulting 
marriage as an institution, is the same in kind and in legal 
incidents in all these cases* A classification of customary 
marriages in these socieities on the basis of such procedural 
differences would be as barren as a classification of 
’Christian1 marriages according as they v.S-re contracted
(a) by civil rites before a Registrar, an embassy official 
in a foreign country, or an officer in one of the armed 
forces; or
(b) by religious rites before a priest of one of the numerous 
Christian sects in the country or before a chaplain in 
the armed forces; and in each case, according to 
whether or not there was a formal proposal of marriage, 
and if so by which of the parties*"^
17# ff-kough These procedural differences do not make the re­
sulting marriages different in kindjjfthey could be of 
some legal importance* E.g. the locus celebrationis»t 
status of the person officiating and form of words used 
would be relevant facts in proving or disproving the 
existence of a marriage in doubtful cases; whether or 
not there was a formal proposal and by whom could be 
vital in an action for breach of promise where the 
very existence of a promise to marry is in issue.
In the other societies of southern Nigeria, viz. 
among the Ijaw, some Edo and some Ibo-speaking peoples of 
Ve stern Nigeria, there are two types of customary marriages.
These are known hy such vernacular terms like iya and igwa
18 19(Kalahari I jaw) , £a or yaa and igwa or egwa (Okrida I jaw)
amoitja, amoiia or ami and isomi, isoma or osi (Edo-speaking 
20peoples) . In this discussion, however, we shall adopt
the popular (hut hy no means accurate) terms 'big dowry1 and
21
’small dowry* marriages. In the former, the wife becomes 
a full member of her husband’s family (insofar as this is 
possible under customary law), is under a legal duty to co­
habit with and perform all the usual domestic services for 
him, and her children belong as of right to his family group. 
In a ’small dowry* marriage, on the other hand, a wife need 
not live with her husband or cook for him (in the absence
18. See Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, pp.l89ff.
19« Talbot, ibid., p.193; Talbot, The Peoples of Southern
Nigeria, Vol.Ill, p.437; Y/illiamson, ’Changes in the 
marriage system of theQkrika Ijo1 (1962) 32 Africa, at 
pp.55 and 56.
20. Thomas, ’The Edo-speaking peoples of Nigeria', (1910)
10 J.A.S. esp. at p.5; Thomas, 'Marriage and Legal 
Customs of the Edo-speaking peoples of Nigeria’ (1910- 
11) 11 J.Comp. Leg. (n.s.), p.95; Thomas, Anthropolo­
gical Report on the Edo-speaking Peoples of Nigeria, 
p.47; Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom and the 
Edo-speaking peoples of SouthrV/estern Nigeria.... esp. 
pTSo
21. Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, p.437; Hubbard 
The Sobo of the Niger Delta, p.191. It should be noted 
that the correct name for the last-named people is now 
Urhobo, the old term 'Sobo' being now reprehensible to 
them.
of a ’buying the mouth* ceremony, of which more below); nor
22has he a legal right to any of her children by him.
Essential requirements for valid customary marriage.
The essential requirements for a valid customary 
marriage may be classified under four broad heads. These 
are (1) consent, (2) capacity, (3) bride price or dowry and 
(4) formal giving away. Let us examine these in turn.
(l) Consent
Under this head will be discussed first family (or 
parental) consent and secondly consent of the prospective 
spouses themselves. In the traditional society, family 
consent was by far the most fundamental of all these require­
ments. Without it bride price could not properly be paid, 
since any such payment must be made to the family and not 
to the bride herself. Obviously too the formal giving away 
of a bride could only be properly done by or with the appro­
val of her family. In normal circumstances family consent 
made up for the spouses1 want of age; in extreme cases it 
dispensed with the consent of an infant bride, who could 
be given in marriage to a bridegroom of her family’s choice - 
her objections and entreaties notwithstanding. Again, in 
the traditional society 'family consent' was a complex notion.
22. See Hubbard, ante, and the other references above.
Por it could mean consent of the family council (as where 
the prospective spouse occupied a special ritual or chiefly 
position in the family), consent of the family head and of 
the spouses* own parents, or consent of such parents only.
In modern society, family consent is still of great 
importance; but it has become less complex and can even be 
dispensed with in certain circumstances. As a rule, 'family 
consent* is now conterminous with 'pahental consent', 
'parental' being used here to include any person, such as a 
guardian, who is in loco parentis to the prospective spouse. 
The person who is de jure entitled to give or witlT~hold this 
consent is the father of the spouse concerned. But an in­
creasing number of widows now exercise what may be called 
a de facto right in connexion with their daughters' and infant 
sons' marriages. As these cases do not come before the 
courts, it is impossible to say at this stage whether or 
not a mother alone can now validly give the necessary consent 
to her children's marriage under customary lav;. As for 
the wider family, their consent is no longer sought or re­
quired as a general rule. A father may still consult his 
wider family or its head before he gives or withholds consent
to his children’s marriage; but this he now does as a matter
he
of courtesy, and not because/has to do so.
Parental consent can be dispensed with in two sets 
of circumstances. In the first place, an adult male has a 
right, as we have seen, to conduct all the necessary negotia­
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tions for his marriage without the knowledge - to say nothing
of consent - of his parents or family,^ though this right
is seldom exercised. In the second place, in those societies
wherein the Carriage, Bivorce and Custody of Children
Ortl&C)
Adoptive Bye-Laws^ 1556, of the Western Region is in force,
it is no?/ possible to circumvent one*s parents if they prove
unco-operative, This is because s.5 of the Bye-Laws provides: 
TWhen any parent or guardian of a bride refuses his or 
her consent to a marriage or refuses to accept his or 
her share of the dowry, the bride, if she is eighteen 
years of age or above, and the bridegroom jointly may 
institute legal proceedings in a competent court against 
the parent or guardian to shov; cause why he or she 
should refuse consent or to accept his or* her share
of the dowry; and if the court is of the opinion that
no sufficient cause has been shown, it shall order 
that the marriage may proceed without the consent of 
such parent *•
This section raises a number of interesting points. First 
it only speaks of fthe bride1, foes this imply that the 
bridegroom has no corresponding right of action; if so, 
why? Or does it imply that men have enough freedom of
1. In re ^apara, ante, Osborne C.J. said, fIam unable to 
accept the proposition ... that the consent of a manfs 
family is a legal essential to his marriage1. (At pp.
607-8).
action to require no help from the legislator in this respect?
Secondly, the right of action is given to the prospective
spouses jointly, and not to the hride independently. This
ol4
may be construed as a recognition of the/^customary rule 
that women acting alone had no locus standi in a court of 
law. At the same time, it deals a serious blow to the 
principle of family solidarity and representation in civil 
litigation. Thirdly, it would appear to pave the way for 
the eventual acceptance of a dowry-free customary marriage, 
bypproviding that * the marriage may proceed1 in the absence 
of a recalcitrant parent's consent, without at the same time 
providing that the maximum permissible sum of £17* 10s. pay­
able to parents under Schedule A should be paid into court, 
for instance. It would be but a short step from dispensing 
with payment of bride price to reluctant parents, to dispen­
sing with such payments in all cases. Finally, there is 
no indication in the Bye-Laws how the proposed marriage 
could be made to proceed in practice if, as seems almost 
certain in these circumstances, the bride’s parents and 
family refuse to co-operate in any way whatever. The 
answer would perhaps lie in the insertion of a new section 
authorising a Customary Court President, for instance, to 
take the place of the bride's parents for the purposes of
2the marriage in question.
The consent of the spouses themselves was not 
essential in the traditional society. But since it must 
have been realised quite early in the history of marriage 
that making an unwilling horse drink was child*s play 
compared with making a wife out of an unwilling bride, it 
was common practice to consult the wishes of the bride-to- 
be as well as those of the prospective husband before any 
bride price was asked for or paid, except of course where 
either spouse or both were too young to be thus consulted,
2 . On parental consent,see Thomas, Anthropological Report 
on the Ibo-speaking Peoples of Nigeria. Part I, p.62; 
Porde and Jones, o p . cit.. pp7l7-lS; Meek, Law and 
Authority.... , p.268; Y/ieschhoff, *Livorce laws and 
practices in modem Ibo culture* (l94l) 26 J.Negro 
Hist., p.299; Esenwa, loc.cit., p.74; Talbot,
In the Shadow of the Bush, p.107; Elias, Oroundworfc,
p. 2 87; A.iisafe, op cit.. pp. 52 and 59; Ward., op. cit. ,
p.21; Partridge, loc.cit. , p.423 and 425; Omoneukan- 
rin, op.cit., p.43; In re Sapara. ante, pp.607-8; 
Coker, op.cit., p*233; Welch, *The Isoko Tribe* (1934) 
7 Africa p.171; Johnson, oppit.. p.114; Ellis, op.cit
p.185; Kasunmu, op.cit., pp*6 and 53; L.A. Talbot,
Woman1s Mysteries♦..., pp.89-90, an out-of-date account 
this.
in which case they only ratified the arrangement later.
In modern society, it is the invariable practice 
to ask for the prospective spouse's consents to the proposed 
marriage even where, as often happens, they are both still 
in an educational institution and the marriage is financed 
by their parents or guardians. Most marriages in fact 
start with an agreement between the spouses, their parents 
being later informed of this and asked for their consent.
In this connexion it should be noticed that it would be a 
criminal offence to lake away or detain or cause a female 
person of any age to be so dealt with against her will, 
even where marriage is thejobject of the exercise. This 
is the result of s.36ll of the Nigerian Criminal Code which 
provides, in part, as follows -
'Any person who, with intent to marry ... a female 
of any age, or to cause her to be married ... by any 
other person, takes her away, or detains her against 
her will, is guilty of a felony and is liable to 
imprisonment for seven years.'
This section was apparently designed to punish persons who 
were guilty of what is sometimes referred to as marriage 
by capture. But there is no reason why a person should 
not be found guilty of this offence if he takes away or 
detaines a girl against her will under the pretext of a 
marriage transaction between him and the girl's family, 
the latter being guilty of aiding and abetting him. \
Finally, it should be recalled that parental consent was 
never required for the remarriage of a widow within her 
late husband*s family. It is not infrequently said that 
the consent of the widow herself was not required in the 
past, as she was merely inherited, not remarried. This 
is a doubtful proposition at any age. It is completely 
untrue in the modern age. (See the section on 'widow in­
heritance* below).^
(2) Capacity.
As an essential requirement for a valid marriage, 
capacity has two aspects. These are (a) capacity to marry 
on the part of each prospective spouse considered as an 
individual, and (b) capacity to inter-marry; in other 
words capacity to marry each other. Under customary law,
3. On consent of the spouses themselves generally, see 
Basden, Among the lb os, pp.69-70; Basden, Niger Ibos, 
pp.214ff, Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Ibo- 
speaking peoples, Bart I, p.62; Ekeghe, op.cit., p.46; 
Esenwa, loc.cit. p.73; Talbot, Tribes of the Niger 
delta, p.184; Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria.
Vol.Ill, pp.455-455v passim; Cotton, loc.cit., p.427-8; 
Talbot, In the shadow of the bush p.110; Cartridge, 
Cross River natives, p.254; Belano, op.cit., p.121; 
Ward, op.cit., pp.17 and 44; Polarin, op.cit., p.17; 
Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit., p.48; Coker, op.cit., 
p.233; Welch, loc. cit., p.171; Temietan, loc. cit., 
p.76 ; Ellis, op. cit, p.185; Thomas, Anthropological 
report un the Edo-speaking peoples, p.59*
260
both these aspects are governed by the parties’ personal 
laws. (A man’s ’personal law’ may be defined as that which 
derives from his membership of a given ethnic group; which 
determines his status in society; and which regulates 
his domestic relations as well as his right to acquire 
or transmit rights and duties at death, by virtue of his 
membership of the said society.)
(a) Capacity to marry.
At customary law ^ a person hfcks legal capacity 
to marry either because he is under age (Eastern Region only), 
or because there is a ’Christhn’ marriage subsisting between 
him and a third party. Section 3 (l) of the -^astern Region’s 
Age of marriage Law, 1956, stipulates 16 as the minimum 
age at which a person can lawfully marry or be given in 
marriage -
’A marriage ... between ... persons either of 
whom is under the age of sixteen shall be void*. Section 
l+(2) provides that ignorance of the parties’ age shall be 
no defence unless the accused can prove that ’he took reason­
able steps to verify the ages of the parties to the marriage’.
1. As modified by statute.
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Ana s.6(1) says that no court shall have jurisdiction to 
hear any action based on a marriage which contravenes' this 
Law, while s.6(2) provides that no court shall.take cognizance 
of any marriage avoided by this Law. fihis section, however 
must not be construed literally, *or one thing the courts 
must assume jurisdiction where an action is based on an alle­
ged marriage, if only to settle the preliminary issue of the 
validity or otherwise of such marriage. For another, the 
proviso to s.3(l) provides that it shall be a good defence to 
sundry charges under the Criminal Code (viz. ss.218, 221, 222 
and 360 which create and provide penalties for sexual offences 
to show that, on the strength of a marriage avoided by this 
Law, the accused honestly believed that the woman concerned 
was his wife.
fhis law, therefore, effects a substantial altera­
tion in the customary law's of the Eastern Region on the 
point. Those laws were all agreed on this that neither tender 
age nor extreme old age was an impediment to marriage, though 
as a rule peop2© did not in fact complete the marriage process 
until the bride had attained the age of puberty. Today, while 
there is nothing in.law to prevent a centenarian from marrying 
a girl of 16, and vice versa, any attempted marriage between 
two fifteen-year olds would be both void and criminal.
There is no .legislation yet in the Western Region 
or in Lagos corresponding to the Age of Marriage Law of
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the Eastern Region- ihe customary law in these areas,
therefore, remains as already indicated: age per se is
no impediment to marriage, though people normally marry
2
at puberty or later.
Since customary la?/ allov/ed polygyny, the sub­
sistence of a marriage with a third party was not a disabi­
lity for a man (though it v/as for a woman, polyandry not being 
recognized by the law). This is still the position as 
regards subsisting customary marriages: these are no
impediment in law (as opposed to economics) to further custo­
mary marriages. But among Moslems, the rule is that 
a man is entitled to have four v/ives (not counting concu­
bines) at any one time. A Moslem is, therefore, legally 
incapable "of taking a fifth ?/ife, his four previous Moslem
marriages still subsisting. Anyone ?/ho has contracted a
■3
TChristian1 marriage - either under the Marriage Act
2. On the customary law relating to marriage age, see: 
Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit., p.U8; E0iarin, op.cit. 
pp.17 and 23; Ajisafe, op.cit., p.61; Elias, Ground­
work , p.287; Williamson, loc.cit., p.5U; Talbot, 
Peoples III, p.l+l+lj &reen~ I b o  Village affairs, p.156; 
Basden, Niger Ibos, p.215«
3. But see the difficult case of Asiata v. Goncallo (1900) 
I.N.L.E.U2, v/here the full ^ourt held that as Lagos 
was not a Christian country, the deceased who v/as a 
Moslem and was domiciled in Lagos had a legal right to 
marry B and C by Moslem rites even if his first Chris­
tian marriage wife was still alive. More of this
later.
within Nigeria, or under the legal system of a country that 
only recognises monogamy - becomes ipso facto incapable of 
contracting any other marriage (customary or otherwise) 
during the currency of the said. Christian marriage- S.35 
of the (Federai) Marriage Act provides inter alia -
'Any person who is married under this Act, or whose 
marriage is declared by this Act to he valid, shall 
be incapable, during the continuance of such marriage 
of contracting a valid marriage under native lav/ or 
custom ...'
S.48 provides a penalty for contravening this section thus: 
'Whoever, having contracted marriage under this Act, 
or any modification or re-enactment thereof, or 
under any enactment repealed by this Act,^ during 
the continuance of such marriage contracts a marriage 
in accordance with native law or custom, shall be 
liable to imprisonment for five years.'
Obviously then, no one who has an existing Christian marri­
age can lawfully take a second wife under customary law 
anywhere in Nigeria, since the Marriage Act is country-wide
4 . I.e. Cap. 95 of the Laws of Southern Nigeria, 1908
edition; and No. 6 of 1913 > Laws of Southern Nigeria 
(foreign marriages).
p '
c ^ V  '{
in its application.
(b) Capacity to inter-marry.
Under this heading we shall consider the question 
of prohibited degrees of relationship, status bars and the 
position of strangers (including ' native strangers' as 
defined in the statute boohs). It is impossible to formu­
late any rules regarding prohibed degrees, which will hold 
for all societies in southern Nigeria. It will, therefore, 
be necessary to state the law for each of the major ethnic 
groups insofar as this is possible on available evidence.
The EKOI (YAKO)
In the words of Talbot, 'There are practically 
no marriage restrictions among this people ... It is not 
even forbidden by native law for half-brothers and sisters 
to marry, though cases of this kind are extremely rare'.^
This point is also made by Bystrom in relation to the ERpara- 
bong. 'No marriage restrictions exist in the clan,' he 
says, 'and a man may marry any woman of the same tribe
5. On the effect of subsisting marriage, see: Lewin, uSome
legal consequences of marriage by native Christians in 
British Africa1 (1939) 3 m* 11 • H . p .40; A s i a t a v Gr 0x1— 
callo, ante; and Onwudinjoh v. Onwudinjoh (1957)
II E.R.L.R.l.
1. In the Shadow of the Bush, p.110.
2 0 ii
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or of another, even a half-sister# 1 Forde went a little 
further when he said of the people of Umor, 1 Cross-cousin 
marriage with the father*s sister*s daughter is regarded 
as desirable and praisev/orthy.y ^  It may, therefore, be 
said that the only degree of relationship which acts as a 
legal bar to marriage in these societies is that between 
full-brothers and^isters.
The EDO (including the Bini. the Ishan. the Urhohp and 
the I sole o;
The fullest aid perhaps clearest statement of the 
rule partaining to prohibited degrees among the Edo was 
made by Thomas as long age as 1910. *0ver the whole area 
occupied by the Edo-speasing people*, he said, * the ordinary 
rule of prohibited degrees is that a man may not marry a 
woman wh© belongs to his father*s or his mother*s family.'
A
Any recognised family relationship is a bar, he says.
But there is no indication what constitutes a 'family' for 
this purpose. The general rule, however, appears to be 
that inter-marriage is forbidden between blood relations.
2. 'Notes on the Ekparabong clan' (1954) III Orientalia
Suecana, part 1, p. 7*
3. 'Double descent in a Nigerian Semi-Bantu community1
(1937) 37 Man, p.66.
4. Anthropological Report on the Edo-speaking peoples of 
Nigeria, p.61.
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■below the fifth degree, but is allowed after that point even 
within the same extended family as above defined. As a 
kini writer put it, 1Within the same family inter-marriage 
is allowable from the fifth generation, or 'ghabiona*, on- 
wards.1 This general rule is sometimes relaxed to permit 
marriage between a man and his paternaL half-sister where 
this ia particularly desirable on other grounds. On the 
other hand, it is illegal for any man to marry two full- 
sisters concurrently, the King of Benin apart.^ 
IBIBIQ-SPEAKING PEOPLES (including the Annang, the Ibibio
proper and the ^fik)
The general rule here is that marriage is not per­
mitted between persons who are known to be related by blood
o
in any traceable degfee. But to this rule there are ex­
ceptions in a number of societies, notably among the Annang 
and the Efik. '-^he prohibition is only strict in Efik Law 
as between members of the same extended family; between 
cousins; between a man and his wife's mother, sister or
5. Egharevba, Benin Law and Custom, p.12.
6. 'The Edo-speaking peoples of Nigeria* (1910) 10 J.A.S.;
p.8.
7* Egharevba, ante, p.20.
8. Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria; the ma&ic beliefs and 
customs of the Ibibio tritigr, p.20h«
Q
daughter; and between a man and his brother’s wife. The 
ban on marriage between a man and his brother’s wife is said 
to extend to half- as well as full-brothers, and to divorced 
as well as deceased brothers-^ Among the Annang, the general 
rule is said to be relaxed to the extent that na man could 
wed his cousin once removed.
ITSEKIRI
As among the Ibo, marriage is forbidden under Itsekiri
law between persons who are related by blood, however remote
the relationship- provided only that it can be traced or that
12there is a tradition (even if legendary) to that effect.
IBP. IJAii and YORUBA
The law relating to prohibited degrees of relationship 
among the Ibo, the Ijaw and the Yoruba is so similar that we 
feel justified in treating these peoples together. Of the
9- Forde (ed.), Efik Traders of Old Calabar (based on the 
diary of Antera Duke, with D. Bimmons and G-.I. Jones as 
the other contributors), p.14. Bee also Simmons, ’Sexual 
life, marriage and childhood among the Efik11, (i960) 30 
Africa, part 2, p.161.
10. Footnote 9 supra. Bee also section on ’’Widow Inheritance”.
11. Talbot, Peoples of southern Nigeria. Vol.Ill, p.717.
12. Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri Law and Custom, p.46.
Yoruba, Sllis says that nMarriage is forbidden in the same
blood; and as descent is traced on both sides of the house,
it is consequently forbidden both in the father’s and mother’s
13families, as far as relationship can be traced”. J But the 
author’s later statement that r,As a rule relationship does 
not seem to be traced further than second-cousins ...” must 
not be construed as meaning that marriage is allowed by the 
law after that degree of relationship. For reputed relation­
ship is usually as effective a bar as relationship that can 
actually be traced on a genealogical tree.
The Ibo rule is succinctly stated by Ardener who says 
that a man "is prohibited from marrying any woman who has 
any traceable blood relationship with him”. ^  (The term 
"traceable" as used here and elsewhere in the present section 
is not a term of art. Relationship is "traceable" if, inter 
alia, a person’s paternal or maternal ancestor is known to 
have descended from a given extended family, even if it is 
now impossible to state his relationship to any members of 
that family in terms of uncles and aunts and cousins. Also 
relationship is frequently regarded as "traceable" even if 
it is only reputed to be so). As Folarin graphically put the
i » " i   i .  . i . i i .  i —  . I..... ......................
13. The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of West 
Africa, p.188.
14. "The kinship terminology of a group of Southern Ibo" 
(1954), 24 Africa, p.95.
matter in connexion with the Yoruba, ’‘Prohibition of marriage 
15takes place as between ..• people with a taint of blood
16relationship in their veins." On this point, it must be
warned that Bawden's statement that “In proper marriage,
consanguinity up to eight or ten generations is nso (forbidden)’
does not imply that marriage is permissible after the tenth 
17generation. The phrase "eight or ten generations" only 
serves as an illustration of the extraordinary tenacity of 
this type of relationship among the Ibo, and the sweeping 
nature of the prohibition.
Affinity (i.e. relationship by marriage) also plays a
part in our marriage laws; pace Ellis who says, "Relationship
by affinity has not yet been invented, and a man may marry
two or more sisters, aunt and niece, and even mother and
IBdaughter, but the last unions do not often occur." Thus
Ward said of the Yoruba that a man may not marry two full-
blood sisters concurrently or even consecutively, though he
may marry two sisters born of the same father but by different
mothers - a rare occurence.^ It is true that there is a
space of forty-one years between the publication of Ellis's
  --
15. I.e. exists.
16. Op. cit. , p.23.
17. Niger Ibos, p.215.
18. Op. cit., p.188.
19. Ward, Marriage among the Yoruba, pp.18-19.
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book in 1894 and that of Ward's in 1937; but it is unlikely
that the rule given hy Ward had been "invented" in the
intervening period. Of the Ibo, Thomas says that a man may
not marry either in his wife's family or in her mother's
family, except that two sisters may be married to the same
20man, "usually, however, only ih succession".
There is an interesting process whereby blood relation­
ship is severed under Ijaw, Itsekiri and Ibo laws. The 
actual ceremony varies from society to society, ranging from 
the offering of sacrifices to the ancestral deity of the
woman's family (as at Ihiala) to a symbolic cutting of the
21relationship in parts of Owerri and Onitsha Divisions.
This devise is sometimes used to facilitate marriage between 
two distant relations where this is known to exist before the 
intended marriage. But more frequently it is used to valid­
ate an otherwise void marriage which v/as entered into in
ignorance of the existence of any blood relationship. In the
2i Alatter case, it operates retrospectively.
As exceptions to the general rule in the Eastern Region, 
it should be noted that among the Aro, the Ututu and the Ihe,
20. Anthropological Report on the Ibo-3peaking Peoples of . 
Nigeria, Part I, p.69.
21. On the Ihiala people, see Talbot, Peoples of s. Nigeria, 
Vol.Ill, p.716.
21A. On the Itsekiri, see Omoneukanrin, op. cit. , p.47.
marriage with very distant relations (including nieces but
22not cousins) is said to be permissible. At Elele and Aro, 
it is said that people "may marry even in the same compound, 
provided the parties have neither the same father nor 
mother".^
Status Bars
In the traditional society there was in most places a 
prohibition on inter-marriage between slaves and free 
citizens, the definition of "slaves" in this respect includ­
ing persons of slave descent. This status ceased to operate 
as a cognizable legal bar to inter-marriage with the passing 
of the emancipation statutes of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. But the social stigma remained, so 
that among the Ibo of the Eastern Region, for instance, the 
words "osu" and "oru" (or "ohu" according to dialect) which 
denote slaves belonging to the gods and those belonging to 
human beings respectively, acquired particularly sinister 
connotations. In 1956 the Eastern Region parliament passed 
the Abolition of the Osu System Law. Section 3 solemnly 
declares that "... the Osu System is hereby utterly and for 
ever abolished and declared unlawful." By section 6 -
22. Talbot, Peoples of southern Nigeria, Vol.Ill, p.717.
23. Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, p.189.
"Whoever on the ground of the Osu System enforces 
against any person any disability whatsoever and 
in particular, but without prejudice to the 
generality of this section, with regard to - 
(l) marriage;
is guilty of an offence ..."
By section 10, it is an offence to abet the commission of an 
offence under this Law, "whether the offence is actually 
committed or not." The significance of s.6 for our present 
purposes is that it would be a punishable offence for a 
parent to refuse to give his son or daughter in marriage to 
a suitor (or female applicant) on the ground that the said 
suitor or applicant is a person of slave descent. The effect 
of s.10 is to render punishable any attempt, whether success­
ful or not, on anybody's part to persuade another not to 
marry or give his child/ward in marriage to a third party 
on the ground that the third party concerned is a person of 
slave descent.
The legislature obviously then had the best of intent­
ions. Unfortunately, however, they not only provided the 
wrong remedy but also, in our submission, left the right of 
redress in the wrong hands. To create discrimination against 
an osu or an oru into a criminal offence could, other things 
being equal, be an effective way of combating the evil. Bor
<T r*
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one thing, it would make it possible for the offender to be 
brought to justice without any cost to the person directly 
injured by his conduct, For another, the fear of a court 
trial and possible term of imprisonment is often a good 
deterrent. But these two points are in fact the major weak­
nesses of this legislation. Because responsibility for 
bringing the offender to trial is taken away from the injured 
party and given to the Police, there is not much certainty 
that the prosecution will be diligently prepared and resolutely
pursued. Again the fact that the accused person faces a
%
possible jail sentence would tend to make the Court lean in 
his favour. It is a notorious fact that the Courts tend to 
construe penal legislations strictly where this would be in 
the interest of the accused. It is also common knowledge 
that the onus imposed on the prosecution in a criminal case 
is considerably higher than that which lies on a plaintiff 
in a civil action. A prosecution under s.6 or s.10 of the 
Law under discussion could therefore easily fail where a 
civil action founded on the same facts would have succeeded. 
Hence our earlier remark that the Law provided the wrong 
remedy. It is submitted that a better approach would have 
been to make any act of discrimination - including incitement 
thereto and abetting thereof - a civil wrong analogous to
what is known in the general law as "slander actionable per 
se", with a provision that punitive damages could be awarded,
and a broad hint that they should - wherever the circumst-
• 23Aances are right.
The only other points worth a passing mention in this 
connection are the fact first that in the past there were 
many societies in which it was unlawful for people to marry 
non-members of their community, usually the town or a group 
of towns reputed to have descended from a common ancestor.
But this is no longer a legal bar, though it still operates 
to a considerable extent as a social bar. Secondly, there 
are still said to be places where socio-political heads,
that is Kings and Chiefs, are not allowed to take wives
/ x 24(especially their first wives) from strange parts.
Position of strangers
As already indicated, the old ban placed by our custom­
ary laws on inter-marriage between members of different
23A. For an unsuccessful attempt to make allegation of osu 
slander actionable per se, see Nwachukwu v. Nnoremele 
(1957) II E .R .L .II.5Ol
24. On status bars generally, see Basden, Niger Ibos, p.258; 
Forde and Jones, op. cit., p.23; G-reen, Ibo Village 
Affairs, p.158; Arikpo, "The end of Osu?" West Africa 
for April 21, 1956, p.201; Horton, "The Ohu system of 
slavery ..." (1954) 24 Africa, p.317; Leith-Ross, "Notes 
on the osu system ..." (1937) 10 Africa, p.207; Talbot, 
Life in southern Nigeria, p.204.
ethnic groups (or even parts of the same ethnic group) has 
now disappeared, except perhaps as regards the heads of 
certain ruling Houses. But the superior courts have now . 
established a rule to the effect that a non-Nigerian has no 
legal capacity to contract a customary marriage with a 
Nigerian. In this connexion it is immaterial that the non- 
Nigerian is actually domiciled in Nigeria.
25In Savage v. Macfoy a man who was born in Freetown 
of liberated slave parents had come to live and work in 
Lagos, where he also went to school. He later went through 
a process of marriage with a Lagos Yoruba girl in accordance 
with Yoruba rites, having obtained the consent of the girl’s 
parents and paid the ano and other traditional dues. The 
girl was formally "given away" to him and ceremonially 
conducted over to the matrimonial home by members of the 
girl’s family. In an action by this woman, now widowed, to 
establish her right to administer her late husband’s estate, 
as his widow, Osborne, C.J., held that she was not the 
deceased’s widow as claimed, for the deceased had no legal 
capacity to contract a valid customary marriage with a Yoruba
25. (1909) 1 Renner’s G-.C. Rep.504. In view of the later
definition of "native" as including "native foreigners", 
i.e. persons of African descent, the decision in this 
case is perhaps no longer good law. See s.3 of the 
Interpretation Act.
of Lagos. He lacked capacity, said the learned Chief Justice, 
because "he came from Sierra Leone where polygamy is unlaw­
ful." Mere adoption of a Lagos domicile, he said, did not
confer on the deceased the capacity to contract a customary 
26marriage. The plaintiff's marriage with him was therefore 
void ab initio.
A similar decision was made fifty years later by Hedges
27J., in Fonseca v. Passman. In that case, a Portuguese had 
come to Nigeria in 1924, and had "married" an Efik girl in 
accordance with Efik customary law, in 1926. At the time 
of the marriage, he was domiciled in Portugal. At his death 
intestate, his Efik "widow" took out a summons to determine 
whether she or the deceased's creditor was entitled to letters 
of administration. The learned judge held that it had not 
been proved that the deceased was domiciled in Nigeria, and 
continued -
"In my view it is clear law that European, domiciled 
in the country of his nationality, cannot contract
a valid marriage in accordance with native law and
 ^ 28 custom in Nigeria."
The learned judge then went on to say, obiter, that even if 
     -------------
26. (1909) 1 Renner's G-.C. Rep.504/v. In view of the later 
definition of "native" as including "native foreigners,"
i.e. persons of African descent, the decision in this case 
is perhaps no longer good law. See s.3 of the Interpret­
ation Act, p.508.
27. (1958) W.R.N.L.R.41. Savage v. Macfoy was not cited in
this case.
28. Ibid., at p.42.
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the deceased had been domiciled in Nigeria, he still could 
not contract a valid customary marriage. (In view of the 
learned judge1s finding that the deceased man was not 
domiciled in Nigeria, this latter statement could be no more 
than an obiter dictum, and this the court made quite clear, 
at p.42^ )
The law as it emerges from these two cases may be summed
up as follows. No person, whether merely resident or actually
domiciled in Nigeria, has legal capacity to contract a valid
marriage in Nigeria with a Nigerian and in accordance with
the customary law of any Nigerian society, if in his country
of origin he was subject to a system of law which enjoins
29monogamy on its citizens.
It would be interesting to speculate on what difference
it would make, if any, on the Court’s attitude if the person
concerned had become a registered Nigerian citizen under the
30Nigerian Citizenship Act of I960. But this point must 
await judicial decision.
29. Cf. on this point the English court decision (per 
Stirling, J.), in Re Bethell (1888).38 Ch.D. .220, where 
it was held that a purported marriage between an English­
man and a Baralong girl in Bechuanaland according to 
Baralong customary law could' not be recognized in England.
30. As amended by the Nigerian Citizenship Act, 1961.
(No.9 of 1961). See also Cap.43 of the V/. Region, 1959
Revision.
(3) Bride Price or Dowry
The third essential for a valid customary marriage is 
what is sometimes called "bride price" and at other times 
"dowry". As used in both legal and popular language in 
Nigeria, these two terms are interchangeable. "Dowry" is 
defined in s.2 of the Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Child­
ren Adoptive Bye-Laws Order, 1958, of the Western Region in 
these words -
’"Dowry* means a customary gift made by a husband to 
or in respect of a woman at or before marriage".
Two minor points call for a word of comment here. Contrary
to the suggestion implied in this section, the dowry deed
not be pai d b£ the husband, being sometimes paid by his
parents, guardian or even employer. The definition should,
therefore, be read as if the words "or on behalf of" were
inserted immediately after the word"by". In the second
place, a dowry is not necessarily a gift. Its payment is
enforceable in a court of law. (There is, however, nothing
wrong in the insertion of the words "to ... a woman" In the
definition: as we shall see presently, part of the dowry
is due and payable to the bride herself in some societies,
especially in the Western Region).
Section 2 of the Limitation of Dowry Law, 1956, of the
Eastern Region has a somewhat similar definition, which readB:
1 'Dowry1 means any gift or payment, in money, natural 
produce, brass rods, cowries or in anyjother kind of 
property whatsoever, to a parent or guardian of a 
female person on account of a marriage of that person 
which is intended or has taken place.1
1 ’Incidental expenses of marriage’ means customary 
gifts or payments, other than dowry, made or 
incurred on account of a marriage, before, at the 
time of, or after that marriage."
The words ’’any gift or payment" in this definition appear, on 
first reading, to suggest that any gift or payment at all 
which passes from a husband or his family to his wife’s parent 
or guardian (including Christmas presents and payments for 
sales of goods, for instance) come within the meaning of 
"dowry". But this is not the case. For "any gift or payment" 
is governed by the operative phrase "on account of a marriage" 
Not all gifts or payments are made "on account"; and only 
those which are, in fact, so made form part of the dowry.
In the same way, the words "gifts or payments" in the definit­
ion of "incidental expenses" are governed by the phrase "on 
account" as well as by the important word "customary".
In the traditional society, the dowry was paid partly 
in the form of labour services rendered by or on behalf of a
husband to his wife’s parents, guardian or family generally.
It started long before the actual marriage took place as a 
rule, and continued right into middle age and beyond. Hence 
the common saying that ”a woman’s dowry is never finished" 
which being translated into English (!) means that the dowry 
on a woman is never paid off completely, being in the nature 
of a perpetual debt. In modern society, the dowry is paid 
in cash and kind, either in one lump sum or by sporadic 
instalments.
It is worth noting that until the recent legislations^- 
controlling the quantum of bride price payable, and even now 
in those places in the Western Region where the Marriage, etc. 
Adoptive Bye-Laws, 1958, are not yet in force - to say nothing 
of the many places and occasions when the statutory limitat­
ions are conveniently forgotten by all concerned, in both 
Regions - the quantum of bride price payable is fixed in each 
case by individual bargaining. Where in the past the circumst­
ances were such that the husband was not likely to be in a 
position to make the usual periodic payments in money and in 
kind, and to be on call in cases of family hardship involving 
his parents-in-law (e.g. where he lived a long way away ferai 
his wife’s family), the dowry was computed at a correspondingly
o
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high figure. This, incidentally is one of the chief causes 
of the sharp rise in bride price which occurred during the 
war years, 1939 to 1945 (availability of large quantities of 
currency was another): many bridegrooms were away on active
service and so obviously not in a position to do the custom­
ary labour services or even make the necessary periodic gifts 
of food-stuff and livestock. They certainly could do any of 
these things by proxy. But so few able-bodied young men 
were available locally for this task that in many cases it 
just was not practicable. It was, therefore, in the interest 
of all concerned that the payments in kind and any labour 
services due should be converted into cash payment; and this 
was usually done.
Though the bride price is an essential element in a 
customary marriage transaction, it is perfectly proper for 
the bride’s parents or guardian to waive it so that nothing 
is actually paid. Cases of waiver - which by the way are not 
of modern origin - are extremely rare even among the most 
progressive elements of today. Most people prefer to honour 
the letter of the law while evading its spirit. (It should 
be noted that the payment of bride price as well as the 
quantum thereof has considerable prestige value for the bride 
concerned and her family - hence the use of the word "evade” 
here). The most direct method of evasion, and one that is
seldom ever adopted, is for a man to make available to his 
son-in-law sufficient funds to cover the agreed dowry and 
incidental expenses. This is done in private. The fund is 
then paid back to its original owner, this time in public, as
for the father (or guardian) of the bride to ask for and 
receive full payments from his son-in-law in the normal way, 
and then give it all back - and more besides - to the new 
couple by way of a trousseau.
But whatever the devise adopted, the point of legal 
interest is that payment of the dowry can be waived, and that 
a waiver is as good in law as a full payment.
Quantum of Bride Price
As we have seen, the maximum amount of bride price now
31payable in the Eastern Region is £30. In the Western Region, 
people are still generally free to pay or receive any sum of 
their choice. But in those local government areas (already 
listed) where the Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children 
Adoptive Bye-Laws Order of 1958 has been adopted, the maximum
dowry for his daughter! But by far the most common
31. Limitation of Dowry Law, 1956, ante.
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32is £35 or as determined by the local government body.
To Whom Payable
It is generally said that tbe bride price is payable to 
the parents of the bride. This is an over-simplification.
In the traditional customary law, bride price had three 
unequal component parts. There was first a token gift - 
originally in kind, later in cash - which was made to the 
prospective bride herself. This may be called "proposal 
money1'. Its acceptance meant that the girl had consented to 
the marriage. (Where she was too young to consent, the "gift" 
was received on her behalf by her parents, usually her mother). 
Conversely, its return to the donor or outright rejection 
meant rejection of the suitor. It was really not a gift in 
the accepted sense of the word; for it was recoverable if 
the proceedings fell through at any stage, or in the event of 
a divorce (though it was sometimes waived). In some societies 
too, chiefly among the Yoruba, a number of payments were due 
to the bride herself. (See, for example, Schedule A of the 
Marriage etc. Adoptive Bye-Laws). Then again, in'all societies 
there were a number of compulsory customary "gifts" made to
- « ■ ______________ .—  --- . . . I . .
32. See s.3 and Schedule A: also s.15 which permits variat­
ion by local authorities of the amount© set out in the 
said Schedule.
the hride on a number of specific occasions or at specified 
intervals during the first year or so of the marriage. These 
customary "gifts" and payments are lumped together under the 
terms "incidental expenses" in the Limitation of Lowry Law 
of the Eastern Region,^ and "allowances" in the Western 
Region Adoptive Bye-Laws, Schedule A.
No part of the dowry paid in cash is paid directly to
the mother of the bride. But in practically every society,
she is entitled to a portion of the payment made to her husband
(or whoever is the bride’s father). Similarly, maternal uncles
(more generally, the maiden family of the bride’s mother) are
entitled to a share of the dowry in matrilineal societies
and mixed-descent groups, though fathers are now said to be
successfully asserting a claim to exclusive entitlement to an
34increasing extent. ^ Again, in strict law, the person entitled 
to the bride price of a "small dowry" daughter is not her 
father but her maternal uncle or his family, since such a 
child never belonged to her social father (by which is meant 
the husband of her mother). Finally, if a "big dowry" wife 
leaves her husband and re-marries to another man (this can
33. But payments and "gifts" to parents are also included 
under that term.
34. Forde, Marriage and the Family among the Yako« p.45; 
Bradbury and Lloyd, op. cit.+ p.156; Hubbard, ante, p.191*
•55 xonly be by a "small dowry" marriage, by the way ), it is
the former husband, not the latter, who in strict law is
entitled to the bride price of any daughter born of the "small
36dowryn marriage *
These special payments and cases apart, a father is the 
person legally entitled to the bride price paid in respect of 
his daughter* In the case of a child born of an unmarried 
mother, the person entitled to her bride price is her mother1s 
father or other person in loco parentis to her.
This is no place to refute the charge that bride price 
is purchase price. Neither will any useful purpose be served 
by discussing the relative merits of the theories (a) that 
the object of bride price is to validate a marriage; (b) that
its payment gives .a husband the usual rights over his wife;
and (c) that the raison dTetre of bride price as an institut­
ion is the transfer of "ownership" and custody of her children 
from a woman’s maiden family to her husband and his family* 
Payment or waiver of bride price has all three effects, except, 
as will appear later, in matrilineal societies and in the 
case of "small dowry" marriages (at all events in the
35* Cf. Williamson, loc. cit*, pp.56-57.
36. Cf. Kammer, "Marriage custom of Bakana, New Calabar", 
(1910) 16 W. Eq. Afr. Diocesan Mag., No.196, pp.58-60*
*37traditional customary laws)*
(4) "Giving away the bride1
Our fourth and final essential for a valid customary 
marriage is what may he called the "giving away" of the bride, 
for want of a better term. This procedure is usually accompan­
ied by festivities, the pouring of libations and ceremonies 
generally; hence the frequent use of the words "marriage 
ceremony" to describe it. But as one learned writer on 
Yoruba marriage law put it, "Customary marriage does not need
57. The literature on bride price and its objects is enormous. 
We can only give a select list here:-
Nature and mode of payment: Basden, Niger Ibos* pp.217-8;
Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Ibo. I, p.65; Ekeghe, 
op. cit.. pp.46-7; Forde and Jones, o p. cit.. p.18; Meek, Law 
and Authority, p.271; Esenwa, loc. cit.. p.76; Williamson, loc. 
cit.. p. 55; Forde, Efik Traders, p.14: Kammer, loc. cit.f pp. 
58-60; Cotton, loc. cit., p.428: Simmons, loc. cit... p.161; 
Forde and Jones (Ibibio section), p.77; Talbot, In the Shadow. 
p.108; Porde, .Marriage ... among the Yako. p.45 ff; Elias, 
Groundworkf p.285; Ajisafe, _o p. cit.. pp.55 and 56; Porde, 
Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, p.28; Delano, o p. cit.. pp.122 and 
124; Ward, c p . cit.P p.21 ff; Partridgef loc. cit.f p.425; 
Bradbury and Lloyd, op. cit.y p.49; p.156; Omoneukanrin, 
pit., p.45; Bystrom, JLoc. cit*, p.7j Temietan, loc. cit.. p.76; 
Ellis, ,op. cit., p.182; Thomas, Anthropological Report on the 
Edo ... p. 48; Delano, .op . cit.. p.52: Kasunmu. ~op. cit., p 3.
Who takes it: Thomas, "Marriage and legal customs of the
Edo", loc. cit.f p.97? Parkinson, loc* cit.. p.516; Johnson, 
p.114; Hubbard, p.191? Porde in African Systems of Kinship and 
Marriage, pp.525-4; Coker, 253.
Quantum: Basden, .Among the Ibos. p*70; Talbot, Peoples
of s. Nigeria, pp .438-9: Talbot, Life"In s. Nigeria, p.205.
Object of payments Ward, op.. cit^ pp.21-22; Porde (see 
last para, above); Bawden, Among the Ibos. p.71.
any particular form of ceremony in order to establish its 
validity. The wedding feast has a social or evidential 
significance, but not a legal one.11^ This statement is true 
of all southern Nigerian societies generally, bar the case 
of Moslem weddings which differ but little from MChristiann 
weddings.
The gist of a customary marriage ceremony, whatever its 
form and trimmings, is the handing over of the bride by her 
parent or guardian to the bridegroom or his representatives.
In a number of societies, including the Ibo and some Yoruba, 
this "giving away” takes place at the home of the bride (or 
some other place of her family's choice), the bridegroom and/or 
his representatives going there to receive her. In other 
societies, the formal handing over is done in the bridegroom's 
place, the bride being taken there for this purpose by members 
of her family. Among societies in this second category are 
the Itsekiri, some Yoruba and the Edo-speaking peoples, 
including the Bini and the Urhobo.
Two further points may be mentioned in this connexion.
The first is that among the Ekoi, there is said to be no 
marriage ceremonies of any type, a marriage being complete as
38. Kasunmu, op. cit.« p.82.
39soon as the woman concerned leaves the fatting-house.  ^ Even 
here, however, there is always a formal handing over of the 
bride: it would he too much to expect her to try and find
her way to the matrimonial home as best she could. The other 
point is that the n fat ting-house1 method of preparing girls 
physically and mentally for the great task of running a home, 
admirable though it is, is progressively proving impracticable 
in the modern society and is gradually disappearing.^
39* Cf. Bystrom, loc. cit., p.7.
40. On 1 giving away" and "marriage ceremonies1 generally, see 
Basden, Among the Ibo, p.70; Sporndli, loc. cit., p.121; 
Esenwa, loc. cit., pp.173 and 76; Talbot. Peoples of southern 
Nigeria, Vol.HI. pp.425. 439, 445 and 452; Kammer, loc. 
cit., p.60; Simmons, loc. cit., p.161; Elias, Groundwork, 
p.285; Ajisafe, op. cit., p.54; Eorde, The Yoruba-speaking 
Peoples, p.28; Ward, op. cit., pp.21 and 50; Partridge, 
loc. cit., p.426; Bradbury ana Lloyd, op. cit., pp.49,
80, 157; Egharevba, op. Cit., p.17; Omoneukanrin, op. cit., 
p.42; Coker, op. cit., p.425; Welch, loc. cit., p.l71; 
Johnson, op. cit., p.114; Temietan, loc. cit., p.76;
Thomas, Anthropological Report on the^do-speaking Peoples, 
p.48; Delano, An African look at marriage, p.85;
Kasunmu, op. ciT.T PP.5 Ccustomary) and 93 (Moslem).
Void, Voidable and Inchoate marriages
The legal effects of the absence of one or more of the 
essential requirements for a valid customary marriage may be 
classified under three main heads: A purported marriage which
lacks one or more of these essentials is either void, voidable 
or merely inchoate, depending on which requirements are miss­
ing. These results will now be examined very briefly.
(a) Void marriages
A purported customary marriage is void ab initio in five 
sets of circumstances. (i) If the consent of the bride’s 
parents or guardian to the transaction was not obtained, there 
could be no marriage, since in the nature of things, there 
would be no agreement on the payment or waiver of the bride 
price; neither could the bride be properly givenavay in 
marriage, (ii) A customary marriage contracted during the 
subsistence of a "Christian" marriage is void ab initio 
because of the operation of s.35 of the Marriage Act, (that 
is, assuming the said "Christian" marriage to have been 
contracted in Nigeria and therefore under the Marriage Act. )
1. In strict logic, a "void marriage" is a contradiction in 
terms, for what is void is no marriage. Nevertheless, we 
use "marriage", "husband", "bride" etc., in such cases as 
shorthand for "purported marriage" etc.
2. Onwudin.ioh v. Onwudinjoh, ante.
It is still, in our submission, an open question whether a 
subsisting "Christian” marriage contracted outside Nigeria 
would invalidate a subsequent customary marriage entered into 
in Nigeria. In the succession case of Asiata v. Concallo,  ^
a practising Yoruba Moslem had been taken as a slave to Brqzil. 
There he had married A by Christian rites, having first married 
her by Moslem rites. He later returned to Lagos where, 
subsequently to the passing of the 1884 Marriage Ordinance 
on which the present Marriage Act of Nigeria was largely 
based, he married B and C by Moslem rites, his "Christian" 
marriage with A still subsisting. The Full Court - Griffith, 
J., speed, J., and Morgan, Acting C.J. -bald that the 
marriages with B and C were valid. Among the reasons given 
for this decision were that the deceased had never ceased to 
be a practising Moslem, his Christian marriage being no more 
than an exercise in social conformity; that he did not live 
in Brazil as a free agent but as a slave; and that Lagos in 
which he was domiciled at the time of his death and in which 
he contracted the Moslem marriages with B and C was not a 
Christian but a Moslem country! A liberal interpretation of 
this case would be that any Nigerian who has never fully given
3. (1900) 1 N.L.R.42.
up his local religion, which is true of most Nigerian 
Christian converts - he they Moslems or so-called animists 
originally,^ has legal capacity to contract any number of 
customary marriages in Nigeria during the subsistence of his 
’’Christian" marriage, if the latter was contracted outside 
Nigeria. On the other hand, it is arguable that the case 
must rest on its own peculiar facts, and that the element of 
involuntary sojourn in foreign lands as a slave distinguishes 
that case from any that is ever likely to occur in modern 
times.
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In Adegbola v. Folaranmi  ^we have the converse case of 
a Yoruba who was married under customary law in Nigeria, later 
contracting a "Christian" marriage in Trinidad whence he had 
been taken as a slave, during the subsistence of his customary 
marriage, and finally dying intestate after his return to 
Nigeria. Another Full Court - Combe, C.J., Pennington and 
Van der Meulen, JJ. - held that his Trinidad "Christian" 
marriage was valid. The Court sought to evade the question 
of the legal effect of the subsisting customary marriage on 
the subsequent Christian one, when they said -
4. It should be noted that the deceased in the instant case 
was converted to Christianity while in Brazil.
5. £1921) 3 N.L.R.81.
"I think that the proper presumption on the facts 
is that Harry Johnson, before he contracted his 
marriage with Mary Johnson, considered that he 
and his partner to the native marriage were 
absolved from all obligations to one another 
founded on the native marriage, and that he
was free to contract a Christian marriage with
c
Mary Johnson  H
It is obvious from the above passage that the learned
Chief Justice was mistaken in thinking that a valid customary
marriage could in fact be dissolved merely because one of
the spouses thought it was so. As Coker said while commenting
on this passage,
" it is not correct that a marriage can be
dissolved by the intention of either of the
parties. To dissolve a marriage, an act in
law is necessary, however formal or trivial
n
such act in law is."
But even if we assume that the deceased, Harry Johnson, was 
justified in regarding his customary marriage as having been 
dissolved in the circumstances - he had lived as a slave in 
the West Indies for some 35 years, without hope or prospect 
of ever going back to his wife and his other "pagan relations",
at p.83,
6. (1921) 3 N.L.R.81,/per Combe, C.J. who delivered the
judgement of the Court.
7. Op. cit., p.274.
Qas the Chief Justice put it - even if he was justified at 
the material time in regarding himself as ’free to contract 
a Christian marriage” in Trinidad, his case could not he 
placed any higher than that of an English man of his day 
whose spouse had been missing for seven years and who had 
reasonable grounds, as later expressed by Sachs, J. in Chard 
v. Chard ,^ for not believing her to be alive. In Harry 
Johnson’s day (i.e. at common law, before 1937), the English 
man’s second marriage ’would be conclusively void” if it later 
turned out that his first wife was then alive.^ As it 
happened, Johnson’s customary wife was still alive both at 
the time of his Christian marriage and at the time of his 
return to Nigeria. In spite of this, and notwithstanding 
the common law rule referred to above, the Full Court held 
that his Christian marriage was valid.
If these two decisions, Asiata v. G-oncallo and Adegbola 
v. Folaranmi are good law, the inference seems irresistible 
that a customary marriage contracted in Nigeria and a Christian 
marriage entered into outside Nigeria have no invalidating 
effect on each other, whatever the order in which they came 
into being.^
8. 3 N.L.R.81, at p.84.
9. (1955) 3 All E.R.721; (1956) P.259 at p.272.
10. Cf. Bromley, op. cit., p.80. Bee now s.16 of the M.C.A., 
1950.
11. Cf. Coker, op. cit., p.271.
(iii) A customary marriage between persons within the 
prohibited degrees of relationship as prescribed by their 
local law is void ab initio, although, as we have seen, the 
position could be rectified either in advance or retroactively 
in a number of societies, chiefly among the Itsekiri, the 
I jaw and the Ibo. (iv) In the same way, a marriage between 
a native of Nigeria and a non-native is void. As already 
seen, a "native of Nigeria" used to be defined for these 
purposes as a person who was a member of an ethnic group 
indigenous to Nigeria, e.g. a Yoruba of Lagos in Savage v. 
Macfoy (ante), an Efik of Calabar in Fonseca v. Passman 
(supra). It is doubtful, however, whether Savage v. Macfoy, 
which was decided in 1909, is still good law in view of the 
subsequent definition of a "native of Nigeria" as including 
a "native foreigner". ^  This latter means "any person (not 
being a native of Nigeria) whose parents were members of a 
tribe or tribes indigenous to some part of Africa and the 
descendants of such persons, and shall include any person one 
of whose parents was a member of such a tribe." (v) Finally, 
a customary marriage is void if it is not supported by the 
payment or express waiver by the bride1 s family of a bride 
price (dowry). It should be remembered, though, that payment
12. Interpretation Act, s.3.
may be postponed in whole or in part, for a fixed period or 
indefinitely* Such postponement does not have any adverse 
effect on the validity of the marriage in question: perhaps
customary law, like equity, regards as done that which ought 
to he done I
(b) Voidable marriages
'The only clear case of voidable marriages under custom­
ary law so far discovered is connected with infant marriage.
As we saw in the section on "Consent of the spouses themselves1* 
a child has a right (which is not infrequently exercised) to 
repudiate a marriage entered into on his/her behalf by his/her 
parents or guardian, when old enough to make independent 
critical appraisal of the relationship. As Basden said, "... 
occasionally £a girl] will refuse to follow the intended 
husband in spite of entreaty or applied persuation. In such 
a case any expenses incurred by the man must be refunded by 
the guardian of the girl." As long ago as 1912, Talbot said 
of the Ekoi that child marriage was voidable, at the suit of 
the infant bride, when she grew up. In Ared A sham v. N.jokk 
Abang, the Native Court held that a girl could, on attaining
1. Among the Ibos, p.69.
marriageable age, confirm her childhood marriage by accepting
marriage gifts from her husband, or reject him by refusing to
2
move into the matrimonial home. Ward says of the Yoruba that, 
though "a marriage can be prescribed for a boy conditionally
!Z
... he is free to refuse (the prescribed wife) if he wishes11*'
- apparently on growing up.
The law on this subject may be summarised by saying 
that though parents or guardians had the power in the tradit­
ional society (and to some extent today where marriageable 
age has not yet been regulated by statute) to give their 
infant children in marriage without the consent or even know­
ledge of such children, the latter have a right (which is 
virtually unfettered in the modern society) to refuse to go 
on with such marriage when they are old enough to know their 
own minds in the matter. Infant marriage can, therefore, be 
said to be voidable at the instance of the infant spouse, 
duch a marriage may be declared void by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, or terminated by the less formal procedure which 
is a characteristic feature of divorce procedure under custom­
ary law.
2.^eTalbot, In the Shadow of the Bush, p.111.
3. Ward, Marriage among the Yoruba. p.17.
(c) Inchoate marriages
The most straightforward case of this (and one that only 
requires a few words of discussion here) is the one which 
relates to absence of "giving away" in a marriage transaction. 
In the nature of things, the legal consequence of this defect 
is not that the marriage is void, nor that it is voidable: 
there just is no completed marriage yet. In other words, 
until the woman is handed over in the traditional way to her 
husband or his family, the proposed marriage is still inchoate. 
The question whether marriage has been completed or is still 
inchoate assumes great importance when the "ownership" 
(affiliation) of a child is involved, or when legal capacity 
to contract marriage with a third party has to be decided.
The first point arose in the Efik case Edet v. Esien.1 
In this case A paid dowry to Inyang’s father while she (Inyang) 
was still a little child. When the girl grew up, she found 
herself another suitor B who, having obtained her parents* 
consent, paid them an agreed bride price for her. B duly 
completed the marriage transaction and took Inyang away to 
the matrimonial home. The couple lived together as man and 
wife, and of this union fchree children were born. A now
1. (1932) 11 N.L.R.47
brought an action against B claiming that, as the dowry he 
had paid on Inyang was never returned to him, he was the 
woman*s legal husband and that the three children of Inyang 
were therefore his. The local customary court held that this 
claim was valid in law. The case was then sent to the 
Provincial Court of Calabar. But the Commissioner found the 
evidence on the customary law governing this point inconclusive 
either way. The Divisional Court, Carey, J. held that what­
ever the customary law, it would be repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience to hold that a man was 
entitled to children born in these circumstances merely 
because the dowry he paid on their mother had not been refunded 
to him.
It was unnecessary, in our submission, to invoke the
doctrine of repugnancy in the instant case. It would have
been enough to hold that there never was any marriage between
A and Inyang, and that as A had no other claim to the children
(e.g. being their natural father), he had no locus standi in
the case. This point of view was adopted in the later case
2of Re Intended Marriage of Beckley and Abiodun. In that, a 
Yoruba couple agreed to marry each other while they both lived
2. (1943) 17 R.L.R.59
in Lagos. The prospective husband later left Lagos for 
Northern Nigeria, from where he authorized the performance 
in his name of the idana (or ana) ceremony for the girl.
Later, however, the youngman changed his mind and became 
engaged to a third party. Thereupon his father entered a 
caveat against a celebration of the proposed Christian marri­
age with the second woman, on the ground that the bridegroom- 
to-be was already married to the first woman under customary 
law. The High Court of Kaduna, Ames, J. held, after hearing 
expert evidence on the relevant Yoruba law, that the alleged 
customary marriage did not exist, since the performance of 
the idana ceremony without more did not constitute a completed 
marriage.
Both the marriage in Edet v. Bsien and that in Re Beckley 
and Abiodon lacked one essential requirement for a valid 
customary marriage - viz. a formal "giving away" of the bride 
to the bridegroom and/or his people. Both were cases of 
inchoate marriage. In both cases, the alleged marriage was 
non-existent. This then is the legal effect of the absence 
of a handing over of a customary lav; bride.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
HUSBARD AND WIFE - I :
RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIPE IN GENERAL,
Legislative competence, Jurisdiction> and Law applicable *
The Schedule to s. 15k of the federal Constitution 
I960, provides under Item 23 that -
"... matrimonial causes relating to marriages 
other than marriages under Moslem law or other 
customary law1 shall "be on the Exclusive Legis­
lative List of the Federal legislature.
On the other hand, legislation on marriages under customary 
law is exclusively within the competence of the Regional 
parliaments. Hence such measures as the East Regional 
Age of Marriage Law and Iamitation of Dowry Law; and the 
Western Region's Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children 
Adoptive Bye-Laws all of which havealreddy been discussed.
Jurisdiction over disputes and other matrimonial 
causes between husband and wife belongs to either the High 
Courts or the Customary Courts according as the parties 
concerned were married under a monogamous or a polygamous 
marriage law. In other words, matrimonial causes between 
parties to a Christian marriage come within the jurisdiction 
of the High Courts; those between parties to a customary
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marriage fall vd thin the jurisdiction of the Customary Courts 
as a general rule. This dichotomy stems from the provisions 
of the High Court Laws on the one hand and those of the 
Customary Courts Laws on the other. (The various Regional 
legislations are so similar in their terms that we need 
do no more than discuss one of each type.)
The Regional High Courts (including the High Court
of Lagos) derive their jurisdiction in matrimonial causes
from the Regional Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act, 1958 -
a Federal statute - which also stipulates in s.i+ what system
of law shall he applied in such causes. Section k reads,
in part, as follows: -
"The jurisdiction of the High Court of a Region in
relation to ... matrimonial causes shall, subject to
the provision of any laws of a Region so far as
practice and procedure are concerned, be exercised by
the Court in conformity with the law and practice for
the time being in force in England".**'
"Marriage" is defined in s.2 as a marriage other than a
marriage under Moslem law or other customary law. The same
section defines "matrimonial cause" as a matrimonial cause
other than one relating to a marriage under Moslem law or
other customary law. The law applicable to matrimonial
causes between parties to a Christian marriage (wherever
1. Cf* s.l6 of the High Court of Lagos Law; s.l6 of the 
High Court Law, 1956 (S.R.).
contracted) is, therefore, the current law of England on 
the subject*
Original jurisdiction in matrimonial causes re­
lating to customary marriages belongs primarily to Customary
■ 2 Courts in the ^astern and the Western Regions* This is
because the Regional Customary Courts ^aws confer on the 
Customary Courts unlimited jurisdiction in these matters 
(and in others which are not relevant here); while the Re­
gional High Court Laws contain provisions which oust the 
original jurisdiction of the High Courts in matrimonial 
causes where the Customary Courts have jurisdiction, with 
two exceptions to be considered shortly. Here are some 
of the relevant provisions:
The Second Schedule to the Customary C0urts Law 
of the Western Region (as substituted by No34 of 1959) gives
the Cus'tomaf yv Cour ts in that Region -
"unlimited jurisdiction in matrimonial causes and
matters between persons married under customary law
or arising from or connected with a union contracted
3
under customary law 
On the other hand, s.13 of the High Court Law, 1955 (as 
amended), Eastern Region, provides as follows £
".*. the Court shall not exercise original jurisdiction
2. ^here are no Customary Courts in Lagos, and so bothW 
original and appellate jurisdictions vest in the High 
Court there.
3* Cf* s. of the Customary Courts Law, 1956, of the 
Eastern Region*
in any cause or matter which is subject to the 
jurisdiction of a Native ^ourt or Customary ^ourt 
relating to marriage, family status or ••••" ^
There are only three circumstances under which a High Court 
could assume original jurisdiction in these matters, viz*
(a) where a case is transferred from the appropriate 
Customary Court to the High Court;
(h) where the Governor "the Region concerned so directs 
hy order; and
(c) in the unlikely event that there is no Customary Court 
in the area so that there is none to which original juris­
diction "belongs as of right*
All these, however, only apply to original jurisdiction* 
r
The High ourts have appellate jurisdiction in matrimonial
5(as in other) causes and matters involving customary law* 
Modification of English Law b.y the Courts*
We have seen that the law applicable to matri­
monial causes relating to Christian marriages is the current 
law of England on the subject* There is some uncertainty as 
to how far, if at all, the High Courts have power to modify 
this law to suit local circumstances* There are at least 
two conflicting views. On the one hand, it is arguable that, 
since matrimonial causes are a Federal matter expressly
ij-. Cf. Proviso to s. 9(1) of the High Court Law, Western Region. 
5* It is not clear in what circumstances the Governor will 
direct a case involving a customary marriage to be tried 
in the High uourt instead of a Customary Court* This he 
will probably do if, e*g* there is a local political dis­
turbance affecting the local courts; or if an influential 
politician is a party to the action*
< 'i  ’
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assigned to Regional High Courts by way of delegation, and 
since the law applicable thereto has been specifically pre­
scribed by the federal legislature, any power to modify this 
law must be expressly conferred on the Courts by the Federal 
parliament. On this view, it will be necessary to look 
through the Federal statute books to discover whether or 
not this power has in fact been granted. .
The two provisions which came closedtto the point 
are s. 15 and s.i|5(2) of the Interpretatioh Act. The former 
reads:
"Whenever by any Act of parliament or Ordinance or Law 
any Act of [the Imperial] Parliament is extended or 
applied to Nigeria or to a Region, such Act shall be 
read v/ith such formal alterations as to names, localities 
courts, offices, persons, moneys, penalties and other­
wise as may be necessary to make the same applicable 
to the circumstances.2 
^his cannot be said to confer on the High ^ourts any general 
powers of modification, since no more than "formal" altera-
CT\ '
tions are envisaged. 1he general term "otherwise" at the 
end of the list of alterable items is not much use either; 
for it is obviously governed by the operative word "formal".
S. U5(2) goes a little further, when it provides that - 
"Such Imperial laws shall be in force so far 
only as the limits of the local jurisdiction and 
local circumstances shall permit ...."
But this sub-section apparently only refers to "such imperial 
laws" as are indicated in sub-section (l) of that section. 
These "imperial laws" are there given as -
"... the common law of England and the doctrines of 
Equity, together with the statutes of general appli­
cation that were in force in England on the first day 
of January, 1900 ...."
If it be objected that there is no reason why, in principle, 
the power of modification granted in s.L|-5(2) should not be 
said to apply to all received ^nglish law generally, the an­
swer is simple. S#2* of the Regional Courts (Federal Juris­
diction) Act, 1958, already referred to stipulates "the law 
and practice for the time being in force in England", and 
then allows for alteration "so far as practice and procedure 
are concerned", while remaining silent on the question of 
alteration to the lav/ itself. This is a strong indication 
that no such alterations are contemplated. And so, either 
a clear and unambiguous provision elsewhere (which does not 
exist) or a very weighty reason bawed on first principles 
(which will next be^investigated) can displace this strong 
contrary indication.
The second view is that in giving jurisdiction in 
matrimonial causes to Regional High C0urts, the Federal 
legislature could not have intended that co-opted English 
statute law on the subject should be applied on a different
basis from received English statute law on other subjects, 
simply because the reception is done by the Federal and not 
a Regional parliament. Were this the intention, the legisla­
ture would have said so in express terms. In other words, 
it is not necessary that the Regional High Courts should 
require express power to modify received ^ngiish iaw (statute 
or otherwise) &erely because their jurisdiction on the sub­
ject matter concerned is of Federal rather than Regional 
origin: if these Courts have power, independently, to mo­
dify received English lav/ generally, they can exercise this 
power irrespective of the source of their jurisdiction in 
a given class of cases.
If this view is correct, there is no doubt but that 
the Regional High Courts have power to alter the current law 
of England relating to matrimonial causes, so as to make them 
better suited for application locally. S.16 of the High 
Court of Lagos Law provides that -
"The jurisdiction of the High Court in ... matrimonial 
causes and proceedings may, subject to the provisions 
of this [Law] and in particular of s.27 ••• be exercised 
by the Court in conformity with the law and practice 
for the timeibeing/in Enrce in England. "
6. This is particularly true of the High Courts of Lagos 
and the Eastern Region. The Western Region has 
abolished the idea of English statute law applying 
there: Law of England (Application) Law, 1959 - No.9 of
1959* S.7 of this law provides,mhowever, that it shall 
not apply to any Imperial Act relating to a matter which 
is within the exclusive Federal legislative list, as is 
"matrimonial causes1’.
S.27 provides for the application of customary law between 
"natives'1, or between natives and non-natives where the 
justice of the case so requires. The combined effect of 
ss. 16 and 27 is that the High ^ourt of Lagos has power to 
modify the received English law on matrimonial causes in 
the light of the local customary law (or the customary law 
of the parties in the case, as the case may be). S.20(1) 
of the High C0urt Law of the Eastern Region is more general 
in its scope, but leads to the same result for our present 
purposes.
"All statutes of general application1', it says, "or 
other Acts of Tthe imperial] Parliament which apply 
within the jurisdiction of the Court by reason of 
this Law or any other written law shall be in force 
so far only as the limits of the local jurisdiction 
and local circumstances permit."
It is obvious from these provisions then that the 
Regional legislatures envisage some judicial modifications in 
the substantive law of Engian& to suit local circumstances. 
The absence of any detailed provision on the point in the 
Western Region is immaterial: its High Court still has this
power dfl modification in appropriate cases. As Allott has 
aptly put it:
"It is submitted that even in territories where there 
is no such express provision enabling [Nigerian] courts 
to modify EngiiSh law for local application, the courts
have an inherent power in similar terms by virtue 
of their general duty to administer justice* Other­
wise the application of English law would he stultified 
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Husband's general position vis-a-vis his wife or wives.
The legal head of an elementary family (household) 
is the husband. This is true today even in the matrilineal 
societies of the Cross River, and among their southern 
neighbours, the Efik of Caiabar, who are frequently described 
in popular parlance as ‘'matriarchal1 on account of their great 
respect for women generally, This means that a man is en­
titled to respect and obedience from his wife or wives, the 
absence of any matrimonial vow to that effect notwithstanding. 
It also ne ans that a woman must first obtain her husband's 
consent to any major transaction or undertaking she wishes 
to embark upon - starting up in businesdjor trade, purchasing 
land or other valuable forms of property, taking a title 
where this is done by women, and joining social or thrift 
associations are only a few examples. In the traditional 
society, it meant, too, that a man had a right to chastise 
his wife, within reason, without incurring disfavour from 
her maiden family. Thomas made an interesting list of some 
of the things a wife was forbidden to do vis-a-vis her
7* A s s a y s  jn African Law, p.25*
husband in the traditional Ibo society - a list that was
good for most other ethnic groups* These were that a wife
must not (a) offer food to her hus'band with her left hand;1
(b) point at his food with her foot; (c) throw away what
her hus'band wanted to have; (d) expose her genitals or
buttocks before him; or (e) "draw down her eyes at" him,
3this would be insulting*
It must not be thought, however, that even in the 
traditional society women were treated as anything but 
respected and cherished members of society - mothers of the 
rising generation, counsellors to their husbands behind the 
scenes, and, above all, people who never quite lost their 
membership of their maiden families and could always count 
on active intervention from the latter in all cases of dis­
pute with their husbands or with other members of their matri 
monial families* Indeed there are societies where women have 
always held a privileged position as against their husbands* 
One of these is Kalahari, an I jaw group of whom ri*albot had 
this to say a© long ago as 1926 -
"Kalahari women are extremely well treated; they
are not bound to do any work beside that of looking
k
after the compound and cooking the food."
More remarkable still is the position occupied by wives
1. I’his is an insult even today, unless accompanied by the 
vernacular equivalent of "excuse my left". It is true 
of all persons a propos their superiors.
2. I.E. in anger, or by way of derision.
3* Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Ibo. Part I, p.61.
Lj.* Peoples of Southern Nigeria. vol.III, p.Ij-90*
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among the ^koi of whom Talbot said that traditionally :
"the head wife, not the husband, was regarded as head of the 
5
house”. Even in those societies where wives were reputed 
to occupy less exalted positions in the traditional society, 
it can be shown that their social and legal inferiority 
then, as now, was more theoretical than real. Thus ^orde 
and Jones say of Ibo wives that they influence their men 
by concerted action and by individual control of the domestic 
food supply (and its preparation). But the position is brought 
out most clearly by Basden in this passage -
"In theory women are regarded as inferior creatures, 
little better than other household property, but in 
. daily life they hold a strongly entrenched position, 
the key of which is food, ^very married woman holds 
the whip hand over her husband by means of this vital 
weapon. A crossed woman will torment her husband in 
galling manner by refusing to prepare food for him ..."
5• In the Shadow of the Bush, p.97 (a book published in 1912). 
But this statement must not be taken too literally, for 
Talbot was obviously thinking here of the relative 
positions of first and subsequent wives in a polygamous 
household. This fact emerges more clearly at p.109 of 
his book where he says: WA mauls first wife is always
the head of the house. The younger wives obey her and 
coih&ider her in everything."
6. Among the Ibos of N i g e r i a , p.100. On the respective posi­
tions of husband and wife generally, see Basden, supra, 
pp.88-102; Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Ibo- 
-speaking Peoples, Part I, pp.61 and 69; porde and Jones, 
op.cit., 2i+; fereen, Ibo Village Affairs, pp.170-5; Basden, 
Niger Ibos, p.130; Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, 
Vol. Ill, p.U39l Talbot, In the Shadow of the Bush, ppT97-8 
and 109; Yifard, The Yoruba husband-Wife Code, pp. 120-137; 
HUbbard, The Sobo of the fifjger Delta, p. 191; Wieschhoff, 
"Divorce laws and practices in modern Ibo culture", loc. 
cit., p.301,
O i I
It is against this "background that the following observa­
tions of Sard’s must be read -
"A husband never considers himself obliged to obey 
his wife. On the other hand, he demands that his 
wife obey him •••• The very nature of the wife’s 
obligations to her husband seems to presuppose 
obedience. It is largely based on obedience. 11 ^
"Nationality", Citizenship and ^omicil.
In this section we shall briefly consider a wife’s 
right to her husband's nationality, citizenship and domicil. 
(For our present purposes, "nationality" is to be understood 
in the customary law sense of membership of a given race or 
ethnic group, or of a sub-division t h e r e o f . W e  shall at­
tempt an answer to three question^, viz., (a) if two Nigerians 
belonging to two different ethnic groups (e.g. an Ibo and a 
Yoruba ) inter-marry, to what extent, if at all, does the 
wife become a member of her husband’s ethnic group, and vice 
versa, by reason of the marriage; (b) if a Nigerian citizen 
marries a non-Nigerian woman, does she ipso facto become a 
Nigerian citizen; and (c) if a man who is domiciled in 
Nigeria marries a woman who is not so domiciled, does the
7* Ward, The Yoruba Hgsband-Wjfe Code, pp.120-1.
1 . The terms "race" and "ethnic group" are used here in 
place of "tribe", a term which has so much emoitive 
political flavour in Contemporary Nigeria, andjis so 
deeply entangled with magic and witchcraft in the minds 
of many a foreign reader, that we propose to avoid its 
use in this work.
wife automatically acquire a Nigerian domicil; again if, as
2has "been suggested, there is a Regional domicil in 
personal law matters, does a woman change her own Regional 
domicil of Eirth or previous marnage in favour of her hus­
band’s Regional domicil?
(a) Nationality of a married woman*
Under customary law, a woman is a member of her 
husband’s family - for a number of purposes at all events - 
for as long as she possesses the legal status of a married 
woman. It is immaterial that in her unmarried state she be­
longed to an ethnic group different from her husband's.
Thus if say a Yoruba or an Ibibio woman is married to an 
Ibo man, she acquires a right to take any Ibo titles open 
to other local housewives; she has a right to assume (and 
often does assume) a locla Ibo name; it would be incest for 
a blood relation of her husband's to have sexual connexion 
with her; and, more generally, she becomes subject to 
the authority of the local (customary) social and political 
authorities, while at the same time acquiring rights and 
obligations under the local customary law as if she original­
ly belonged to that ethnic group. Now, membership of an 
ethnic group depends on membership of some family within 
the group, as an ethnic group is no more than the apex of
a socio-political pyramid whose base comprises a large____
2. See Qkonkwo v. Eze and Another (i960) N.R.N.L.R.80; 
but see also Nwokedi v. Nwo&edi, ^uit No. Wd/17/1958 
(Lagos).
multitude of extended families. It would seem to follow, 
therefore, that a woman is sufficiently absorbed into her 
husband’s family, under customary law, for her to acquire her 
husband’s nationality as above defined, ^he converse, how­
ever, is not true: a husband never assumes his wife’s
nationality to any extent at all, not even in the matrili-
neal societies, and not even where he resides among her 
3
people.
(b) Citizenship of married women.
Citizenship is a peculiarly ’’English" law concept, 
and will be discussed as such. And as indicated above, we 
are only concerned here with the acquisition of Nigerian 
citizenship by a non-Nigerian woman who marries a Nigerian 
citizen.^ " Neither the Federal Constitution, I960, nor the 
Nigerian Citizenship Acts provide for automatic acquisition 
by ci woman of her husband’s Nigerian citizenship by virtue 
of their marriage. They do, however, provide for her re­
gistration an application. (There are no provisions on the 
converse case of a non-Nigerian male marrying a Nigerian 
female citizen).
Section 8(2 ) of the Federal Constitution, i960, 
provides that a woman "shall be entitled, upon making 
application in such manner as may be prescribed by Parliament
3. For an interesting attempt at a judicial construction of 
the term “native of Egbaland" generally, see Allen v. 
Peliku (1911) 1 N.L.R.117 at pp. 121 and 122. It must be 
warned, however, that this case had nothing to do with 
husband and wife relationship.
1+. For persons who became Nigerian citizens on 1.10.60, 
see ss.7f 8 (l) and 9*
to be registered as a citizen of Nigeria" if on the 30th day 
of September, i960, she was married to a person who became 
a Nigerian citizen on the 1st of October, 19&0, by virtue 
of s. 7 thereof, or who would havejbecome such a citizen but 
for his prior death. The combined effect of s.7 and s.8(2) 
is that a wife or widow has a right to be so registered
on application if her husband was - (a) born in the former
Colony or Protectorate of Nigeria, and (b) a citizen of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies or a British protected person 
on the said date, and (c) a son or grandson of a person who
g
was born in the former colony or Protectorate of Nigeria.
S.8 (3) provides that a woman "who is or has been 
married" to a citizen who became so by registration under 
s.8(l) and who is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colo­
nies or a British protected person, shall be entitled to
registration on application. This brings in the wives of 
persons neither of whose parents or grandparents was born 
in Nigeria but who, nevertheless, satisfy conditions ja) 
and (b) in the last paragraph above. The point of s.8 (3 ) 
is that such persons must apply for citizenship before the 
1st of October, 1962. S.8 (U) is similar in terms to s.8(3)
except that it relates to the wives of eligible but deceased 
persons.
3. This excludes "aliens" (as defined in s.l6 ) like French­
men who might satisfy conditions (a) and (c) regarding
birth and ancestry respectively.
6. Conditions (a ), (b), (c) are parts of s.7, (c) being the 
proviso thereto.
o So far, we have been dealing with women who 
before their marriage were "citizens of the United -Kingdom and 
Colonies or British protected persons." S.3 (3 ) of the 
Nigerian Citizenship Act, i960, deals with women who before 
their marriage were outside this class. It provides that 
the wife of a Nigerian citizen or of a person who but for 
his death would have been such a citizen, may apply for re­
gistration as a Nigerian citizen, even if she is not of full 
age and capacity, provided that she - (a) makes a written 
declaration of her intention to renounce any other citizen­
ship she might have, and (b) takes a n  oath of allegiance. 
Sections 3 B, 3 C(l) and 3 D (l), which were added by the 
Nigerian Citizenship Act, 19&1, are similar in terms to 
sections 8(2), 8(3) and &(h) of the Federal Constitution 
already discussed, except that they provided the procedure 
for these applications for registration. Ihis they do 
by stipulation which of the ^orms in the Schedules thereto ; 
shall be used by a given applicant, and by prescribing the 
time lirnita for such application under s. 3C(l). Finally, 
s.lt|A(2) extends the rights given, to persons who are 
"British subjects without citizenship".
(c) Domicil of married women
Domicil, like citizenship, is a peculiarly 
"English" law concept. Ihe current law of England on the
7. As amended by the Nigerian Citizenship Act, 19&1 (No.9 
of 1961).
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subject of a married woman's domicil is succinctly stated by 
Bromley, and we can do no better than reproduce him here.^
"On marriage", he says, "a woman automatically acquires 
her husband's domicile and retains it throughout ther 
covertureThis will not occur, of course, if the 
marriage is void; but if it is voidable, she will 
retain her husband's domicile until the na rriage is 
annulled.^ She is incapable of acquiring a separate
domicile of choice even though the spouses separate by
11 IPagreement or under a decree of judicial separation
and a fortiori if she merely has grounds for a divorce
13but has not petitioned for one. Similarly, if the
husband deserts his wife and acquires a fresh domicile
abroad, her domicile still automatically follows his."1^
Now since many problems in family lav/, including the validity
of marriages and the question of the courts' jurisdiction
in divorce and other matrimonial causes, are inextricably
15interwoven with a man's lex domicilii, it is obvious that
the law of Nigeria on matrimonial domicil is the same as
8. e^e ^romley, op.cit.» p.14.
9* Harvey v. Sarnie"'(1882) 8 App. Cas. 43.
10. De Keneville v.~De Reneville [1948] p. 100; [1948] 1 All
S.R."55“.
11. Dolphin v. Robins (1859) 7 H.L. Cas. 390.
12. A.-G-. for Alberta v. Cook [1926] A.C.444.
13* Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey [19211 1 A.C.146.
14. H.v.H. 11928 1 p.206.
15. Of. Bromley, p.12.
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the current law of -^ngland by virtue of s.l+ of the Regional 
Courts (federal Jurisdiction)nAct, 1958, already discussed. 
And so the above excerpt from Bromley is a reasonably good 
summary of our law on the subject.
16It follows then that where a non-Nigerian woman 
marries a man who is domiciled in Nigeria, she automatically 
acquires a Nigerian domicil, which she retains all during 
the legal existence of the marriage. It is immaterial 
where the marriage took place. Given that the husband is 
domiciled in Nigeria at the date of the marriage, his wife 
automatically acquires a Nigerian domicil, wherever the mar­
riage took place and whether or not, if it took place out­
side Nigeria, the woman intends ever living in Nigeria or 
indeed ever visiting it. Again, it makes no difference to 
her domicil that the woman in question is not a citizen of 
Nigeria. For citizenship and domicil are two separate 
concepts in Nigerian law, and need not co-exist in respect 
of the same person. Thus if a Scots-woman domiciled in 
Scotland marries a Nigerian domiciled in Nigeria, she auto­
matically becomes domiciled in Nigeria. And since no one
17can have two domicils at one and the same time, she will 
lose her Scottish domicil for the duration of the mrriage. 
Similarly, a Frenchwoman resident in Nigeria but domiciled
16. By which we mean a person not domiciled in Nigeria, 
in this context.
17* Cf. Bromley, p.13. 1his excludes cases of "suspended1 
or "dormant1 domicils of origin.
in France will lose her French domicil in favour of a
18Nigerian one if she marries a person domiciled in Nigeria.
There remains the question of a Regional as op­
posed to a Nigerian (national) domicil. If a Northern 
Nigerian woman marries an Eastern Nigerian, or the other way 
round, does she thereby acquire a Northern or an Eastern 
Regional domicil, as the case may be? This obviously depends 
on whether or not there is such a thing as a Regional domicil. 
The only two known cases on this point flatly contradict 
each other. In December 1958, Onyeama, J. held in the Lagos 
High Court that "there is only one domicile in this country
19for matrimonial causes and that is the Nigerian domicile.tf
Hurley, Acting C.J., on the other hand, held in the High
Court at Jos in i960 that when a perao n petitions for
divorce, "he must have the same dhmicile as he has for all
other purposes, and that will be a Regional domicile or a
20domicile in the Federal Territory" of Lagos.
The High Court of Lagos came to the conclusion 
it did in the Nwokedi case (viz. that there is only one 
Nigerian domicile for matrimonial causes) on the following 
grounds -
"There is only one system of law relating to matrimonial
18. It is possible that neither of the spouses is a Nigerian 
citizen. But the question whether or not a man can 
acquire a Nigerian domicil while remaining a non-Nigerian 
citizen is beyond the scope of the present work.
19* Nwokedi v. Nwokedi. Suit Np.yj)/17/1958 (Lagos) at p.2.
20. Okonkwo v. Eze and Another 11960) N.R.N.L.R.80, at p.81.
causes (other than matrimonial causes arising under
native law and custom or Moslem Law) in Nigeria, and
that is the law aa enacted hy the federal Legislature*
There is no power in the Regional legislatures to enact
laws pertaining to matrimonial causes. It follows
that although there is a High C0urt of Justice in each
Hegion, yet in matrimonial causes the jurisdiction of
all the High Courts is the same irrespective of the
Regional residence of the parties, and derives from
21the same source ...V
The Nwokedi case (which is unreported) was not cited 
in the later case of Okonkwo v* ^ze (ante), hut the ratio: 
decidendi of it was reproduced practically verbatim by 
counsel and decisively rejected by the learned Acting Chief 
Justice in the latter case* As appears from the Court’s 
judgment, counsel had argued that the Regional High Courts 
obtained their jurisdiction ih matrimonial causes under the 
Regional Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Ordinance which was 
a Federal statute; that legislative competence in relation 
to such causes was exclusive to the federal parliament by 
virtue of s.51 and Item 22A of Part I of the First Schedule 
to the 195U Constitution; and that -
’’Nigeria is a territory subject to one system of law 
in relation to matrimonial causes and is therefore, to
21* Nwokedi v, Nwokedi* ante, at pp.2©3 (Cyclostyled Report.)*
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the exclusion of the Regions, the unit for the
purposes of domicile in matrimonial causes, and the
jurisdiction of this court in matrimonial causes extends
to cases where the hus'band is domiciled anywhere in
Nigeria and not confined to cases where he is domiciled
22in the Northern Region."
To this contention the learned Acting ^hief Justice replied: 
"Each Region is a unit, to the exclusion of the other 
Regions and the Rederation, for the purposes of domicile 
where domicile comes in question in relation to legi­
timacy, or in relation to the succession to movables.
The person whose domicile is material in any dispute 
concerning legitimacy or concerning the succession to 
movables will necessarily have a domicile in one of 
the Retions or in the Federal Territory of Lagos, not 
in Nigeria as a whole, when he comes to court to 
petition for a dissolution of marriage, he cannot have 
a different domicile, for he cannot have more than one 
domicile at the same time; he must have the same do­
micile a& he has for all other purposes, and that will
be a Regional domicile or a domicile in the Federal 
23Territory."
This argument can be reduced to two simple pro­
positions and a conclusion. "Every person has a Regional
22. Okonkwo v. Eze and Another, ante, at p.Si (From the 
judgement) •
23« Ibid.
domicil for* the purposes of the law relating to legitimacy
and succession to movables. No one can have more than one
/
domicil at a time. Therefore every person must have a Re­
gional domicil for the purposes of the law relating to 
matrimonial causes." The second of these propositions is 
unexceptionable; but the first smacks of petition principii. 
For it has not been established yet that domicil in relation 
to legitimacy or intestate succession to movables is in fact 
Regional. On the contrary, there is some indication that it 
is not. In Re. Macaulay^he west African Court of Appeal 
held that for a person who was subject to customary law 
(as most Nigerians are), the proper law for determining his
legitimacy or otherwise was the customary law of the ethnic
25group of which he was a member. Since this customary law, 
like the ethnic group to which it belongs, may cut across 
Regional boundaries or else apply only to a very limited 
section of a Region, it follows that in deciding questions 
relating to legitimacy the courts do not necessarily advert 
to the Regional membership of the person concerned.
A person is not held to be legitimate or otherwise because 
he is an Eastern, a Western a Lagos Nigerian whose Re­
gional or Lagos customary law so stipulates. He is said to 
be legitimate or illegitimate because he is a Yoruba, an I jaw 
or an Ibo. In view of the fact that ethnic groups are not
2k. (1951) 13 W.A.C.A.304. 
25. Fbid.. p.309.
co-estensive with, and may cut across the limits of any 
given Region, it is more likely than not that the courts 
regard their various lav/s (i.e. customary law) not as part 
of the legal system of any particular Region hut merely as 
part of the law of Nigeria. If t-this view is correct, then
since "domicil” is defined with reference to a legal system,
the case for the existence of a Regional as opposed to a 
Federal domicil would appear not to have been made out. The 
same doubts and queries must also be expressed >with regard 
to the proposition that intestate succession to movables is 
determined with reference to a Regional domicil, at all 
events where the proper law of the case is customary law.
If in spite of these doubts and quries the deci­
sion in the Eze case turns out to be accepted by the courts
in preference to the Nwokedi doctrine of a Nigerian domicil, 
then if a woman from one Region marries a man of another 
Region her Regional domicil will give way to her husband’s 
in much the same way as if she were a non-Nigerian marrying 
a Nigerian.
The Matrimonial Home.
Under this head we shall consider the legal position 
of husband and wife with regard to the matrimonial home both 
under customary law and under the general law. But as a 
necessary preliminary, we shall discuss the question of 
matrilocal (perhaps more correctly, uxorilocal) marriages,
and their place in contemporary Nigeria. We start there­
fore with an examination of the question whether the "matri­
monial home" is normally among the husband’s or the wife’s 
people.
The general rule is that customary marriages in 
southern Nigeria are patrilocal (more correctly, virilocal): 
after marriage, a woman is under legal obligation to take 
up permanent residence with her husband among his people, 
or wherever else he chooses as their home. (She is normally 
consulted of course if a choice of new home is to be made 
subsequent to the marriage). This, too, is the rule under 
the general law.
In a number of societies, however, there is a form 
of customary marriage in which the law does not contemplate 
any right or duty of cohabitation between the spouses. This 
is the case with the "small dowry" system of marriage found 
among the I jaw. A "small dowry " wife has a right to con­
tinue to live with her people, in her maiden family and away
1
from her husband, for an indefinite period. In the tra­
ditional society, she was expected to do this unless and 
until a formal handing-over ceremony was performed - the 
husband making certain traditional payments and gifts with a 
view to "buying the mouth" of his wife, the wife’s parents
1. Williamson, loc. cit., p.56. See also Hubbard, op.cit. p.
191.
formally handing her over to her husband with whom she could 
now cohabit and for whom she had to cook and keep house*
In modern times, many I jaw men get over this rule of separate 
homes for husband and wife by a number of devises which
pinclude taking wives from otbe r ethnic groups than theirs,
or performing the spying the mouth ceremony at the same
time as the marriage itself.
There are no known systems of matrilocal marriages
properly so called anywhere in southern Nigeria. That is,
there is no .society today where the law requires a husband
to move over to and take up permanent residence among his
wifefs maiden family, though there is nothing in law to stop
him doing so if he wishes. There were in the past, however,
places such as the Western Ibo area wherein young husbands
sometimes took up residence (for months or even years running)
among their wives1 people, with a view to being better able
3
to render the labour services required of them. This was 
particularly so where the y§ung man concerned was not in a 
financial position to pay the necessary bride price for his 
wife in cash, and so had to work off his indebtedness to 
his "in-laws" by such services.
To summarise: wives are under a legal obligation
2. Hubbard, op.cit♦, p.192.
3* Cf. Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Ibo . Part
IV, The Law and Custom of the Ibo of the Asaba District, 
Ch.l*. On the practice in that area in more recent times, 
see -bsenwa, loc.cit.. p.75*
to cohabit with their husbands, the matrimonial home being 
normally among the husband’s people, ^here the "small dowry” 
marriage system exists, a wife so married has a right to 
live among her own maiden family and away from her husband 
until formally "bought over” by him. There was a system 
whereby young men could elect to live with their parents-in- 
-law and pay off their dowry debts by performing labour 
services rather than by paying cash, and ultimately take 
their wives away.
To what extent, if at all, has a wife anynlegal 
right to share the matrimonial home with her husband? The 
general rule in the vast majority of non-urban areas is 
that men provide their wives with houses or rooms of their 
own. This is so in monogamous as well as polygamous families 
In the latter, each wife normally has her own house or room 
which is separate from those of all the other wives and se­
parate from her husband’s. But all such houses form part 
of one and the same pompound; or section or a largen 
parent-compound in the case of a multiple-household resi­
dential unit. As already said, a woman’s house or room is 
under her exclusive possession vis-a-vis her husband and fel­
low wives. None of the latter has a right to make any use 
whatever of this house or room without her consent (though 
this consent may be implied or even presumed to be forth­
coming, where personal relations are good). Conversely,
a husband has an exclusive right of occupation and user over 
his own house or room, as against his w i v e s I f  then we 
define “matrimonial home1' in the Western sense of a house 
or flat occupied jointly by man and wife, the answer to 
the above question is that a wife has no right under custo­
mary law to any such matrimonial home in these societies, for 
such a home normally does not exist. If, on the other hand, 
"matrimonial home" is understood in the sense of the entire 
compound (or section thereof) occupied by a man and his wives, 
the answer is that a wife has a customry law right to live 
in and share the use of it with her husband and his other 
wives, if any.
In the urban areas, the general rule, in view of 
their considerable population pressure and housing difficulty, 
is that a man shares the same house Dr flat with his wife or 
wives in much the same way as his counterpart does in the 
Western world. This is also true of certain rural eoeieties 
(for example, some Yoruba and Western Ibo societies) where the 
general housing pattern is one large circular (or square) 
building with an open court in the middle and a common exit. 
Again, even in the societies discussed in the Jast paragraph 
above, young married men sometimes have to share the same 
house or room with their wives. In these places and circum-
U. It should be noted that we are here concerned solely 
with the legal rights of husbands and wives inter se.
As against strangers, the whole compound and all the 
houses therein are in the ownership and possession of 
the man, not his wives, in the eyes of the customary 
law.
stances then, there are “matrimonial homes" of much the same 
kind as are found in Western societies* In such places too 
a wife has a legal right to live in the matrimonial home, 
which in this case means a right to share the house or room, 
as the case may he, with her husband and his other wives, if 
any. In all cases, a wife’s right to live in the matrimonial 
home, however the latter is defined, is co-extensive with 
her married status.
Given the dual connotation of the term "matrimo­
nial home" in the context of contemporary Nigerian society, 
viz. (a) a single house or room shared by man and wife, and 
(b) a cluster of houses occupied by a husband and his wife 
or wives, usually one to each, and constituting either a 
single compound or a well-defined part of a multi-household 
residential unit - wei.can now formulate the general principle 
governing a wife!s position regarding the matrimonial home. 
Marriages in which no legal duty of cohabitation exists be­
tween spouses apart, there is a legal obligation on a husband 
to provide his wife (or wives) with living accommodation com­
mensurate with his means and station in life, having regard 
to the normal residential arrangements between spouses in 
the locality. Expressed from the women’s point of view, 
this means that a wife is legally entitled to live in the 
matrimonial home as locally understood, for the duration
r= r\o & b
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of her status as a married woman - a stafeds which, as will 
appear later, may extend beyond the natural life of her hus­
band and into what is coiunonly known as widowhood.
So far we have assumed that the matrimonial home 
is owned or otherwise provided by the husband in his private 
capacity. But what is the legal position of a wife whose 
husband, irratead of accupying a house owned by himself or 
rented from a third party, lives in the "family house" at 
the time of his marriage or subsequnetly moves into it?
The rule here is that a wife has the same right and to the 
same extent to live in the "family house" in these circum­
stances as she has to live in her husband’s privately acquired 
house or flat. To put it from the husband’s point of view, 
a man who himself has a right to live in the "family house" 
has fright to bring his wife into it and to live with her 
t h e r e A  woman retains her right to live in the family 
house after her husband’s death and for as long as she has 
not re-married, What is not clear, however, is whether 
a man’s right to bring his wife to reside with him in the 
family house (and, conversely, her right to live there 
even after his death is merely a necessary adjunct to 
his own right to live there himself by virtue of his family 
membership, or an independent right arising from the wife’s 
5* Cf. Coker, op.cit., p.118.
6. Coker v. Coker, 1U N.L.R.83, at p.86 (per Carey, J.).See 
also Cp^er, op.cit., pp.Al, 118, 159-160•
7. Cf. Coker, ante, p.159*
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membership of that family. In other words, is a wife’s 
right to reside in the family house derived from her husband’s 
or from her own membership of the said fan ily? This is still 
an open question. But in our view, the wife’s right is in­
dependent of and not derived from her husband’s. This is 
because, in our submission, there is no general right at­
taching to family members to settle non-members in the family 
house without the consentlof the family. In other words, 
a member’s right to occupy does not imply or include a right 
to bring non-members onto the property without family consent. 
A member, for example, has no right to bring his msitress 
to live with him, or, having brought her, to retain her, in 
the family house in the face of family opposition. Not so 
his wife. So long as her husband in in lawful occupation of 
the family house or part thereof, a v/ife cannot be ordered 
out of it by the family acting in opposition to her husband. 
The difference between these two cases would, therefore, 
seem to stem from the fact that the wife is, while the 
mistress is not, a member of the family concerned.
“What, finally, is the legal position of a man who
lives with his wife in her house or that of her maiden family?
8. The question whether or not a woman is a member of her 
husband’s family is not as academic as it appears to be - 
a question which the statement in the text begs obviously.
A number of results flow from the acceptance or rejection 
of the theory of a woman’s membership of her husband’s 
family. In particular, its acceptance may well provide 
the rationale for many a pergexing rule, e.g. those re­
lating to affiliation and legitimacy of post-humous 
children, "Widow inheritance*’ and the like. But of these, 
more later.
To take the second part of the question first* A hush and 
as such has no legal right (under customary law) to live in;- 
any house belonging to his wife's maiden family. If he 
chooses to do so, or indeed even if he has to, his legal 
position is at the best that of a tenant at sufferance; he 
is more commonly looked upon as a parasitic stranger* A womanj 
for her part, has no legal right to bring her husband to 
live in any house forming part of her family's property.
This rule was given (and (accepted judicially) as expert 
evidence in the unreported Yoruba case of Omomiregun v*
Sadatu in 1888, and was later repeated without comment - 
apparently with approval - by the Full Court in Lopez v*
Q
Lopez, in 192k.
On the other question, what right, if any, a man 
has to live in his wife's house or flat, the short answer is 
that he has no such right under customary law. This is be­
cause customary law made no provision for such a situation.
For as the chiefs said in expert evidence in the Ibo case 
of Nwugege v. Adigwe, ^  it was unthinkable that a man should 
live in his wife's house. As for the general law, the 
position is probably that a wife's duty to cohabit with her 
husband '‘will normally mean that he will have a right to the 
use and occupation of the matrimonial hone even though it
9. 5 N.L.R.U7, at pp.U9-50. (Combe, C.j., Van der Meulen and 
Tew, J.J.).
10. 11 N.L.R.13U.
*>, (p. *:
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is her p r o p e r t y " B u t  a husband will lose this right 
if he loses his right to his wife's consortium by his own 
conduct
Matrimonial and other names.
The general rule under customary law is that a
woman has a right, which is often exercised, to retain her
1
maiden first names* But there are societies, especially 
among the Ibo, where a husband and his family have a right 
to re-name a new wife* In the past, this was normally done 
without any consultations with the woman concerned, who for 
ehr part, had no right to reject a name so chosen for her. 
Today, however, the practice is growing of obtaining a wife's 
approval for her new married first name.
On the question of surnames, the general rule under 
customary law is that a woman is entitled to use her hus-? 
band*s name. In the less sophisticated societies, she adopts 
his first name as her surname. But in other places, she 
assumes his surname as hers. This, as far as is known, has 
always been the law and practice in southern Nigerian so­
cieties except among the Yoruba. Here, the traditional rule 
was that a wife retained her maiden surname for as long as 
she pleased. The modern trend, however, is as already stated 
she has a right to use her husband's first or family name as
11. Bromley, op.cit., p.428; and see Shipman v. Shipman 
(1929 .^11+0, at p.146.
12. Bromley, ibid*, and Shipman v. Shipman, ante.
1. Cf. Kasunmu, op.cit.. p.222.
her surname, and this she often does.
Similar to the rule relating to surnames is that 
which governs a woman's position where her husband takes a 
title under customary law and assumes a new name as a result. 
A woman advances automatically in soaTal status with her 
husband, especially if she is his fixsfc or only surviving wife 
If therefore he takes a title which is indicative of an en­
hanced social or political status, and if this title gives 
him a traditionally recognised right to assume a new name or 
title of honour, his wife too is entitled to assume a cor­
responding name of her own. This need not be the same as 
her husband's, and seldom ever is. She, like her husband, 
has a right by virtue of her new title or status to choose 
any name she pleases from a whole range of names reserved to
women whose husbands have attained the rank or title in 
2question.
2. Two little points deserve notice here. The first is 
that among the Ibo of the Onitsha area, a short in­
expensive, matter-of-course ceremony is required to en­
dow the wife of an q z q  title holder with a status cor­
responding to his, and so to confer upon her the right 
to assume a new pzp name. Only the most senior or sole 
wife is entitled to have this ceremony performed on her 
behalf; and only she has a right to wear the usual in­
signia of the pzp title-holder's wife. The other point 
is that the titles and title-holders' names we have in 
mind here are only those that indicate distinction in 
the social or traditional political sphere. We are not 
concerned here with professional titles (such as those 
of blacksmiths and doctors) or with religious titles 
(such as those of priests and the like).
o
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A woman’s right to her husband’s name or to a name 
acquired "by virtue of her position as the wife of a titled 
man attaches to her for life or until divorced. In other 
words, she loses her right to his name and to her title- 
-name on divorcing qd "being divorced by him. If he pre­
deceases her, she retains her right to these names until 
she dies or re-marries. In the case of the Ibo qzq title, 
this is a curious rule, since the qzq title is ceremoniously 
undone at a man’s death: and yet, his widow retains her
qzq title-nameI
Under the general law, derived from the common 
law of England, a woman has a legal right to assume her 
husband’s surname. (In certain circumstances, however,
Y/ojuen prefer to retain their maiden surnames for professioaih 
purposes. At present this is common among women doctors;, 
it will probably spread to radio and television stars in due 
course, as it has done in England and America.) If a man 
has a knighthood, his v/ife automatically assumes the female 
version of \his title. Bo far, only Christian marriage wives 
have used such a title (’’Lady X”) in public. But in 
principle, there is no reason why a lawful v/ife, however 
married and whether an only wife or one of many, should not 
enjoy a legal right conferred on wives qua wives by the 
general law of the land.
A woman’s general law right to use her husband’s
surname continues "after the marriage has "been germinated
z
either by death or hy divorce*" Thus a Christian marriage
wife, like a customary marriage one, has a right to use her
husband1 s name after his death. But unlike her customary
law counterpart, a Christian marriage wife has a right to
retain her husband’s name, if she wishes, after divorce.
This is because 1 a man has no such property in his name
as to entitle him to sue for an injunction to prevent his
hdivorced wife from using it ...." If, however, she uses 
his name so as to defraud him, he has a right to ask for 
such an injunction. If she holds herself out as his wife 
(that is by conduct or by word, in addition to using his 
name), he can restrain her from doing so by the curious 
process called jactitation of marriage. Finally, if 
a divorced woman holds herself out as still married to her 
former husband, who has in fact remarried to another v/oman, 
she wfill be liable |or defamation at the suit of the man’s 
current wife; the innuendo being that the latter is not law-
g
fully married but merely living in sin with the man concerned. 
3* Bromley, p*153*
4. Ibid. dee also Cowley v. Cowley [19°0] p.305; Du Boulay v. 
Du Boulay (1869 J L.R.2 P.C• U3Oat p.iiUl.
5. On this see Bromley, p.53« For its limitations, see 
Thompson v. kpurke [1893] p«ll and 70; Hawke v. Corri 
(l820) 2 Hag. Con. 2B0; R.v. Kingston (1776) 20 St.Tr.356.
6. Cf1. Bromley, p. 153, footnote (b). It should be noted that
in practice women drop their husband’s names as soon as
they are legally divorced, and sometimes even before this 
- as soon as they are separated and have made up their 
minds never again to go back to their husbands.
CHAPTER NINE
HUSBAND AND WIPE - II;
RIGHTS OVER THE PERSON
In this chapter we shall discuss four questions 
relating to husbands1 and wives* rights over each other's
person, and what remedies are open to a spouse whose rights
in this respect have been invaded either by the other spouse 
or by a third party. These are (a) the question of a 
husbandfs right, if any, to chastise his wife; (b) the ques­
tion how far, if at all, a husband has a right to restrain 
his wife; (c) the right of one spouse in the other’s con­
sortium; and (d) the remedies open to a spouse where his 
or her right to consortium has been evaded by the other 
spouse or by third parties.
(a) Right to chastise.
Under customary law a husband has a right to
chastise or otherwise correct his wife, within reason, for
misconduct which infringes his rights or threatens his po­
sition as husband and head of the household."*' It should be
1. Cf# Ward, Yoruba Husband-Wife Code. pp.8U-85 and 91; 
Ajisafe, op.cit.. p.62; Simmons, "SexUal. Life, marriage 
and childhood among the Efik", loc.cit.. p.l6l; Porde 
(ed.) Efik traders of Old Calabar. p.li+; Talbot, Tribes 
of the^iger Delta, pp. 199-203; Thomas, Anthropological 
Report on the ibo ...., Part I, pp.69 and 123; Basden, 
Niger Ibos, p.233»
emphasised ffom the outset that this right does not cover 
all types and degrees of misconduct* For example, it would 
he considered cruel for a man to chastise his wife for a 
trifling slip such as failure to sweep out the kitchen floor 
on one occasion, omitting to shut the chicken pen at the 
iBual time (where this is her duty), or failure to get the 
children ready for school at the right time on one or two 
isolated mornings* But, as already said, a hushand does have 
a right (which is now hut seldom exercised) to correct his 
wife where her misconduct is an affront to him, a threat to 
his position in the home or a serious encroachment upon his 
marital rights* He may, for example, impose a fine (normally 
in kind, hut at times in cash) or inflict corporal punishment 
upon her for adultery, for keeping had company in spite of 
his admdtnitions, for indolence (this affects his economic 
position as well as hers) or for insubordination* Whatever 
form of correction a hushand chooses must he reasonable 
in amount and in kind in the circumstances*
Should a man punish his wife for no just cause, 
or impose what is excessive punishment in the circumstances, 
she can seek redress in one of three places, viz* her maiden 
family, the husband’s own family, or, in the more serious 
cases, the customary courts* In each case, the hushand may 
he asked to atone for his irrational conduct by paying 
a little compensation - usually in kind, not in moneyto
the injured woman. *diat constitutes "just cause" or "Exces­
sive punishment" in a given case is of course a question of 
fact to he determined in the light of the surrounding cir­
cumstances.^
The law of England on this subject at the present 
day is that a man has no right to chastise or otherwise 
punish his wife without recourse to due process of law.
It would, therefore, he an assault punishable by the courts, 
for a husband to inflict corporal punishment on his wife. As 
Bromley puts it: "it would be no defence today to a husband
prosecuted for assaulting his wife that he was doing no more 
than administering reasonable chastisement.^
2. Cf. Ward, ante, p.91» ^ith the prggressive emancipation 
of our women, the customary law as set out here is rapidly 
falling into deseutude without any intervention by the 
courts. Besides, there is the possibility (perhaps erven a 
probability) that the superior courts would reject this 
law as repugnant to natural justice, equity etc., especial­
ly in view of the position under the general law (post).
3. See Bromley, pp.130-2.
Bromley, p 150, and see R.v.Jackson [1891] 1 Q#B.671# at 
pp.697 and 682. ^here seems to be some doubt as to whether 
the law of England, as opposed to social practice, ever 
gave a man the right to chastise his wife. According to 
Bacon’s Abridgement, says Bromley, a husband might beat 
his wife (but not in a violent or cruel manner) and confine 
her. But in Lord Leigh’s case (I67U) 3 Keble U33* Hale 
denied he had any such right in law. Nevertheless,
Blackstone maintained that "the lower rank of people, 
who were always fond of the old common law, still claim 
and exert their ancient privilege" to beat their wives.
See Bromley, p.150.
Whether or not this is the law in force in 
Nigeria is not entirely free from doubt. It is arguable 
that the subject does not fall within the provisions of 
s.i± of the Regional Courts (Federal Jurisdiction)Act, 1958, 
being outside the jurisdiction of the High Courts "relating 
to marriages and ... matrimonial causes." If so, then of 
course English iaw would not apply to such cases in Nigeria 
by virtue of that section. Against this view, it should be 
pointed out that the phrase "in relation to marriages" ap­
pears wide enough to include matters (such as the present) 
which are incidental to marriage, and not just the validity 
and recognition of marriages: validity of marriage is
indeed more directly covered by the word "annulment" which 
occurs in the same line. A stronger indication that husband 
and wife have no right in law to inflict any punishment on 
each other comes from s.l60 of the .Evidence Act which 
provides by sub-section (l) (c) that when a person is charged 
with inflicting violence on his or her wife or husband, the 
other spouse concerned shall be a competent and compellable 
witness for the prosecution (or defence) without the con­
sent of the spouse so charged. Obviously then, a man could 
be criminally liable for using violence on his wife; and
chastising her would in all probability come with in the
5
meaning of "inflicting violence". If this view of the
5. On a similar rule at common law, Bromley says:
"This includes any form of violence ..." p.27U, note (d).
section is correct, it becomes clear that a man has no right 
to inflict corporal punishment on his wife any more than a 
wife has a right to do so on her husband. It must be noted, 
though, that this provision of the Evidence Act does not 
apply to customary marriage couples (including those married 
under Islamic law), because s.l6l expressly provides to the 
contrary.
(b) Right to restrain.
To what extent, if at all, has a husband a right 
to restrain his wife by force from pursuing what he considers 
to be an objectionable course of action, or to confine her 
with a view to enforcing his right to her consortium? Under 
customary law at the present moment, neither of these rights 
directly attaches to a husband. A man has a right to use 
moral force to restrain his wife or to forbid her leaving 
the house. If she ignores him and goes on with the objection­
able course of conduct, this would be a case of insubordination 
which, in suitable circumstances, would entitle him to impose 
suitable punishment upon her. But he has no right in law to 
employ physical forcenin order to prevent his wife from 
leaving him; neither has he a legal right to punish her in 
anticipation of a threatened desertion.
There are no such rights under the general lav/ 
either. As long ago as 1891# the Court of Appeal held in 
R. v. Jackson that a husband had no right to confine his
wife, and that, on an application for a writ of habeas 
dorpus it was no defence that the husband was merely con­
fining his wife in order to enforce his right to her con- 
6sortium • As McCardie, J. said of this case in Place 
v. Searle -
"From the date of their decision the shackles of
servitude fell from the limbs of married women and
9° 7
they were free to come andj^ at their own will."
(c) Consortium
"Consortium", says ^romley, "connotes as far as
possible the sharing of a common home and a common domestic
life." But, he goes on, uIt is difficult to go beyond this
and to define with more precision the duties which the
Q
spouses owe to each other ••••" Consortium may be des­
cribed, in the context of customary law, as the fact of 
the spouses1 accepting and treating erach other as husband 
and wife, coupled with either the fact of their living 
together as man and wife, or at least the intention of so 
doin^ as soon as circumstances permit. Ihis means that 
consortium is not lost or interrupted, for instance, by the 
fact that a man is compelled by circumstances to live a long 
way away from his wife on account of his profession, trade 
or employment. On the other hand, a married couple may still
6. [1891] 1 Q.B.671: Bromley, p.150.
7. [1932J 2 K.B.U97, at pp.500-501. See Bromley, p.151*
8. Bromley, p.152.
live under the same roof and share a common front door
and entrance hall, while being in fact separated a mens a 
a
et thoro.
We have already considered some of the legal inci­
dents of consortium - cohabitation (with exceptions in some 
cases of "small dowry" marriages), wife’s right to her hus­
band’s name and rank, and the like# Here we shall only 
touch upon two more incidents# These are the spouses’ rights 
and duties inter se regarding sexual intercourse, and each 
spouse’s right to protection by the other against third 
parties.
Sexual intercourse. Under both the customary and 
the general law, each spouse owes the other a duty to satisfy 
the other’s reasonable demands for sexual intercourse. But 
here again ”reasonable demands" are g guestion of fact to 
be determined with reference to the ages, health, tempera­
ments and biological needs of the parties, as well as such 
extraneous factors like extremes of temperature and what 
is regarded as the norm in the local community generally and 
among the class to which the couple concerned belong, in 
particular. On the one hand, excessive demands could amount 
to cruelty, especially if the other party’s health is thereby 
affected adversely. On the other hand, refusing reasonable 
demands, like practising coitus interruptus in spite of
9. For want of a more appropriate term, we shall use the 
word "consortium" for both the "English" and the custo­
mary law concept of being husband and wife in fact and 
in spiMt, as far as external appearances go.
protests from the other party, could he harmful to health 
(physical or meh&al) and so constitute cruelty.
In the past, customary law gave a hushand the 
right to attain his legal right to sexual connexion by using 
(perhaps reasonal) force. This was probably because a man 
would normally find it difficult to determine whether his 
wife’s refusal (especially when young) was genuine and 
intended to be final, merely inspired by modesty, or else 
just a preliminary to extracting a favour from him. Cases 
of this nature seldom ever reach the law courts. And so it 
would be difficult to say how far, if at all, the traditional 
customary law stated here still holds good. Under the ge­
neral law, too, a husband no longer has a legal right to 
compel his wife by physical force to have connexion with 
him. If he did, he would be guilty of common assault,^ but 
not, in our view, of indecent assault. If this happened 
while they were separated either by mutual agreement or by 
order of a court of competent jurisdiction, he would be 
guilty of rape upon her.^
Mutual protection. Each spouse owes the otbe r a 
duty of protection from danger to life and limb according 
to their abilities - which means in practice that, as a 
rule, a man owes this duty to his wife. As Bromley succinct­
ly put it, one spouse is entitled to use reasonable force
10. R.v. Miller [195U] 2 All E.R.529* following R.v.Jackson. 
ante.
11. K.v. Clarke [19^9] 2 All E.R.W+8. And see Bromley, p.155.
to protect the other from attack or other physical harm,
"and may kill an assailant if he or she believes that
the act is absolutely necessary to preserve the other’s 
12life.” This seems to be the extent of the customary law 
too, in modern society. But in the past, there was a right 
in one spouse to defend the other’s honour or good character 
"by physical force if necessary, provided this force was used 
against a person of his or her own sex. Thus, if a man Y 
maligns X’s wife, X had a right to defend his wife’s good 
name with any weapon which he considered reasonable in the 
circumstances. So might X’s wife if her husband was de­
famed by a woman. Perhaps physical violence is only per­
missible today, however, only in cases of protection from 
physical harm. For while it may be hard to expect a man to 
stand by and do nothing while his wife is being assaulted or 
otherwise subject^o physical harm, there is not the same 
compelling argument in his favour if all his wife suffers 
is no more than injury to her name or reputation. A court 
action would be less dangerous to life and limb, and perhaps 
more rewarding. In any case, tempers and passions are 
normally easier to keep in chefek where the only weapon of 
attack employed against one’s spouse is words, than where 
physical violence is used.
12. Bromley, p.155 (and R.v.Rose (188U) 15 Cox, C.C.5U0) and 
the other cases given in note (b) therein.
(d) Remedies in re consortium.^
Under this head we shall discuss the remedies open 
to a spouse whose right to the other’s consortium has been 
invaded. In appropriate cases, these remedies will be 
discussed in two parts, namely one spouse’s remedies against 
the other spouse, and a spouse’s remedies against third 
parties. The remedies to be considered are actions for
(i) recovery of a deserting wife (including the general 
law remedy of restitution of conjugal rights which is open 
to both spouses);
(ii) harbouring a deserting wife;
(iii) enticement; and
(iv) adultery.
(i) Recovery of deserting spouse
Customary Law.
Until very recent times, the idea of a husband
deserting his wife in the sense of leaving the matrimonial
home with no intention of ever coming back or of re-uniting
with her, was practically unknown to customary law. For,
as marriage was virilocaL, and as virtually every married
man lived in his own (not rented) house, for a man to desert
his wife in this sense would be tantamount to his abandoning
his membership of his native community and seeking refuge
1. It should be emphasised that in applying the term "con­
sortium” to customary marriages we are merely using a 
shorthand expression for the rights that flow from the 
fact of being husband and wife on the plane of personal 
relations.
in strange parts. Even now that many spouses live in 
rented houses or flats in the urban areas (or in quarters 
provided by their employers elsewhere), it is generally con­
sidered infra dignitatem for a man to abandon his home on 
account of domestic difficulties with his wife or his 
stronger attraction towards another woman. But desertion 
by a wife is a common feature of domestic life under 
customary law. So also is what may be described as con­
structive desertion, viz. where a man either drives his 
wife away from home without lawful justification, or makes 
cohabitation so difficult for her by his ffequent misconduct 
that she feels impelled to leave him. ^hat remedies are 
open to the innocent spouse in such cases?
Customary law has nothing corresponding to the
English action for restitution of conjugal rights. In bther
words, neither the customary courts nor the superior courts
applying customary law have power to compel a deserting
spouse to return to the matrimonial home against his or her
will. Nor, in the case of constructive desertion as above
described, have the courts any power to compel an unwilling
2husband to take back his wife.
2. There are, however, two indirect courses of action which 
the innocent party may pursue: (a) appeal to the guilty
party’s family and friends for their intervention: the
resulting moral and social pressure is usually enough to 
effect a reconciliation; (b) sue for divorce: the guilty
party may then be penalised on such matters as the amount 
of dowry recoverable and when, custody of children (in 
the Western Region), and distribution of property.
Similarly, a husband has no right or power to 
recover his deserting wife by force under customary law 
(neither, for that matter, has a wife). As the Ibo put it:
"E jirp mkpa anu di". A literal translation of this in col­
loquial language would be: "It is not a ’done thing’ to
kidpap one’s wife’1. But "Kidnap” here does not refer to 
what is sometimes called "marriage by capture" - a practice 
unknown to Ibo law - but to the "recapture" of one’s deserting 
wife. Writing on Yoruba law, Ward, says that if a wife de­
cides to leave her husband on account of his bad conduct, 
ill-treatment and the like, he cannot stop her. Neither can 
he bring her back by force, once she has left him. "And", 
she concludes, "the law gives him no power to do so,"
The general law:
After a long period of uncertainty, it was decided 
that a man had no right at common law to recapture his er­
rant wife, or to confine h£irt in his house in order to en­
force his right to her consortium, i'his was a Court of Apr 
peal decision in R. v. Jackson.^  In that case a woman had 
refused to return to her husband (after his period of absence 
from the country) and had failed to comply with a court 
decree of restitution of conjugal rights. He therefore got 
two men to seize her as she came out of church one Sunday
3* Yoruba Husband-Wife Code, p.112. See also Thomas, Anthro­
pological Report on the fbQ Part I, pp.67-8; Talbot,
Peoples of S. Nigeria^ III, pp.U50, 1+55* and 667; ^gha- 
revba, op.cit., p.20; Partridge, Cross River Natives, 
p.256.
U. [1891] 1 Q.B.671.
and take her to his home: this they did. The woman was
thereupon confined to the house, though she was allowed to
move freely inside it* On her applicatipn for a writ of
habeas corpus, the Court of Appeal unanimously made the
decision stated above. "So ended the husband’s right to
treat his wife as he would a recalcitrant animal", says 
5Bromley. "Prom the date of their decision", said McCardie,
J., "the shacklesnof servitude fell from the limbs of married
6women and they were free to come and go at their own will". 
This is the "English1 law in force in Nigeria as regards 
Christian marriage spouses. That is, a husband has no right 
to compel his deserting wife by physical force to return 
to the matrimonial home; nor, if she happens to be there, 
has he a right to keep her there against her will. But he 
does have an action against her for restitution of conjugal 
rights, for which reference should be made to the standard 
works on divorce.
(ii) Harbouring a run-away wife.
Under customary law, if a woman leaves her husband 
without just cause, and goes back to her own people, the 
husband’s first step is normally to appeal to her parents 
and other kinsmen. If the latter co-operate, the resulting 
moral, social and sometimes economic pressure is usually
5# Bromley, op.cit., p.151#
6. Place v. Searle [1933] 2 K.B. k97$ at pp.500-1.
andugh to bring the woman back to reason* Should they 
refuse/fail to co-operate, or if their efforts prove 
fruitless, the husband may sue them for a refund of the 
bride price which he had paid in respect of his wife, or
7aelse for a return of the latter to the matrimonial home*
The same rule (as to action for a refund or return 
of the wife) also applies where a woman is harboured by a 
person who is not a relation of hers, ^  except that in this 
case the third party concerned may also be liable in da­
mages for adultery, if proved; except also that husbands do 
not begin with a quiet plea in a case like this* Where, as 
sometimes happens in more recent times, a wife leaves her 
husband and goes to live on her own (usually in some urban 
area) her husband has an action against her personally for 
the repayment of whatever bride price he had paid on her* 
This rather strange rule seems now to be well established; 
strange because the woman concerned is held liable for the 
refund of a sum of money which was not paid to her and in 
which she^had no share as of right* (^es* Among the Efik 
where woman are given a substantial part of their bride 
price, this seems to be done as a matter of grace rather 
than of right*)
Finally, it should be pointed out that there are
7a, 7b. See Ajisafe, op.cit.* p.58; Forde, Marriage and 
the Family .** Yako, p.72; Partridge, supra;
Talbot, Peoples *••*, Vol. Ill, pp.W+9 and C55; 
Thomas, supra* pp.67 and 68. Also Egharevba, op.cit
p.20.
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societies, chiefly among the Ibo of Onitsha and Udi areas, 
where the strict rule relating to the repayment of dowries 
is that a woman's parents are not liable for such refund 
unless and until she re-marries. This rule works hardship 
in at least two respects. An innocent, deserted husband may 
have towati for months or indeed for years in order to re­
cover his bride price. The woman concerned may die in the 
waiting period, or contract some incurable disease, or else 
become so morally degenerate that she loses all chances of 
ever; remarrying: in each case, the husband loses his
money entirely. It is little wonder, therefore, that even 
in these societies the more general rule stated earlier is 
gradually but progressively being accepted and applied by 
the customary courts.
English lav/ has never had anything like an action 
for harbouring a deserting husband; while the common law 
action for harbouring a deserting wife is now thought to be 
obsolete.^
(iii) Enticement and frunlawful detent ion1* of wives.
We shall discuss here the two related subjects of 
enticing a wife away from her husband with a view to esta­
blishing marital or amorous relations with her, and unlaw­
fully taking a wife away from her husband with a view to 
giving her in marriage to a third party or for some other
8. See bevlin, J. (as he then was) in Winchester v. Fleming 
[1957] 3 All E.R.711. ^lso Bromley, p.l527 _ : “
reason# To some extent, both these wrongs exist under 
our customary as well as non-customary laws; but the re­
medies are different#
Taking a wffe away from her husband with a view to 
giving her in marriage to a third party ("unlawful deten­
tion" for short) is primarily a customary law concept and 
of course is done by,the woman's parents or guardian#
Among the other reasons why parents adopt this course are 
personal differences between them and their son-in-law; a 
desire to set up their daughter in trade or profession for 
the benefit of her maiden family; . and possibly (in parts 
of the Mid-West area where the institution known as
idegbe is found)mbecause her father has died leaving no male
9issue to succeed him# As in the case of harbouring a run-
-away wife, the husband's legal (as distinct from social)
remedy is an action to compel his parents-in-law either
to return his wife to him or to refund the bride price he
paid in connexion with the marriage# Since, ex hypothesi*
there is no lawful justification for the action of the
woman’s parents, they are liable for the immediate refund
of the bride price if they insist on keeping the woman in
the family# (By "immediate" here is meant that, contrary
9* idegbe is normally a woman who, because her father 
left no male child, remains unmarried in her maiden fa­
mily so as to raise sons and heirs for her father’s 
estate# But it is possible that a married daughter might 
be taken awray from her husband for this prupose, the bride 
price being refunded and her marriage dissolved eventually* 
On the idegbe generally, see fowling, Notes on Land 
Tenure in .## Benin Province* para#99«
to the rule found in many places, the parents are not 
entitled to wait until she remarries before having to re­
pay the bride price to the injured husband#)
Where the spouses contracted a Christian marriage, 
the position is more complex. To begin with, two legal 
Actions are Required: one a petition for divorce against
the v/ife herself, on grounds of desertion; the other an 
action against her parents on guardian for the repayment of 
the bride price or, alternatively, return of the woman to 
her husband. (The latter action is usually the first in 
sequence.) '^hen again there is the difficulty of proving 
desertion where, as often happens in these cases, the woman 
concerned is opposed to her "detention", only submitting to 
it for social and sentimental reasons not quite within her 
control. Above all, there is the difficulty of establishing 
the jurisdiction of a given court in the case. For on the 
one hand, it is arguable that even where the Christian mar­
riage was preceded by a customary marriage, the latter 
merged in the Christian marriage, ^  and that therefore only 
the High Court could have jurisdiction in such cases. On 
the other hand, it is equally arguable that the concept of 
bride price has not been assimilated into the general law, 
and that therefore a subsequent Christian marriage has no 
effect on the jurisdiction of customary courts on matters
10# Cf, ^lias, Groundwork . # #. who ssys, at p#28U, that a 
"church or court marriage supersedes the prior or 
subsequent customary unions."
relating to the "bride price. .
Enticement.
Under the general law a person is guilty of 
"enticement" if he or she induces , causes, procures or is 
in some way positively responsible for one spouse leaving 
the other and so committing .a "breach of his/her duty to 
consort with the other spouse, ^he position was explained 
with delightful lucidity "by the V;est African Court of Appeal 
in Sharpies v. Barton. ^  a case heard on appeal from the 
High court at Jos. In that case, a wife had her injured leg 
$i?eated by a doctor friend of the family. In the course of 
the treatment, doctor and patient fell in love and both of 
them informed the husband of that fact. r^he latter there­
after objected to his wife’s seeing the doctor any more; 
whereupon she left him, and went on seeing the doctor.
6 In an action by the husband against thd doctor for
enticement, the ^est African ^ourt of Appeal held that the 
doctor was not liable, because (a) it was not enough to 
prove that the woman and the defendant committed adultery; 
or that she left the matrimonial home so that she could go 
on seeing him; (b) it was not enough to prove that the 
defendant alienated the wife’s love for her husband;
(c) to succeed, the husband must jr ove that there was a
11. (1951) 13 v‘*£.£#A;198: Verity, C.J., Lewey, J.A. and Be 
Comarmond, J. See also Beniring, J# in G-fettlieb v. Gleiser 
[1958] 3 All ^.R. 715, [1951] 1 Q.B.267; Place v.
Searle, ante.
definite interference by the defendant with the husband's 
right of consortium with his wife; or that there was, pro­
curing or inciting; or that but for the defendant's per- 
suation the wife would not or might not have left the 
matrimonial home.
This action (which is for damages) for enticement 
is open to both spouses in English law. in other words, an 
action will lie at the suit of a wife whose husband was 
enticed away by, another woman as well as at the suit of a
husband whose wife was enticed by another man. ^his was so
12decided by barling, J. in Gray v. Gee, a decision which 
was subsequently approve^ d obiter, first by the Court of
l-z
Appeal in Place v. ^earle and then by the House of Lords 
in Best v. Gamuel ^ox. ^  As will appear shortly, there is 
no corresponding action open to women under customary law.
It is a good defence in English law that, in per­
suading one spouse to leave the other, the defendant acted 
from principles of humanity - to prtoect the spouse in 
question from further oppression in the hands of the other 
spouse. This defence of "humanity” is good even where it
turns out that the facts were not as the defendant had
15
thought they were at the material time. It is also a good 
defence of course that the defendant did no more than receive
12. [1923] 39 t .L.r .U29. Cf. Newton v. Hardy (1933) ll+9 
L.T.165.
13. [1932] 2 K.B.U97.
11+. [1952J 2 All E.R.391+; [1952] A.C.716.
15. Per Greer, J. in Place v. Searle, ante.
and retain a spouse who had left the matrimonial home on
his or her own accord; for in such a case the defendant
has obviously done no; positive act to induce, persuade
or cause the spouse in question to leave the matrimonial 
16home. Finally, an action for enticement dies with tbe 
plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be in English 
law.1"^
Under customary law, a husband (but not a wife) 
has an action against a man who induces, procures, causes 
or otherwise entices his wife to le ave him either with a 
view to marrying her or merely to establish amorous relations 
with her. (*ye are not concerned here with the case of 
parents or guardians inducing theirdaughters or wards to 
leave their husbands; this has already been considered.)
This wrong is substantially the same as "enticement" under 
the general law. But there are two significant differences 
in the relevant ddjectival ilaw. In the first place, there 
is a presumption under customary law that a man who receives 
another man's wife into his house and takes no immediate 
steps to bring the spouses together again, was himself re-
1 o
sponsible for her leaving her husband in the first place.
16. Sharpies v. Barton (1951) 13 W.A.C.A.198; Newton v. Hardy 
ante.
17* ^romely, p.162. Quaerft, if this is true of Nigerian 
(general) law.
18. The first duty of a man in whose house a deserting wife 
takes refuge is to inform her husband of her presence 
there; then endeavour to effect a reconciliation or to 
persuade the woman to go back to her husband; or, failing 
these, send her back to her maiden family, 
cf. Egharevba, op.cit.. p.20, on the
But this presumption is rebuttable. Secondly, while the re­
medy for the injured spouse in the general law.is damages,
the remedy under customary law is the refund of the bride
19price by the defendant.  ^ As already said, while the gene­
ral law gives both husband and wife a right of action agains# 
anyone who entices his or her spouse away from the matri­
monial home, customary law only gives the said action to a 
husband - a logicaljstate of affairs since the only remedy 
is refund of the bride price which is not paid on husbands*
(iv) Adultery and damages therefor .
Who may sue? Subject to certain exceptional 
circumstances to be discussed later, a husband has a right 
of action for damages against any man who commits adultery
with his wife - this being in addition to his right to di­
vorce her on grounds of her adultery. A wife, on the other 
hand, has no right of action for damages against a woman who 
commits adultery with her husband, ^hls bias in favour of 
husbands is common to both the general and the customary 
laws in Nigeria. Bromley says with reference to
English law that!
• since crim. con. was based upon the quasi­
proprietary interest which the husband had at 
common law in his wife, the anomaly survives that
a wife may not petition for damages from a woman
19* ^or references see notes 7a and 7b above, udder the 
heading "Harbouring a run-away wife."
who has committed adultery with her. 
husband.
Forde summarised the customary law position everywhere in 
southern Nigeria when he said of the Yako:
,fA wife can place no legal restriction on the
2sexual activities of her husband ....”
In other words, there is no legal remedy open to a wife either 
against her hushand or against ‘'the other v/oman", short of 
an action for divorce - this latter only in the case of a 
Christian marriage wife as a rule.
Remedies for adultery.
(a) Between the spouses themselves.
(i) Under customary law, two remedies are open to a 
hushand whose wife is guilty of adultery. 1he£e are 
reasonable chastisement, as we have seen, and divorce. Even 
one solitary act of adultery by his wife entitles a man to 
send hkr wife away from the matrimonial home, recover any 
bride price lawfully paid by him or on his behalf in con­
nexion with the marriage, and have the marriage dissolved.
(In practice, however, none but the most highly sophisticated 
and Victorian husband would divorce his wife for just one 
act of adultery, assuming that other things are equal.)
There is a third remedy which, though more frequently
1. Bromley, op.cit., p.166. .
2. Marriage & the Family ...., p.102. ^ee also Forde, Double 
Descent in African Systems of Marriage ante, p.326;
Lloyd, "TPIie Itsekiri" in Bradbury and Bioyd, op.cit., p. 
190; Talbot, Peoples of Nigeria, ^ol.III, p. 1+31* 
According to Taihot, a husband1 s age-class members can 
also claim damages from an adulterer in Ikwerri. ,
C, P' r"'
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resorted to than either of the other two, is difficult to 
classify as a legal remedy. This consists in "sending 
her to Coventry" and refusing to make any further con­
tributions towards her mairtenance, her continued residence 
in the matrimonial home notwithstanding.
On the other hand, a wife whose hushand has ieommit- 
ted adultery has hut one legal remedy open to her viz. 
divorce. hven this one remedy*, however, is only available 
if the adultery is persistent or aggravated, -^ or these 
purposes, adultery may he described as persistent if it 
is carried on in spite of the wife’s protests. -&nd so, a 
number of clandestine illicit affairs unknown to the wife 
at the time will not, as a rule, entitle her to ask for a 
dissolution of her marriage if and whenever she learns the 
truth. Adultery is aggravated if it is also an incest, 
if it is accompanied by or results in the husband neglecting 
the general welfare of his wife and children, or (among 
the Xbo at all events) if committed under the man’s roof.
In these cases, a wife is entitled to divorce her husband 
even for one act of adultery. (She seldom does so in fact.)
The popular reason usually given for this discri­
mination against female spouses is that a wife has not that 
degree of proprietary interest over her husband’s person-as 
will turn his illicit sexual activities into a personal 
wrong against her - an invasion of her legal right.
Whatever the intrinsic merits of this theory, it goes to 
account for the fact that man’s adultery gives his wife 
no right to a legal remedy unless it also involves a serious 
wrong against the gods or the ancestors (as incest and 
adultery under one’s roof are said to dOj) or else en­
croaches upon some other matrimonial rights of the wife 
(as in the case of neglect. It should be noted also that 
there is an element of mental cruelty involved in what we 
have described as persistent adultery in spite of a wife’s 
protests.)
(li) Under the general (English ) law, both husband
and wife have a right to petition for divorce on account
of each other’s adultery. In this case, too, one case of
adultery is sufficient to found an action for divorce. In
addition, a wife forfeits her right to her husband’s con-
3sortium and maintenance by reason of her infidelity.
(b) Against third parties.
(i) Customary law.
Under customary law, a husband has a right of 
action against anyone who commits adultery with his wife, 
this action being forrdamages. (The ancient remedy- of self 
help whereby a man inflicted corporal punishment on "the 
other man" is now obsolete.) The quantum of damages re­
coverable varies with the status of the injured husband
3. see Bromely, op.cit., pp.156, 196* ^ee also ibid pp.U28 
IUlO, 202 and 33? i'or other consequences of a wife’s 
adultery.
(the higher his status the greater the damages payable), 
the degree of relationship between him and the defendant 
(the closer th£ relationship the smaller the damages; hence 
if the kinship ties are strong enough to make the wrongful 
act an incest as well, no damages are claimed or paid: the 
adulterer only has to provide money and provisions for a 
sacrifice of propitiation to the family and other gods, 
in appropriate cases#).
In exceptional cases, especially where the husband 
also claims divorce from his wife, the damages recoverable 
are measured in terms of the bride price paid by the plain- 
tiff or his family on the woman in question. In other 
words, an injured husband sometimes asks for , and the court 
orders, refund by the paramour of any bride price paid in 
respect of the woman concerned; this repayment done, the 
defendant may then proceed to complete the marriage process 
thus started per force.
The mere fact that a aman and his wife were living 
apart aha the time the adultery took place does not of it­
self affect his right to recover damages from the adulterer. 
But if he had sent his wife away, thus renouncing his claim 
to her ’*consortium", he loses his right to recover damages: 
Chawere v. ^ihenu and gohnson (1935) 12 N.L.R.U# Even where
3a. Cf# Native Coufct decision as given in Chawere v. Ajhenu 
and Johnson (1933) 12 N.L.R.U. Though that judgment was 
reversed by the Divisional Court (Graham Paul, J^, the 
Customary Courts still apply the principle therein 
contained.
a man was deserted by his wife in the first place, he will 
probably lose his right to damages if it eould be shown that 
he no longer desired to continue the marriage relationship.
It is a good defence to an action for damages for 
adultery under customary law that the husband is impotent, 
suffering from a chronic disease, insane, or either too old 
or too young to perform the biological act necessary for 
procreation, and that the adultery complained of was commit­
ted at the request /instigation of the wife herself as the 
only practical means of achieving what society deems the 
true object of marriage - procreation of children. It is also 
a good defence among the Ibo that the adultery was encouraged 
or positively arranged by the husband’s family either for one 
of the above reasons, or for some reason of eugenics: for 
example, because the husband is abnormally short or ugly, an 
incorrigible rogue, a prodigal , a sloth or a half-wit. In 
both these sets of circumstances, no damages are recoverable; 
but the defendant still has to provide the plaintiff with the 
wherewithal to make propitiatory sacrifices to the ancestral 
gods (if he believes in these).^
U* On adultery,' see Basden, higer ibos, p.233; Thomas. An-
thropological Report on the Ibo Parti, pp.67-8;”Talbot^
Tribes of the hjger Delta, pp.199-203; Talbot, Peoples of 
~S. Nigeria. V. Ill pp.431. 629, 644, 650, 651, 654, 673; 
Simmons, loc. cit., p.l6l; Talbot.Woman*s Mysteries 
p.97; Forde, Marriage ... among the Iako, p.l02;"Elias 
Groundwork, p.289; Ajisafe. op.cit., pp.35.56; Ward, 
Marriage among the Ypruba, p.hO; Egharevba, op.cit., p.48; 
Omoneukanrin, op.cit., pp.49-50; Chawere v. Ajhenu and 
Johnson (1935) 12 E.L.R.4; Welch, loc.cit., p.172; Parkirscn 
loc. cit., p.316; Ellis, op.cit. p.186; Thomas, Antrop. 
heport on the Edo ...., p.52; Folarin, op.cit., pp.34-5*
(41) The general (-English) law.
Under the general (English) law, a wife has no 
right of action for damages against a woman who has com­
mitted adultery with her hushand. (She could name, her in a 
petition for divorce on grounds of her husband’s adultery, 
though, hut even then noQdamages are recoverable from “the 
woman named.”).
A hushand, on the other hand, has a right of action 
for damages against anyone who commits adultery with his- 
v/ife. This claim may he made in a petition for divorce or 
for separation, in which case the man ' concerned is cited 
as co-respondent, or else in a separate action for damages
by virtue of s.30 (l) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 -
$
an Act of the United Kingdom parliament.
Q.uantum of damages;
(i) Adultery during cohabitation. Damages for adultery are 
compensatory, not puhitive, being designed to <en>mpensate a 
hushand for the loss of his wife’s society and comfort which 
inevitably flows from the adulterer’s wrongful act, for the 
injury to his feelings, for the blow to his marital honour, 
for the hurt to his matrimonial and family life,^ and for any 
economic loss sustained by him as a result of the co-respon­
dent’s breaking up his marriage. The essential points to be
5. Quaere whether such an action lies against a woman who 
commits an unnatural sexual act with a man’s wife.
6. V/eedon v. Tjmbrell (1793) 5 Term Kep.357* at p.360 
(Ashhurst, «J.).
7« Butterworth v. Buttery/orth [1920] p.126 (McCardie, J. )
considered in assessing such damages are, therefore
(1) the value of the woman concerned as a wife, mother, 
house-keeper and source of income (e.g. as property owner, 
"business woman or income earner);
(2) the nature and extent of the injury to the husband’s 
feelings (this being most severe where there was great mu­
tual affection between the spouses, where a woman of high 
moral purity is seduced, where the husband is himself a man 
of considerable moral integrity and social standing, or where 
the adultery took place under the husband’s roof; the in­
jury would be less severe natmrally where the woman con­
cerned was a person of loose character, where little love
is lost between the spouses, or where the parties b^ cdr; 
parted by mutual consent);
(3 ) the conduct of the parties (e.g. whether the woman had 
been the prime mover in the illici t relationship; whether 
the wife of an honest man of humble means has been dazzled 
and lured into adulterous relations by an unscrupulous man 
of wealth); and
(i-1-) any other aggravating or extenuating circumstances, such 
as the adulterer’s knowledge or ignorance of the fact that 
the woman was married, whether, in particular, the woman 
had put herself up as a single woman, whether the liaison 
had continued in spite of the husband’s protests to the 
adulterer, or whether the illicit relationship had led to
a break-up in the marriage and if so (perhaps) whether or
not there are issue of the marriage to be taken into consi- ■
deration. Ut should be noted that the damages recovered
may be settled by court order for the benefit of such
8children in appropriate cases. )
(2) Adultery during separation, ^hougn the case law on 
this subject is somewhat conflicting and unsatisfactory, 
the better view is that the fact that the adultery complained 
of took place while the spouses were separated is not of it­
self a bar to a husband’s right to recover damages from the 
adulterer; its relevance is rather to the quantum of damages 
recoverable. Thus in Afebo v. Udo a wife deserted from the 
matrimonial home eleven months after her marriage with the 
plaintiff. Twelve months later, she committed adultery with 
the defendant. Thereupon the plaintiff brought this action 
for damages against "the other man". Abbott, J. held that 
"an action such as this dearly lies ...." ^  On the 
quantum of damages to be awareded, the learned judge said: 
"The final consideration relates to damages and I have 
to ask myself the question: ’What was the extent of 
the financial loss sustained by the petitioner by 
reason of the respondent’s adultery?’ This is by no
means an easy question to answer. After careful con-
11sideration I assess the damages at £15*”
8. M.C.A., 1950, s.30(3).
9. (19U7) 18 N.L.R.152.
10. Ibid., at p.152.
11. Ibid., at p.l5U#
In Mohammed v. Mohommed and Afcel the court of first 
instance, Robinson, J., awarded nominal damages at £5 
chiefly because the woman concerned in that case was a 
person of loose morals before she married, but probably also 
because the series of adulterous unions complained of did 
not start until after the spouses had separated. The V^ est 
African ^ourt of Appeai held, however, that the husband 
was entitled to substantial damages, which they assessed 
at £200.13
In the recent case of Svoroja v. Evoroja and 
another, ^  an Urhobo woman deserted her husband and went to 
live with another man as husband and wife. The husband 
thereupon took this action for damages for adultery, "joining* 
his wife as a party, without asking for divorce. There was 
no evidence that the respondent and co-respondent committed 
adultery b^bre the separation of husband and wife occurred: 
there was indeed no direct evidence that adultery ever 
took place at all, it being held that the fact that the 
petitioner’s wife and the co-respondent lived together as 
husband and wife was enough evidence that they had committed 
adultery. On the qeustion of damages, the High Court of 
the Western Region, Adeyinka Morgan J., held as follows -
12. (1952) 14 w.A.c.A.199.
13« It should he noted that (a) though the wife was chiefly 
responsible for the break-up of the marriage, the co- 
-respondent was found to have contributed thereto;
(b) this was a divorce case, not just an action for 
damages as in Agbo v. Udo (supra).
1U. (1961) W.N.L.R7&: '
"It was held in Weedon v. Timbrell (1793) 5 Term Rep.
357 and ^inter v. Henn (1831) L|- C.& P. k9kf that no
damages are obtainable if husband and wife had been
living apart at the time of the•adultery. For this
reason, I hold that damages are not obtainable in 
15this case."
This decision was based apparently on a passage in Rayden 
16on divorce. But it is unfortunate that the attention of
the Court had not been directed to a passage in Latey on
Divorce which is in the following words:
"But a husband is wronged by the seduction of his
wife, far beyond the loss he sustains by the breaking
up of his home, and the mere fact that he was Hiving
apart from his wife at the time of her seduction is
17no answer to his claim for damages."
Moreover, Weedon v. Timbre11 and Winter v. Henn actually
contradict each other in what they decided, and neither of
them supports the view that a husband cannot recover damages
for adultery committed by his wife while living apart from
him. Let us take a closer look at these and a few other
English cases on the subject.
I SIn Weedon v. Timbre 11, a husband’s claim was indeed
rejected. But this was not just because he and his wife were
157 Ibid., p.8. ' ~  —  ~  ~ ’
16. (7th edn.). p.521.
17* (ikth edn.), para 579t p.296*
18. Ante.
living apart at the material time; it was rather because 
the husband had already freely relinquished his rights to 
his wife’s consortium by entering into a voluntary se­
paration agreement with her. ^he ratio decidendi of the 
case was neatly summed up by Lord Kenyon in this rhetoric 
question -
"But what injury was done to the plaintiff, who
19has voluntarily relinquished his wife?" ^
The same point was made, and in stronger terms still,
20by -^ lderson, J. in the other case of Winter v. Henn 
in his direction to the jury when he said -
"I apprehend the law to be that the plaintiff will 
be entitled to recover, unless he has, in some 
degree, been party to his own dishonour, either 
by giving a general licence to his wife to conduct 
herself as she ;pleased with men generally, or by 
assenting to the particular act of adultery with 
this defendant, or by having totally and permanently 
given up all the advantage to be derived from her 
society." ^
If however, the learned judge continued, if before the 
adultery took place the husband Had permanently given up 
all intention of living with his wife, he could not recover:
19* Ibid.. at p.360.
20. Ante
21. Ibid., at p.A98«
n••• because, if he had, it seems to me . *• that he
cannot set up the loss of what he had voluntarily
relinquished as the ground for a claim for compen- 
22sation.”
23In hvans v, Evans and Platts, the adultery complained 
of took place more than a year after a husband and his wife 
had separated* directing the jury, the President of the 
Probate ^ourt said -
"It cannot be denied that there have been thrown out, 
at different times and in various cases, suggestions 
tending to show that where a husband and wife have 
become separated, the husband cannot afterwards claim da- 
laagss.Shat is not, however, the law* And that is
T 2Unot the lav/ I arn going to lay dov/n to you. 11
The fact of a separation having taken place before the
adultery was committed, continued the learned President,
was only one of the elements to be taken into consideration
in assessing the quantum of damages to be awarded; it did
not of itself deprive the husband of a right to recover
damages in appropriate cases* ^his was because -
UA man is wronged by the deduction of.his wife far.
beyond the loss which he sustains by the breaking up
of his home* It is a matter for consideration whether
22* Ibid*, at p.U99- 
23. TTE99J TP.195.
2U* Ibid., at p.198.
a man whose wife has "been seduced by another man 
has not been subjected to intolerable insult and 
wrong, and the fact that he is at the time separated 
from his wife does not render the blow to his honour 
less acute • ••" ^
26In Gardener v« Gardener and Bamfield the spouses
had executed a separation deed (thus releasing each other
from their marital obligations) and were living apart when
the adultery occurred - the husband had found his wife’s
irregular and intemperate habits quite intolerable, Bannes,
J, quoted with approval the last passage reproduced above from
the Avans case, and then invited the jury to consider the
value of the woman in question in that case to her husband,
as a wife and company* ^he jury must have decided that she
was valueless, for they awarded no damages* The judge’s
direction to the jury as to the law shows however that Ma
husband is not precluded from recovering damages from a co-
-respondent by reason of the fact that there had been a
separation between himself and his wife before adultery
27was committed*" The jury’s act in not awarding any
damages at all in the case is an illustration of yet an­
other principle, viz. that they need not award any damages 
if, on other grounds, they think that the case is not one
25. Ibid*
26. T1901] 17 T.L.Ji.331.
27* Ibid*» from the headnote*
28for damages.
To sum up. Other things "being equal, the fact 
that a man and his wife were living apart when she committed 
adultery,, does not deprive him of the right to recover 
damages from the co-respondent. But if the hushand had, 
prior to the adultery, voluntarily relinquished his rights 
to his wife’s consortium, or had contributed by his own act 
or omission towards the commission by the wife of the adultery 
&& complained of, then he cannot recover any damages. Simi­
larly, if the wife’s character is such that, while living 
with him, she was worthless to him as a wife and companion, 
no damages will be recoverable from her seducer. A different 
consideration would apply, of course, where the co-respondent
(not the wife) was responsible for the break-up of the
•  ^ 29marriage.
28. Cf. ^ibson v. Gibson and West (1906) 22 T.l .R.361# See 
also Butterworth v. Butterv/orth (ante); Collins v. 
Collins jl920| P.126; Barratt v. Barratt (ibid)~ 
Howell v. Howell (ibidT; Adama v. Adams (ibid.); 
Ellworthy v. ^llworthy(ibid).
N.B. These cases were all decided by McCurdie, J.
between January 13th and February 10th, 1920, 
and were reported together.
29. It will be seen that the weight of judicial decisions 
is against the judgment in Evoroja v. Evoroja (supra), 
which must therefore be regarded as made per incuriam.
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CHAPTER TEN 
HUSBAND AMD WIPE - III:
MISCELLANEOUS,
1. Maintenance.
Jurisdiction. Before 1950, no court, in Nigeria had
jurisdiction to entertain an action "by a Christian marriage
wife against her hushand for maintenance simpliciter.
This was held in effect hy a powerful Bench of the West
1
African Court of Appeal in Okakpu v. Dkakpu. In that 
case a wife sued her hushand for maintenance in the Supreme 
Court. Vi/hen the case went on appeal to W.A.C.A., the hus­
hand raised a fresh point to the effect that there were no 
provisions in the laws of Nigeria for the payment of main­
tenance hy a hushand to his wife. 1’he Court upheld this 
contention, holding, among other things, that the Supreme 
Court had no such jurisdiction; that the law on this 
point which was in force on 1st January, 1900, was the
o
Summary Jurisdiction (Married V^ omen) Act, 1895 ; that
this was not a statute of general application; and that 
it did not apply to Nigeria. As there was no local le­
gislation conferring such jurisdiction on the Supreme Court
1. (I9k7) 12 W.A.C.A.137* Per Harragin, Chief Justice of the 
Gold Coast as she then was; Verity, Chief Justice of 
Nigeria; and Lucie-Smith, Chief Justice of 3erra-Leone.
2. This Act applied to Magistrates Courts in England, not 
to the High Court.
or the Magistrates Courts, it followed that u wife who 
wished to obtain an order for maintenance without asking 
for divorce or judicial separation had no locus standi in 
any court.
This lacuna in the law was filled by s.23 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 (we have seen that this applies 
to Nigeria) which reads as follows -
”(l) Where a husband has been guilty of wilful neglect 
to provide reasonable maintenance for his wife or 
the infant children of the marriage, the court, if it 
would have jurisdiction to entertain proceedings by 
the wife for judicial separation, may, on the applica­
tion of the wife, order the husband to jnake her such 
periodical payments as may be just; and the order may 
be enforced in the same manner as an.order for alimony 
in proceedings for judicial separation,
(2) 'Where the court makes an order under this section 
for periodical payments it may, if it thinks fit, 
order that the husband shall, to the satisfaction of the 
court, secure to the wife the periodical payments, and 
for that purpose may direct that a proper deed or 
instrument to be executed by all necessary parties 
shall be settled and approved .
A neglected wife can now, therefore, petition for maitenance 
by her husband, under the general law. She can, however,
O' t. C
only make this application to the High Court. This is
because the Magistrates Courts still lack jurisdiction over
2amaintenance actions between husband and wife.
The 1950 Act does not apply to customary marriage 
wives, neither have the customary Courts any power to enter­
tain maintenance actions involving Christian marriage wives.
Duty of maintenance under customary law. The duty to
provide sustenance as well asr.shelter for the household is
primarily that of a husband. A man is therefore under legal
obligation to provide his wife with the necessities of life
according to his means and station in life. "Necessities
of life” in this context include not only food and clothing
but also medical attention in times of illness, pregnancy
and the like. Indeed they also include fees for membership
of social and recreational societies such as married women’s
social and dancing clubs. In strict legal terms, these
duties attach to the husband even if the wife has separate
3income of her own. In practice, however, a wife with in­
dependent income or property invariably contributes to the 
daily domestic budget either in money or in kind or both 
ways. Thus in peasant and fishing communities, the man 
usually provides the local staple food for at least one meal 
a day, while his wife provides the other meal or meals out of
2a. But see ss.3 and 6 of the Maintenance Orders Act for the 
power of Magistrate Courts to enforce foreign maintenance 
orders.
3* Of. Folarin, op.cit.» p*21.
her own resources. In non-peasanty/fishing communities, the
husband normally provides money for the greater part of the
family (household) budget; the wife makes up any deficiencies
and provides the "condiments'' out of her own pocket, if any.^
A husband’s duty to maintain his wife is limited
under customary law to the period during which they cohabit.
Should they live apart following a dispute, then as a general
rule, this duty is suspended for the duration of the sepa- 
5
ration. It is immaterial whose fault was responsible for 
the separation: the innocent party has no right to be main­
tained in these circumstances. But to this general rule
there are two exceptions which are similar to each other in 
nature. If the separation occurs during a wife’s pregnancy, 
her husband must make reasonable contributions to her main­
tenance at her new address if he wishes to avoid heavy .
"charges1 •, when the time comes for him to claim the child
from his wife or her family, b'or a man is liable for the cost
of maintaining his child in these circumstances, if he makes
6a claim for the child. Similarly, if husband and wife 
separate while the wife is nursing a baby, so that she takes 
him away with her, the husband has a legal duty to send them
k* See 1‘orde and Scott, op.cit., pp*65-6; Talbot, bribes of 
the Niger belta, p.205; Ajisafe, op.cit., p«62; Ward,
Yaruba Husband-W^fe Code, pp.58-67; ^orde, Marriage among 
the Yako, pp.65-6, 101-2; Polarin, supra.
5* This does not apply of course to spouses living apart be­
cause of the demands of the husband’s trade, profession 
or employment, and vice versa.
6. He is not liable, on thisscore, to his wife; the liability 
is to her family (as a rule she goes back to them) who will 
have a right to retain the child in their custody till his 
father discharges his duty of maintenance - in arrear.
money or food as often as is reasonable, again under pain 
of having to make substantial back payments for his child’s 
maintenance, *'hat is reasonable contribution in these cases 
will depend of course on such practical considerations as 
the husband’s means as compared with the wife’s and her 
parents’, the distance between the husband’s and the wife’s 
new homes and so the possibility or otherwise of sending re­
gular contributions.
There is a duty on the family head in particular 
and other members of the family in general to house and 
maintain the wife of a member, if her husband will not or 
cannot do so,^ Eut this duty, which was more important in 
the past than it is today, is only moral, not legal. It is 
only one aspect of the moral obligation of members of a fa­
mily to help one another in case of need,
Q
Duty of maintenance under the general law,
"Primarily the husband’s duty is to provide his 
wife with the necessities of life •••• this duty is prima 
facie complied with if he provides a home for her, and the 
wife has no right to separate maintenance in a separate home 
unless she can justify living apart from her husband ,,,, 
this obligation remains if the spouses are obliged to live 
apart, for example owing to the illness of one of them
7* Cf, - k j i s a f e ,  op.cit,, pp,6l-62, ,
8, ‘^or details, see ^romley, pp, 195-257# and the standard 
works on divorce. Here we shall do no more than give 
an outline of the rights and duties of Christian marriage 
spouses inter se.
provided that there is no desertion on the part of the-wife” *^
($o far, there is complete similarity between the duty of a
Christian marriage husband and that of a customary marriage
husband on the subject of maintenance*)
A wife who commits adultery - even on one solitary
occasion - ipso facto loses her right to be maintained by her
husband* Lven if he remained unaware of the adultery for
some considerable time, a husband has a right to refuse his
wife further maintenance on subsequently discovering the
offence* And the fact that the husband himself had committed
adultery is immaterial. Thus in o^vfer v* Hancock, a husband
was held to be under no duty to maintain his wife who had
committed .adultery, the fact that he had himself done so
before her, that he had treated her with cruelty and that he
had driven her away from the matrimonial home notwithstanding
What is more, if a v/ife by her conduct leads her husband
reasonably to believe that she had committed adultery, he
is relieved of his obligation to maintain her, for the
11duration of such belief. On this subject, a customary 
marriage wife is in a better.position legally.than her 
Christian marriage counterpart* T'or as we have seen, a 
husband may chastise his wife (within reason) or impose a
9m Bromley, p.196* summarising Lord Hodson’s statement in 
McGowan v* McGowan [19^ -8] 2 All E*R*1032, at p*103U, 
and a uourt of Appeal decision in Lilley v* Lilley [1959]
3 All E.R.283.
10* (1796) 6 Term Rep*603*
11* Cf. Chilton v* ^hilton [1952] 1 All L*R*1322jj But a man is 
not relieved of his duty of maintaining his wife if he had 
condoned or connived at her adultery: Bromley, p. 197*
small fine (usually not in cash hut in kind) on her for 
her adultery* But he is still under an obligation to main­
tain her as long as he wants her for a wife - which' he usual­
ly does*
A man is also relieved of his duty to maintain his 
wife if she deserts him* But the obligation revives as doon 
as the desertion ends* A husband remains under the duty 
of maintenance if he deserts his wife. The' combined effect 
of these last two rules is that if a wife deserts her hus­
band but subsequently makes a genuine move to return to him 
and is refused, her right to be maintained by her husband 
revives: for in that case, and provided that the request
to return to the matrimonial home was genuine when made and 
remained so when proceedings were taken, it is the husband 
who is now in constructive desertion.
There is a measure of similarity as well as an 
important difference between the respective duties of a 
Christian marriage and a customary marriage husband whose 
wife has deserted him. In both cases, the husband is re­
lieved of his duty to maintain the wife. But whereas a 
Christian marriage husband reverts to his former duty if, 
as a result of his unreasonable refusal to take his deserting 
wife back, he becomes himself guilty of constructive de­
sertion; a customary marriage husband’s duty of maintenance 
does not revive in these circumstances* Till actual
cohabitation re-commences (or is deemed to have done so, 
by mutual agreement), his duty is suspended. Again, as 
desertion by a husband was virtually unknown in the tra­
ditional society, there is no provision under customary 
lav/ whereby a deserting husband remains obliged to maintain 
his wife.^
Enforcement of maintenance orders (For the orders that may 
be made, see ss.19, 20,22, 23 and 2k of the Matrimonial 
Cuases Act, 1950)
(a) Orders made within the country. If a husband 
against whom a maintenance order has been made (in favour 
of his wife) is in arrears with the payment, the wife can 
enforce the payment of such arrears by some of the methods 
open to a judgment creditor. Among other things, she can 
apply to the court for a writ of fi.fa. (fie**i facias, or 
writ of execution), for sequestration (in which case tempo­
rary control of the husband’s property or part thereof will 
be taken over by law-enforcement officers), for a charging 
order, or for a garnishee order (in which case the husband’s 
money in the hands of a third party will be attacked - a 
usual method of getting hold of his bank account. &he can 
also apply for an order to attach the husband’s earnings at 
source if four or more weekly payments, or two or more
221 But this duty will probably be imported into customary 
law by the superior courts applying the principles 
of "natural justice, equity and good conscience”, 
if need be.
other periodic payments are due and unpaid, provided that 
the husband has either wilfully refused or culpably ne­
glected to make these payments.^ If such an order is 
made, the husband’s employer has to make the necessary de­
ductions from his wages /salaries and pay them over to 
the proper officer of the court.
A wife cannot, however, enforce the payment of 
maintenance arrears by means of bmikruptcy proceedings; 
or by an ordinary action in debt in the High Court. More­
over, the court has power to vary the orders on the husband 
application, and to remit the arrears payable either in 
part or in full. If the husband dies, any arrears still 
unpaid die with him, for a wife has no right to enforce 
their payment against her deceased husband’s personal re­
presentative. (Neither can the personal representative of 
a deceased wrife enforce the payment of any such arrears 
owing to her at her death.) In the same way, a wife cannot 
prove in her hudband’s bankruptcy in respect of maintenance 
arrears. (we saw earlier that she cannot herself initiate 
bankruptcy proceedings to have him declared bankrupt, as 
a means of enforcing the payment of maintenance arrears.)
0>) Enforcement of foreign orders. The Maintenance 
Orders Act ^  provides machinery whereby maintenance orders
13* See Part II, Maintenance Orders Act, 1958 (of England), 
especially s.6. Cf. Bromley, pp.213-217*
1U* Laws of the federation of Nigeria (1958 Revision), Cap.
ilk.
obtained in England or Ireland can be registered in a Ni­
gerian Court. Once duly registered, such an order is 
deemed "from the date of such registration [to] be of the 
same force and effect ... as if it had been an order 
originally obtained in the court in which it is so registered,
and that court shall have power to enforce the order ac-
15 ^cordingly". A maintenance order is registered ir/court
of similar jurisdiction to the one in which it was made in
England or Ireland - High ^ourt orders in the High court,
magistrates courts orders in the Magistrate Courts - the
Nigerian court in question thereby acquiring the same
powers as regards enforcement as had the court in which
16the order was originally made.
Wife’s liability to maintain her husband uncler "English"
law............................................ ......
The general rule under “English" law is that a 
wife is under no obligation to maintain her husband. There 
are, however, a number of circumstances under which the 
courts may order that she shall do so or that her property, 
business profits or earnings shall be settled for his bene­
fit. Orders of this kind may be for an interim period, for 
a specified term or on a permanent basis.
15* 2.3(1). And see s.6 for the enforcement of provisional 
orders.
16. 8.3 (2).
' ' ■
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In the first place, if a v/ife presents a petition 
for judicial separation on the ground of her husband’s in­
sanity, the High Court has power under s.20(3) of the Matri­
monial Causes Act, 1950 (of England) to make an interim 
order that she shall pay alimony to her husband. On making 
the decree for judicial separation asked for, the court 
has power under the same sub-section to order that the wife 
shall pay such permanent alimony to her husband as the court 
thinks fit.
In the second place, if a wife petitions for 
divorce on the ground of herLhusband1 s insanity, the High 
Court may, by virtue of s*19(U) of the same Act, make an 
interim order against her for the payment of alimony to her 
husband. If the divorce asked for is granted, the wife may 
be ordered to secure to her husband 2such gross sum of money 
or annual sum of money for any term not exceeding his life” 
as the court thinks fit. In addition to or in place of 
this secured sum, the wife may by order be directed to pay 
her husband a monthly or weekly sum of money for the rest 
of their joint lives.
In the third place, if a decree of divorce or of 
judicial separation is granted against a wife by reason 
of her adultery, cruelty or desertion, the High C0urt may 
order that any property to Y/hich she is entitled (whether 
in possession or in reversion) shall be settled in whole
of in part for the benefit of her husband anchor children: 
s.214.(1).
In the fourth place, if a decree of restitution 
of conjugal rights is granted on a husband’s application, 
there is power under s.2lj-(2) of the same Act whereby the 
High Court may make one of the following orders, viz.
(a) that the. wife’s property shall be settled in whole or 
in part for the benefit of her husband and/or children; or
(b) that any part of the wife’s "profits of trade’' or 
earnings shall be paid periodically by her to her husband 
for his own benefit, or to her husband or any other per­
son for the benefit of their children or any of them. ^
The first point to note in connexion with ss.
199 20 and 214- of this Act is that, s.2l|(2) apart, their 
provisions only apply 'where a decree for divorce or for 
judicial separation has been granted or is being sought.
In other words, there is no power in the courts to make 
an order, by virtue of thbse sections, that a wife shall 
maintain her husband or settle her property for his bene­
fit while the spouses are still living together, or while 
they both desire so to live. On the face of it, s.2U(2) 
is an exception to this observation, being concerned as it 
is with property settlements and periodic payments following
17# See further, Bromley, pp.2U5 ff*
a decree of restitution of conjugal rights. But the sub­
section was obviously intended by the legislature to pro­
vide some practicable remedy against a wife who refused 
to obey a court’s order for restitution of conjugal rights. 
Committing her for contempt of court could hardly do any 
good; bringing her back to the matrimonial home by force 
of arms would be worse than useless as a basis for family 
life. Hence this provision for an economic sanction.
Another point that calls for a word of comment
is that there is only one condition under which a husband
can obtain an order for permanent alimony against his wife.
This is where the latter obtains a decree of judicial se-
18paration against him on the ground of his insanity.
Again, it should be noticed that no provision is made in 
3.19(U) for any payments by a wife to her husband in the 
event of her obtaining a decree of nullity (as opposed to 
divorce) on the ground of the husband’s insanity. Sub­
sections (1), (2) and (3) of s. 19 provide for payments by 
a husband to a wife in the event of his asking for or 
obtaining a decree of divorce or nullity; but sub-s. (4) 
only speaks of cases "where a petition for divorce is pre­
sented by a wife, on the ground of her husband’s.insanity”. 
Finally, it should be remarked that while an order to se­
cure a gross or an annual sum of money in favour of a
18. S.20(3); and cf. 1*01 stoy on ^ivorce (4th e.dn.), p.148
husband who is divorced on account of his insanity may be 
made "for any term, not exceeding his life”, an order for 
the payment to him of monthly or weekly sums for his main­
tenance is limited to the duration of "their joint lives” - 
s.19(4). To this extent then, a periodic payment of this 
type is not a good substitute for a secured gross or annual 
payment; though against this must be set the fact that not 
many wives have enough resources for secured lump or annual 
payments.
2. Property rights of spouses inter se.
Ante-nuptial property. The fact that a woman 
was later married does not affect the legal ownership of 
any property which she acquired before the marriage. Such 
property remains in her separate and exclusive ownership 
under both systems of law - customary and general. Under 
customary law, if the property in question v/as never brought 
by the woman to her husband’s place, then not only does it 
remain in her separate ownership in her life time, but also 
the husband has no inheritance rights'over it. If the pro­
perty was brought over to the husband’s place, he can in­
herit it, but even so only if the woman concerned left no 
children who are legally capable of inheriting it. As 
Ajisafe said of women landowners in Yoruba law:
”When a woman owning land is married to a man, 
whether of her own township or tribe or not,
in no circumstances whatever can the husband
become the owner of such Ja nd: . it is part and
parcel of the property of such woman, and when
she dies her children inherit it,11 ^
a rule which finds an echo in practically identical words ■’
2in Partridge’s article of the ^gba Yoruba* On Onitsha 
Ibo la?/, the High court (then called.a divisional ^ourt 
of the Supreme Court where there v/as a sole judge) has 
held in Nwugege v, &cLlgwe that even where a man and his 
wife lived in the wife’s ante-nuptial property (in that 
case a house) till her death, he had no right to inherit 
that property as against members of her maiden family, Ihe 
same case also decided that on the death of a married 
woman, property which she had acquired before her marriage 
goes to her own maiden-family and not to her husband or his
ii
family, in the absence of children.
The positi on under the general law is regulated by
legislation - the Married vY'omen’s Property Act, 1893 (of
England) which applies as a statute of general application, 
and which has been re-enacted as the Married VYomen’s Property
Law, 1958, by the WestemRegion, ^ S,4(l)(b) of the latter
1, Ajjsafe, op,cit,, np,7-8, '
2, "Native Law and custom in Egbaland", loc,cit,, p*433*
3* (1934) 11 N.L.R.134 (Graham Paul, J,) See Also Thomas,,
Anthropological Report on the Ibo, Part I, pp,124-5*
4* It not infrequently happens that husband and wife merge
their property rights (whether ante- or post- nuptial) by
mutual consent, or as a result of "gentle persuation" on 
the part of the husband. Indeed, it sometimes happens that 
the husband assumes (or is given) full control and at least 
apparent ov/nership of his wife’s property* But here we have 
passed beyond the strict bounds of law into those of 
social arrangements, ^
5* Laws of the Western Region, Cap,76 of the 1959 Revision,
Law provides that all property which belonged to a married 
v/oman before marriage shall be hers as if she were a feme 
sole, S.6 provides that all stokk, deposits^ annuities and 
the like which stand in a married woman’s name shall be 
deemed to be her separate property: presumably this section
relates to ante-nuptial property of the types enumerated, as 
well as to those acquired during coverture. As will appear 
presently, there are statutory provisions for the protection 
of one spouse’s property from the other spouse.
On this question of ante-nuptial property, a man 
would seem to be in a disadvantageous position in law as 
compared with his wife, i'or, as we have seen, a husband’s 
property, whenever acquired, becomes liable for the wife’s 
maintenance, and may be attached, sequestered or settled 
by court order in order to meet this liability - under the 
general law. Under customary law, too, a man is legally 
liable to maintain his wife from any property at his dis­
posal - including property acquired before the marriage.
He is, in addition, bound to permit his wife to make such 
use of his farm land (whether lying fallow or under culti- 
vation) as is customary in the local community. A man’s 
property is therefore less separate and exclusive: than ia 
his wife’s•
6. Cf. ^rdener, loc.cit., p.88; Jones, "Ibo land tenure", 
loc.cit., p.315*
Wife’s capacity to acquire •property under customary lav/.
The air of mystery and confusion which surrounds 
the question whether or not women have legal capacity to 
acquire and own property under customary lav/ is forcefully 
brought home to us by Leith-Rcss when, writing' on the Ibo, 
she said -
"The question of a married woman’s or widow’s property 
is a nebulous one. One is constantly being told 
a woman has no property, yet one is equally constant­
ly being shown "my" farm or hearing of a woman who 
has gone to. court about "her" oil palms or "her" share 
of a dowry." ^
A good example of such conflicting statements can be seen
in the following three passages taken from an early book 
8on the Ibo, "Women have but .few. rights in any circum­
stances, and can only hold such property as their lords
9 .
permit." ("Lords" presumably stands for "husbands").
"Practically the whole of the trade in Ibo country is in the
hands of the women, and they are extremely capable”. ^  ,
"The only possessions that can really be labelled as the
property of a wife are her waterpot, market basket and
calabash, together with her <£> oking utencils, and all the
vegetable called koko (ede). Ghe helps to purchase other
7* African Women: A study of the Ibo of Nigeria, p,102.
8• Basden, Among the Ibos~of~Nigeria (1921).
9* Ibid., p.S8.
10. Ibid., p.90, It is not clear who owns the capital and 
profits here. .
household requisites and has free use of them; she may 
also accumulate extra things in her own corner." ^
The position, ih our submission, is that a married 
woman has legal capacity to acquire, own and dispose of 
property in her own right and in her own name, under custo­
mary law. (There are, as we shall see later, certain li­
mitations in her power of disposition of certain types of 
property; but this is a reflection not on her legal ca­
pacity as such but on the peculiar rules governing the dis­
position of those classes of property.) As Thomas, another 
early writer on the Ibo, said of societies covering appro­
ximately the same territory as those of whom Basden wrote,
a wife’s money and koko yams are her own property over which
12her husband has no rights or control. A woman who co­
operates with,her husband in farm work in the normal fashion 
is entitled to be given plots by him for her own corps, and
has a right to plant her own crops among the husband’s
yams according to the local rules of interplanting of crops. 
Again, women (including married ones) can "secure personal
control over land by providing money for purchase or securing
13pledged land ...." According to Jones, the women
II• Ibid.. p.93* lo this list should be added a wife’s
personal articles such as clothing, beads, etc., as well
as such crops like the cassava which along with her other
crop ("koko") and her husband’s yams constituted the 
staple food of the Ibo at the time when Basden wrote. It 
is therefore hard to see how women could be siad to lack 
capacity to own property.
12. Anthropological Report on the Ibo ...,-■ Part I, p. 124
(But, he says, this rule does not apply to Nise, a town 
in Awka•)
13* Porde and Scott, op.cit.. pp.66-7 Cf. Esenwa, op.cit., 
p.73.
themselves can acquire property in land in their own right,
obtaining it by gift, for rent, on pledge or by outright 
Ik
purchase,” He says indeed that a woman is debarred by 
Ibo custom from having absolute ownership of property; but 
then he goes on to say, "As long as she remains in his [i.e. 
husband’s] household, however, the property is hers and
15she can dispose of it as she lilces during her lifetime.”
The most categorical statement of the law is to be found
16in the works of Talbot: "Among all tribes”, he says, "the
wife’s property is exclusively under her own control and .
can never be touched by her husband; she leaves it to whom
she likes, usually to her dauthers or sons, but sometimes
to her own relatives.” Among the Skoi, a wife is said to
have a right of action in court against her husband if he
used her own separate property without her consent.^ Yako !
ii
wives, too, own and control property apart from their husbands 
Of the Lagos Yoruba, Harris says: "A wife’s profit from
her trade is her own, and she spends it mostly on her per­
sonal needs, her children and in helping her own relatives”-
and this even where the initial trading capital was provided
19by the husband. ' A 19th-century writer on Yoruba law 
llj.. "Ibo land tenure", loc.cit. t p.315*
15* Ibid., p.316. See also," ^ orde and Jones, op.cit. ♦ p.70.
16. Peoples of Southern Nigeria. Vol. Ill, pp.J+55 and 678.
Cf. Ardener. loc.cit.. p.68.
17. In the shadow of the bush. p.9B7Cf. Partridge, Cross 
River Natives. 235.
18. Forde in African systems of kinship and marriage♦ p.289*
19. Harris, op.cit., p.53*
generally summed up the position in these words, "tll the
property of a wife is always separate and distinct from
20that of her husband."
Wife’s capacity to acquire -property under the general law•
A married woman*s "English" lav? capacity to 
acquire property and to possess separate property of her 
own is governed by statute law, once more the Liarried Women1. 
Property Act, 189%• By s.3 of this Act, as re-enacted by 
the Western Regional parliament: "... a married woman shall
(a) be capable of acquiring, holding and disposing of any
21property ... in all respects as if she were a feme sole.”
All stock, deposits and annuities standing in the sole name
22of a wife are deemed to be her separate property.. (For 
the husband’s remedy where his wife invests his money in 
one of these ways without her consent, see below.) A mar­
ried woman may take out an insurance policy in her own name 
and for her own benefit, either on her life or on her hus­
band’s life.^
Protecting one spouse’s property!from the other spouse, 
fa) Customary law. As already indicated, a woman who is 
married under customary law can acquire and own property 
as of right. She also has an action against her husband (or 
anyone else) if he infringes this property right, 'ftiis
20. -Sms. I'he Yoruba-speaking peonies ..... p.177. Cf. 
Partridge, "Native lav/ and custom in Egbaland" (arfe), 
pp.431-3* on the ILgba Yoruba.
21. Laws of the Western Region (1959 Revision) Cap.76*
22. Ibid., s.6.
23. Ibid.. s.9*
principle is recognised and preserved by statute to some 
extent. For S.1U8 of the Criminal procedure Code provides 
in effect that a customary marriage wife (like her Christian 
marriage counterpart) has a right of action against all 
persons, including her husband, "for the protection and se­
curity of her own separate property"• But unlike a Christian 
marriage wife, a customary marriage wife can institute pro-
211.
ceedings in this regard while still living.with her husband ♦
Again, s. 36 of the Criminal °ode provides that, Christian
marriage spouses apart, husband and wife can be criminally
responsible for an offence against each other’s property
25even if no third party’s property rights are involved.
The same section also provides by implication that legal 
proceedings may be taken against a spouse who has committed 
an offence against the property of the other spouse even 
if they are still living together. This rule about criminal 
responsibility and time for legal process was unknown to 
the traditional customary law, under which an injured spouse’s 
only remedy against the other spouse was an action for 
compensation - a civil action.
(B) The General law. As a rule, spouses married by "Chris- 
tianM cannot be criminally responsible under the gene­
ral law for any offences committed against the property of 
each other unless the property interests of a third party
26are involved. Even where the offending spouse is criminally
2k* Laws of_ the— federation, Cap.1+3. On 2.1U8, see furtheiyppsti. 
25* Criminal Code (Fed*), s.36; (W.R.), s.33*
26. Criminal ^ode (Fed.), s.36.
responsible in fact, it is provided in .the same section 
of the Criminal Code (s. 36) that no proceedings shall be 
instituted while the sp ouses are still living together* Thus 
even if a third party’s interests are involved adversely 
in the offence so that the guilty spouse can be brought to 
trial for it, this cannot be done while the spouses are 
living together. Similarly, though a spouse who takes and 
carries away some property of the other spouse while de­
serting or about to desert the latter is criminallytrespon­
sible for that act, yet no proceedings may be taken in 
respect of the offence until the desertion is actually ac­
complished.
As for civil liability, S.1U8 of the Criminal 
Procedure CQde ^  provides that a Christian marriage wife 
has civil action against all persons, including her husband 
for the protection and security of her own separate property. 
But this section is made subject to the operation of §.36 
of the Criminal ^ode (already touched upon) as regards the 
permissible time for the institution of proceedings. This 
probably means that, like criminal proceedings, civil actions 
may not be brought by a wife for any injury or offence om- 
mitted by her husband against her property so long as she 
is living with him. It should be noted in this connection 
that this statutory right to a civil action is available
27- Laws of the Federation, Cap.ij-3* Cf. s. 10 of the
Married Women’s Property Act, 1893 (1958 for the W.Region)
to wives only, and not to husbands: a husband has no-.civil
action against a wife who damages or commits any other wrong 
against his property.
There is an interesting provision in the Married 
YVomen’s Property Act, 1893 (of England), which reads - 
"If any investment in any such deposit, annuity or 
shares shall have been made by a married woman by 
means of moneys of her husband without his consent
the High ^ourt may upon an application under S. 17
order such investment and the dividenls thereof 
or any part thereof to £e transferred and paid re-
pO
spectively to the husband".
The effect of this section is to provide a husband with a 
measure of protection against misappropriation of his money 
by his wife. For it says in effect that a husband has a 
right, by means of summary proceedings under s.17* to 
"follow" his money into the hands of a bank or insurance 
company wherein his wife has deposited or invested it.
This is obviously a useful provision from a husband’s point 
of view, in view of the fact that there is, as. already in­
dicated, no other civil remedy open to him against his wife
in such circumstances.
28. This is s.7 of the TT. Region version of the Act. S.17 
is the one which provides for "summary proceedings" 
between spouses alone or with third parties (e.g. a 
bank or an insurance company) in respect of the; pro­
perty of one or both spouses to a Christian marriage. . .
^icarious liability and representation*
(a) Customary law* A husband is not liable in law for his 
wife1s debts, tortious acts, breaches of contract or any 
other civil wrong committed against a third party, unless 
she was, at the material time, actin^on his instruction or 
authority. In practice an injured party would normally not 
institute any legal action against a married woman unless 
and until he has made a formal complaint to her husband, 
and the latter has indicated that he has no intention of 
settling the claim himself out of court. But this does 
not mean that the primary liability is on the husband. It 
simply means that no one would normally ■wish to disturb a 
man’s domestic life by bringing an action against his wife, 
without first giving him a chance to have the matter settled 
out of court* ’^he English law principle of. ”agency of ne­
cessity" is unknown to our customary laws. In the realm 
of criminal lav/ too, a husband is not responsible for his 
wife’s offences unless he had asked her to commit a given 
offence. Thus a husband who sends his wife to steal or 
to destroy another’s growing crops will be as guilty of 
the offence as his wife is. But these unusual circumstances 
apart, a woman is criminally responsible for her own offences 
In the past, husbands were expected to, and usually 
did represent their wives in civil as well as criminal pro­
ceedings before a male (but not a female) arbitral court. ^
29. Cf. toard, Hushand-Wife ^ode. pp.68-70; ^olarin, op.cit.
p. 22.
But this he did, not because he was personally liable/ 
responsible in law, but because he was the head and spokes­
man of his household. In more serious cases, and especially 
where strangers were involved as parties to the case, this 
task of representation was performed by the family head - 
that is, the head of the v/ider group of which a man’s 
household is a part. Today there is nothing in the statute 
books to prevent a man from representing his wife, if he 
so desires, in the Customary Courts, and some husbands 
still do so. Butcthere is an indication in the Regional 
Customary Courts Laws to the effect that such representation 
requires at least the consent of the wife concerned. 3.32(1) 
of the Customary Courts haw of the ^astern Region, and s. 
28(1+)(a) of that of the IT. Region provide in similar terms:- 
"... a customary court may permit the husband, or 
wife, or guardian, or any servant, or the master, 
or any inmate of the household of any party* who 
shall give satisfactory proof that he or she has
authority in that behalf • •••” to represent him or her. 
As the first part of this passage shows, not only is there 
no suggestion that a husband has a duty to represent his 
wife, but also the court has a discretion to permit him 
to do so or turn him out. And as appears from the last 
part of the passage, some proof of authorisation is re­
quired from the would-he representative (though, it is
perhaps arguable that the fact of marriage is enough evi­
dence of such authorisation, on account of the traditional 
practice discussed above.) There is no corresponding
provision whereby a husband may represent his wife in a
Magistrate Court or the High Court.
0>) The general law. Under this, there is no duty on a
husband to represent his wife in any litigation, whether 
civil or criminal. Neither is a husband civilly or cri­
minally responsible for his wife’s offences or wrongs. The 
two apparent exceptions to the latter rule are, first that 
a husband who actually compels his wife to commit a crime 
in his presence (excluding crimes punishable by death, or 
those involving grievous bodily harm or an intention to 
commit them) will probably himself be personally responsible 
s.33 of the Criminal Code (federal) (s.31 of the western 
Region Criminal Code) provides that the wife will not be 
responsible in those circumstances. Secondly, a husband may 
be liable civilly or criminally for his wife’s wrong if she 
was acting as his agent at the time. But this is not an 
incident of marriage but an aspect of the law of agency.
For a master or parent or guardian may be similarly liable 
for the wrongs of a servant, child or ward as the case may 
be. In other words (and this is also true of a wife’s 
^agency of necessity") a husband’s liability here is based 
on the principle that he had either authorised the wrong
or contract as the case may he, or is deemed to have autho- 
30nsed it*
Spouses and the law of crime*
(a) Offences against property*
We have seen that, Christian marriage spouses 
apart, husband and wife may he guilty of a criminal offence 
against each other’s property - theft, arson and wilful 
damage, fof instance - in the same way. and to the same ex­
tent as if they were not married.^ We have also seen 
that, in the case of Christian marriage spouses, neither 
spouse can commit a crime in relation to the other’s pro­
perty unless either (a) the act complained of involved a 
third party’s interest, or (h) one spouse took away the
other’s property while deserting or intending to desert
2that other party.
(h) Assault and rape*
It would appear from Aiawusa v* Qdutose ^ that
a husband and wife cannot be guilty of indecent assault on
each other, though they can be guilty of common assault.
In that case a husband shaved off his wife’s pubifce hairs
against her will, and was charged with indecent assault on
her. The West African Court of Appeal held that uan assault
upon a wife is not rendered indfccent by circumstances which
30. &n agency of necessity, see Bromley, pp.198-203, and
the standard works on agency. See also M.Vif.P. Act, 1893 
ss. 11, 12, 18.
1. S.36 of the Criminal ^ode (S.33> ^*B. Criminal Code).
2. Ibid.
3 .  (1915-1) 7  a y .a . c .a . i U o .
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would render it indecent, in the case of,another woman"• ^ 
They therefore held that though he was guilty of common as­
sault on his wife on the facts, the accused was wrongly 1 
convicted of indecent assault. k .
As long as a husband is entitled to his wife's 
consortium he cannot be guilty of rape on her. For a wife 
is deemed to have consented to having sexual intercourse . 
v/ith her husband from the moment of their marriage, this
consefct. only being withdrawn or terminated by a separation 
5agreement or by judicial separation. A man does not lose
his right to his wife's consortium by reason only of the
fact that they had a dispute and are living apart. And so,
a man who has sexual intercourse with his wife against her
6will in these circumstances will'not be guilty of rape.
It is immaterial in such a case (i.e. where a husband has 
connexion with his unwilling wife while the spouses are 
living apart other than as a result of judicial separation 
or separation deed v/ith a non-molestation clause), that the 
husband effected his objective with the aid of reasonable 
physical force: he is still not guilty of rape.
But as was held in Alawusa v. Odusote. a man can 
commit common assault on his wife. In R. v. Jackson (ante) 
it was held to be unlawful for a man to restrain his wife
From the headnote.
5* Obiter dictum by Lynskey, J. in v. Miller [195U]
2 All F.r #529.
6. R. v. Miller (Ante).
by force in order to enforce his right to her consortium* 
following this case, Lynskey, J. held that a man who, at a 
time when he was living apart from his wife, used physical 
force to achieve sexual intercourse with her. against her 
will, was guilty of assault on her.^ In the same way, a 
man who administers corporal punishment on.his wife, how­
ever reasonable in amount, would be guilty of assaulting 
her.^
(c) Marital coercion.
Section 33 of the (federal) Criminal code is so
curiously worded that, before attemptirgto divine its
meaning, it would be necessary to set it out in extenso.
9It reads -
"A married woman is not free from criminal responsi­
bility for doing or omitting to do an act merely be­
cause the act or omission takes place in the presence 
of her husband.
Eut a wife of a Christian marriage is not 
criminally responsible for doing or omitting to do 
an act which she is actually compelled by her hus-r 
band to do or omit to do, and wrhich is done or omit­
ted to be done in his presence, except in the case
of an act or omission which would constitute an
7. R.v. Miller', ante. ' ' .
8. b.y. Jackson, ante. See also s.l60(l)(o$ of the Evidence 
Act (federal), and -^ romley, pp. 150, 155% 329*
9* Cf. s.31 of the Criminal ode of the hrestern Region which 
is identical in effect though less ambiguous in its 
wording.
offence punishable with death, or an offence of 
which grievous harm to the person of another, or 
an intention to cause, such harm, is an element, 
in which case the presence of her husband is 
immaterial."
the
The first paragraph of this section disposes of/old English 
law doctrine of marital coercion whereby"a woman who com­
mitted a crime in her husband’s presence was presumed to 
have done so under compulsion by him. The first part of 
the second paragraph says by implication that a wife of a 
non-Christian, marriage can never take advantage of what 
looks like a new version of the doctrine of marital coer- 
sion. That part also means that, as a general rule, a 
wife of a Christian marriage will not be criminally res­
ponsible for a crime which she was actually compelled to 
commit by her husband "sitting on top” of hhr, as it were. 
In other words, she is free from responsibility if (a)
her husband was present at the material time and place, and
the offence
(b) she was actually compelled torcommt/by him. Neither 
,ractuallytf nor "compelled", nor again "his presence" is de­
fined. -^ nd ©o it is difficult to say what in fact makes 
compulsion "actual", boes "actual" here mean"physical" 
as where a man by beating or physical torture makes his 
wife forgGi'. another man’s name on a chepue? This could 
hardly be the meaningr.contemplated by the legislature.
Surely anyone so compelled by physical force - husbarid, 
wife child or stranger - would not be a free agent as far 
as the crime is concerned: or would he? If he would not,
then the point about Christian marriage wives is superfluous; 
for no one would be! criminally responsible if he did not 
act as a free agent. Perhaps then, "actual" simply means 
"effective" so that "actually compelled" means "effective­
ly compelled". A similar difficulty arises about the meaning 
of "compelled". Will moral or psychological pressure be 
enough? Does the compulsion have to be physical, or is it 
enough that threats were used? On the question of the 
husband1s presence, what degree of proximity to the scene 
of the crime is required? Does a man's wife commit arson 
"in his presence" if he stood fifty yasds away from the 
property concerned hut in full view thereof? Is a forgery 
done in his presence if he stands at the entrance door of 
a bank while his wife appends the forged signature on a 
cheque at the counter across the room?
But even if these points were clarified, even if 
we said that a wife is%actually compelled* to commit a crime . 
in herihusband’s presence if in some way he gets her to do 
so against her will with him sufficiently near the scene 
that she feels she has no choice but to do the act or omis­
sion required of her - we are still faced with the problem 
of assigning some meaning to the part of the section
beginning with "except". Cce s this passage mean that a 
wife is not free from criminal responsibility for a capital 
crime or one involving grievous bodily harm even if she 
was compelled to commit the offence by her husband who was 
physically present at the material time and place? Or is 
the contrary meaning intended? The crux of the problem is 
in the phrase "in which case the presence of her husband 
is immaterial#" Does this mean that the wife is responsible 
even if the offence was committed in her husband’s presence 
and as a result of compulsion by him: or the other way
round? In re-enacting this section, the V.'estern Region 
interpreted it to mean that a wife will not be excused from 
this type of serious offence even if committed in the 
circumstances just described.
On this construction of the section, the law then 
is that where a Christian marriage wife commits a crime 
(other than a crime punishable by death, or one involving 
grievous bodily harm or an intention to commit this) in 
her husband’s presence and by his actual compulsion (physical 
moral or psychological), she will not be criminally res­
ponsible. In all other cases - i.e. (a) in all cases in­
volving customary or Islamic marriage wives, and (b) in etli 
cases involving Christian marriage wives, where the offence 
is punishable by death or involves grievous bodily harm - 
a wife is criminally responsible for her crime.
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Spouses and the law of torts.
We have seen that under S.1U8 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, a wife hy a Christian marriage has a civil 
action against her husband (and other persons) for any offence 
committed by him against her property: for example for
conversion, detinue, slander of property, and passing off 
where they produce rival g o o d s y ; e  have also seen that 
a husband does not have a similar right of action against 
his wife, barring the summary proceedings under s. 17 of the 
harried Women’s Property Act, 1893* ^ven where a Christian 
marriage wife has a right of action, she cannot initiate 
legal proceedings while still living with her husband*
Subject to these exceptions, a spouse has no 
fight of action in tort against her husband under the general 
law* Spouses by customary law marriages, however, do have 
a right of action against each other for civil wrongs com­
mitted by one against the other. And, though this is rare 
in practice, they may bring this action in the Customary 
Courts while still living together. (Civil cases between 
spouses used to be quite frequently decided by the tradi­
tional "arbitral" courts of the past, and by chiefs, family 
heads and other persons acting as arbitrators in modern 
times.)
Spouses and the law of conspiracy.
A husband and wife of a Christian marriage are
1. Cf- s.10 of the Married women’s Property Act (ante).
not criminally responsible for a conspiracy between them­
selves alone  ^- "Christian marriage" being a marriage 
which is recognised by the lex loci celebrationis as a
voluntary union fotf life of one.mand and one woman to the
2exclusion of all others# This means that spouses so 
married will be free from criminal responsibility for 
doing an act which would otherwise be a conspiracy, if and 
so long as they did not act in concert with any other per­
son; but they will be so responsible if a third party 
took part in the act or scheme. Thus a husband and wife 
of this description will be open to a criminal charge if 
they committed an act of conspiracy with their son or 
daughter, ward or servant, provided only that the latter 
has attained the age of criminal responsibility. The 
section also means that other spouses, such as customary 
law and Islamic law spouses, have no immunity of any kind 
in this respect.
On a charge of conspiracy involving a husband and 
wife, it is not necessary for the parties to prove their 
Christian marriage strictly or at all, in the absence of
express demand to that effect. In Keshiro v. Inspector-
3-General of Police, a man and a woman were conviced by
1. S.3U of the (federal) Criminal code: reproduced in s.32. 
of the Western Region Criminal Code. And see Keshiro v. 
Inspector-General of Police (1936) W.N.L.R.8U.
2. S.l of the (federal) Criminal Code.
3. Supra. Cf. R. v, A.jiyola, R.v. Udom, R.v. Adesina 
(Eefs. below).
a Senior Magistrate on a charge of conspiring to bring false 
accusation against another person contrary to s*125 of the 
Criminal code* At the trial they were both sworn on the 
Bible; the woman accused referred to the man charged with 
her as "my husband" in her evidence; and other witnesses 
described the accused persons as husband and wife. This 
allegation (that they were husband and wife)'was not 
challenged by the prosecution.or questioned by the Court.
On appeal to the High Court, the conviction was quashed on 
the ground that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
and in view of the fact that the accused persons were sworn 
on the Bible, it must be presumed that they were husband and 
wife and that their marriage was a Christian marriage. 
Spouses and the law of evidence.
(a) Non-Christian marriage spouses. Section 161 of 
the Evidence Act of the Federation provides that where an 
accused person has contracted a non-Christian marriage, 
his or her spouse is a competent and compellable witness 
for both the prosecution and the defence. To this there 
is a proviso to the effect that in the case of a Mohammedan 
marriage neither spouse may thereby be compelled to disclose 
any communication made to him or her by the other spouse 
during the continuance of the marriage.. In other words, 
while as a general rule spouses of non-Christian marriages 
may be compelled to testify for or against each other, in
waddition to being free to volunteer evidence for either
side in the case, where the non-Christian marriage spouse
concerned is an Islamic carriage spouse, he or she cannot
be compelled to testify one way or the other if this would
involve her having to disclose a communication made to him
or her during the continuance of the marriage.
^hile, as we have seen, the courts are willing to
presume on very slight evidence that a man and woman are
husband and wife of a Christian marriage for the purposes
of accepting or rejecting the evidence of one spouse for
or against the other spouse, it has been.held on more than
one occasion that no such presumption can.be made in favour
of a polygamous marriage. If the prosecution, for instance,
wishes to compel a wife to testify against her will or
against her husband’s desire, it must produce positive proof
to the satisfaction of the court that the spouses had con-
h
tracted a non-Christian marriage. In Idiong v. R. 
the Rest African Court of Appeal held that no presumption 
in favour of a polygamous marriage could arise from the 
fact that the wife was sworn by a gun and was therefore 
probably not a Christian, or from the fact that the court
records of the case described the accused husband as a
m 5’’pagan". Ten years before in the case of R. v. Laoye
the same Gourt had said In a unanimous judgement -
U. (1950) 13 iV.A.C.A.30
5. (19U0) 6 V/.A.C.A.6.
"... the wife of the second accused was called
as a witness for the prosecution .without it being
definitely given in evidence that she was not the
wife of a monogamous marriage. It is true that she
was sworn on the Koran and was therefore presumably
a Mohammedan; but a point of this importance should
6not be left to presumption."
In the sphere of civil actions the question of 
the competence of spouses of the parties to testify is 
governed by s.157 of the Evidence Act. The section reads:- 
"Subject to the proviso contained in s.11+7» in all 
civil proceedings ... the husband or wife of any 
party to the suit shall be" a competent witness.
But the section is silent on the question whether or not 
such a spouse is also compellable. A similar provision 
is contained in s.162 of the same Act, which says that 
"the husbands and wives of the parties [to any proceedings 
instituted in consequence of adultery] shall be competent 
to give evidence in the proceedings ...."
Both s. 157 and s.l62 merely speak of "husbands" and tiwives"
without any indication or reference to the type of marriage
which made them so. It is therefore reasonable to infer from
this that both Christian and non-Christian marriage spouses
6. Ibid.t at p.8 Note that "pagans" often contract "Christian1 
marriages in Nigeria.
7# S. 11+7 deals with the non-competence of a parent to give 
evidence of non-access where the legitimacy or paternity 
of his child is involved.
are contemplated therein*
(t>) Christian marriage spouses*
The general rule is that whan a person is charged 
with a criminal offence, his or her Christian marriage 
spouse is "A competent and compellable witness but only
Q
on the application of the person charged." This means
that in normal circumstances such a spouse can only be
called as a witness for the defence, and that an unwilling
spouse can be compelled to testify.for the defence but
not for the prosecution. But the possibility cannot be
ruled out of an accused masochist making an application
that his wife or husband as the case may be, should be
allowed or indeed compelled to testify for the prosecution.
xt is submitted that in this unlikely situation, the court
has no choice but to grant the application.
To this general rule there are a number of
exceptions. First, where a person is charged with one. of
the many sexual offences or those against children, under
the Criminal Code, his or her spouse is a competent and
compellable witness for thfe prosecution or for the defence
g
without the consent of the person so charged. Secondly, 
where a person is charged with an offence against the pro­
perty of his or her spouse, the latter is a competent and
8. S.i60(2) of the (Federal) Evidence Act. And see R.v. 
Adebowale (19Ul) 7 W #A.C.A.il|2; Akpolokoolo v. Com, of 
Police ri960) W.R.N.L.R.89; and s.8(2) of the (Federal) 
Criminal Code.
9. S.l60(l)(a) of the Evidence Act. f^he sections of the 
Criminal Code referred to here are: ss.217-219, 221-226, 
231, 300, 301, 3h0, 3U1,.357-362, and 369-371.
compellable witness ibf the prosecution or the defence 
without the consent of the party charged.^ But this is 
subject to the proviso that a husband and wife of a Christian 
marriage cannot be charged with an offence against each 
other's property unles (i) there was also an intention to 
defraud or injure a third party, or (ii) the offence 
was committed while the accused spouse was leaving or about 
to leave the other spouse. In other words, s.l60(l)(b) of 
the Evidence Act is subject in its operation to the provi­
sions of s.36 of the Criminal Code* T h i r d l y ,  where one 
spouse is charged with inflicting violence on his or her 
wife or husband as the case may be, the spouse thus assaulted 
is a competent and compellable witness for the defence or 
the prosecution, and that without the consent of the person 
charged: s.l60(l)(c) of the Evidence Act. Fourthly, under
the provisions of s.6 of the Punishment of Incest Law, 1955$ 
of the Eastern Region, the wife or husband of a person 
charged, v/ith incest ’'may be called as a witness either for 
the prosecution or the defence and without the consent of 
the person charged.” But there is no indication here 
whether or not such a spouse can be compelled to testify 
against his or her will. There is a similar provision, and 
a similar quaeret in s. 11+9 of the Federal Criminal Procedure 
Code which says that in an action by a Christian marriage
10. S#l60(l) (b). Evidence Act*
11. Laws of the Eastern Region, 1955•
wife for the protection of her property, "both she and her
12husband shall be competent witness^
It is expressly provided in s.160(3) of the Evidence
Act that nothing in that section "shall make a husband
compellable to disclose any communication made to him by
13his wife during the marriage11 and vice versa* The ef­
fect of this is that an unwilling spouse cannot be compelled 
to testify for or against ^  the other spouse if such evi­
dence would take the form of disclosure of some oral or 
written information made to him or her by the other spouse 
during the subsistence of their marriage* Sub-section (3) 
of s*l60 must, moreover, be read with s.163 of the same Act. 
The latter provides that neither spouse can be compelled to 
disclose a communication made to him/her by the other 
spouse during the marriage, nor can he/she be permitted to 
do so except with the consent of the spouse who made the 
communication. An interesting result of these provisions 
is that while one spouse can permit the other spouse to 
disclose a marital communication where this is in his in­
terest, and can forbid such disclosure where it would
12. See below under civil actions,
13. This sub-section applies to. all spouses, however married. 
Unlike many other sections of the Code, it is not 
limited in its application to Christian marriage spouses 
either expressly or by necessary implication.
1U. The intention was presumably to prevent the prosecution 
from compelling spouses to testify against each other.
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militate against his interests, there is no power in the 
courts to compel an unwilling spouse to disclose such a 
communication at the request of the spouse who made it*
This is a flaw in the lav/, since the defence may well crumble 
without such a disclosure. Suppose a woman is charged with 
murder. Suppose that her defence is that she v/as being raped 
by the deceased, and that she struck the fatal blow in de­
fence of her chastity. Or suppose that the accused is a 
man and that his defence is that he struck the victim down 
in a blind rage because the latter had made a revolting 
suggestion to him to perform some homosexual act. In either 
case, the defence may well stand or fall according as the 
accused person can or cannot prove his/her claim that he/she 
had reported the incident to the other spouse, soon after­
wards - a difficult claim to prove wi thout that spouse’s 
co-operation.
One of the several problems that could.arise under 
this sub-section is v/hat precise meaning to attach to the 
word 11 communication”• V/ould this include a statement in­
tended by one spouse for a third party but made incidental­
ly or unintentionally to the other spouse? More specifical­
ly, would this include, for instance, a statement contained 
in a document sent to a third party (such as a postcard, a 
telegram or a letter) but which the writer expected the 
other spouse to see and which in fact he/she saw; a state-
ment which one spouse overheard the!other spouse make to a 
third party or to himself; or, nearer the border line, 
a letter written by one spouse to a third party and handed 
to the other spouse to be typed or translated before being 
transmitted to the addressee thereof? These and similar 
questions must, however, await a treatise on the law of 
evidence. Suffice it here to note further that s.160(3) 
does not give any clear answer to the question whether or 
not divorced spouses may be compelled or allowed, as the 
case may be, to disclose communications made to each other 
during their marriage, against the wishes of the party 
who made them. On this point it is submitted that the 
position is the same as in the law of England on the ques­
tion of incompetence to testify generally, ’^hat law may be 
summed up in these words: once incompetent, always in­
competent. "if a spouse is incompetent to give evidence 
against the accused during marriage," says Bromley, ”the 
incompetence dontinues in respect of matters which occurred
during coverture after a decree of divorce and, apparently,
15after d deree of nullity where the marriage was voidable.”
Thus in v. Algar^a man had been drawing on her husband’s
rbank account by forging cheques ibn her name. -Lhis was not 
discovered until after their marriage had been annulled on 
the ground of the husband’s impotence. He was then
15* Bromley, p.275*
16. [1953] 2 A n  Ji.R.1381, [I95h] 1 Q.B. 279.
17prosecuted and convicted of forgery, the ex-wife
testifying against him. On appeal the Court of.Criminal
Appeal held that the wife was incompetent to testify as she
did in spite of the fact that she was no longer his-wife
v/hen the trial took place, and in spite of the fact that
10
their marriage was voidable anyway.
As already indicated in the section on non-Christian
marriage spouses, the courts are ready to make a presumption
in favour of Christian marriages where the result of such
assumption would be to prevent one spouse from being allowed
or, a foftiori. being compelled to testify against the other
spouse without the consent of the accused, ^here is a long
line of cases in which this principle was either laid down
in e xpress terms or applied without verbal formulation. In
R. y, Ajjyoia, ^  for instance, the ^est African Court of
Appeal held in terms that 7/here a wife was sworn on the
Bible (her husband 7/as also sworn on the Bible) before she
testified, there was a presumption that she was a wife of
a Christian marriage. It 7/as, therefore, also held that
she was not a competent witness against her husband without .
his consent. This decision was followed by the same court
20
four years later in R. v. Udom; by Morgan, J. in
17. It should be noted that the man could not be charged 
with stealing the money, since the "theft" took place 5 
while he and the owner of the money were' husband and 
v/ife, and since the fftheftH did not occur v/hile the 
accused was deserting or about to desert his wife.
18. Cf. Bromley, n.64.
19. (1943) 9 W.A.C.a .22.
20. (1947) 12 tf.A.C.A.227.
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21Akpolokpolo v« Commissioner of Police» and by the Re-
c% 22 
deral ^upreme °ourt in R« v« Adesina. Chief Justice
Verity summed up the law on the point thus:
"This question has been dealt with in a number of
23cases. In R. v. Mamodu Laoyo it was said that 
where a witness was sworn on the Koran she was . 
'presumably a Mohammedan'f but the court added;
'a point of this importance should not be left to 
presumption'. In R. v. Ajiyola and others where both 
the witnesses and the person charged were sworn on 
the Bible the Court said 'it must be taken that they 
are husband and wife of a Christian marriage and the 
woman was only a competent witness if called upon the 
application of the person charged.* In R.v. Ajobodu 
Afenya [unreported] it was lid down that it is neces­
sary for the prosecution to show that the marriage is
not monogamous and that this cannot be presumed. This
2Uwas followed in R. v. Udom." ^
In civil cases, on the other hand, the rule is that
both spouses are competent witnesses each for and against 
25the other. This is the effect of the broad provisions
21. (1960} W.R.N.L.R.89.
22. (1958) 3 P.S.C.25* Conviction upheld on grounds of 
other sufficient evidence.
23* 6 W.A.C.A.6.
2b* Idiong v. R. (1950) 13 ‘^•A.C.A#30, at p.31*
25* See Evidence Act, ss.157> 162 and 167; and s.li+9 of 
the Criminal Procedure ^ode - a curious section which 
in fact deals with civil litigg&ion.
of s. 157 of the Evidence Act which says: "Subject to the 
proviso contained in s.Hj-7 [relating to evidence of non- 
access by husband and wife] in all civil proceedings the 
parties to the suit and the husband or wife of any party to 
the suit, shall be competent witnesses." Similar in 
terms to this are the provisions of s. 11*9 of the Criminal 
Procedure code which says that the spouses shall be competent 
witnesses in an action by a Christian marriage wife for 
the protection of her separate property - an action she is 
entitled to bring against her husband or anyone else by 
virtue, inter alia, of s. 148 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
Again, s.162 of the Evidence Act provides that "The parties 
to any proceedings instituted in consequence of adultery 
and the husbands and wives of the parties shall be competent 
to give evidence in the proceedings." Finally, s.163 of the 
same (Evidence) Act provides -
"No husband or wife shall be compelled to disclose 
any communication made to him or her during marriage 
by any person to whom he or she is or has been married; 
nor shall he or she be permitted to disclose any 
such communication, unless the person who made it, 
or that person's representative in interest, consents, 
except in suits between married persons, or proceedings 
in which one married person is prosecuted for an offence 
specified in subsection (l) of s.l60."
The wording of this section, (in particular, the insertion
therein of the phrases "any person to whom he or. she is or
has been married" and "nor shall he or she be permitted to
disclose any such communication"), avoids two possible
sources of hardship which exist in s.3 of the Evidence Act,
1853* of England and in s.l60(3) of the Evidence Ac,t of
Nigeria which are practically identical in their terms.
As Bromley says of the English provision, "... it gives
the privilege to the spouse to whom the statement was.made’
and not to the maker of it. Hence if the statement in
question was made by the husband to his wife, he may be
compelled to disclose it although his wife may not; but
if she waives her privilege he has no power to prevent her
26from breaking his confidence." Section 162 of the
Nigerian Evidence Act obviously avoids these strictures by 
protecting both the maker and the recipient of the commu­
nication. It also avoids this other defect of which Bromley 
complains thus: " ... once the marriage has been terminated 
by death or divorce, the surviving or former spouse, no 
longer being the husband or wife of the other, may then be
compelled to disclose communications which during the mar-
27
riage would have been privileged." The effect of this 
section is, therefore, that neither party to a Christian
26. Npomley, p.274*
27* So held in Ehenton v. T.vler [1939] 1 All H.K.827;
[1939] Ch.620: a court of Appeal decision.
marriage is compella'ble to disclose any communication made
to him or her by the other party; that neither party may
be allowed to disclose any such communication without the
consent of the party who made it or his/her successor in
interest; and that a communication once thus privileged
never ceases to be privileged even after the marriage has
28come to an end*
Spouses and the law of wills
The law relating to wills is governed by two 
sets of statutes. The first set consists of (a) the Wills 
Act, 1837* of England which applies to Nigeria as a statute 
of general application, and which still governs testamenta­
ry dispositions in Lagos and the Eastern Legion; and 
the Y/ills Law, 1958 (No.28 of 1958) of the Western Region, 
which is an adaptation and re-enactment of the Snglish 
statute of 1837* The second set concerns women’s capacity 
to make wills, and comprises (c) the Carried Women’s property 
Acts, 1882 and 1893* of England which also apply to Nigeria 
as statutes of general application and which are still 
in force in Lagos and the Lastern Region; and (d) the 
Married Women’s Property Lav/ of the Western Region already 
referred to.
Three points call for brief mention here on the
28. The discusion assumes throughout that the communication 
was made during the subsistence of the marriage.
law of wills as it affects husbands and wives# r^he first 
is the capacity of women to make testamentary dispositions), 
the second is the effect of a person’s marriage on his 
existing will; and the third relates to the validity or 
otherwise of a gift made to a person’s spouse in a will 
which he attests.
(i) Testamentary capacity of women.
There are no statutory provisions which disqualify 
women from making testamentary dispositions of their se­
parate property by reason only of their sex. Neither is 
there any such incapacity on women property owners at com­
mon law or under customary law. As far as a feme sole is 
concerned, therefore, there is the same, legal capacity , to 
make a will as attaches to a man. 3.8 of the Wills Act, 
1837* deprived married women of any testamentary capacity; 
but that defect was later removed by s.l of the harried
Women’s Property Act, 1882, and s.3 of the Harried Women’s
1
Property Act, 1893*
(ii) Effect of marriage on existing wills.
Section 18 of the WHis Act, 1837* provides that-
"Every will made by a man or woman shall be
revoked by his or her marriage ....”
The intention of the legislature in enacting this section
was obviously to make a testator’s estate descend on his
1. Cf. the Married-Women’s Property. Law of the Y/estern 
Region, ss.3 and 13*
8wife and.issue as on intestacy (mutatis mutandis for a 
testatrix) should he forget to change his will after 
marriage in favour of his widow and issue if any - an in­
tention which appears clearly in the exception to this ge­
neral rule in the same section, to he considered presently. 
Clearly then there is a strong case for the application of 
this rule to customary law marriages, in the patrilineal 
societies at all events, ^or while it is true that women 
do not inherit anything from their deceased husbands, it is 
equally true that sons do so in all patrilineal societies 
and that daughters too inherit under some customary laws.
So far, this question has not come before the courts.
But s. 15 of the '^ills Law, 1958, of the Wester Region ex­
pressly removes customary law marriages from the operation 
of that rule when it provides -
“Every will made by a man or woman shall be revoked 
by his or her marriage (other than a marriage in 
accordance with customary law) ....“
The reason for this exclusion is apparently a desire on the 
part of the legislature to keep the legal effects of the 
two systems of marriages separate and distinct. Vvhile 
this may be a laudable objective at the present stage of 
our legal development, there is little doubt but that the 
result could be hardship and injustice in some cases. Sup­
pose a testator who was married under customary law made a
will in vhich he left all his property “to my wife Mgbogo, 
my daughter Odukpe, and my sons Ekong and Aghevba!f# His 
wife later died, and he contracted another customary mar­
riage, of which four sons were born* He never got round to 
altering his will* He now dies, leaving his .widow and 
seven children surviving* Had his first wife survived him, 
the second wife and her four sons would have been without 
any inheritance from him; what is worse, they would lose 
their rights to a roof over their heads (assuming the fami-. 
ly all lived in the late testator’s house*) As it is, the 
surviving widow is entitled to nothing under the will, 
since the gift to the testator’s wife was made to her by 
name. And since that wife pre-deceased the testator, her 
legacy lapsed. It is only to this part of the estate that 
the four sons of the surviving widow are entitled on partial 
intestacy - a part which they have to share with the other 
three children who got the bulk of their father’s estate 
under the will. Now, had the testator re-married under 
the Marriage Act after the death of his first wife, this 
will would iuso facto have been revoked; both the widow and 
all seven children would each be entitled to some share in 
the estate under the provisions of S.I4.9 of the Administration 
of Estates Law, 1959* of that Region.
Agency of necessity*
One of the common lav/ remedies open to a wife
whose husband fails in his duty to maintain her in the style
to which she is accustomed* having regard to the man’s
social position and resources, is to pledge his credit for
the purchase of such goods and services as are “necessaries1
for her and the household* "The power", says Bromley,
"takes the form of an irrevocable authority vested in the
wife to act as her husband’s agent for the purchase of
necessaries ♦ ♦♦." Though normally exercised by wives
living apart from their husbands, this power is probably
exercisable by a woman cohabiting with her husband if he
fails to make her adequate allowance for housekeeping:
Alderston, B., in Bead v. Regard.^  A wife’s agency of
2necessity was held in Bazeley v. ^order to include a
right to pledge her husband’s credit for the purchase of
necessaries for their children. The term "necessaries"
here include; not only food and clothing but also lodging
3
and education. It must be emphasised, however, that 
agency of necessity does not arise except where the husband 
fails to supply his wife with enough funds to purchase 
what the law would consider to be necessaries in the parti­
cular circumstances of the household, and then perhaps only 
where the wife is living apart from the husband.
1. (1851) 6 Ex.636; Bromley, pp.198-9.
2. (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 559.
3. Bromley, p.336. Agency of necessity is too big a subject 
to be dealt with at all adequately here. Eor details, 
reference should be made to standard works on Agency
and Sivorce.
It has been suggested by a distinguished writer 
that "the wife (or wives) may pledge the husband’s credit 
for such necessaries of life as are suited to her (or 
their) condition’* ^ - the use of the plural forms in 
parenthesis indicating that the rule applies to customary 
marriage wives as well as to Christian marriage ones. But 
inquiries made so far have not discovered any society in 
our area of reference where the principle of agency of 
necessity is recognised by customary law.
!+• Elias, Groundwork, p.296.
Inheritance rights of spouses in each otherys -property
1. Under customary law
(a) Position of widow
Nowhere in southern Nigeria does the customary 
law give a widow-.the right to inherit, or to share in the, 
intestate estate of her husband.^ The federal Supreme
2CourtTs decision on the Yoruba case of Suberu v. Sunmonu
neatly sums up the law for all societies in these words:
"It is a well settled rule of native law and custom
of the Yoruba people that % wife could not inherit
■5
her husbandTs property.M 
Even where a husband in his life time allots a farm, a 
house or some other form of landed property to his wife 
for her use and enjoyment, the latter does not thereby 
acquire inheritance rights in it. A contention that she 
did acquire such rights under Yoruba law was rejected in 
no uncertain terms by the West African Court of Appeal in 
Dosunmu v. Dosunmu.^ As the Court put it -
"The native law and custom alleged here is, brM*lyr
that property can be allotted and descend not through
1. See Esenwa, loc.cit., p.60; Cotton, "The people of Old 
Calabar", loc.cit., p.305; Talbot, In the shadow of the 
bush, p.3lU (Ekoi); Forde,■Marriage and the family 
among the Yako, p.70; P'orde, "Double Descent among the 
Yako", loc.cit., p.325; Lloyd, "Some notes on the Yoruba 
rules of succession ....", loc.cit., p.28; Omoneukanrin, 
op.cit., p.7U (Itsekiri); OokerT op.cit♦, p.l6l; Thomas, 
‘‘Marriage and legal customs of the ^ao-speaking peoples 
of Nigeria", loc.cit., p.100; Lloyd, Yoruba Land law, 
Pp.30i|-205.
2. (1957) 2 F.S.C.33.
3. Prom the headnote.
k. (195U) lk W.A.C.A.527.
a child but through a wife. If such native law and 
custom existed, it would mean that on the death of a 
childless wife, not of the same family as her husband, 
property vested in her would pass away from the husbandte 
family, from whom the wife became entitled to it, to 
the wife’s family."
As will appear later, it is for this same reason that a 
husband is excluded from succession to his wife’s share of 
her (maiden) family property.
Nevertheless, a widow is not entirely without
rights in her late husband’s estate. She has a legal right
to retain the use and possession of the matrimonial home,
whoever the new owner of the radical title may be and even
if the said matrimonial home happens to be part of the fa-
£
mily property. In the same way, a widow is entitled to 
make use of as much portion of her late husband’s farm 
land as she ordinarily requires. In either case, she has 
the right whether or not she has any children surviving, 
and for as long as she wishes to remain in residence among
■y
her late husband’s people.' The result is that the legal 
heir’s right to possession is postponed till the widow dies 
or re-marries or otherwise leaves the family for good.
5. Ibid., at p.528.
6. Cf. Coker, p.l6l.
7. Ibid., pp.l60 and 2kk*
(b) Position of husband
With the exception of the Ekoi and' the Yoruha, 
the general rule is that a man can inherit his wife’s post­
nuptial movable property and any ante-nuptial property which 
she brought with her to the matrimonial home. He only does 
so, however, if there are no children of the marriage or, 
more generally, if the woman left no children who are en­
titled to succeed to her property on intestacy. A husband 
has no right to inherit his wife’s ante-nuptial landed 
property, at all events where such land is situated in the
g
territory of her maiden community. Similarly, he cannot
inherit her share of her (maiden) family land, as this would
mean that the land in question would pass away from the woman
to the man’s family. But a man can and does inherit his
wife’s after-acquired landed property if at any rate it is
9
situated in his or in a neutral community.
The Yoruba rule, on the other hand, is that a man 
does not inherit his wife’s property or anybpart thereof on 
intestacy. Her primary heirs are, as we have seen, her 
children. Pailing children, her siblings will inherit."^ 
Under ^koi (including Yako) law, too, a woman’s heirs are
her siblings, not her husband,xf she left no children
8. Cf. Nwugege va Adigwe (193UJ 11 N.L.5,l3lj.,
9* "Neutral” means here neither in his nor in her local 
community.
10. Lloyd, "Some notes on the Yoruba rules of succession ...." 
loc.cit.» p.28; Partfidge, ’’Native law and custom in 
Egbaland", loc. cit., p.5-33; Lloyd, Yoruba land law, p.30U
surviving her.*^ ^h±s rule also applies to the property 
of "small dowry1 marriage wives in I jaw law,
2. Under the general law,
(a) Lagos,
The surviving spouse of a person who contracted
a marriage under the Marriage Act and who in his life time
was subject to customary law is entitled to succeed to the
intestate estate of the latter; so is the surviving spouse
12of an issue of such marriage. It is immaterial whether 
or not the issue of an ’Ordinance marriage’ was himself 
married under the Act or died single; his disposable pro­
perty still descends to his spouse in whole or in part in 
accordance with the provisions of English law aa it stood
on the date of commencement of the Act in 191U# Again, if
13the Privy Council decision in Coleman v. bhang is followed 
by the courts in Nigeria, as it probably will be, then it 
would also make no difference that the surviving spouse is 
not an ’Ordinancy marriage’ spouse. Provided only that man 
of the spouses was once married under the Act, any spouse 
who ultimately survives him will benefit from the provisions 
of s.36(1) of that Act.1^
The effect of s. 36 of the Mapriage Act is to
11. Porde, Marriage and the family among the Yako, p.69*
12. S#36(l), Marriage Act.
13. [1961] 2 All E.R.i|06: on appeal from the Supreme Court 
of Ghana.
1U# k'or a more detailed discussion, see the section on the 
inheritance rights of parents and children inter se,
• post.
incorporate into the law of Lagos the provisions of the 
Statutes of Listribution 1670 and 1685 as amended hy the 
Intestates1 Estates Act, 1890, of England. These provisions 
may "be summarised as follows. If a man so married dies 
intestate as regards the whole or ary part of his persona­
lity or as regards any realty which he could have disposed 
of by will, this property shall be distributed as if it 
only consists of personalty. Where there are surviving 
issue in addition to the widow, the latter is entitled to 
one-third of the net estate - the rest going to the said 
issue. If there are no issue who can inherit, the widow 
takes the entire net estate if it does not exceed £500 in 
value. If it exceeds £500, she takes one-half of the net 
estate, plus another charge of £ 500 on the estate, plus 
an interest of 1+ per cent, per annum on the value of her 
inheritance as from the date of the husband*s death.
Where the surviving spouse is the husband, he is 
entitled to the deceased’s net estate absolutely, whether 
or not there are any issue surviving.
(b) Western Region
The inheritance rights of the spouses of a Chris­
tian marriage inter se is governed by s.1+9 of the Administra 
tion of Estates Law, 1959* of the Western Region. If the 
spouse in question dies intestate, leaving the other spouse 
surviving, but not leaving any issue or parent, or brother
427
or sister of the whole blood or any issue thereof, then 
"the residuary estate shall be held in trust for the sur- 
viving husband or wife absolutely: s.h9(l)(i)(l)* Where
the deceased left a spouse as well as issue/surviving, the 
surviving spouse shall take (a) all the personal chattels 
absolutely; (b) a charge on the residuary estate to the 
value of one-third of such residue; and (c)rr.subject to 
this charge, one-third of the said residue shall be held 
in trust for the surviving spouse for life. Finally, if 
the intestate left a spouse and one or more immediate re­
lations (i.e. parents, brothers or sisters of the whole 
blood), but no issue, then (a) the surviving spouse is en­
titled to the personal chattels absolutely; (b) in addi­
tion, the residual estate shall stand charged with a money 
payment to him or her equal to two-thirds of the value of 
the said residue; (c) subject to the payment of this charge 
half the residue shall be held in trust for the surviving 
spouse, and the other half shall be held in trust for the 
surviving parent absolutely (equally, if both parents are 
still alive), or on trust for sale for the deceased’s 
brothers and sisters of the whole blood.
(c) Eastern Region
Whether or not the provisions of any, and if so 
which, English statutes apply to the ^astern-Region is far 
from clear, ^or many years, the courts have held almost
consistently that thougVi s . 36 (l) of the Marriage Act did 
not apply to the Region, succession to the intestate estate 
of any person who contracted a Christian marriage should he 
regulated by the law of England and not by the local customary 
law. ^his was, for example, the decision of Ames, J. in
*] c
Ke Emodie, Administrator-General v. Rgbuna. But the ^hief
Justice of the Region said twelve years later in Onwudinjoh
v. Onwudinjoh ^  that he would not decide the case before
him in accordance with the line of cases whereby successive
generations of his learned bretheren had sought to bring
the law of Nigeria in line with that of England as it was at
the close of the nineteenth century. In his view, the de-
17cision ih Cole v. cole f on which later judges based their
own judgments, may one day be called in question by the Fe-
18deral Supreme ^ourt. If therefore Re Fmodie and similar
cases are followed, the inheritance rights of spouses of a 
Christian marriage will be the same as those already dis­
cussed in connexion with hagos. If, on the other hand,
Ainley, C.J.’s hint is heeded by the courts, customary law 
and not the law of England will be applied. In that case, 
the rules discussed in the section on customary lav/ rights 
of spouses to take on each other’s intestacy will apply.
15. (1945) 18 N.L.R.l.
16. (1957) II E.R.L.R.l.
17. (1898) 1 N.L.R.15.
18. Onwudinjoh v. Onwudinftoh, ante, at p.5*
CHAPTER ELEVEN
PARENT AND CHILD Jtf
  ^
LEGITIMACY, LEGITIMATION AND AFFILIATION 
A. LEGITIMACY.
Conflict of laws.
The problem of determining whether or not a child 
is legitimate represents one of the most complex aspects of 
the notoriously complicated field of conflict of laws in 
Nigeria. For it calls for answers to at least three 
deceptively simple questions, involving three tiers of 
choice of law rules:
(a) to which legal system shall reference be 
made, Nigerian or foreign?
(b) if Nigerian, which type of law should 
apply, customary or non-customary; if the 
former, which society’s law is to be applied;
(c) to what extent, if at all, do the two types 
of law in Nigeria employ the same principles 
in deciding a person’s legitimacy or 
otherwise?
The position is made more difficult by a number of judicial 
dicta which, by suggesting that the customary law knows 
nothing of illegitimacy as a status, tend to blur the 
distinction between legitimacy at birth and legitimation by
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subsequent events, and the further distinction between 
legitimacy as a status and membership of a social group.
Taking the last points first and anticipating 
a little what will be later developed more fully, it 
should be pointed out at the outset that there is a 
status of illegitimacy under the customary laws of all 
the societies within our area of reference; that this 
status carries with it certain legal disabilities 
especially in relation to inheritance and succession to 
property and traditional offices with ritual functions 
respectively; that while the Nigerian’s proverbial desire 
for children has led to the principle that, in a 
patrilineal society, every child is affiliated to 
(i.e. is a member of) some family at birth, a child in 
such a society is illegitimate if his membership of the 
family derives solely from that of his mother as opposed 
to his father; and that to say that a child’s status as 
legitimate has nothing to do with his mother’s status as 
a wife or widow is to confuse legitimacy acquired at and 
by virtue of birth with legitimacy acquired after birth 
by virtue of the subsequent act of the parents or one of 
them.
(a) Nigerian or foreign law?
The legitimacy or otherwise of a non-Nigerian 
child is determined with reference to the law of his
r o
lk O f
domicil at any given moment.^ A child’s domicil is that 
of his parents, if married to eafch other, and changes with 
it as will be seen later* (The child’s nationality or 
citizenship is irrelevant for this purpose*) If the 
parents were not married to each ofher at the time of his 
birth, and if they had different domicils either then or 
subsequently, his domicil is that of his mother. If* 
however, the child’s parents were married to each other 
at the time he was conceived or born, his domicil would 
be that of his father. The father’s domicil may be his 
domicil of origin, namely where he was born, or that of 
choice; for a man may change his domicil at will 
provided he has attained the age of twenty-one. A 
mother’s domicil, too, may be either one of origin or 
one of choice. But it may also be a domicil of 
dependence, viz. that of her husband for the time being.
It follows that where a child depends for his domicil on 
his mother (because he was born out of wedlock, or because 
his father has didd), his domicil may change to that of 
his mother’s new husband even if the child has in no way 
been accepted as a member of his household and has never
1. Bamgbose v. Daniel (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 116; ^955jf
A.C. 107; Phillips, "Conflict between statutory and
customary law of marriage in Nigeria,” (1955)
18 M.L.R. 75, at p. 75.
2. Bromley, p. 14.
been to the new man’s country* (We shall see later that 
this only happens when the mother expressly changes the 
child’s domicil for his own benefit*)
Once the child’s domicil is ascertained through 
the application of one of the above rules, the question 
of his legitimacy is determined with reference to the 
law of that place. These, by the way, are English 
conflict of laws rules which apply to Nigeria presumably 
under the general rubric of "common law". Incidentally, 
too, these rules apply without regard to the child’s 
nationality or citizenship, as a rule* Thus a child 
born in Nigeria since independence is a Nigerian citizen 
by birth (subject to two exceptions relating to the 
children of enemy aliens and members of the diplomatic 
corps.) But he will not have a Nigerian domicil if his 
father is domiciled elsewhere.
(b) Which Nigerian law?
If a child’s domicil of dependence, as above 
described, is Nigeria, we are faced with the problem of 
internal conflict of laws. To begin with, which of the 
two types of law in force in the country should be 
applied - customary law or the general law? The prima 
facie answer is that this would depend on whether the 
child in question was born of a customary or a Christian 
marriage. But this, in our submission, would be quite
wrong. While the married status of a child’s parents
at the time of his conception or birthf is a vital point
in determining his domicil in external conflict of law
cases as already seen, and while that status may be
important in deciding the question of legitimacy itself
Nigeria,
where the child is domiciled » it is irrelevant to
the problem of choice of law. The vital question here
is whether or not the child concerned is a person subject
to customary law. If he is, then the proper law of the
3case would be the customary law of the child's society. 
Since, in spite of early judicial dicta to the contrary, 
the courts still regard all Nigerians^ as subject to 
customary law by applying that law to cases to which they 
are parties (wherever the nature of the cause or the 
transaction which gave rise to it permits,) it follows 
that for practically all Nigerians the proper law of a 
legitimacy case is his local customary law. A child’s 
"local customary law" is that which prevails in the society 
of which he, like his ancestors before him, is a member.
3. So held in Re Macaulay, 13 W.A.C.A. 304. See the 
unanimous judgment in this case (per Verity, O.J.) 
at pp. 309-10, for the point under discussion.
4. The statutory provisions which require the courts to 
apply and enforce the application of customary law in 
suits involving "natives" have already been discussed. 
The difficulty of applying these provisions to 
naturalised Nigerians has been Mntbdd.
If, however, a child is not subject to customary law 
(e.g. where his parents had immigrated into the country 
from a European or North American country), his 
legitimacy will be determined with reference to the general 
law (ante), which is the same as the law of England.
Who is legitimate?
(a) Under the general law, a child is 
illegitimate if born out of wedlock and vice versa. A 
child is only born in wedlock if he is the joint 
biological product of his parents, and if the said parents 
were lawfully married at the date of his conception or 
birth. A child so conceived or born is legitimate at 
birth; all others are not. If a marriage is void ab initio, 
any children born of it are illegitimate at birth. Thus 
in Onwudinjoh v. Onwudinjoh, a man purported, during
the subsistence of his Christian marriage, to marry 
another woman under customary law, and of this latter 
"marriage” a number of children were born. It was held 
that as the second marriage was void by virtue of s.35 
of the Marriage Act, these children were illegitimate.
In coming to this decision, the court was obviously
5. The Legitimacy Act is a misnomer, so is the 
Legitimacy Law of the W. Region. They only deal 
with legitimation by subsequent marriage and its 
effects on inheritance.
6. (1957) TT E.R.L.R. 1.
applying the general law principle that a child horn out
of wedlock is illegitimate. In view of the decision in 
7
Re Macaulay1 on the proper law applicable to cases of 
persons subject to customary law in Nigeria, this choice 
of law might be said to be wrong in principle. But it is 
perhaps justifiable on the general conflict of law rule 
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, any 
foreign law may be presumed to be the same as what we
o
shall call the primary law of the court. (As we have 
seen, customary law is treated as foreign law in the 
Interpretation Act, for the purposes of its ascertainment 
in court)• Be that as it may, the important point here 
is that under the general law, and in the absence of any 
personal law operating to the contrary, children of a 
marriage that was void ab initio are illegitimate.
If a marriage was voidable and was later nullified, 
any children thereof will be legitimate if they would have 
been so had the marriage been valid to begin with but 
subsequently dissolved by divorce. This is because the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, provides:
"Where a decree of nullity is granted in respect 
of any voidable marriage, any child who would have 
been the legitimate child of the parties to the
7. Ante.
8. Cf. Allot, Essays in African Law.
marriage if it had been dissolved, instead of being 
annulled, at the date of the decree shall be deemed to be 
their legitimate child notwithstanding the annulment.*1 
Doubt has been expressed as to whether the phrase wat 
the date of the decree" refers to "the legitimate child 
of the parties to the marriage" or to "if it had been
Q
dissolved."^ If the former, then a child would only 
be legitimate by virtue of this section if he would have 
been legitimate at the date of the annulment, had the 
marriage been valid in the first place. In other words, 
a child conceived during the subsistence of a voidable 
marriage would not be legitimate if born after the said 
marriage had been annulled even if he was the joint 
biological product of his parents as parties to the 
marriage. But if the :other view is correct, then a 
child would be legitimate even if born subsiquently to 
the annulment of his parents* voidable marriage, provided 
he was their joint product and was conceived during the 
subsistence of the marriage. This, in our submission, 
is the correct interpretation of the section. In other 
words, the section simply means that a child born of a 
voidable marriage which was subsequently annuled at a 
given date shall be legitimate if he would have been so 
had the words "voidable" and "annulled" been replaced 
with "valid" and "dissolved" respectively, so that what 
took place in fact at the relevant date was a dissolution
9. Bromley, p. 290, note (y)
of a valid marriage.
(b) Under tfc^  customary law, no child is born 
illegitimate if he was either conceived or born during 
the subsistence of his mother's valid marriage. And, 
as a general rule, a child is legitimate if conceived and/ 
or born during his mother’s widowhood, provided that 
her marriage to the late husband had not been formally 
dissolved (usually by repayment of the bride price).
This means that paternity and legitimacy have no necessary 
connection under customary law. A child is the legitimate 
child of the man to whom his mother was married at the 
time of his birth (sometimes conception), whether the 
said husband is alive or deceased, and whether or not the 
husband was also the child's natural father.^ In 
Briggs v. Briggs (see note 10), a man sued a woman in the 
Kalahari Native Court for slander because she had said that 
the plaintiff was not a son of his father's. The plaintiff1 
father gave evidence for the defendant,and the action 
failed^ apparently on grounds of justification. Later
10. Cf. Polarin, op. cit., p. 33. See also Briggs v . 
Briggs (1957) II E.R.L.R.6, where this was the 
substance of counsel's^contention, insofar as this 
could be gleaned from the judgment of Palmer, Ag.J., at
p. 8.
the plaintiff sued his own father in the Magistrate's 
Court, again for slander - the father having repeated 
his statements about the plaintiff's paternity outside 
the court. The magistrate gave judgment for the plain­
tiff, and his father appealed on the ground that* the 
magistrate had no jurisdiction over the case which,he 
argued, was a matter of "family status". In the High 
Court, the case was fought mainly on the issue of 
justification. In allowing the father's appeal, Palmer, 
Acting J. said:
"A curious point was raised in argument which I 
confess I have some difficulty in following. It 
is said that the essence of the defamation lies not 
in the defendant's denial that he is the plaintiff's 
father, but in the further assertion that Ajumo is.
I cannot quite see what difference it makes ......
I am saitsfied that the real question at stake is 
the plaintiff's paternity and legitimacy."11 
It is submitted that what is curious in the case is not
that the plaintiff and his counsel were trying to 
distinguish between paternity and legitimacy in Kalahari 
customary law, but that the learned judge should fail to 
see that distinction, or worse still, having seen it,
11. Briggs v . Briggs (ante), at p. 8. But query if
these two concepts (paternity and legitimacy) are
identical in Kalahari law.
should dismiss it as immaterial. What the plaintiff 
was saying was that he was his father's son legally even 
if not biologically. If this was actually what he 
pleaded and argued in the lower court, then in our 
submission, the court erred in telescoping the two 
concepts of paternity and legitimacy into one and treating 
the issue as if the case revolved on the single question 
of paternity in the biological sense. It is a great 
pity that expert evidence was neither asked for nor 
called to help determine the following questions which, 
in our submission, were really the crux of the plaintiff's 
case:
(a) whether in Kalahari customary law a person 
was a lawful child of his mother's husband at the time 
of his birth, even if he was not also a biological 
product of the said husband;
(b) if the answer to this question is in the 
affirmative, whether such legal relationship could be 
repudiated by the father; and
(c) if a father had no such right to repudiate
in law, whether his purported repudiation was defamatory 
of the child concerned.
In fairness to the learned judge, however, it 
must be pointed out that whatever observations he made on 
the identity or otherwise of the concepts of paternity 
and legitimacy were entirely obiter. For in hiw own
words:
"The main issue raised in this case is the paternity
12of the plaintiff, which is a matter of family 
status. There is sufficient evidence to show that 
this issue is within the jurisdiction of the 
Kalahari Native Court .... The jurisdiction of the 
Magistrate's Court is therefore ousted.
"In the result, therefore, this appeal must be 
allowed, the judgment of the lower court set aside, 
and the plaintiff's claim struck out for want of 
jurisdiction. If the plaintiff wishes to have the 
matter of his paternity determined, the only court 
in which he can take action is the Kalahari Native 
Court. If he feels, as he may well do, that it 
should not he tried there, he must apply for a
1*5
transfer" to a higher court.
The decision in this case, therefore, still leaves open 
the question whether or not there is a necessary connection 
between biological paternity and legal paternity (i.e. 
legitimacy in this context) in Kalahari law. And, for 
what it is worth, the judgment of the Magistrate's Court, 
albeit given without jurisdiction, gives some indication
12. This, with respect, is not quite accurate: the main
issue appears to he legitimacy, not paternity. But 
this does not affect the correctness of the court's 
decision which only concerned jurisdiction.
13• Ibid., at p. 9
that there is no such necessary connection* The High
Court did decide, however, that the proper court in which
to "bring an action wherein the issue of family status
was raised should be the local Customary Court. It
therefore, also held by implication that the proper law of
such a case was the local customary law, since this would
naturally be the primary law of that court. But it
cannot be emphasised too strongly that even if the case
were tried by a non-customary court (by way of transfer,
for example, or on appeal), the proper law would still be
the parties' customary law. This, in our view, is not
because the plaintiff was born of a customary marriage, as
the High Court said, but because the parties were persons
subject to customary law*
Y/here a person's mother was not married at the
time of his conception or biirth, the proper law applicable
to the question of his legitimacy is, in our submission, the
customary law of his mother's society, assuming of course
that she is a "native of Nigeria" as defined in s. 3 of
the Interpretation Act. (The enactments setting up the
various Courts provide that customary law shall apply
1 4 - xwhere the parties are natives are irrelevant here. )
14. See, e.g., the High Court Laws: s.22 (1) (B.R.),
s.12 (W.R.), s.27 (Lagos); Mag. Courts Laws: s.43 
(E.R.), s.32 (W.R.)
15The Privy Council held in Bamgbose v, Daniel
that the status of a child as a legitimate child must
be considered independently of the status of his mother
as a lawful wife or widow, and that the difficulty or.
otherwise of accepting his mother as a lawful widow for
the purposes of the Statute of Distribution does not
affect the claim of the child as a legitimate child.
Again a distinguished writer has said: "The legitimacy
of the children depends on their recognition by the father
the status of the mother, as a wife by English or by
16customary law or as a lover is immaterial." It must be 
remembered, however, that the Privy Council was dealing 
in Bamgbose v. Daniel with the inheritance claims of 
children whose mother was married under customary law at 
the time of their birth, and who were treated by the 
deceased as his lawful children down to the end of his 
life. The Court's decision in that case must, therefore, 
not be taken as a general statement of the law relating to 
legitimacy in all circumstances. As Coker reminds us in 
connection with Yoruba law (it was under Yoruba law that 
Bamgbose v. Daniel was decided), it is not correct to 
suppose that there is no status of illegitimacy, for that
15. (1954) 14 W.A.C.A.116; /T9557 A.C.107.
16. Lloyd, "Some notes on the Yoruba ..." (1959)
3 J.A.L., at p.22; Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, p.297.
status does exist: a "bastard • •• is commonly called the
omo ale, which literally means ’the child of a mistress
17or unmarried woman1 It is submitted that there is a 
customary law rule of universal application in southern 
Nigeria, viz* that a child born of a unmarried mother is 
illegitimate at birth - "unmarried" being used here to 
include women whose marriages have been legally dissolved*
Presumption of Legitimacy*
Section 147 of the Evidence Act provides that if 
a child is born to a man’s wife during the subsistence of 
a valid marriage or within 280 days after its dissolution, 
the woman remaining unmarried meanwhile, this fact "shall 
be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that 
man," unless it can be proved (a) that there was no access 
during the material period, or (b) that even if there had 
been a meeting or more of the spouses during the material 
period, the circumstances were such that sexual intercourse 
was "highly improbable." It is therefore possible to 
prove that a child was not born in wedlock in the sense of 
not being the natural and joint product of his parents, 
by showing*for example, that his "father" was impotent, too 
ill or too far away from the mother all during the possible
17* Coker, op* cit*, p. 237 Cf. Simmons, loc♦ cit*, 
p. 156., p* 156, on the Efik.
period of gestation, or that his mother and her husband 
never met in private, or that they only met in a prison 
cell with a glass wall between them*
A proviso to s* 147 says, however, that neither 
spouse is a competent witness as to "their having or not 
having had sexual intercourse with each other where the 
legitimacy of the woman’s child would be affected," and 
further that declarations made by either spouse on this 
subject are not relevant (i.e. admissible) evidence.
The effect of this is that only circumstantial evidence 
introduced by third parties could be used to prove a 
person’s illegitimacy in these circumstances, in the 
vast majority of cases. It may be objected that positive 
evidence may be adducjted to prove that the child in 
question was a natural child of another man, and that 
both spouses as well as third parties can introduce such 
evidence. (Blood test and comparison of physical features 
readily spring to mind here.) But it is submitted that 
evidence of this type may be useful in proving adultery; 
it is completely useless in disproving legitimacy. This 
is because s.147 only provides for two related methods 
whereby the presumption of legitimacy can be rebutted. 
These are by proof of non-access during marriage or within 
280 days of the dissolution of the marriage; and by proof 
that even if there was access, the chances of sexual 
intercourse having taken place were practically non­
existent* No other method of disproving legitimacy is 
contemplated* And so it is not open to anyone to 
negative the presumption of legitimacy by ascribing 
paternity to a third party however strong the indications 
are from laboratory tests and physical resemblances.
This line of reasoning obviously leads to a number of 
anomalies. One of these is that it might be possible 
to show from blood tests and other scientific methods 
that a woman has committed adultery and that a child te# 
resulted from that illicit liaison. The wife may then 
be divorced and her paramour made liable in damages.
And yet the child concerned would be presumed conclusively 
to be the legitimate child of his mother1s husband.
Another possible anomaly is that, in strict legal principle, 
a man would have no right to repudiate his wife’s child on
not
the ground that he wasjpthe child’s natural father, unless 
he can prove non-access or a very high degree of 
improbability that sexual intercourse could have taken 
place between him and his wife during the possible gestation 
period. How could a man repudiate a child who is deemed 
to be his own legitimate child? Another result of the 
provisions in s. 147 is that a woman’s confession of 
adultery, or its admission by her lover, during divorce 
proceedings or in an action for damages for adultery, as 
the case may be, is not admissible in evidence in an
action for declaration of legitimacy. This is not 
just because the parties are different (as is the case 
in civil actions founded on the same facts as those of 
a prior criminal prosecution); it is because the 
presumption of legitimacy can only be rebutted in the 
way already described, a way which is not open to either 
spouse. (A lover’s confession of adultery is, in our submissicr 
inadmissible evidence in legitimacy proceedings as it 
has nothing to do with access or the absence of it as 
between the spouses themselves.)
There is a proviso to. s. 13 of the Marriage, 
Divorce and Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-Laws Order*
1958, of the Western Region which says simply: "Provided
that the husband of a woman shall be presumed, for the 
purposes of these Bye-Laws, to be the natural father of 
any issue born or conceived by the woman during the 
period over which their marriage sibsists." But there 
is no indication whether or not this presumption is 
rebuttable.
The presumption in favour of a child’s 
legitimacy is not a product of statute law only: it also
exists under customary law pure and simple. The best 
statement of this rule was made by Forde in relation to 
Yako law. A man.) he says, is presumed to be the father 
of his wife’s children. Even where evidence of physical
paternity by another man is conclusive, the husband is
still the legal father of a child born to his wife,
provided only that the marriage was still subsisting -
18presumably at the time the child was conceived^
The same author accounts for this rule in terms of payment
and receipts of dowry (bride price), "There is no doubt,”
iq
he says, "that it is the transfer of the libeman
which gives the husband legal right to his wifefs services
and to the social fatherhood of the children born to her
20during the marriage.” This account is quite correct 
in principle, but it requires a little qualification in 
view of the fact that, as we have seen, the bride price 
may|waived by the person entitled to receive it, deferred 
for a time or paid by instalments. Therefore, there 
need not be any "transfer" of bride price. But there 
must be a valid marriage. And so it may be safely 
concluded that what gives a man a right to the "social 
fatherhood of the children” born to his wife is, in the 
final analysis, the fact of their being married.
The relevant point that emerges from this
18. "DGuble Descent among the Yako" in African Systems 
of Kinship and Marriage (ed. Radcliffe - Brown and 
P o ' r & e ) ----
19* i.e. the bride price, dowry or marriage consideration.
20. Forde, loc.cit♦, p. 323*
discussion is that, other things being equal, a child 
is the legitimate child of his mother’s lawful husband. 
But against this must be set the growing practice of 
sophisticated men renouncing their wives* children on 
the ground of non-paternity, witness the Briggs case* 
However, this practice and its converse have more to do 
with affiliation, and will further be examined later.
B. AFFILIATION
Definition and Scope.
This is such a vast subject that we shall have 
to limit the scope of the present study rather severely. 
The term, "affiliation1 is used in two different and 
unconnected senses. Under the general law, it is usually 
found in the phrase, "affiliation proceedings," which 
means, in simple language, the process whereby a man 
is compelled by the courts to make contributions towards 
the maintenance of his natural child until the latter 
attains a specified age. We shall not be concerned with
this meaning of the term. As used in the field of
customary law, "affiliation" denotes the right of a 
person or his family to the "ownership" of a child, and 
conversely the right of a child to the membership of a 
given family by virtue of his blood relationship with one 
of its members. The present discussion will be confined 
to this meaning of the word.
Child of Unmarried Mother.
Children of unmarried mothers may be classified 
under two heads according as their mothers were or were 
not betrothed at the time of their conception or birth.
And since the law which governs affiliation in each case
is different one from the other, it will be convenient 
to adopt this two-fold classification*
(a) Where mother was not betrothed.
The general rule under customary law is that a
child born of a woman who is neither married nor betrothed
is affiliated to the family of his mother, not that of his
natural father. As Simmons says of the Efik, if an
unmarried girl gives birth to a child, he'“will be
stigmatized as a bastard, or eyen akpara, ’child of a harlot’
Such a child, he says?belongs to his mother’s parents
1whose name he bears. This is true even where the man
2and woman live together as husband and wife, Simmons
3
goes on, a point also made by Pordd about the Yako, by
A
Thomas about the Edo, and by Elias about Nigerian
5societies generally. Similarly, Leith-Ross says of the
Ibo that "if a girl is entirely free, that is to say, if 
not even the smallest instalment of dowry has been paid,
1. hoc. cit., p. 156. Cf. Meek, Law and Authority ....
pp. 282- 3.
2. Ibid., p. 163. Cf. Forde and Jones, op.cit., p. 18.
3. Marriage and the Family among the Yako ..., p. 113.
4. Anthropological Report on the Edo ....... . p. 50
(Urhobo).
5. Groundwork of Nigerian Law, p. 297.
then, if she bears a child, that child belongs to her
parents fbut they think shame.111 Of the Egba Yoruba,
Folarin says, "Any child begotten by un-married woman
for a friend cannot be claimed by that friend as his own"
7
unless he proceeds "forthwith" to marry her. "An 
illegitimate child born before marriage belongs to the
Q
girl's father", states Egharevba, writing of the Bini.
The one writer who makes a categorical statement to the 
contrary is Lloyd in his contribution on the Itsekiri.
In this society, he says, a "man has rights over any child 
of which he can claim biological paternity •••• whether 
or not he was the legal husband of the mother at the
Q
time of the child*s conception or bil*th."^ Similarly, 
Bradbury says that among the Urhobo and the Isoko (Edo), 
illegitimate children "live with their mother when small, 
but the genitor can claim his son later on, perhaps after 
he has paid compensation to the woman's father or husband?*^ 
It would appear nevertheless * that in all these societies - 
Itsekiri, Urhobo and Isoko, the position is very much like 
that in Yorubaland, viz. that in strict law a man has no
6. African Women, A Study of the Ibo of Nigeriat p.103
7. Op. cit., p.33*
8. Op. cit., p.19. Cf. Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit♦, p.36.
9. Bradbury and Lloyd, op. cit.» p.191•
10. Ibid., p.137.
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right to his natural child, but that in the absence of
opposition from the family of the childfs mother, such
a natural father can acquire paternal rights over the
child by acknowledgment.^
This brings us to the modern development on
this subject. As we have seen, there is now statutory
power in the courts to award "paternal rights" to the
natural father of an illegitimate child in parts of the
12Western Region. Elsewhere, the practice is growing 
of natural fathers claiming their illegitimate children 
as against the mothers family - even among the Ibo.
(b) Where mother was betrothed.
The problems that could arise in connection 
with the affiliation of a child whose mother was 
betrothed at the time of his conception or birth are 
many and varied; for the circumstances are capable of 
a wide variety of permutations and combinations. But 
they can all be dealt with in answer to three sets of 
questions. First, if a betrothed girl (including a 
woman whose previous marriage had been dissolved) becomes
11. For further references on the general rule: Basden, 
Among the Ibos, p.76; Thomas, Anthropological 
Report on the Ibo, T, p.69; Esenwa, loc. cit.,
pp.73 and 75; Sporndli, loc.cit.. p.118.
12. i.e. where the Marriage, Divorce and Custody of 
Children .... Order?:, 1958, has been adopted.
jr.
pregnant either by her fiance or per alios, and the 
marriage proposed falls through, so that the child was 
born while his mother was single, who is entitled to the 
child? Secondly, if a girl becomes pregnant by her 
fiance but marries another man before the child is born, 
who is entitled to the child? And thirdly, if a 
betrothed girl becomes pregnant per alios)but proceeds to 
marry her fiancl nevertheless, and the child is born 
subsequently, who is entitled to the child?
Where a betrothed girl becomes pregnant during 
the period of betrothal, but the child is born after the 
termination of the betrothal, affiliation of the child is 
governed by the same rules (already discussed) as apply 
where the girl was not betrothed. The general rule 
(which, as we have seen, is subject to statutory 
modifications in some places and to a growing but as yet 
unrecognised practice elsewhere) is that the child in 
these circumstances is affiliated to the family of his
1. Here as elsewhere in this treatise we speak of people
being "entitled1 to children as if they were pieces 
property. Indeed some writers describe children as 
"property of X" in such circumstances. But it should 
bfc emphasised that this is no more than a reflection 
of people1s almost pathological attachment to 
children as the fulfilment of their mission in life.
It can be translated into "custody" in English law
provided that term is extended to include custody over 
children of unmarried mothers.
mother. In such cases, it makes no difference whether the
♦
pregnancy was caused by the girl's fiance or by another man.
Nor does it matter that the fiance had already paid some
bride price on the girl and that at the time the child was
born this bride price had not been repaid in full or at all.
As we have seen in another context, the mere fact that a
man had paid bride price on a girl does not give him any
rights whatsoever to her children unless the proposed
marriage was actually celebrated: Edet v. Esien (ante).
The answer to the second question flows
naturally from the rule, already discussed, that a child
is the lawful child of the man to whom his mother was
married at the time of his birth, whether or not that man
was his natural father. We may, therefore, state the
rule thus: where a girl is betrothed to a man and
becomes pregnant by him during the period of betrothal,
but marries another man before the child is born, then as
a general rule, the child is affiliated to the second man
as his mother's legal husband, and not to the first man to
whom she was merely betrothed. The woman's family have no
2claims to the child in this case.
If the betrothed girl becomes pregnant per aliQs
2. Gf. Forde, Marriage and the Family among the Yako in
South-Eastern Nigeria^ Once more this rule is subject 
to the provisions in s.13 of the Western Region's 
Marriage ... Adoptive Bye-laws Order, 1958, where this 
enactment has been adopted.
■ . W £
but proceeds nevertheless to marry her fiance, and the 
child is born subsequent to the celebration of the marriage, 
then, subject to the exceptions already indicated, the 
child is affiliated to his mother's fiance, now her 
husband. There is, however, a local variation to this 
rule among the Urhobo and the Isoko areas of Edoland.
In these places, "if a betrothed girl bears a daughter to
a man other than her future husband, the genitor,
paid
provided he has/compensation to the husband, may claim 
the marriage payment when the daughter is herself married." 
From this it would appear that the woman's husband has 
custody (in the technical sense) while the biological 
father has a right to the child's bride price, a right 
which is, however, conditional on his having paid com­
pensation to the husband for the illicit affair. But 
whether the lover has a right to demand that the husband 
shall accept payment of compensation in these circumstances, 
or whether he merely, has an option to make the payment 
and so set up a claim to the child if the husband does not 
feel disposed to be a legal father to another man's 
natural child, is uncertain. It is submitted that the 
second alternative is the more likely except where the 
1958 Marriage .♦ Bye-Laws Ord^r has been adopted, in 
which case "paternal rights" will in all probability be
3. Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit.t p.137.
awarded the natural father. Which brings us to our
second exception to the general rule, viz. that the
courts may now award "paternal rights1 to a natural
father wherever this is possible, having regard to the
child*s interests - in parts of the Western Region;
There are two other local variations which
deserve a word of mention here. The first is that among
the matrilineal Yako (and Skoi generally) of the Cross
River, children born of Yako (or Skoi) parents - but not
those one of whose parents is a 1 non-native” - are
affiliated to the family of their maternal uncles or
grandfathers, though they normally live with their mothers
in her matrimonial or other home till old enough to start
after their father*s death, 
off in life on their own^ / The other local variation is
that in the case of a woman who has been divorced(or
widowed) from a "big dowry” marriage among the I jaw and
parts of the Western Region (already described), all her
subsequent children, whether bo m  to lovers, to fiances
or to later husbands, are affiliated to the ”big dowry"
4husband, if alive, or his family, if he is now deceased.
In these communities, too, a "small dowry” wifefs 
children are affiliated to her family of origin and not
4. Since a "big dowry" marriage is never repeated by 
the same woman, a widow or divorced woman who had 
been so married can only contract a "small dowry” 
marriage after the dissolution of her "big dowry"
5
to that of her husband. These variations described in
this paragraph apply with equal force in the cases about
to be discussed, viz. where a married woman bears, a child
6by a man other than her husband.
Children born during coverture.
The law relating to the affiliation (as above 
defined) of a child born or conceived during the sub­
sistence of his mother’s marriage is virtually identical 
in all societies within our area of reference. Barring 
the exceptional cases and the statutory provisions 
discussed in the last paragraph above, a child born or 
conceived by a married woman is affiliated to whoever was 
that woman’s husband at the time of the child’s birth, or, 
if she had divorced one husband and married another in the 
period between the child’s conception and birth, to the 
man to whom she was married at the time the child was 
conceived. It makes no difference that the husband in 
question was not also the child’s natural father. Nor, 
in particular, is it material that the second man, where 
a change of husbands occurred between conception and
5. See Williamson, loc.cit., pp.55, 56 and 57; Kammer, 
loc.cit.t p.58; Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, 
esp. p.195; Talbot, Peoples of S. Nigeria, Vol.lJf 
p.459.
6. Or where the woman concerned is a widow whose bride 
price has not yet been repaid to her husband’s people.
birth, was the child’s natural father. In other words, 
suppose a man commits adultery with another’s wife and 
she becomes pregnant as a result; suppose further that 
the woman divorces her husband and marries her lover, and 
that the child is b om subsequently to the second marriage, 
the child is still affiliated in law to the former 
husband. A fortiori, where a woman leaves her husband, 
(whether through her own fault as in desertion, or through 
the fault of her husband as in the case of constructive 
desertion) and cohabits with another man, and a child is 
born of the liaison, the child is affiliated to the 
husband, not the lover. In all these cases, it is 
immaterial that the husband concerned has died in the 
internal between the child’s conception and birth: for
in those circumstances the child is affiliated to the 
deceased husband’s family. In the felicitous language 
of Elias, "if a married woman leaves her husband for 
another man by whom she later has a child before her 
first marriage has been formally dissolved and the 
’dowry’ returned to her husband, customary law would 
award the child to the first man to whom she is still 
regarded as married.”^ On the same subject Lloyd wrote 
of the Yoruba, ’’The legitimacy of a child, under customary 
law, as a member of the descent group is determined by his
1. Elias, Groundwork of Nigerian Law, p.297.
birth. The legal pater is the man who was the legal
husband (having paid the bride wealth) of the mother at the
2
time of the child’s conception ...” But perhaps the
clearest expesition of the legal position was made about
the Ibo by Basden when, after stating that a child born of
an adulterous relation by a married woman belongs to her
husband as the legal father, he said, "That he is not
himself the ^biological]?' father will not affect possession:
the child is born to his wife, and that is the argument 
•3
that counts.”^
For the sake of completeness, the exceptions 
already discussed above will be mentioned again here. The 
first is that in the Mger Delta area, children of a 
"small dowry” marriage are affiliated to their maternal 
grandfathers (or uncles) families, not to their mother’s 
husband; children of a woman who was once married by the 
"big dowry" procedure are affiliated to the "big dowry” 
husband (or ex-husband) even if that marriage no longer 
subsists in fact. The third is that , where the 1958 
Marriage legislation of the Western Region has been 
adopted, "paternal rights” may be awarded the natural
2. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, p.78
5. Basden, Mger Ibos, p.226. The affiliation of post­
humous children will be dealt with presently under a 
separate heading.
father of a child horn of an illicit relation.^
Posthumous children.
A child born to a woman whose husband has died 
is affiliated to the late husband's family (more correctly 
to the husband's name) if the bride price had not been 
refunded and the marriage legally terminated before the 
child was conceived. The internal between the husband's 
decease and the child's conception is immaterial, so is 
the fact that the deceased man was not the child's 
natural father. If the woman remarries between the date 
of conception and that of birth of the child, the result is 
still the same - the deceased husband's claim to the child
4. See further: On the IBO and IBIBIO:- Leith-Ross,
African Woman, p.105; Basden, higer Ibos,pp.215 and 
226; Porde and Jones, op.cit; p.17; Meek, Law and 
Authority, pp. 282-3; Green, Ibo Village Affairs, 
p.156; Leith-Ross, African Conservation Piece, j£.7l; 
Esenwa, loc.cit: p.75; Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta 
p.195; Talbot, People of S. Nigeria, Vol. IV, p.5$7; 
ditto, Vol. Ill, pp.4^1 and 459; Williamson, loc.cit;
55 and 57; Kammer, loc.cit; p.58; Simmons, loc.cit, 
p.161; Porde and Jones, op.cit., p.77; Porde in 
African Systems of Kinship & Marriage (ed. Radcliffe- 
Brown and Porde), pp.291, 295 and 328. On the YORUBA: 
Polarin, op.cit., p.35; Partridge, "Native Law anct 
Custom in Egbaland", 10 J.A.S*, p.455; Lloyd, Yoruba 
Land Law, p.78. On the ITSEKIRI:- Omoneukanrin, 
op.cit.7 pp.45-6. On the EDO:- Bradbury and Lloyd,
op.cit., pp.50 and 137; Egharevba, op.cit., p.19; 
Thomas, "The Edo-speaking Peoples" 10 J.A.S., p.6; 
Hubbard, op.cit., p.191; Thomas in 11 J. Comp.Leg.(n.s.) 
p.99; ThomasfAnthrop. Report on the Edof p.50.
is superior to that of the living husband in these 
circumstances* If, however, the woman or her maiden 
family had repaid the bride price to the deceased husband 
family, the child is affiliated to the latter family. 
Finally, if the woman had re-married within the deceased 
husband*s family (the so-called widow inheritance), the 
child is affiliated to the new husband just as if he were 
a stranger who marries another man's widow*
In Amachree v* Taria (or Grpodhead)  ^the head 
of a Degema family brought a writ of habeas corpus to 
determine the affiliation of a child born posthumously to 
a member of the family* The dispute was between the 
plaintiff on behalf of the deceased and the family 
generally on one hand, and the child*s maternal grand­
mother on behalf of her family by marriage. In other 
words, this was a contest between the maiden family of 
the child’s mother and the family into which she Ijatf 
married* The child’s natural father put in no claim.
The local Native Court had held in 1907 that the child
1. (1923) 4 N.L.R.99* See also Elias, op.cit * * p.297;
Meek, Law and Authority ••*, p.282-3; and contrast 
Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, p.218. Talbot’s 
statement that among the Ibo a widow "may leave the 
family on repayment of dowry; but, even in this case 
all children subsequently bo m  to her belong to the 
House” was probably intended to refer to the ttbig 
dowry” marriage system of Kalahari of which the 
author had just written.
in question belonged to the family into which her mother 
had married, a decision which was confirmed 15 years later 
by another Native Court* Meanwhile, the child’s grand­
mother had been given custody of the child by the plain­
tiff* s family after she had signed a statement to the 
effect that the child was a member of the plaintiff's 
family. The grandmother now refused to give up custody, 
hence the writ of habeas corpus.
Counsel for the defence argued that the two 
Native Court decisions were wrong in law, and were, in 
any case contrary to natural justice and humanity. To 
award parental rights over the child to the plaintiff's 
family (as against the defendant and her family by 
marriage) merely because the child's mother was once 
married therein was unconscionable, as it amounted to 
taking away the child from her blood relations and handing 
her over to comparative strangers, counsel said. The 
Divisional Court at Degema (Berkeley, Acting J.) held, 
however, that the two customary court judgments stated 
the customary law on the point correctly, and that the 
grandmother's signed statement was an admission of this 
fact. The learned judge hlso held that the customary 
law which affiliated a posthumous child born in 
"concubinage” to the family into ■fchich the child's mother 
was married, instead of to the mother's maiden family, 
was not "repugnant either to natural justice or humanity"
2as counsel had contended.
As indicated in passing in sundry places, there
is a growing practice of what may be called "disaffiliation1
whereby the more sophisticated husbands renounce their
legal fatherhood of children born to their wives on the
ground of non-paternity in the biological sense. It is
too early yet, perhaps, to say whether or not this has
become a generally accepted social practice, or, what is
more important, whether or not the courts will accept it
as part of the customary law of any given society.
More popular still is the practice whereby a
man claims a child bo m  to him of an illicit sexual
relation as hiw own, without also taking the child's
mother for a wife. In some cases, the child's mother
is unmarried; in other cases she is a married woman.
There may,therefore, be claims and counterclaims involving
the child's natural father on one hand and either the
mother's husband (as the legal father) or the mother's
family on the other hand. In the Western Region there
is some indication on what lines the courts will take in 
3
such cases, but no reliable information is available 
elsewhere. The position, however, appears to be as
2* Ibid., at p.100.
3. See the Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children 
Adoptive Bye-Laws Order, 1958, ss.13 and 14*
follows* Where the natural father claims a child and 
the legal father resists the claim, then in our submission, 
the claims or counter-claims of the legal father must 
prevail, except in the few local government areas where 
the Marriage etc. Adoptive Bye-Laws Order of the Western 
Region has been adopted, in which case the court has some 
discretion in the matter.^ This is because the claims 
of the legal father are founded in law; those of the 
natural father in natural justice. Where neither the 
legal nor the natural father puts in a claim, or both 
fathers disclaim, the courts should lay the responsibility 
for maintenance and upbringing of the child on its 
natural father. This would bring the customary law in 
line with the general law relating to affiliation.
Finally, where the legal father is willing to give up 
his rights to a child in favour of the natural father 
who is willing to take over such rights, there is an end 
of the matter as far as the two fathers are concerned.
But it is arguable that, on growing up or even long, 
before, the child can institute proceedings to have
4. S.13 provides: "Paternal rights shall normally be
awarded to the natural father whether or not such 
natural father is married to the mother." The 
juxtaposition of "shall" and "normally" apparently 
means that these rights shall be awarded the natural 
father except that the rule may be varied in s pecial 
circumstances in the child’s interest.
himself attached to his legal father if this is in his
5
best interest socially or otherwise. ,
5. Why should a man be allowed to shirk his duties to 
his legal child if this will result in hardship to 
the child? After all, he has an action for damages 
for adultery against the natural father.
C. LEGITIMATION
As was seen in the section on children’s 
priority as members of the household, an illegitimate 
child may be legitimated in one of two ways, viz. by the 
inter-marriage of his mother and putative father,and 
by acknowledgment of paternity by the latter. We shall 
here consider some of the more important points of legal 
interest involved in these processes.
Legitimation per subsequens matrimonium (General Law).
By the Legitimacy Act, 1929,^ where the parents
of an illegitimate child contract a Christian marriage,
the child is legitimated with effect from the date of
such marriage; if the marriage took place before the
commencement of the Act, the date of legitimation is the
17th day of October, 1929> on which date the Act came
into force; provided in each case that the child’s
putative father was domiciled in Nigeria at the date of
2the marriage. ’Christian marriage” is defined as a 
marriage which is recognised by the lex loci celebrationis
1. No. 27 of 1929 as amended by No. 107 of 1955- This
has been re-enacted for Lagos as Cap.103 of the 1958
Revision (Federal) and for the Western Region as 
Cap.62 of their 1959 Revised Laws, but the wordings 
are virtually'identical.
2. 8.3(1).
4G7
as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman 
to the exclusion of all others. This definition implies
that a child is legitimated per subsequens matrimonium 
wherever the marriage took place, provided only that it 
is monogamous in conception.
Any person who claims that he, his parent or
remoter ancester was legitimated in this way has a right
to apply to the High Court for a declaration to that
effect.^ On any such application, the Court "shall
5
make such decree as the court thinks just,” This 
suggests that the court has a discretion to make the 
declaration prayed for or not, just as it sees fit.
But in our submission the provision only allows the 
court to exercise its discretion in deciding how much 
evidence it would consider sufficient to prove the 
celebration of the alleged legitimating marriage.
It is also provided that a judicial declaration 
of legitimacy shall not prejudice any person’s interest 
if it is subsequently proved that it was obtained by 
fraud or by collusion. What is more, the declaration can 
only prejudicially affect parties to the proceedings, 
persons who had been made or cited as parties (but did
3. S.2.
4 . S.4(1).
5. S.4(3).
not appear), or persons who derive their title or claim
6from one of them.. Subject to these qualifications, a
declaration of legitimacy is a judgment in rem in the
7sense that it is binding on all persons. In other words, 
though only parties or persons cited as parties and their 
successors in interest can be prejudiced by such a 
declaration; yet all persons are bound to recognise it, 
and so accept the child concerned as having been legitimated 
thereby.
For the purposes of testate or intestate 
succession, a legitimated person ranks as a person who was 
born legitimate to begin with. Thus a legitimated child 
will take as a nchild” under a will which leaves property 
to the "children1 of a named persons This he could not 
do under the general(common) law. Similarly, a 
legitimated child will take on intestacy if he would have
Q
done so had he been born legitimate. Conversely, if a 
legitimated person dies intestate, his estate will be 
inherited by the same persons as would have done so had
Q
he been born legitimate. But where property rights 
(presumably including succession rights) depend on the
6. Proviso to s.4(3)
7. Rayden on Divorce (7th edn.), p.740.
8. S.5(1).
relative seniority of the children of a given person, a 
legitimated person ranks as if he had been born on the 
date of legitimation* If two or more persons were 
legitimated by the same marriage or otherwise at the same 
time, they rank in seniority inter se in order of seniority 
of age
A legitimated person* s rights to be maintained
and advanced by his parents or guardian, and, conversely,
his obligation to maintain or advance his own children or
wards as the case may be, are the same as those which
attach to a person who was born legitimate.^ In the same
way, any rights to damages, compensation, allowances, or
other benefits to which a person would be entitled in
respect of a legitimate child, will be equally open to
12him in respect of a legitimated child. In a word, for 
all practical purposes there are no differences known to 
the law between a legitimate child and a legitimated child, 
except that the latter is deemed to be born at the date 
of his legitimation.
Legitimation by subsequent marriage under a 
foreign law is recognised by Nigerian Law. For the
10. S.5(2). But no preferential rights shall accrue to 
legitimated persons by virtue of this provision:
s.5(2)9 proviso.
11. S.8.
12. S.8.
Legitimacy Act provides that if the parents of an
illegitimate child inter-marry, and if at the date of the
marriage the father is domiciled in a country whose law
recognizes legitimation per subsequens matrimonium, the
child will be regarded in Nigeria as a legitimated child*
This is so even if at the date of the child’s birth the
law of his father’s domicil did not recognise such 
13legitimation*  ^ The effects of these provisions are 
three-fold* In the first place, if the law of the 
father*s domicil has altered in favour of legitimation 
by subsequent marriage between the child’s birth and his 
parent’s marriage, the child will benefit from this change 
in the law* Secondly, if between the date of a child’s 
birth and the date of his parents’ marriage his father 
had abandoned his domicil in a country which did not 
recognise legitimation by subsequent marriage, and had 
acquired a new domicil in a country which did so, the child 
will once again benefit from the changelin domicil* And 
thirdly, a child will be legitimated, it would seem, by 
a marriage celebrated in a country whose law does not 
recognise legitimation by marriage, provided that the 
said marriage satisfies the definition of a Christian 
marriage, and provided further that at the date of the 
marriage the child’s father was domiciled in a country
13. S.9(1)
whose law does recognise this type of legitimation.
This is because the Act only speaks of the state of the 
law of the father1s domicil, and is silent on the state 
of the Lex Loci celebrationis on the subject. The 
converse is true of course in all these cases; so that 
whether or not the lex loci recognises legitimation by 
subsequent marriage, a child1s status as an illegitimate 
child will not be affected by his parents1 marriage there, 
if at the date of the marriage his father was domiciled 
in a country whose law did not recognise legitimation by 
subsequent marriage. Worse still, he will still not be 
recognised as having been legitimated (in Nigeria, that is) 
even if at the date of his birth, but .hot at *kke date 
of his parents1 marriage, his father had been domiciled 
in a place where hhis type of legitimation was recognised. 
In other words, any change in his father1s domicil or 
in the state of the lex domicilii away from recognition 
of legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium will affect the 
child adversely. This is not unfair to the child, nor 
is it a flaw in the law of Nigeria which, after all is 
only concerned with according to a child born illegitimate 
the same change of status, if any, as his own law would 
accord him by virtue of his parents* marriage.
If a legitimate child died before his parents 
inter-married, and if he was survived by any spouse or
• rkrn
children or remoter issue, and if these persons or any 
of them were alive when the parents of the deceased 
illegitimate child ultimately married, then provided that 
he would himself have been legitimated by such marriage, 
the provisions of the Act regarding property rights as 
well as those relating to succession rights by and to the 
surviving spouse, child or remoter issue as the case may 
be will apply as if the deceased had lived and been 
legitimated on the date of his parents1 marriage 
In such circumstances, therefore, and for property and 
succession purposes, a deceased illegitimate child is 
treated as if he were legitimated posthumously. It 
should be noted that this section of the Act speaks of 
the deceased leaving "any spouse, children or remoter 
issue.n It would, therefore seem to follow that the
type of marriage which the deceased illegitimate child 
himself 'fyaA contracted is immaterial - it may be 
customary or Christian - so long as his parents1 marriage 
is a Christian one.
Finally, where a woman is survived by one or 
more illegitimate children and no legitimate ones, her 
intestate estate is inherited by the illegitimate child 
or children as if they were legitimate. Conversely, a 
mother inherits from her illegitimate child as if he
14. S.7.
f f't r:>
lk t
15were legitimate.  ^ This, however, does not affect
succession rights under customary law, where the mother
of the illegitimate child is a "native."
There is nothing in the Legitimacy Act to
prevent a child's being legitimated per subsequens
matrimonium by reason only that either or both of his
parents were lawfully married at the time of his birth.
This is because the Act does not contain the equivalent
of S.1(2) of the Legitimacy Act, 1926, of England - a
17relic of the Canon Law era* If therefore, a married
person has an adulterine child, and later has his or her
current marriage dissolved, he/she can legitimate this
18child by subsequently marrying the other party.
The Legitimacy Act only applies to the 
subsequent marriage of an illegitimate child's parents 
to "one another." It does not operate to legitimate 
a child because either his mother or his putative father 
later married a third party. By the strict letter of 
the law, therefore, a child will not be legitimated if,
contrary to his parents' claims, he was not in fact
their joint issue, even if they both believed in the
15. S.10(1), (2).
16. S.10(3).
1^. Cf. Bromley, p.291.
18. The discrimination against adulterine children in
s.1(2) of the English Act of 1926 was removed by
the Legitimacy Act, 1959*
correctness of their claim. In practice, however, a man's
;
recognition of a child as his natural child is regarded by i
the courts as sufficient practical proof of the child's 
paternity, so that even if the acknowledgement of paternity 
was based on a false but honest belief, the child will be 
regarded in fact as the natural child of the man who acknow­
ledges him, and will be deemed to be legitimated by his marriage
1 9to the child's mother.
Legitimation by acknowledgment: Customary law
The Yoruba law on the acknowledgment of illegitimate
children by their natural father is thus stated by Lloyd-
"The natural father of a child born to an unmarried
woman or as the result of an adulterous union with a
married woman may, by acknowledging the child as his
own and caring for it (with the child's reciprocal
acknowledgment of the father demonstrated especially
at the latter's funeral), confer upon the child
1
legitimate membership of his own family,"
Mr. Justice Coker, on the other hand, would not put the 
matter any higher than this that "acknowledgment by the 
father is reputed to clothe /Eis natural children7 with
19* Cf. James, L.J, in the Privy Council case of La Cloche v,
La Cloche (1872) L.R. 4 P.C. 325, at p.333*
1. Yoruba Land Law, p.78.
the right to receive property, not, as some people think,
2with the status of legitimacy.1 It is not easy to see
what legal disability attaches to a child born illegitimate
but subsequently acknowledged as his putative father's
child. Howbeit, it is perfectly safe to say that for
certain purposes at least - including family membership,
property and succession rights insofar as these rights
depend on family membership - an acknowledged child ranks
in law as a legitimate child as from the date of the
acknowledgment, as already indicated in greater detail.
What constitutes "acknowledgment" is, in the
final analysis, a question of fact to be decided on
available evidence in each case. Nevertheless, it may
be said that it is not enough that a man is known, or
reputed, to be a child's natural father. It is not even
enough, in our submission, that he merely admits 
3
paternity. Some positive act is required on the 
putative father's part. He may, for example, take the 
child into his custody and bring him up as he would his
2. Coker, op.cit.♦ p.266.
3. To attempt a distinction between "acknowledgment" and
"admission" of paternity is, in Coker's view, to
make "a distinction without a difference?" op.cit.,
p.237. But unless we are prepared to endorse the
view that no positive act on the father's part is
required to accept the child as his own, there seems
to be something to be said for the existence of this
distinction.
own child by a lawful marriage; he may undertake respon­
sibility for the child*s education and/or general main­
tenance; he may enlist the aid of a third party in the 
child*s custody, maintenance or education if he is not in 
a position to bear these responsibilities himself; or he 
may leave the child in its mother’s custody, making her 
periodic payments on a voluntary or an agreed basis in 
the express understanding that these payments are made to 
her not just as a mistress but as the child’s custodian* 
But merely to own up to having had an illicit affair with 
a woman and to being the father of her child - which is 
all we understand by "admission11 of paternity - will not 
ipso facto clothe the child with the status of a child 
legitimatedby acknowledgment*
The principle of legitimation by acknowledgment 
has been stated and re-stated with reference to Yoruba 
Law in a long line of cases, one of the earliest of which 
is Savage v. Macfoy*^  In that case it was held that 
all the children of the intestate, whether born in or out 
of wedlock - and there were some of each - were entitled 
to inherit, since the latter had been acknowledged by the 
deceased as his children during his life time. Quashie - 
Idun, Ag*J• came to the same decision in the comparatively
4• Ante*
5
recent case of In re Adelabu and Aremu. In this case 
action was brought under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 
which was at the time applicable in the Western Region, 
on behalf of? th^ inter alia, the four children of Aremu and 
the seventeen children of Adelabu some of whom were 
illegitimate. Giving judgment in favour of the children, 
the Federal Supreme Court had this to say. on appeal -
"Children not born in wedlock (Marriage Ordinance) 
or who are not the issues of a marriage under 
native law and custom, but are issues born with­
out marriage can also be regarded as legitimate
children for certain purposes, if paternity has
c.
been acknowledged by the putative father.”
The West African Court of Appeal had, in 1955> made the
7
same point in Alake v. Pratt in words to this effect - 
/it has been satisfactorily proved before the trial judge 
that/ "under the Native Law and Custom of the Yoruba people, 
paternity of the two persons concerned having been ack­
nowledged by the deceased in his life-time, they are to be
8regarded as legitimate under the law in Nigeria.n And
5. (1959) W.R.N.L.R.155.
6. (1961) 1 All N.L.R.245.
7. 15 W.A.C.A.20.
8. Prom the headnote.
in view of this finding of facts, the Court concluded, the
question of marriage of the children*s mothers was not a
q
relevant subject for investigation.
To what extent does the doctrine of acknowledg­
ment apply under customary law outside Yorubaland it is 
difficult to say at the moment. This is because there is 
evidence everywhere, especially among the more sophisticated 
elements, that the practice is both popular and progressive­
ly widespread. Since customary law,-'unlike "general 
custom" in England, does not have to be traced beyond the 
limits of legal memory or indeed to any date at all, there 
is the probability that expert evidence will be readily 
available to prove the application of the rule in question 
to all and sundry societies.^ For example, it was held 
on the basis of expert evidence that the rule is part of 
the customary law of Kwale. This was in another action 
under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, and the decision was 
made in the High Court at Warri by Dufus, J. The 
illegitimate children of the deceased were in that case 
held to be entitled to recover as "children" within the 
meaning of the Act because it was proved that the deceased
9* Ibid. See also Phillip v. Phillip (1946) 18 
N.L.R.102, and cf. Kasunmu, op.cit., p.170.
10. This claim was made, but not proved, in the Ibo 
case of Onwudinjoh v. Onwudin.joh (ante) •
recognised and treated them as his children in his life, 
and because according to Kwale customary law, reads the 
headnote, "such recognition accorded them the same rank 
in every respect as and an equal status with the children 
of a marriage."^ Again, Simmons says of the Sfik that 
a natural father may legitimate his putative children by 
making a money payment to their mother’s family. (This 
was £12 in I960).12
More problematic still is the question whether 
or not a man who has contracted a Christian marriage has 
legal capacity to legitimate his natural child by acknow­
ledgment if the child was b om during the subsistence of 
the said marriage. An eminent writer said on this - 
"This is not a case where acknowledgment of 
paternity can be evoked, for .the nature of the 
marriage renders the man incapable of having 
any other woman as his wife or any other off­
spring as his children during the subsistence of
13such Christian marriage .... the issue of
capacity would affect their father to the extent 
that he could not even acknowledge them, however 
much he might be willing to do this."^
11. Jirigho v. Anamali (1958) W.R.IT.L.R. 195 .
12. Loc.cit., p.164.
13. Coker, op.cit., p.263*
14. Ibid, p.272.
It is tempting to say that this view of the
law is contrary to the West African Court of Appeal decision
15in Alake v. Pratt where it was held that both the 
children of the deceased by an Ordinance marriage and the 
two other children born to him out of wedlock were entitled 
to succeed on his intestacy, as legitimate children. 
Delivering the Court1s judgment (in which Coussey, J.A. 
and Abbott, J. concurred without comment), Poster Sutton, P. 
said -
"The short point we were asked to determine at 
the hearing of this appeal was whether the 
appellants, Adeyinka and Adenike Coker, who are 
children born out of wedlock to their father 
/D*T.C j * deceased, are entitled to share in his 
estate together with the respondents who are the 
issue of a marriage contracted by him under the 
Marriage Ordinance.':......
"The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion 
that it had been satisfactorilyrproved that 
under the Native Law and Custom of the Yoruba 
people, paternity of the two persons concerned 
having been acknowledged by the deceased during 
his life-time, they are to be regarded as
16legitimate under the law in Nigeria .... "
15. 15 V.A.C.A.20.
16. Ibid., at p.20.
But to say that this decision directly contradicts Mr. 
Justice Coker’s views quoted above would be to beg the 
question. The gist of the decision in Alake v. Pratt 
is that where a child is legitimated by acknowledgment, he 
has equal rights of succession on his father's intestacy 
as the other children of the deceased who were born 
legitimate. The case did not decide the more fundamental 
question whether a marriage under the Marriage Act does 
or does not divest a person so married of his customary 
law capacity to legitimate his natural children by 
acknowledgment, which is Coker's proposition. It may be 
argued that this question was decided by implication: the
deceased was married under the Act; he left illegitimate 
children; these children were held to be entitled to 
succeed as legitimate children; therefore, they must have 
been legitimated in fact and in law. But this argument 
overlooks the point that the report is silent on the 
question whether the children were born and/or acknowledged 
before, during the subsistence, or after the dissolution 
of the marriage. The question under discussion could 
only be said to have been answered by implication if the 
acknowledgment was made during the subsistence of the 
marriage.
We are, therefore, driven back to first 
principles. What effect, if any, has a marriage under
the Marriage Act on the legal capacity of a person so 
17married? Does such a marriage clothe a person with
a status so alien to customary law that he loses any
capacity he had before the marriage to legitimate his
putative children by acknowledging them as his? To what
extent, if at all, does this type of marriage remove a
person from the ambit of the customary law of his people
into that of the general (English) law in the fields of
personal law and intestate succession?
These questions have cropped up time and again
before the courts in Nigeria since the celebrated decision
18of Griffith, J. in Pole v . Cole, So far, no compre­
hensive answer has yet been attempted by the judges.
19In Bamgbose v. Daniel, J for example, it was contended
that a child by an Ordinance marriage had no legal capacity
to contract a customary marriage, and that his alleged
children by a customary marriage were therefore illegitimate.
20The Privy Council rejected this proposition, as did the
21 22 West African Court of Appeal before it. In Re Macaulay,
17. The statutory provisions regarding bigamy and kindred 
offences apart, that is.
18. 1 N.L.R.15.
19. 14 W.A.C.A.116 (P.O.)
20. Ibid.
21. 14 W.A.C .A.Ill (W.A.C.A.)
22. 13 W.A.C.A.304.
it was contended, on facts which were similar to those in
Alake v. Pratt (ante), that by contracting an Ordinance
marriage a man lost his (customary law) capacity to
legitimate his natural children by acknowledgment, for the
purposes of intestate succession under s.36 of the
Marriage Act. It turned out that the crucial question
in that case was this: Which law, customary or general,
should determine the legitimacy or otherwise of children
born out of wedlock to a man who was married under the
23Marriage Ordinance? Following Re Goodman^ Trusts
r\ a
and the Sinha Peerage Case, the West African Court of 
Appeal held that the question of legitimacy must be 
decided with reference to the lex loci domicilii of the 
children concerned; and that in the case of persons who 
were subject to customary law, this meant with reference 
to their local customary law. In the words of Chief 
Justice Verity (in whose judgment the other members of 
the Court - Lewey, J.A. and Jibowu, J - concurred without 
comment):-
"If, as it appears to have been assumed through­
out the proceedings, the deceased was a person 
subject to native law and custom (and only in 
such cases would section 36 of the Marriage
23. (1881) 17 Ch.D.266.
24. Z^ -9467 1 All B.R.348, n.; 171 Lords Journals, 350
Ordinance apply), then the law to be applied in
ascertaining the legitimacy of the children is
the native law and custom applicable to him
their deceased father/^ subject, of course, to
such modification and qualifications as may be
25imposed by statute.” ^
The learned Chief Justice therefore, concluded that:-
”.... those children who are legitimate according
to the native law and custom to which the
deceased was subject as modified or qualified
by statute, shall be entitled to participate in
26the distribution of the estate ...”
So far as is known, there is no statutory provision which 
has modified or qualified a persons customary law right 
to legitimate his putative children by acknowledging them 
as his, or excluded the operation of this rule from cases 
where the putative father was at the material time married 
under the Marriage Act. It would, therefore, seem to 
follow that the personal status of a man as a married or 
a single man, a Christian or a customary marriage husband, 
does not affect the law to be:applied in determining his 
natural children*s status as legitimated children under 
customary law. This, in effect, is saying that an
25* Re Macaulay, ante, at p.309* 
26. Ibid., at p.310.
Ordinance marriage does not affect a man’s legal capacity
to acknowledge his natural children, provided that he
would have possessed such capacity under customary law
27if he were not married under the Ordinance. By the
same reasoning, a man1s customary capacity to legitimate 
his natural children by acknowledgment is not affected hy 
any other form of monogamous marriage, wherever contracted.
27• ^  should be noted that as in Alake v . Pratt, the
report does not specify whether any* and if so which, 
of the children in Re Macaulay were born and/or 
acknowledged during the 5 months duration of the 
deceased’s Ordinance marriage - from December 1898 
to May 1899 when the wife died: loc. cit., p.305*
All that appears is that wat various times both 
before and after his marriage the deceased begat 
a number of children ... by a number of women:”
Ibid. But this does not affect the ratio of the 
case in any way.
CHAPTER TWELVE
PARENT 1 AND CHILD - IIV 1
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.
Maintenance and advancement#
A child has a right to maintenance and advance­
ment by his parents on whom there is, therefore, a cor­
relative duty* Under customary law, however, this right 
and the correlative duty only exist as between legitimate 
(including legitimated) children and their parents* For 
although a man may be compelled to marry a girl who is 
with his child, on pain of having to pay damages to her 
parents, he cannot be compelled to maintain the girl or 
her child otherwise than by paying the necessary damages.* 
The position under the general law is a little different 
in that a putative father may be compelled to make con­
tributions to his child’s maintenance by means of affi-
2liation proceedings.
1* Contrast the position in Ghana where it has been re­
peatedly held that a natural father is under a duty 
to maintain the child, and that native and non-native 
putative fathers alike are under this obligation:
Duncan v* Robertson* in Sarbah’s Fanti Law (2nd edn.) 
p.13b; Davie v* Nassar, W.A.C.A. Cyclostyled Judgements, 
March, lfith 1953: and Ad.jei and Dua v. Ripley (1956)
1 W.A.L.R. 62.
2. Note that these proceedings do not vest the putative 
father with parental rights; neither do they legitimate 
the child. Their purpose is to make the "father” main­
tain his child up to a stipulated age.
The parental duty of maintenance is primarily 
that of the father who isixdn law hound to house and clothe 
and maintain his wife or wives and their children to the 
best of his ability, having regard to his material re­
sources and the children’s age and needs. This duty can 
be enforced by court order at the instance of the child’s 
mother or, presumably, another member of the wider family 
of which the father is a member - subject, of course, to 
the statutory limitations on representation in law suits 
already discussed. A father who has been in breach of 
his duty in this respect, with the result that a third 
party has had to carry the burden of maintenance of his 
children, may be ordered by a court of competent juris­
diction to reimburse that other person. This is true 
whether the other person in question is a kinsman, a 
member of the wife’s maiden family, or the wife herself 
(assuming in this last case that she did so out of her
own separate property), especially where the spouses are 
3living apart.
This customary and common law duty is reinforced 
by a number of provisions which place a duty on parents, 
in common with other persons in charge of children under 
fourteen, to supply their children with the necessaries
3* Cf. Folarin, op.cit., p.29.
of life.** A parent who fails in this duty without lawful
iscause is guilty of a misdemeanour. If he did so in 
circumstances which amounted to desertion or abandonment 
of the child, and if any grievous harm (e.g. starvation or 
exposure to the elements) were likely to result to the
6child, the offending parent would be guilty of a felony*
Custody, care and protection.
Parents have inherent rights and obligations re­
garding their legitimate (including legitimated) children, 
and in the case of mothers, also regarding their illegi­
timate children, - subject to a number of qualifications 
and modifications introduced by legislation. In general, 
it would be an offence, civil or criminal or both according 
to circumstances, for a third party unlawfully to inter­
fere with these parental rights, and, conversely, for 
parents to neglect their duties to their children. In 
theory, these rights and obligations attach primarily to 
the father in the case of legitimate children whether or 
not the parents are living together. ^ In practice,
!+• Ss. 300 and 301 of the Criminal Code (Pederal).
5* Ibid., s. 339*
6. S.3U1.
1. In the absence of an indication to the contrary and
except where the context will not so permit, “legitimate” 
will hereafter be used to include “legitimated”; and 
“parents11 will be used to include “guardian”.
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however, actual custody and care of children are in the 
hands of the mother, especially in the case of young
children and in polygamous families, so long as the
are living together. It is usually where the parents 
parents^/are living apart as a result of divorce or se­
paration that the father’s primary rights and obligations 
re-assert themselves, subject, as will appear presently, 
to certain statutory qualifications* We shall now brief­
ly examine the legal consequences of this principle that 
parents are entitled to their children’s custody, and are 
under a legal duty adequately to exercise it and to pro­
tect their children*
(a) Abduction and kindred offences.
It is a misdemeanour, punishable by up to two 
years imprisonment, for any person to take an unmarried 
girl under eighteen years of age out of her parents’ 
custody or protection, against the will of such parents,
and with intent that she may be ’’unlawfully carnally known 
2
by any man.” It is, however, a good defence that the 
accused person believed on reasonable grounds that the 
girl was above the age of eighteen* But an intent to
have or permit unlawful sexual connexion with an unmarried 
girl is not essential to constitute the offence of abduction 
where the girl concerned is under the age of sixteen. ^
2. Criminal Code, S.225*
3. Ibid*
U* Loc* cit*, s* 362.
In this latter case, too, it is no defence that the accused
person believed the girl to be above sixteen; neither
does it make any difference that the girl was taken away
5with her full consent or indeed at her own suggestion.
It is a felony, punishable with up to fourteen years 
imprisonment, for any person to take, entice away or de­
tain a child of any sex under the age of twelve years, 
or knowingly to receive or harbour a child so taken away - 
with intent in each case to deprive the parents of the 
possession of the child.^ But it is a good defence on 
a charge under this section that the accused person took 
away the child on a bona fide claim of right, or, in the 
case of an illegitimate child, that the accused was the 
child’s mother or claimed to be itt natural father as the 
case may be.
(b) Seduction
Subject to the statutory provisions relating to 
abduction and kindred offences, and to the provisions of 
the Criminal Code relating to rape and indecent assault 
on females, seduction in the sense of having an unlawful 
sexual relation with an unmarried girl or divorced woman 
is neither an actionable civil wrong nor a criminal offence 
There are a number of suggestions to the contrary. Talbot,
5. Ibid., 8.363 (a), (b).
6. Ibid.. 8.371 (1), (2).
for instance, says of the Kalahari that in such circum­
stances the guilty man is fined at a joint meeting of 
his family and that of the girl concerned.^ Even if 
this was the law when the author wrote, it is no longer 
possible in law for the families or anyone else to 
impose a fine on an alleged offender in respect of an
unwritten law* A similar statement by Omoneukanrin on 
8Itsekiri law must also be .read, in the light of what
has just been said about immunity from punishment for
any offences other than those specified in some written
law* Ajisafe said of Yoruba law that ® "When a man
carnally knows a fully grown-up girl hitherto unbetrothed,
he is made to pay a certain fixed and reasonable amount
to the parents as dowry and take'the woman for wife*"
It is submitted, however, that something more than mere
sexual relation is required to evoke this "sanction" on
a man. A better view, in oUI> submission, is that expressed
by Porde on Yako law when he said that if a girl becomes
pregnant before being betrothed to anyone, her lover is
under an obligation to marry her: the girl’s father can
"insist on the youth’s obligation to provide marriage money
and take her as a wife after the birth of the child" 10 - a
11point also made by Simmons on -Efik law* Even this
7. Peonies of Southern Nigeria* Vol. Ill, p.6l+5«
3. Op.cit*, p. 50*
3* Oj^cit •) p*57•
10. Porde, Marriage and the Family among the Yako in 
South-Eastern Nigeria, p.19*
11. Loc* cit., p.156.
statement must, however, he qualified to the extent that 
the man concerned must either take the girl as wife on 
payment of the necessary bride price, or pay an agreed 
compensation to her parents for having "spoilt" their 
child, that is, for having ruined the girl's chances of 
finding a desirable spouse and consequently her parents' 
expectation of a reasonable bride price. The rule, then, 
is that illicit sexual relations without is not
actionable; but that if the girl becomes pregnant as a 
result, her seducer is under a legal obligation to marry 
her or, alternatively, pay reasonable compensation to her 
parents. %at compensation is reasonable in any given 
case is a guestion of fact, and is either determined by 
mutual agreement between the two families concerned or 
fixed by the courts in the light of the surrounding cir- 
custances including the girl's moral repute and the boy's 
character generally.
(c) Right to child's services.
It is an actionable wrong for any person un-
i
lawfully to deprive a parent of his/her right to a 
child's services, domestic or contractual. If the child 
in question is under twenty-one years of age, there is a 
presumption that he/she performs some domestic services 
however nominal. But this presumption does not extend 
to children of twenty-one or over, anc^o, the onus is 
on the parent in such a case to prove by evidence that
the child did perform some domestic services while living 
with him,12
(d) Abandoning, ©r giving away, a child,
A parent who, being able to maintain his child,
"wilfully and without lawful or reasonable cause deserts
the child and leaves it without means of support, is guilty
of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for [up
1^to] one year," It would, presumably, be a good defence
to a charge under this section that the parent deserted/ 
/abandoned the child because he had not the wherewithal 
to maintain it. It would also be a good defence to show 
that, at the material time, the deserting parent was 
mentally unbalanced (the act would then not be "wilful"); 
or that he had contracted a dangerous and highly infec­
tious or contageous disease which, had he not deserted 
as he did, would in all probability have affected the 
child (he would then be acting with ’’reasonable cause", 
assuming of course that he aould also satisfactorily ac­
count for his failure to arrange a temporary transfer of 
custody in those circumstances).
The Children and Young Persons Law, 1958, of 
the Eastern Region makes it an offence to place one’s 
child in moral danger; to give a child into the custody
12, See further, Bromley, pp.3U5-53> for details and cases 
on the common law. See also the standard works on tort,
13* S.372 of the Criminal Code (re-enacted as s,313 of the 
Western Region’s Criminal Code, "Child" here is a 
person under the age of twelve years.
or possession of anybody other than the child's gran- 
parent or a descendant of such a grandparent; or for 
anyone other than a child’s grandparent etc* to receive 
the child into his custody or possession. But it is a 
good defence to show that such a transfer was in the 
child's interest and that the child was in no moral 
danger as a result; or that the transfer was in accordance 
with customary law, the latter not being repugnant to na­
tural justice, morality or humanity, or inconsistent with 
some written law. ^  "Moral danger1 is defined to in­
clude "bondage and exposure to destitution, prostitutbn
1 5or immorality of any kind".
A somewhat similar provision is contained in
16the Children and Young Persons Law, 19.1+6» of the Wbstern
Region.*^ Under this Law, it is a crime, punishable
1 D
with up to seven years* imprisonment, to "give or 
acquire the custody, possession, control or guardianship 
of a child ... in such circumstances that it may reasonably 
be inferred that such child has been sold or bartered 
or that by reason of such giving or acquiring such child
1 9may reasonably be inferred to be placed in moral danger. ^
li+. No.6 of 1958, s*3l(l)* ‘■■’he punishment for an offence 
under this section ismimprisonment for up to 7 years.
15* S.31(5)* Cf. s.30(b) of the Children and Young Persons 
Act (cap.32 of the Federal laws, 1958 Revision), as 
regards Lagos.
16. Back-dated to 1st July, 19U6; the same date as Cap.32 
sunra.
17. S. 38. 18. S.Ul.
19. S.38(1) Same def. of "moral danger" as above; see fn.lt.
There is a presumption that the giving or acquisition of
custody to or hy a person who is not a member of the child*s
20 21 family is in contravention of this provision; hut
whether or not this presumption is rehuttahle does not
appear* It is, however, a good defence to a charge under
the section to show that "such child was so given or
acquired in accordance with native law or custom so far
as such native law or custom is not repugnant to natural
justice, morality or humanity or inconsistent with any
22written law.1 There is power in the Governor of the
Western Region, and the Minister for the time heing res­
ponsible for child welfare and juvenile courts elsewhere, 
to make regulations prohibiting the giving or acquisition 
of children*s custody either in specified areas or gene-
2*5rally, any customary law to the contrary not withstanding.  ^
(e) Education: religious and secular
Parents, have a right to decide which system of 
religious instruction or worship their children will re­
ceive or attend, and may even withdraw them from religious 
education altogether. This right has received statutory 
recognition, ^he Education Law, 1956, of the Eastern 
Region, for example, provides -
"If the parent of any pupil in attendance at any
20. "Family" is not defined in any of the statutes under 
discussion.
21. S.32 (2).
22# Ibid.. proviso.
23. Children and Young Persons Laws: s.l+O (Western Region), 
s.31(2) (Eastern Region), and s.30(3)(Lagos) respectively
institution requests that he he wholly or
partly excused from attendance at religious
worship in the institution or from attendance
at religious instruction in the institution or
from attendance at both religious worship and
religious instruction in the institution, then,
until the request is withdrawn, the pupil shall
2khe excused from such attendance accordingly#”
To guard against the natural temptation of school pro­
prietors refusing or dismissing pupils who will not, or 
whose parents will not let them, attend religious services 
or instruction, it is provided that no person shall he 
refused admission or he prevented from attending as a
pupil at school ”on account of the religious persua-
25tion • •• of himself or either of his parents#” Again, 
the principle that, as far as reasonably practicable,
”every pupil shall he educated in accordance with the
26wishes of his parents” has received statutory recognition#
The duty of parents to give their children adequate 
education, having regard to their means and the children*s 
ability, has also been recognised by the legislatures.
2U# S#22(3)* Cf# s#25 of the Education Lav/, Western Region, 
which, however, only refers to "public institutions"; 
and the Education (fiagos) Act, s.59(l) which also only 
refers to ”any maintained or assisted school”# But 
there is no reason to suppose that pupils in other 
schools could be compelled to attend religious instruc­
tion against their parents1 wishes#
25* S#53(l): Lagos; s#19: W.Region#
26# S.18: Western Region, for instance#
Hence the provision in the Education (Lagos) Act^for 
example that it shall he the duty of a parent whose child 
has been registered at a primary school "to cause him to 
receive full time education by regular attendance at the 
school ••• until such time as he has completed his pri­
mary school course or until the end of the school year
27in which he attains his fourteenth birthday." ' Hence
also the provision elsewhere that a parent has a duty to
cause his child "to receive efficient full time education
suitable to his age, ability and aptitude either by regu-
28lar attendance at shcool or otherwise." 9
Chastisement
Parents have a right to chastise their infant 
children by such means and to such extent that are con­
sidered reasonable by society in the circumstances, having 
regard to the child’s age and general behaviour. E0r the 
present purposes a person is an "infant" until he attains 
his puberty or is initiated (formally in some places) in­
to adult life. Section 295 of the Criminal Code provides 
that a parent may correct his child, legitimate or il­
legitimate, who is under sixteen years of age, "for mis­
conduct or disobedience to any lawful command." ^
27. S.19(1).
28. S.32: W# Region. See also the Infants Law, s.19, of 
that Region.
1. Sub-section (l).
41) 8
If a parent lawfully entrusts "the governance or custody”
of his child to another person, he may also delegate to
the latter his own "authority for correction", including
the power to determine in what cases correction ought to
2
he inflicted." Such a delegation is presumed in the
case of a schoolmaster or a person acting as such, except
' ' 3insofar as it may he expressly withheld.
No correction is Justifiable which is unreason­
able in kind or degree, having regard to the recipient’s 
age and condition - physical and mental. Nor is correc­
tion Justifiable if the child, by reason of his tender
age or mental condition, is incapable of understanding
h. 5 its purpose. 9
Vicarious liability for wrongs, contracts etc.
As we have seen on more than one occasion, a 
parent’s customary liability for his child's wrongs 
has now disappeared to the extent that it is no longer 
absolute. A parent will only be held liable for his 
child's wrongful act or omission if at the material time 
the child was "acting for" him (i.e. as his authorised
2. Sub-section (k)*
3* Sub-section Ik) 
k. Sub-section (6)
5* On the customary law, see: Basden, Among the Ibos, p.67;
Talbot, Woman's Mysteries ...., p.90; Partridge in
10 J.A.S., p.i+23; Egharevba, op.cit.. p.l3«
1. See, e.g. Ellis, op.cit. (189U) p.177; Egharevba, op.cit. 
(3rd edn., 19U9) on Yoruba and Bini laws respectively.
agent, the authorization being either express or implied), 
or if the act or omission occurred on account of the 
parent’s neglect of his duty to exercise proper control 
over the child. A parent will, for example, he liable for 
any damages done to a neighbour’s crops or other property 
by his cattle while being driven to or from the grazing 
grounds. The technicalities of the law of England an the 
subject of cattle trespass have no place in customary law). 
This is because the child would, in such a case, be acting 
as his parent’s agent. But a person could not be held 
liable for his child’s act of vandalism which results in 
damage to a third party. For example, a child who breaks 
a neighbour’s w^ter pots, wine jars, glass windows or 
wind-screen will not thereby render his parents liable to 
the injured party. But where there is a duty to exercise 
proper and effective control over the child, and the parent 
on whom this duty lies neglects to carry it out, he will 
be liable to the injured party. Thus if after due warning 
a parent fails to restrain his stone-throwing child by 
all reasonable means, he will be liable to a neighbour 
whose pots, window or wind-screen is broken. Similarly, 
a parent will be liable to any person injured by any act 
of his mentally defective child if the circumstances show 
that he had failed in his duty to keep the child under
5 0 0
2reasonable restraint.
^he old customary law rule that a father was 
under a duty to pay the marriage expenses for his sons’ 
respective first wives ^ is now moribund, if not obsolete.
So too is the rule that a father should pay his first 
son’s title-taking expenses in societies where titles 
with a political or administrative significance were open 
to anyone who could pay for them (as among the Onitsha 
Ibo, for instance).
A  dumber 0f liabilities were imposed on parents 
by the variousnChildren and Young Persons legislations al­
ready referred to. Where a child or young person is charged 
with any offence, for instance, his parent may be ordered 
by the court to give security for the child’s good behaviour 
If the charge is proved, the parent may be ordered to pay 
damages or costs or to provide security for the child’s
5
good behaviour; provided, that is, that the parent 
ha& been requested to attend but failed to do so, or that 
he has otherwise been given an opportunity of being heard.** 
In the same way, a parent may be required to attend at a 
court in which his child is being tried for an offence,
2. Cf. Ajisafe, op.cit., p.5*
3* Elias, Groundwork, pp.296 and 297*
U# S.10(2) (W. Region): s.11 (2) (E. Region); s.10(2) (Lagos
5. S.10(3) (W. Region): s.11 (l) (E. Region); s.10(3) (Lagos
6. S*10(l|.) (W. Region); s.11 (l|.) (E. Region); s.lo(U) (Lagos
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during all stages of the proceedings,"^ Finally, a parent 
may he ordered to pay any fine, damages or costs awarded 
in connexion with his child’s trial, unless the court is 
satisfied "that he had not conduced to the commission of 
the offence hy neglecting to exercise due care of the child
Q
or young person". Indeed, where the child offender is a 
"child" (defined as a person under the age of fourteen) 
as opposed to a "young person" (defined as a person be­
tween the ages of fourteen and sixteen), the courts must 
order that the fine, damages or costs shall he paid hy the
Q
parent, subject to the qualification already indicated.
Loss of parental rights and authority.
A parent may lose his rights or he relieved of
his responsibilities in respect of a child hy renouncing
the child or being renounced hy him; when the child is
of age or exceeds the relevant age under a given statute;
hy forfeiture (following conviction for certain crimes);
or hy surrender in the case of juvenile delinquents. We
shall now say a few words on each of thfese modes of escape
from or loss of parental duties and rights.
To what extent, if at all, a parent has a legal
right to renounce his child and so lose his rights and
7« S.9 (W.Region); s.10 (E. Region): s.9 (Lagos).
8. S.10(1) (W. Region); s.11(1) (E.Region); s.10(1) (Lagos). 
9* Ibid. These provisions (note 8) are virtually identical 
to s,U29 of the Criminal Procedure Act. See also, 
Criminal Procedure Act, s.1+27 (h), (i).
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responsibilities towards him (andvice versa) is not clear. 
Perhaps a parent has no such right if the child concerned 
falls within the definitions of "child1 and "young person” 
in the Criminal Code and the various Children and Young 
Persons legislations already referred to. For a parent 
to renounce a child in such a case would probably be held 
to constitute desertion or abandonment contrary to s.372 
of the Criminal Code; it would almost certainly amount 
to Exposure to destitution" contrary to s.31# §*38 or 
s.30 of the Children and Young Persons Laws/Act of the Eas­
tern and the Western Regions and the Federal Territory of 
T 10hagos respectively. In the case of older children, 
however, this right probably does exist: such children
would have attained their puberty under customary law any­
way. Perhaps, too, a child has a right to renounce his 
parents and so relieve them of their parental obligations 
towards him. But here again a child who is old enough 
and independent enough to do this would be considered an 
adult under customary law anyway, so that the question is 
of more academic than practical importance.
A person can surrender his parental rights and
responsibilities to some extent where he can prove to the
10. On a parent1s criminal responsibility and cognate
matters, see footnotes 13-23 under "Abandoning or 
giving away a child”, ante.
satisfaction of a juvenile court that he cannot control 
the child in question* ^he court will then make such 
orders as it sees fit regarding the care and custody of 
the child, such as committing him to the care of a third 
party or to an approved institution*11 Even then the 
court may hy order require the parent to make some financial 
contribution towards the child’s maintenance wherever he 
may he*
In much the same way, a parent can forfeit his 
parental rights in certain circumstances* Where a child 
happens to he in the custody of a person other than his 
parent, and the latter applies to the court for an order 
for the child to he delivered up to him, the courts may 
decline to make the order asked for if it is satisfied that 
the parent-applicant had abandoned the child or had "other­
wise so conducted himself that the court should refuse to
1*3
enforce his right to the custody of the child"* J Again,
where a parent had abandoned or deserted his child, or had
in breach of his duty, allowed his child to he brought
up at another person’s expense, the court will not make an
order restoring the child to the undutiful parent unless
the latter satisfies the court that he is a fit person to
have custody of the child.1** Finally, where a child
11* Children and Young Persons Law, s.28 (jfi*R); s*3U (W*R*); 
s*27 (Lagos).
12. Ditto, s.29(1) (E.R.); s.35 (l), (2) (W.R.); s.28 (Lagos)*
13, lU. Infants Law (W.R.), ss*l6 and 18* Cf. the Custody
of Children Act, 1891 of England, S*l, which 
perhaps applies as a statute of general application 
In Lagos and the Eastern Region*
comes within a long list of cases, a juvenile court may 
make such orders regarding his custody and care by per­
sons other than his parents as the court thinks fit, having 
regard to the child’s interests* One of the orders that 
may be made is that the child shall be committed "to the 
care of anyjfit person whether a relative or not, who is 
willing to undertake the care of him." And the circumstances 
which would justify such an order include parental neglect 
to maintain or to exercise proper control over the child; 
a parent’s incapacity or unfitness to look after the child
by reason of his addiction to drink or to crime; and
15exposure to "moral danger" generally. The Punishment 
of Incest Law, 1955> of the Eastern Region has another 
provision similar to this, in s.2(5 ) which reads, in part:
"On the conviction of any male person of [incest] or of 
an attempt to commit the same, the court may divest the 
offender of all authority over the female person against 
whom the offence is committed". F0r the purposes of the 
section "incest" is defined as having carnal knowledge of 
a person who, to the offender's knowledge, is his daughter 
or grand-daughter, inter alia, whether by lawful marriage 
or not.
15* Children and Young Persons Law: s.26 (jS.R.); s.33 
(W.R.); s.26 (Lagos).
A chjJxUs right to his parents1 citizenship and domicil•
The i960 Constitution made the acquisition of 
Nigerian citizenship by a child born in pre-independence 
Nigeria dependent on whether or not any of his parents or 
grandparents were born there# Section 7 (1) provides that 
a person who was born in the country and who was a citi­
zen of the United Kingdom and Colonies oh the 30th day of 
September, i960, became a Nigerian citizen on the first 
day of October, 196^*
”Provided that a person shall not become a citizen 
of Nigeria by virtue of this subsection if neither 
of his parents nor any of his grandparents was born 
in the former ^olony or Protectorate of Nigeria#”
In the same way, a child who was born outside the country 
before independence acquired Nigerian citizenship if, but 
only if, his ”father was born in the former Colony or 
Protectorate and was a citizen of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies •#•” or would have been but for his prior death#^ * 
A child born on or after independence, outside Nigeria, 
becomes a Nigerian citizen at birth if at that date his
2father was a Nigerian citizen otherwise than by birth# 
Conversely, a child born in the country does not acquire 
a Nigerian citizenship by virtue of such birth if, at the
1 . S . 7 (2 ).
2. S. 11.
5 0 (?
date of his "birth, (a) neither of his parents was a 
Nigerian citizen and his father had diplomatic immunities 
or (b) his father was an enemy alien and the birth occurred 
at a place under enemy occupation.
A legitimate child acquires his father’s domicil 
at the date of his birth, if this took place in his father’s 
lifetime. A legitimate child born after his father’s death 
receives his mother’s domicil at the date of his birth; so 
does an illegitimate child.** A child legitimated by sub­
sequent marriage acquires his father’s domicil; but whether 
this is the father’s domicil at the date of the child’s le­
gitimation or at the date of his birth is not clear. Perhaps
5
it is the latter. The same principle also applies, pre­
sumably, to a child legitimated by acknowledgement.
Until he comes of age, a child has no capacity to
change his domicil by his own act. But until that event, his
domicil changes automatically with any change in his father’s. 
After the father’s death, but not before, the mother may 
change the child’s domicil. Even then, she can only do so if 
she exercises her power to change the child’s domicil for 
his benefit. Thus, while the mother’si domicil changes to that 
of her new husband if she re-marries, that of the child need
not do so, even if he is actually living with his mother. ^
3. On registration of persons of Nigerian descent born Outside 
the country, and of persons of alien descent born there, 
see the Nigerian Citizenship Act, I960, s.3> subss.(2 ) and 
(U), and s.U(l)> as amended by the Nigerian Citizenship 
Act, 1961, s.3A, esp. subss (l), (2). 
h* I&rden, op.cit.♦ p .32
5. Rayden, ibid.
6. Rayden, p.1+3*
7. See generally, Bromley, pp.llj.-15«
Inheritance rights of parent and child.
Scope. Inheritance is obviously too large a subject 
to be dealt with in any detail in a treatise of Family Law. 
vie shall therefore be content with a bnef treatment of the - 
more important problems which confront the courts by reason 
of the existence side by side of divergent inheritance 
rules derived from English law and from local customary 
laws. These problems include the question how far, if at 
all, daughters can nov/ be said to have a right to inherit 
their father’s property on intestacy; to what extent a 
man’s children can now inherit his property in a matri- 
lineal or a mlxed-descent society; how far the old doctrine 
of primogeniture found especially among the Bini and the Ibo 
can still be regarded as good law in modern society; what 
changes, if any, result from the fact t»f a man’s being mar­
ried under a monogamous legal system; and the effect of 
illegitimacy on a child’s inheritance rights under the ge­
neral law as well as under the various customary laws.
' Rights under customary law 
Classification Inheritance rules under customary law ma£ 
be said to fall into four distinct patterns in the patri­
lineal societies, with a fifth broad pattern for the matri- 
lineal areas; the basis of this classification being whether 
all children, all sons, first sons or no children at all 
are entitled to inherit from their parents. T^ese five 
patterns may be designated:
(a) The Yoruba
(b) The Bini
(c) The I jaw
(d) The Ibo, and
(e) The ^koi systems of inheritance.
It must be warned, however, that the patterns themselves are 
not as clear-cut as these names would suggest; that there 
are wide varieties even within the same ethnic group; and 
that the names adopted here are not intended to suggest 
that only five ethnic groups are covered in the discussion. 
Yhat we have called the Ekoi system covers all matrilineal 
and mixed-descent societies, v/hile the f,Ibo" system covers 
all societies not within one of the other named ethnic groups.
(a) The Yoruba system
The traditional Yoruba law was that where a man 
died intestate, his disposable landed property (i.e. the 
land itself, houses and economic trees and plants) was 
inherited by his sons, v/hile his movable property went to 
his junior brothers (i.e. those younger than himself in 
age). Nothing went to hid senior brothers in age, or t o 
his daughters. As between the sons, the eldest (called the 
Dawodu) was entitled to a larger share than any of the
others by virtue of his position as the new head of his
1. Omoniregun v. ^adatu (1888), Lagos Reps of Certain Judg- 
ments of the Supreme Ct., p*15; Re Hotonu (1892), -do- 
p.18; Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, pp.293 & 296; Partridge, 
"Native law and custom in Egb aland11, loc.cit., p.U28; 
Kasunmu, oj^ cit., p.180.
father’s family.
These traditional rules have now been modified 
in two respects, ^irst, all children are now entitled to 
inherit from their father on intestacy irrespective of 
Secondly, the ^awodu is no longer entitled to a 
larger share of the estate, ^he modern law therefore is 
that all the legitimate (including legitimated) children 
of a man are entitled to succeed to his disposable landed 
property on the basis of equality. Neither infancy nor 
the fact that a daughter is already married at the date 
of the father’s death or the date of distribution of the 
estate affects a child’s inheritance right. In Salami
■z
v. Salami the High Court of the Western Region had 
occasion to consider the inheritance rights of an infant 
daughter of an Abeokuta Yoruba. ^he had been taken by her 
mother to the French Cameroons shortly after her father’s 
death in 1927» fifteen years later, and while she was 
still an infant, the other two surviving children of the 
father distributed the estate between them leaving nothing 
for their absent sister. In 1953 she returned to Abeokuta 
and demanded a share of the inheritance only to be met with 
the statement that women had no inheritance rights in 
their father’s property, and that in any case she was a
2. Lopez v. Lopez (1921+) 5 N#l .R.1+7 (A Full Court decision 
per Combe, .^ J., Van der Heulen and ^ew, JJ.); Ravage 
v. Macfo.Vt ante, see also Gbker, op.cit., pp.227-45* 
21+9-52, 264-83, and the cases discussed therein; Sala­
mi v. Salami, infra.
3. (1957) w.R.N.L'.k'.lO.
minor when the said property was distributed. In her action 
to enforce her right to a share in her father’s estate, 
Irwin, J. held that neither the daughter’s minority, nor 
her absence abroad, nor again the fact that she was a woman 
affected her right to inherit under Yoruba law.^
It is often said that illegitimacy has no adverse 
effect on a person’s inheritance rights. This, as we have 
endeavoured to show, is not strictly true, if we exclude 
from the list of illegitimate children persons who have been 
acknowledged by their natural fathers. Such persons, as 
we have said, are not illegitimate; they are ’’persons le­
gitimated by acknowledgment”. But what is the legal posi­
tion of a child born to a man by an illicit sexual union 
and not in any v/ay acknowledged by him in his life time?
Such a person is illegitimate and has no rights or interests 
in his putative father’s estate either in his life time or 
on his intestacy. This, in our submission, is implied in
the West African Court of Appeal decision in Young v. Young 
5
and others in which it was held that a man to whom land 
had been devised as “family property.under a will was 
under no obligation to obtain the consent of his unacknow­
ledged putative child to a conveyance of the said land.
k* See also: Coker, supra; Ajisafe, op.cit., p.8; Forde,
The Yoruba-speaking peoples of south-western Nigeria, 
pp.2U-6; Lloyd, ""Some notes on the Yoruba rules of 
succession loc.cit., p.22; I’olarin, op. cit.,
pp.8U-6; Partridge, "Native law and custom in Egbaland”, 
loc. cit., p.lj-28.
5. (1933) W.a .C.a . Civil Appeal No.3631* cyclostyled Report.
The devisee had obtained the consent and signature of his 
legitimate children to they conveyance in 1 9 kh; in 1950 
he acknowledged the illegitimate child for the first time; 
and shortly after this the latter brought an action against 
him and the legitimate children claiming that as he did not 
consent to the conveyance as a member of the Young family, 
the conveyance was invalid and should be set aside. TheL 
West African Court °? Appeal held, inter alia, that as the 
first proved act of acknowledgment by the putative father 
occurred long after the land had been sold aid so ceased 
to be family land, and since the then members of the family 
all consented to the conveyance, the child so acknowledged 
had no right to upset the conveyance. T^g Court held in 
effect, therefore, that until duly acknowledged, an illegi­
timate child was not a child of his putative father in law, 
was not a member of the latter’s family, and had no rights 
or interests in the property of the said family. If this 
reading of the Court’s decision is correct, the conclusion 
appears inescapable that unless and until he is acknowledged 
as his own by the putative father,, an illegitimate child 
has no inheritance rights in the intestate estate of such 
a "father”.
Distribution of a man’s property among his children 
is done (a) per capita, where all the children were born 
to the deceased by one and the same woman; and (b) first
per stirpes, where there are children born of more than one
woman; then per capita as between the children of the same
mother* (As already explained, a stirps is used in this
/*■
work to mean the children of each mother in what we have 
called a non-homogeneous family.) In Dawodu v* hanmole,^  
the doubts thrown on this well-known Yoruba gpinciple of 
distribution by a decision of Jibowu, C#j# in the court of 
first instance were dispelled first by the Federal Supreme 
Court and finally by the Privy Council. In that case a man 
was survived by nine ehildren born of four different wives. 
The question before the court was whether the man’s intestate 
estate should be divided into four part3 (per stirpes) or 
into nine parts (per capita), ^he Privy Council, upholding 
the Federal Supreme Court’s rejection of Jibowu’s decision 
in the court below, held that distribution should be in 
four parts. The Privy Council also held that this 
principle of distribution was not repugnant to natural 
justice, equity or good conscience as the trial court had 
said it was.
The inheritance rights of children in their 
mother’s intestate estate are governed by the same rules as
6. Folarin, p.8 b; Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law. pp.37>m85, 296 
(on the question of acknowledged illegitimate children 
constituting stirpes), 297 (children of a deceased child 
take what would have been their father’s or mother’s 
share had the latter survived the intestate).
f^. ’’The Times”, July 26th, 1962: per Lords Fyershed,
Jenkins and Guest.
For the F.s.C. decision, see (1958) 3 .^S.C.lj.6.
those Just discussed with reference to a father’s estate, 
with two differences arising from the nature of things. 
First, a child’s illegitimacy has no effect on his inheri 
tance rights over his mother’s property; this is because 
whatever his status, he is his mother’s child. Secondly, 
the question fif distribution is more straightforward in 
this case, being always done per capita.
is inherited by his parents but only in the absence of any 
surviving children or brothers and sisters of the whole 
blood. r^hat is, where the deceased child is survived by
take to the occlusion of the parents; similarly, where a 
person is survived by brothers and sisters of the whole 
blood as well as by his parents, the former will take to 
the exclusion of the parents. But where a person is sur
of inheritance (as far as the succession rights of a de­
ceased person’s children are concerned) is the principle 
of primogeniture, Khere a man is survived by children
8. Adedoyin v. ^imeon (1928) 9 N.L.R.86. This case was con­
cerned with the rival claims of an illegitimate child’s 
mother and half-sisters. But the propositions stated in 
the text were given as expert evidence before the court.
If a child dies intestate, his disposable property
his own children as well as by his parents, the former will
vived by his parents and half-brothers the
parents have a prior claim to the inheritance.
(b) The Bini system
The most outstanding characteristic of Bini law
born to him by one wife only, his disposable property pas­
ses to his eldest son in its entirety. Any obligation on 
him to ppovide for his younger brothers and sisters out 
of the estate or to give them a share thereof is moral, 
not legal. Where the deceased is survived by children born 
to him of more than one wife, his property passes to the 
eldest sons, one from each "house11 or stirps. Once more 
there is a moral but no legal obligation on these first-
-sons and heirs to make gifts out of their respective shares
9
of the estate to their younger siblings.
The same principles govern succession to a man’s 
property under Ishan law. But in the latter society, an 
elder son and heir who does not carry out his obligations, 
if any, with regard to his father’s funeralnonly has a life 
interest in the estate; a younger brother who performs these 
duties will be entitled to what remains of the estate after 
the death of the legal heir.^
A mother’s property is also inherited by her sons, 
usually by the eldest son exclusively. But household uten- 
cils and articles of personal adornment are shared by her 
daughters, if any.1^
(c) The Ij aw sys tern
Under I jaw customary law, children of "big dowry11
97 Bradbury and LI oyd. op. c i t., p. •
10. Ibid.. p.77
11. * * P • ^i7 •
marriages inherit from their fathers; those of "small dowry"
marriages inherit from their maternal uncles or some other
maternal relations with whom they had established a special
12legal association known as the ye kune. In the former
case, the basic principle of inheritance is primogeniture, 
the eldest son taking to the exclusion of all other children 
in a simple (homegeneous) family while the first sons by 
the various wives take jointly in a composite family as 
under Bini law. Here again, there is a moral obligation 
on the heir or heirs to cater for the ordinary needs of 
his/their younger brothers and all their sisters of what­
ever age. Failing sons, a man’s disposable property descends
13to his eldest surviving bidther.
A Small dowry" marriage child’s right to inherit 
from his maternal uncle or other maternal relation as above 
described exists even if the deceased is also survived by 
his own children, and even if the latter are "big dowry" 
marriage children.^ But it is not clear whether a 
nephew’s rights supersede or co-exist with those of the 
deceased’s own eldest son or sons as the case may be.
The above rules represent the orthodox Ijaw 
customary law of inheritance, ^here is, however, a growing
12. See Williamson, loc.cit.» p*56, on the Okrika I jaw. The 
yekune rites place an uncle in the position of a legal 
father to the nephew concerned.
13. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria> Vol.Ill, p.689 ff* 
and Table of inheritance.
1U. Cf. Williamson, ibid., p.36.
practice whereby children claim their father’s property
on intestacy whether or not they were horn of a "big dowry" 
15marriage.  ^ Similarly, many children now resist any claims 
made by their "small dowry" marriage cousins to their de­
ceased father’s estate.
Succession to a woman’s property is governed by
the same rules as those described above with reference to
Bini law. In this connection, it makes no difference
whether a woman’s children are all born of a big dowry or
a small dowry marriage or whether some belong to one group 
and some to the other.
(d) The Ibo system.
There is primogeniture in the Ibo customary law of 
inheritance to the extent that (a) the eldest son of a de­
ceased man is exclusively entitled to any property which 
vested in him by virtue of his position as a family head;
(b) the eldest son is entitled to the ownership and pos­
session of the father’s obi (i.e. principal house) subject, 
however, to the right of occupancy of any members of the 
family who may have been put into possession of any part 
thereof by the deceased in his life time; and (c) pending 
distribution, the eldest son takes control of the estate 
as manager and care-taker for the family. But unlike the 
position under Bini law, the obligation on the eldest son
15. Williamson, loc.cit., p.59*
to cater for the needs of the junior members of the family 
out of the estate is not moral but legal, as far as landed 
property is concerned. The eldest son in a simple, and the 
eldest na le members of the various branches (hsekwu) in a 
composite family cannot be compelled by legal action to 
share the father’s money or other movable property with the 
other children; but he/they can be so compelled to share 
the land, houses and economic trees and plants (less the 
special portion of the estate already indicated) with them 
if he fails without just cause to perform his duties as the 
new family be ad as well as he should.
Distribution of the estate is done per capita 
in a homogeneous family, and per stirpes in a composite one.
A woman’s movable property (other than money)
15apasses to her daughters on intestacy. In general, the
eldest daughter is entitled to a number of items (some 
kitchen ware and articles 2>f clothing), while the bulk of 
the estate goes to the youngest daughter (an example of 
ultimogeniture). But there are local variations. In some 
places, all daughters inherit jointly; in others, the 
eldest daughter takes exclusively.
Money is inherited by sons - usually by the eldest 
son who, however, is under a duty to perform the funeral 
and second-burial rites.
15a. Cf. ^senwa, loc.cit., p.80. (The author also describes 
in the same place some modern developments on children’s 
inheritance rights on intestacy generally.)
Failing daughters, all the movable property of a 
deceased woman descends to her sons; the general rule being 
ultimogeniture, with the same local variations as in the 
case of daughters.
The landed property of a woman is inherited by 
her sons, if any, as women cannot inherit land on intestacy 
under Ibo law. Here again, the eldest son takes charge of 
the land pending final distribution. But aL 1 the sons are 
entitled to shares if and when distribution is decided upon.
Failing children, a woman’s property is inherited
by her husband or his heir if he is already deceased. The
a
only exception to this rule is that/woman’s ante-nuptial
landed property descends in her maiden family and not to
16her husband or his heir. In the case of an unmarried
woman,, inheritance is by. her brothers and sisters. The 
former inherit the land if any; the latter take the 
movables. In both cases the rules relating to distribution
are similar to those which govern distribution among a
t ,/ , v+ 17, 18, 19woman’s sons and/or daughters.
16. Cf. Nwugege v. Adigwe (1934) 11 N.L.R.134*
17. It will be recalled that the "Ibo" system of inheritance 
includes all the societies in southern Nigeria which are 
not specifically named under (a),(b), (c) or (e).
18. On the Ibo, see Basden, -Among the ^bos of Nigeria, p.
80 ff.; Basden, Niger Ibos, pp.267-8; Thomas, Anthro­
pological Report on the Ibo I, pp.86994; horde
and Jones, op.cit., pp.20-21; Meek, haw and au thority... 
pp.319-20; Horton, "The ohu system of slavery in a nor­
thern Ibo village-group" (1954) 24 Africa 311-338, at pp 
316-7; Jones, "Ibo land tenure f (1949) 19 Africa 309-323 
at pp.315-6; Ardener, loc.cit., p.88; Talbot, Peoples of 
southern Nigeria, pp.687-8, of Vol.Ill; Ssenwa, loc.cit.
pp.80/-Stl
19. Qn the Ibibin, including the ufik, see Forde. Bfik tra­ders, p.14; horde and Jones, op. c 11., pp.75-o; Talbot,
Life in southern Nigeria, pp.218-9*
(e) The ^koi system
Among the matrilineal societies of -^ koi (including 
the Yako) and the mixed-descent Ibo peoples of Afikpo and 
Ohafia areas, movable property is inherited primarily by 
brothers of the whole blood. Under the "orthodox" custo­
mary law, such property goes to the deceased’s eldest sur-
2 0  - Iviving brother. ailing brothers, the eldest son of the
Q"]
deceased person’s eldest sister inherits. There is, 
however, a strong indication that matrilineal succession is 
losing favour with the people, and that succession by one’s 
children rather than nephews is being progressively accepted 
in these places.
bj
Land, too, is inherited by brothers, or/nephews
Latter A,
(where there are no brothers)! Eut in th&^ case, the heir
must elect between staying oh among his father’s people
(in which case he normally obtains all the land he needs for
residential and farming purposes from them) and going over
to his maternal uncle’s people to receive and enjoy his
inheritance there. This once again is the traditional law.
More aid more people are now challenging the rights of their
father’s brothers and nephews to inherit the estate. Parents
for their part, now adopt various devices to circumvent
2Qy Talbot. In the shadow of the bush, p.3lU* ’
21. Forde, Marriage and the family ... Yako, pp.i-t-5 and 69;
Forde, ’’Double descent among the Yako" in African systems 
of kinship and marriage (R a del i ff e -Brown and '^orde, eds.j 
pp. 307 and 328.
the doctiine of matrilineal descent; these include wills,
inter vivos gifts and getting wives from patrilineal
. . .  22 societies.
. ! Rights under the general law.
Lagos. Section 36 of the Marriage Act provides that 
where a person who is subject to customary lav/ contracts a 
marriage in accordance with the provisions of that Act 
and dies intestate ’'leaving a widow or husband, or any is­
sue of such marriage”, his personal property and disposable 
real property shall be distributed in accordance with the 
law of England relating to the distribution of the personal 
estates of intestates, any customary law to the contrary 
notwithstanding, provided, that real property which the 
deceased had no right to dispose of by will as well as any 
part of the estate vhich under English law would become "a 
portion of the casual hereditary revenues of the crown” shall 
be distributed in accordance with customary law rules. This 
provision also applies to the intestate estate of an issue 
of a marriage contracted under the Act. Thelrelevant 
English law is contained in the Statute of Distribution,
I67O and a similar enactment of 1683•
The effect of this section for our present pur­
poses is that where a man who v/as married under the Act dies
intestate leaving no widow, his children are entitled to
22. Cf, uhubb7 Tbo £and tenure (2nd edn.), paras.hll-2•
the net estate, share and share alike; if the deceased was
survived by a widow as well as children, the latter will
take two-thirds of the net estate - the other one-third
23going to the widow* ^ Similarly, two-thirds of the dis­
posable property of a woman na rried under the Act and dying 
intestate will, if she is survived by a husband, be distri­
buted equally among her children irrespective of sex; if 
she left no husband, the said property will go to her 
children absolutely.
The Privy Council has held on a case from Ghana 
that the term "widow11 in the Ghana equivalent of s.36 (ante)
means any widow who survives the deceased, and need not be
2 ha woman married under the Marriage Act. In other words,
once a man contracts an ’Ordinance marriage’ (as marriages 
under the local marriage legislations are called in common 
law ^est Africa), his intestate estate will be inherited 
in accordance with the pre-191^ law of England (for Lagos) 
whether or not he later contracts a customary law marriage. 
Presumably then English law will also apply to the distri­
bution of the intestate estate of a woman who was first 
married under the Marriage Act and later, following a 
divorce or her husband’s death, under customary law.
Section 36 bas no very striking effect on the suc­
cession rights of Lagos Yoruba children in their parents’
23* E>ee Williams on Executors, Vol. II* pp.891-899*
2b* Coleman v. dhang [1961] 2 All .^P.i-i-06.
property. Almost the only result of its operation is that 
the actual shares received by each child will he diminished 
to the extent that the surviving parent is entitled to one- 
third of the net estate. But in the case of a non-Yoruba 
family, the result could be quite startling, -^ or it would 
mean, for instance, that an Ekoi child or the I jaw child of 
a "small dowry" marriage who, as we have seen, has no in­
heritance rights oyer his father’s property, will acquire 
such rights. In the same way, the Bini principle of primo­
geniture vj±11 be superseded by the English ^aw doctrine of 
equality. (We have seen that the effect on a widow’s rights 
is even more revolutionary.)
This section will certainly apply to any real 
property which the deceased had in Lagos', since the lex 
situs governs succession to real property. But will it also 
apply to the personal property of a person whose native com­
munity is not Lagos but who lived and died in Lagos? Again, 
will the section apply to the "issue" of a marriage under 
the Act beyond the first degree; in other words, will it 
apply to grandchildren and remoter issued These’-and si­
milar questions are yet to be raised or answered in the courts. 
But whichever way they are answered, one fact stands out 
clearly, and that is that the section very badly needs 
amendment and clarification. For it was either badly 
drafted by some person or persons who did not stop to give 
the matter any serious thought, or else it was deliberately
r; n  n
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left loose and ambiguous by a draftsman who hoped that in 
working out its implications and inherent problems the courts 
would seize the opportunity to extend the application of 
English law in the country and so anglicise the customary
Western Region
The inheritance rights of a prent and his or her 
children inter se are governed by s.U9 of the Administra­
tion of Estates Law, 1959> of the Western Region - an enact-
ment which, however, only applies to the intestate estates
26of persons who contracted a Christian marriage# If the
deceased left some issue but no spouse, his net estate
(or the residue thereof in the case of partial intestacy)
27is held in trust for sale for the said issue. If, on
the other hand, the deceased left a spouse in addition to 
issue, the latter are entitled to (a) two-thirds of the net 
estate or residue and (b) the reversion on the other one-
pa
third which is held-on trust for thecsurvivlngispouse* 
Distribution as between the issue is on the basis of equali­
ty# '•diere the deceased left one or both parents but no
25* For further doubts and queries on the section, see Obi, 
op.cit#, espp pp.220-222# F0r bold statements invdvlng 
rather ambitious reforms, see Cole v. C0ie (1898)
1 N.L.R.15.
lav/, as the Full Court had done in 1898.^
26. S.l.
27. S.U9
28. S.U9
spouse and no issue surviving, the net estate or residue
goes to the sole surviving parent absolutely or to both
parents equally as the case may be* (That is, where both
parents are living, division is done on the basis of equa- 
29 N
lity too* Brothers and sisters only take in the absence
30of a surviving child, spouse or parent.
Eastern Region
Section 36 of the Marriage Act (supra) does not 
apply to the Eastern Region or anywhere else outside Lagos; 
neither is there any local statute regulating intestate suc­
cession there* But until 1957, there was a strong tendency 
on the part of the courts to hold that because a person 
contracted a Christian form of marriage, he must be pre­
sumed to have adopted the law of England as it stood early 
in 1900 as the proper law that would regulate succession to 
his intestate estate. In Re Emodie, Administrator-general
71
v* Egbuna it was held by Ames, J. (as he then was) that
English law, not Ibo customary law, should govern the suc­
cession rights of the relatives of an Ibo man who contracted 
a christian marriage at Port Harcourt and died in the 
Provinces (i.e. outside Lagos), leaving a widow, a brother 
and an illegitimate daughter by another woman. The case,
29. E.i|-9(l)(iii) and (iv).
30. 8.14.9(1) (v). Note also that no relations more remote than 
"uncles and aunts of the half-blood" can inherit in any 
event. In the absence of any of the persons enumerated 
above, the property goes to the Crown as bona vacantia!
31. (19U5) 18 N.L.R.l. Cee also Coker v. Coker T19U5)
17 N.L.R.55 (by Brookes, J.) and ttooding v« Martins 
(1914-2) 8 VI.a . C . A . 1 0 8 .
said the learned judge, was covered by Cole v, ^ole. But 
in 1957> Ainley, C#j# said in Onwudin.joh v, Qnwudinjoh ^  
that Cole v« C0ie »itself and the whole line of cases de­
cided by reference to it may one day be called in question
33by the federal Supreme Court.” It is therefore probable
that in future the mere fact of having contracted a Christian 
marriage will no longer be regarded as a sufficient basis 
for the application of English law as opposed to the local 
customary law to the distribution of the intestate estate 
of a Nigerian so married.
Meanwhile, however, the position would appear to 
be that such an estate will be inherited in the same way 
and by the same persons as we have already discussed in 
the section on Lagos.
32. (1957) II ^.L.R.l.
33* Ibid., at p.5* ^or an earlier expression of doubts on 
the correctness of the decision in CQie y. Cole, see 
Smith v. Smith (192I4.) 5 N.L.h.102, per Van der Meulen, J. 
at p.101+.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN.
ADOPTION AND GUARDIANSHIP.
Scope of inquiry.
In this Chapter we shall briefly examine the custo­
mary law relating to adoption and guardianship. The general 
(English) law on these subjects will not be considered for 
three reasons: first because this work is mainly concerned
with customary law; secondly because, insofar as these 
subjects are covered by principles of English law or by 
local statutes based thereon, there is a wealth of readily 
accessible literature on them; and thirdly because adoption 
and guardianship other than in accordance with customary 
law are so rare in occurrence in southern Nigeria that there 
is little point in discussing them at the present stage of 
our legal development.
A. ADOPTION.
Who may adopt
Every adult male person who is sui juris has a 
legal right to adopt any child of his choice, ^here is 
nothing in customary law to prevent a person from adopting 
a complete,.stranger; but in practice, most cases of adoption 
occur between blood relations. Again, there is nothing in 
law to prevent a man from adopting a child even if he is 
Obviously in no position, economically, to provide the child
with adequate maintenance, education or training for a good 
career; but since few if any parents or guardians would 
ever give their child or ward as the case may be to an 
adoptive parent who is in no economic position to cater 
adequately for the child, the result is that only compara­
tively well-to-do people ever adopt in practice, finally, 
it is legally possible, but extremely rare in practice, for 
one adult to adopt another adult; in which case perhaps 
this may be done without the consent of the adopted person1s 
family. Any adult female person, too, may adopt anyone of 
her choice. But in the case of a married woman or an un­
married one who is still under the effective as well as 
formal legal control of a male relation, the consent of her 
husband or guardian as the case may be should be (and 
invariably is) obtained. As in the case of male adoptive 
parents, it is normally well off women who enter into adop­
tion relationships. In practice, too, it is almost only 
childless men and women who adopt; though there is nothing 
in the law to prevent a person who has children of his or 
her own from addiiig to their number by adoption.^
Methods of adoption
Adoption may be formal or informal. In the former 
case, there is usually a meeting cf representatives of the
1. ^ee generally, ^homas, An-fchropological report on the Edo- 
speaking peoples of Nigeria, p # 8 9 ;  Partridge, Native 
law and custom in Egbaland", loc.cit., p . 423; Porde, 
"Double descent in a semi-Bantu community" ( 1 9 3 7 )  3 7  Man, 
p . 66; Polarin, p . 36; Porde, Marriage and the family 
among the Yako. p p . 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 ;  and -SliasV opTcitT, p p . 3 ^ 1 0 3 0 2
two families involved, viz* those of the prospective adop­
tive parent and child. Parental rights and responsibilities
are there transferred and accepted, and the proceedings
"5agenerally end with a commensal meal. As a variant of 
this, there is a meeting of members of the adoptive parent’s 
family and perhaps also a number of his friends invited for 
the occasion. The adoptive parent presents the child to 
this meeting and informs them of his intention thereafter 
to regard him as his own child.
In an informal adoption, there are no meetings 
and no public declarations. r^ he adoptive parent receives 
the child (usually an orphan or the child of a newr knisman) 
into his home and treats him as he would his own child, and 
the child for his part regards &h& treats him as his father 
or mother as the case may be. The great weakness of this 
mode of adoption is that it is sometimes impossible to 
tell whether a given relationship is one of guardian and 
ward or of (adoptive) parent and child. One may have
to wait for many years to disoover what the true position 
is: if the child stays on in the adoptive family as a member
thereof after he has oome of age, the relationship is deemed 
to have matured into adoption. (This situation is most 
frequently encountered in cases where a woman has an illegi­
timate child with one man and later brings the child with
3a, 3b: Cf. *'orde, Marriage and the family among the Yakot
pp.106-107*
e: o q
her to the matrimonial home on being married to another man. 
The child is then brought up by his mother’s husband and 
treated in all respects as if he were a member of the 
latter’s family.)
Legal incidents of adopt ion
Adoption confers the same rights and imposes the 
same duties upon a child, vis-a-vis his adoptive parent or 
parents and his/their family, as attach to a child who was 
born outside wedlock and subsequently legitimated in one 
of the wpys already described. In other words, from the 
date of the adoption, the child concerned becomes the law­
ful child of his adoptive parent and a member of his family 
for all practical purposes. Eut the child’s link with his
family of birth survives to the extent that he cannot law-
3cfully marry any member or near relation thereof. ..........
B. GUARDIANSHIP 
Guardianship relationships classified.
Guardianship may be general or restricted in scope. 
In the former case, the guardian assumes custody and control 
over the child and his property rights, if any. In the lat­
ter, the guardian’s rights and duties are restricted either 
to the person or to the property rights of the child. It
?c. On the legal incidents of adoption, see Thomas, Anthro­
pological report on the ^do-speaking peoples ...., 
p.89; '^orde, "Double descent in a semi-Bantu community”, 
loc.cit., p.66; Eolarin, op.cit., p.36. An adoptive 
child is said to have no inheritance rights in his 
adoptive parent’s intestate estate: Partridge on the
Egba (.ante), at p.lj-23» But see Elias, ante, p.302.
isnpossible, therefore, to have two guardians (or sets of 
guardians) in respect of one and the same child - one re­
sponsible for his personal welfare and the other for his 
property rights and interests.^
Appointment of guardians 
(a) who may appoint
Subject to what has been said about unlawfully 
giving or accepting custody or control of children, parents 
have a right to appoint one or more guardians for their 
infant child. Under the traditional customary lav/, where 
both parents are alive but cannot agree on the need or the 
right person to appoint, the wishes of the father prevail; 
for, as between the parents, a child is regarded as^in his 
father’s custody and under his control, as we have seen, 
where the father is already deceased, the mother has a
right to appoint a guardian, at all events in modern custo- 
2
mary law.
If both parents are dead, a customary court may
appoint one or more guardians, depending on the number of
persons who apply for appointment, the needs of the child
or children and the ability of the prospective guardians
3
to cater for these reeds adequately. Failing parental and
1. Gf. Egharavba, op.cit., p.39 on Bini law.
2. dee, e.g., Infants Law (h.Region), ss.2, 8 and 11. Also 
Leith-Ross, op.cit., p.65; Forde and ^ones, op.cit..
pp.20-21.
3. Customary Courts Law (E.Region). s.25(l)> (W.Region), 
s.23(l); Infants Law (w.Region), ss.8 and 11.
judicial appointment, the family head has a right to appoint
by virtue of his general position as "father" of the whole 
kgr oup•
(h) Lho may be appointed
Parents have a right to appoint any person of 
tteLr choice, whether or not he is a kinsman, and many parents 
do appoint comparative strangers. The family head, too may 
appoint anyone of his choice, and often appoints a stranger. 
But his choice may be successfully challenged by court ac­
tion at the instance of other members of the family, and 
sometimes by the!:child's maternal uncle - if there is reason 
to believe that the proposed appointment is not in the best 
interests of the child.
(c ) How appointment is done
A guardian may be appointed by deed, by will, by 
way of judicial decision and record, or by word of mouth 
accompanied by actual physical transfer of the child. The 
first two methods are gaining in popularity with the increase 
in literacy in recent years. The third is also becoming 
increasingly popular as society grows more and more imper­
sonal, and as more people live in isolation from their kin­
ship groups and family heads. But by far the greatest number 
of appointments are still done by word of mouth in the manner 
and circumstances here indicated.
k* Ajisafe, p.U; Partridge (supra), p.k2k; for general dis­
cussion on appointment by family heads.
Where a deed is used, this is usually executed 
hy the child’s father alone; or, if he is deceased, hy 
the mother alone; or else hy the family head alone. Oc­
casionally, however, the deed is executed hy hoth parents, 
or hy the mother and the family head.
Sections 25(1) and 23(1) of the Customary Courts 
Laws of the ^astern and Western Regions respectively pro­
vide, in identical terms, that "In any matter.relating to 
the guardianship of children, the interest and welfare of 
the child shall he the first and paramount consideration".
A Customary Court must, therefore, consider all representa­
tions made to it hy any party interested in the child’s 
welfare before arriving at a decision as to who should he 
appointed; for only in this way could the Court he in 
possession of all the facts relevant to the question of 
the child's welfare.
Legal incidents of guardianship
The relationship of guardian and ward carries 
with it most of the mutual rights and obligations which 
attach to parents and children inter se. In other words, 
as far as rights over the person and of control are concerned 
a guardian may he said to step into the shoes of the child’s 
legal parents.
Some idea of the extent and nature of the re­
sulting relationship and its legal incidents can he seen
from a brief consideration of a few statutory provisions
and customary law examples. Section 161+ of the labour ^ode
provides that no person shall continue to employ an infant
under the age of 16 if he has notice that such employment
is agairst the wishes of the infant’s guardian (or parent).
S.295 of the Criminal Code gives to guardians the same powers
as it does to parents in relation to the administration of
corporal punishment on a child and the delegation of such
powers to a third party, such as a schoolmaster. A guardian^
like a jarent, may be required by a court to attend at the
5
trial of his ward, and may be compelled to do so. So may
he be ordered to pay any fine, damages or costs awarded by
the court: indeed, any such fine, damages or costs must
be paid by the guardian where the child involved in under
I k  years of age, unless the guardian cannot be found or
has not conduced to the commission of the offence by ne-
6gleeting to exercise due care of the ward. _Again, a
guarcfen may represent or be represented by his ward in legal
proceedings before a customary court in the same circumstances
and subject to the same li&itations as a parent may represent
or be represented by his/her child.^
Guardianship differs from adoption (even if the
5* Children and Young Persons Law, s.10 (E.Region), s.9
(W. Region).
6. Ibid., s.11 and s.10 respectively.
7. ^ustomary Courts Law, s.32(l) and s.28(U)(a) of the 
Eastern and Western Regions respectively.
two relationships are sometimes difficult to distinguish 
from each other, as we have seen) in at least tv/o fundamental 
ways, '^irst, a ward has no right of inheritance in his 
guardian1s intestate estate by reason only of the relation­
ship. Secondly, while an adoptive child cannot, a ward
can marry a member of the guardian*s family if he other-
8wise has legal capacity to do so.
G-uardianship and property rights.
A guardian is under a legal duty to take proper
care of his ward!s property, if any, and may be liable for
culpable waste or misappropriation in certain circumstances.
The general rule is that so long as the guardian takes
reasonably good care of such property, and so long as he
provides adequate maintenance and advancement for the child,
he need not account strictly for the use of the property
and its proceeds. It would be too much to expect a non-
literate guardian (and all guardians were of this category
until the last few decades) to keep Separate accounts of
his own and his ward*s properties. Hence the rule that
he may keep part of the proceeds of the latter*s property
or enjoy the property itself in spicie so long as he caters
for the ward reasonably well, having regard to all the
circumstances of the case. The presumption is, apparently,
that part of the maintenance and advancement costs of the
8. I.e., if he does not come within the prohibited degree 
of blood relationship. Cases of wards being given their 
guardians* daughters in marriage are not infrequent.
child is from time to time borne out of the guardian’s own
resources - a presumption that is bDrne out by the facts
q
m  the vast majority of cases.
This principle that a guardian need not account
strictly for the property of his ward was given some
10grudging recognition in Martins v. Martins. In that
case an orphan had money deposited in a bank for him out 
of the estate of his father. Later, his uncle with whom 
he lived and who was his guardian applied to the court for 
permission to withdraw part of the funds for the purpose 
of acquiring landed property as an investment for the child. 
The application was granted; the money was duly withdrawn; 
but none of it was used in the purchase of landed property 
or any other property. Part of it was, however, used with 
the infant’s consent and for his benefit - being spent on 
his school fees, necessaries and general maintenance. On 
attaining majority, the ward brought an action against his 
guardian for account. Butler Lloyd, J. held that notwith­
standing the fact that the guardian had not used any part 
of the money for the purpose for which its withdrawal was 
permitted, yet he should be given credit for such part of 
the funds as were actually used with the child’s consent
9. A guardian, says Ajisafe, "is entitled to the use of the 
ward’s land and the fruits accruing therefrom during 
the tenure of his office.” Op.cit., p.l+ Cf. Folarin, 
op.cit., p.53« See also:-
Egharevba, op.cit., p.39; and Partridge, “Native law 
and custom in -kgbaland", loc.cit., p.i|2h.
10. (1940) 15 N.l .R.126.
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and for his benefit. xhis list must, however, be closely 
scrutinized; and the guardian must make good any sums not 
coming within the approved list of expenses, the court held. 
Termination of guardianship.
Guardianship comes to an end in one of several 
ways, ^irst it will naturally come to an end when the child 
becomes an adult as understood in the local community. 
Secondly, guardianship is terminated by the wardTs marriage, 
as a general rule. In the case of a female ward, this fun­
ction devolves on her husband or, if he is himself a child 
of tender years, on his parent or guardian. Eut the guardian 
of a female child’s property need not cease to act by reason 
only of the child’s marriage, ^or he may have to be 
responsible for the upkeep and management of the property 
until the owner is old enough to take over control, and 
actually does so, if the property in question is land or s. 
house. As we have seen, such property does not come under 
the husband’s control by reason of the fact that he is 
married to its owner (and will not be inherited by him or 
by any member of his family apart from any children that 
that wife may have borne him.)
Thirdly, an appointment made by parents or the 
family head may be revoked by them or by a court of law; 
and a court may, of course, revoke its own appointment fo? 
any sufficient cause. Finally, a guardian has a right
(which, however, is rarely exercised) to surrender his 
rights and responsibilities if, among other reasons, he 
becomes physically or mentally incapable of taking good 
care of the child or his property or both; if he has to go 
abroad on transfer or to take up a new employment or calling, 
and it would be deleterious to the child’s personal or 
property interests for the relationship to be maintained 
in the circumstances; or if the child turns out to be a 
wilful delinquent. In thjs last case, the guardian may 
surrender his responsibilities at proceedings in a juvenile 
court, as already seen in connexion with parents and their 
children.
Guardianship ad litem.
For the sake of completeness, mention should be 
made of a concept which resembles true guardianship in name,
though in little else, ^his is guardianship ad litem. It
11 12 arises because, subject to one exception , an infant
has no legal capacity to institute or defend an action in
court. He must sue by his next friend, and defend by
a guardian ad litem. ^
11. where an infant sues for wages, not exceeding £100, 
due to him for work as a domestic servant, for piece
work or otherwise. See, e.g., Magistrates Court Law
(S. Region), s.37*
12. I.e. a person under the age of twenty-one years.
13. Savage v. Johnson (1926) 7 N.L.R.53 (Tew J.)
I k . Cf. Magistrates Courts Law (s. Region), s.39*
A guardian ad litem is appointed by the court 
after an action has been brought by or against the infant. 
In theory, any one may be appointed. In practice, however, 
such an appointment usually means no more than a confirma­
tion by the court of a choice made outside the court by 
the infant himself or on his behalf by his parent or a 
person in loco parentis; and the "guardian1' may in fact 
be the child's parent or his crdinary guardian. Hence our 
earlier remark that this functionary resembles a guardian . 
properly so called in little more than his official title.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
DISSOLUTION OF FAMILY TIES.
Scope of inquiry
The question whether or not the family ties be­
tween parents and their children could be severed and, if 
so, how this could be done has already been discussed in 
the Chapter on “Parent and child". In the present Chapter, 
we shall deal with the law relating to the dissolution of 
marital relations (a) by act of the parties, that is by 
divorce, and (b) by operation of law, that is by death in 
certain cases, ^he discussion here will be devoted mainly 
to customary lav/, but there will be occasional references 
to the general (English) law by way of contrast or 
comparison.
It will not be necessary to pursue the question
whether or not customary law recognizes divorce. For
whatever the legal position in the past, and in spite of
1
many assertions to the contrary, divorce is now an ac­
cepted socio-legal fact everywhere in southern Nigeria.
1. See, e.g., Rev. Johnson, Ihe history of the Yorubas, p.ll6 
where it was said in 1921, "Divorce is very rare; so 
rare as to be considered practically non-existing". In 
strict legal theory, says Lloyd of Itsekiri law, !,A ce­
remony performed before the ancestors to solemnize 
marriage can never ... be revoked": The Lenin Kingdom 
and the Edo-speaking peoples, p.190. Ajiaafe, too, says 
of the Yoruba of old, "Divorce is not permissible in 
native lav/": op.cit.. p*58; but this should be read v/ith 
a lawyer’s view of the law as expressed by Folarin in 
1939: The laws and customs of Egbaland, pp.30-32.
A. DIVORCE
YIio may initiate proceedings, and how.
Everywhere in the past, and in the less sophi­
sticated societies of today, divorce could he obtained 
either in court or extra-judicially; judicial proceedings 
being formerly only resorted to where a husband refused to 
accept a fefund of the bride price (marriage consideration) 
which he paid on the wife, or where a wife refused to leave 
the matrimonial home on being asked to do so by the husband 
or, having left it, she (more usually her maiden family) 
refused to refund the bride price on request.
(a) Extra-judicial divorce.
Either the husband or the wife may initiate divorce 
"proceedings". In the one case, the man orders his wife 
out of the matrimonial home and back to her own people for 
one of the usual reasons which will be discussed presently, 
and duly informs his parents-in-1 aw of his intention to 
bring the marriage to an end forthwith. Members of eitle r 
or both spouses1 families then attempt a reconciliation.
If the attempts fail, the wife’s parents decide whether or 
not they should wait until their daughter finds a new suitor 
before returning the bride price to the husband and having 
the marriage terminated. Where the wife is ordered out of 
the house through.no fault of hers or for no sufficient cause,
her parents have a right to hold their hands until a new 
suitor is forthcoming and a re-marriage arranged, fflf, 
however, the woman is sent out through her own fault (e.g. 
because she is a habitual thief or adulterer), then 
as a general rule, the husband has a right to call upon 
her parents/family to refund whatever bride price he paid 
for her. Should they refuse or fail to do so, he has a
right of action to compel hem, if he so desires. In parts
of Iboland, however, a man who has himself ordered his wife 
out of the matrimonial home (whatever the reason) has no 
right to call upon her family to repay the bride price to 
him unless and until her re-marriage has been arranged.
In other cases, the wife leaves her husband and
goes back to her own people or, in more recent times, to
live on her own in one of the urban areas. The husband is 
then informed of his wifefs intention to end their marriage 
relationship. If the wife left for no just cause, and if 
all attempts at reconciliation fail, her family will have 
to refund whatever bride price they receive for her to the 
injured husband. If they do not, the husband may bring an 
action against them to do so. i*here, however, the wife left 
on account of the husband*s fault (e.g. because of his 
cruelty to her, or because he has turned out to be an incor­
rigible rogue or an exceptionally indolent man), the 
woman’s family need not repay the bride price till her
re-marriage has been arranged.
In yet other cases, the wife is recalled by her 
own family, either because they are dissatisfied with her 
husband as husband and son-in-law, or because there is a 
more worthy (usually more wealthy) admirer asking for the 
woman’s hand in marriage. If the wogian consents and so leaves 
her husband, the latter has a right of action to compel im­
mediate refund to him of|the bride price paid for his wife.
The tendency in more recent years is for the courts
to decline to assist a man in recovering his bride price in
full or even in part where the marriage broke down through
his own fault, and, on the other hand, to order immediate
refund of the bride price where the wife’s fault, or that of
her maiden family has caused the break-up of marital rela- 
2tions.
2. bee generally, on the Ibo: Leith-Ross, African Aomen.
A Study of the Ibo of Nigeria, p.103; Easden, Among the 
Ibos of Nigeria, nn.76-77: Basden, Niger Ibos, p.239;
horde and Jones, op.cit., pp. 18-20; Lieek, Law and autho­
rity in a Nigerian tribe, pp.277-281; ^ieschhoff, ‘'Divorce 
laws and practices in modern Ibo cultured, (19U1) 26 J. 
Negro Hist., pp.302-310; -^senwa, loc. cit., p.75 and p.76. 
On the I jaw: Talbot, bribes of the Niger delta, p.2l6;
Talbot / Peoples of southern Nigeria, Vol.Ill,, p.2+39*
On the Ekoi: Talbot, ibid., p*o7U; Talbot, In the shadow
of the bush, p. 113; '^orde, Marriage and the family among 
the Yako ... ♦, p.71; ’^orde, "Double descent among the 
Yako", loc.cit.. p.325* On the Ibibio (Including the Efik) 
Porde, ^fik. traders of Old C a l a b a r , p.In] Cotton, loc.cit. 
p.i+30 (to be read with caution); Simmons, loc.cit., 
pp.l61+-5; Porde and Jones, op.cit., p.77* On the Yoruba: 
Porde, The Yoruba-speaking peoples of south-western Nigeria ^
p.28; v'ard, xhe Yoruba husband-wife code, pp.llOvlll; 
Folarin, on.cit.. on. 30-31: Johnson, The history of the 
Yorubas, p.116. On the Edo: Bradbury and Lloyd, on#cit., 
pp.U9 and 80.
(b) Judicial divorce.
As indicated above, recourse is had to the courts 
where the parties fail to reach agreement either on the 
question whether a marriage should be dissolved or not (as 
where a man refuses to accept a refund of the bride price he 
paid on his wife, or where a wife refuses to leave the matri­
monial home on being asked to dc|so by her husband), or on 
the quantum of the bride price repayable in the event of 
the comtemplated divorce being accomplished* As a general 
rule, and in the absence of any local legislation to the 
contrary, the customary courts (which alone have original 
jurisdiction in such matters) have no right to refuse to 
pronounce a /decree" of divorce on being asked to do so by 
a competent party - the competent parties being the husband 
and/or his family on the one hand, and the wife’s, family 
on the other. (There is, though, a growing practice whereby 
divorce decrees are made on the application of maltreated 
wives.) The court may attempt a reconciliation of the parties 
and usually does. But if the attempt fails, it has no choice 
but to declare the marriage at an end, manifesting its dis­
approval of one or the other of the parties by its judgment 
as to the amount of bride price recoverable, the amount 
of maintenance allowance payable to a nursing mother where 
the child is too young to be separated from his mother, or 
the time limit within which the bride price must be repaid.
"Grounds" for divorce.
There are, strictly speaking, no "grounds" for
divorce, if that term is used in its technical connotation
of facts which the law requires to be established before
divorce could be granted by the courts. As we have seen,
a marriage may be lawfully dissolved by mutual consent-
a state of affairs which is impossible at least in theory
under the general law, in view of the fact that such mutual
consent would constitute "collusion" v/hich is an absolute
bar to divorce under that law.'*’ As already indicated, too,
divorce could be secured without any:recourse to the courts,
with the result that there is no need for any set of facts
which a party seeking divorce must prove in order to show .
that the marriage has become a complete failure and should
2
be dissolved in the name of humanity.
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons and 
circumstances v/hich are generally accepted as affording a 
party sufficient moral justification to seek to have his 
or her marriage dissolved. These include impotence or 
sterility on the part of the husband or sterility on the
1. Cf# Bromley, pp. 139 and 1N2.
2. Jeune, President of the Probate Gourt*expressed the
rationale for the rule against collusion in these words: 
"When the parties to a suit are acting in complete con­
cert, the Court is deprived of the security for eliciting 
the whole truth, afforded by the contest of opposing 
interests, and is rendered unable to pronounce a decree 
of dissolution of marriage with sufficient confidence in 
its justice^ Churchward v. fchurchward [1895] P*7* at p.30.
This statement assumes, inter alia, that the courts are
better judges than the spouses themselves v/hen a marriage 
has broken down, and that a decree which is desired and 
welcomed by both parties to the proceedings id not neces­
sarily just.
part of the wife, since the main object of marriage is the 
procreation of children; cruelty on the part of either 
spouse, especially where this is accompanied by repeated acts 
of violence; excessive meannes- by the husband towards his 
wife or her maiden family; indolence of either spouse, 
since this would not conduce to the proper care and main­
tenance of any children that may be born of the marriage; 
adultery by the wife, especially if repeated, as this is an 
indication that the woman concerned would not make a good 
mother to her daughters as far as morals are concerned; 
incest by either spouse, especially where this is commit­
ted with a member of the innocent spouse’s family - the 
offending spouse is then considered far too defiled to 
continue cohabiting with the other spouse without drawing 
down the wrath of the ancestral gods; addiction tojcrime 
(p.g# theft, poisoning or gangsterism), because for one 
tiling, few people if any would like to maintain their as­
sociation with a habitual criminal if they can help it, for 
another since criminal proclivity is believed to run in the 
family, no spouse would willingly continue a marriage which 
is likely to result in the birth of criminals and social 
misfits. As we have seen in another context, a husband’s 
adultery without more is not regarded as sufficient justi­
fication for divorce. (This is ibviously due to the fact 
that, as in many another country, there is a double standard
of sexual morality in southern Nigerian societies - one 
standard for the women and a much lower one for the men.)
'^o constitute a "ground” for divorce, a husband’s adultery 
must be accompanied by some other matrimonial wrong such as 
neglect of his duties his own children or wife. That 
one spouse has contracted a dangerous and/or incurable 
disease is often a good reason for the other to divorce 
him; this is because, apart from the fact that a full and 
satisfying marital relationship would be difficult tf not 
impossible in the circumstances, there is the real danger 
that children will not be born or, if born, will probably 
become infected. But in the case of spouses who have pas­
sed their prime, and in those societies where the procreation 
of children per alterios is accepted socially as well as 
legally, the fact that either spouse in the former case 
or the husband in the latter case has contracted an in­
curable disease does not normally lead to a dissolution of 
the marriage, i or in the case of middle-aged or elderly 
couples, either enough children have been born of the mar­
riage to justify its continued existence without any more 
children, or the parties have already reconciled themselves 
to a childless marriage. In the other set of circumstances, 
the main purpose of the marriage could still be achieved 
by the wife with the help of another man chosen for the 
purpose by her or for her by either or both families
invovled in the marriage.*^
What constitutes divorce, 
and how is it obtained*
As in other systems of law, divorce under custo­
mary law consists in the dissolution of the marriage bond, 
with the consequent release of the spouses and their re­
spective families from all marital obligations towards each 
other. Contrary to popular opinion in certain quarters, 
customary marriage is not dissolved by the mere fact that 
one spouse has left, or beef!', sent away by, the other with 
the express intention of never again living together with 
him or her as husband and wife. "here this happens, there 
is no more than a voluntary separation: the parties remain
husband and wife in the eyes of the law nonetheless. Some 
formality is required to bring the marriage to an end. In 
the traditional lav/s of most societies, this normally took 
the form of a symbolic cutting of the marriage links between 
the two families concerned and an exchange of oaths to the 
effect that neither family or its members would knowingly 
harm the other or any of its members by reason of the fact
3. ^or more details see references in note 2 under the heading 
"Extra-judicial divorce" supra. Also Kanimer, loc. cit., 
p.60; Elias, op.cit♦ p.289 Egharevba, op.cit♦, p*20; 
Omoneukanrin, op.cit., pp.50-51j the Marriage, Divorce etc 
Adoptive Bye-laws Order, 1958, of the V/estern Region, s.7; 
Thomas, "The Edo-speaking peoples of Nigeria" loc.cit♦, 
p.6; Welch, loc.cit., pp.172-3; Delano, An African looks 
at marriage, p.31; Kasunmu, op.cit., pp.133-15U and the 
cases cited there.
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that the ties that bound them together were now broken. In 
the case of a judicial divorce, the dissolution was pronounced 
by the tribunal seised v/ith the case, this being all the 
formality necessary in such circumstances.
In modern times, there is a tendency everywhere 
to dispense v/ith the exchange of oaths, symbols or ceremonies 
of any kind. ■Lhe modern procedure can be summarised in a 
few sentences. There is first a separation, which is brought 
about in one of the ways already described, father simulta­
neously with this or subsequently, one of the parties in­
forms the other that the marriage has come to an end for all 
practical purposes as far as he or she is concerned. The 
husband is next sent for to come and collect what bride 
price he has paid on his wife. (Alternatively, he demands 
a refund and the woman’s family indicate their readiness 
and willingness to meet his demand on the subject.) A day 
is fixed for the repayment of the bride price. On the day 
so appointed, the husband takes with him some members of his 
family and/or trusted friends to the meeting place. (He 
may send other people to represent him, of course; or he 
may ask the special marriage guardian/middleman to act for 
him.) If the sum paid in the first place or repayable in 
the circumstances cannot be agreed upon, as it seldom is 
in the less sophisticated places where records and receipts 
are not used, recourse is had either to the law courts or
to a special tribunal chosen by the parties for that purpose* 
At last the sum due and repayable is agreed or adjudicated 
upon, and then paid to the husband or his representative* 
There is a final commensal meal or drink to show that there 
are no hard feelings. This brings the marriage to an end.
(It should be noted that the husband may well be in arrear 
with his payment of some non-refundable customary dues, in 
which case this will be set off against any repayments due 
to him.)
So far we have been dealing with extra-judicial 
divorce, the only recourse to the courts in such a case 
being to determine the quantum of bride price or customary 
dues repayable. In a judicial divorce, one party to the 
marriage brings an action in court to have the marriage dis­
solved. More often than not, the petitioner is the wife 
acting alone or in concert with her family, praying the court 
to dissolve her marriage and compel her unwilling husband to 
accept a refund of his bride price. If the husband appears 
or is represented, the court usually attempts a reconcilia­
tion. If this fails, the court pronounces the marriage at 
an end, and adjudicates on the amount of bride price to 
be repaid, having regard, as we shall see shortly, to the 
conduct of the parties as observed by the court or proved 
to it, the duration of the marriage, and the number of 
children born of the marriage, among other factors, ft'here
the husband does not appear and is not represented, as 
often happens, the case proceeds nonetheless; the court 
pronounces the marriage at an end, having fixed the amount 
of bride price repayable to the husband or his family. This 
sum is then paid into court, and the marriage is well and 
truly dissolved.
Where the action is brought by the husband or 
his family, the procedure is the same as above, except that 
it might be necessary in such a case to have the court’s 
judgment regarding the repayment of the bride price executed. 
Jn cases of extreme dissatisfaction with a life’s character, 
a husband brings an action for divorce against his wife 
and/or her family and declares that he does not want any 
refund of the bride price whatsoever, and (still more rare­
ly) renouncing any rights to any child she might be with.at 
the time of the action, ^he court thereupon pronounces the 
marriage dissolved, and t hat is the end of the matter.
It should be mentioned as a closing remark that 
in modern times an ever-increasing proportion of divorces 
is obtained in court - a practice which said to be well 
established in Calabar early in the century,'1' and in -figba- 
land in the 1930’s. does not mean that extra-judicial
1. Cf. C0tton, loc.cit., who said in 1905> "A man can only 
divorce his wife by bringing her before the courts and 
giving sufficient reasons. A woman cannot divorce her­
self, but she can bring her husband before the courts, 
and obtain release from him if the court decides his 
guilt,” (at p.U30)*
2. ”... all cases of divorce,” wrote ^olarin in 1939* "are 
[now] done in court and adjudicated upon according to 
merit.” Op.cit., at p.31•
divorce ia no longer lawful; it simply means that as so­
ciety becomes more and more impersonal, as less people 
become available for the often time-consuming and intricate 
business of ascertaining what payments have or have not been 
made and how much of this should be repaid in a given case 
in respect of a marriage which has probably subsisted for 
many years, it becomes progressively more convenient for 
all concerned to have such matters settled before a tribunal 
of full-time judges.^* 4 
Legal effects of divorce
(a) On property rights of spouses
When a woman leaves her husband or is sent away 
by him pending a formal dissolution of the marriage, she 
is entitled to takeaway with her all her personal effects 
as well as any movable property which she brought to the 
matrimonial home or acquired during coverture by her own 
exertion in her own time , or purchased with her own money (and, 
of course, any gifts made to her for her own separate use
by her blood relations or friedds). As a rule, however,
she has no right to take away any property given her by 
the husband in circumstances which made it clear that the 
property was intended for her as a wife and house-keep&TS*
Jj. Thoughlbusternary court judges sit in rotation in most
places, they do sit full-time whenever it is their turn 
to do so.
U. For further details on divorce generally, see aLso Hammer, 
loc.cit.» p.60; Williamson, loc.cit., pp.55-56, both 
on the Kalabari I jaw.
Thus she has no right to take away any cooking-utensils 
or furniturejb ought, for her by the husband even if the 
furniture Tbn question was intended for use in her own bed­
room and was actually so used. If she took away any such
property, she and her family will be liable for a fair 
compensation therefore Indeed, according to the strict
letter of the customary law, a wife and her family must 
pay for any clothing, trinkets or other articles of dress 
which she was given by her husband and which she took away
with her on being separated from him - the usual time for
such payment being the occasion of the settlement and refund 
cf whatever sum is due to the husband on account of the 
bride price and other customary dues.
The question of a wife’s right to her landed pro­
perty (i.e. buildings, economic plants and the land itself) 
is more difficult to state with any degree of confidence. 
This is because here we are faced with two conflicting but 
fundamental principles of customary law. ^he first is that 
a person is entitled to the fruit of his labour even where 
this takes the form of an improvement to another’s land, 
provided only that the improvement was effected with the 
consent of the landowner in the first place. On this .
principle, then, a divorced wife should be entitled to the
1. This was probably what Easden had in mind when he said 
of Ibo law that a woman who was ordered out of the matri­
monial home by the husband was thereby deprived of all 
property: Among the Ibos of Nigeria, p.77*
continued use and ownership of what was her landed property 
during the subsistence of her marriage, ^he other principle 
is that non-resident strangers cannot own permanent rights 
or interests in landed property if they have no intention 
of establishing any other legal relationship with the local 
community or any of its members. On this principle, a 
divorced woman, being now a non-resident stranger in her 
ex-husbandfs community (she has to be a stranger in the vast 
majority of cases on account of the rule relating to exo­
gamy), could not retain her rights over her landed property 
in these circumstances. Happily, this dilemma never presents 
itself to the courts because the woman concerned always dis­
poses of all her landed property before the marriage is dis­
solved. ^ven where she is driven out of the house by the 
husband or his family, she still can alienate such property; 
for though separated from the husband, she is not divorced 
until the bride price has been repaid or the marriage other­
wise judicially dissolved. The woman and her family will 
not unnaturally play for time in a situation like this; and 
if, realizing this, the husband resorts to court action to 
obtain divorce, the inevitable delay entailed in litigation 
would afford the woman all the time she needs at least to 
give the property away if she cannot or will not sell it.
In any case, she (or her family) can always apply to the 
court for time in which to straighten out her property rights
the courts are not favourably disposed towards property- 
grabbing husbands, and so will almost certainly grant the 
time prayed for in these circumstances,
(b) On the bride price
There was uniformity in the law on the effect of 
divorce on t he husband’s claim to recovery of his marriage 
consideration (bride price), the general rule being that all 
the substantive bride price and customary dues were recoverable 
But now the rules vary from society to society unless re­
gulated by statute. -Even where a statutory maximum sum 
refundable has been fixed, there are still local variations 
as to what items within this limit should and should not 
be repaid.
The maximum bride p? ice recoverable in the Eastern 
Region at the present moment is £30. ^his, in our submission, 
is the combined effect of s.3 of the Limitation of Dowry 
Law, 1956, which sets a top limit to the amount of bride 
price payable in respect of any marriage at £30 (including 
"incidental expenses", where applicable), and s.3 of the 
same Law which bars the courts from entertaining any suits 
or making any decisions which would in effect violate the 
provisions of that Law.
Within this statutory limit there are, as indicated 
above, local variations. Thus among the iVbiriba, for
2. No.23 of 1956, Lav/s of the Easter Region of Nigeria.
instance, there is said to be a reduction of ten shillings 
and one pound in the bride price paid, for every female
3
issue or male issue of the marriage as the case may be.
All that can be usefully said by way of a general statement 
is that the proportion of bride price and in particular the 
customary dues ("incidental expenses") recoverable by a 
husband in divorce proceedings in respect of his wife di­
minishes with the duration of the marriage being dissolved 
and the number and sex of any children born of the marriage.
In those parts of the Western Region where the 
Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-Lawd
Order, 1958,^ is in force, and to the extent that the figures
5
therein stated have not been varied by the local authority, 
the maximum sums recoverable on divorce are set out in 
the Schedule (Part B) to. s.8 as follows;-
where the marriage has not been consummated: £35 (Pull sun)
where the marriage has been consummated but has
existed for less than one year: £30;
where the marriage has existed for one year
or more but for less than five years: £25;
3* Ekeghe, op.cit., p.U8. 
k* E.R.L.N. No. 1+56 of 1958.
5* Two District Councils (Ijero and Odo-Etim) have adopted
the Bye-Laws with increased dowries payable and refundable; 
the Ikorodu Divisional Council, on the other hand,
adopted the Bye-Laws with decreased figures. See Dr#N#L.N.
160 of 1961, W.N.L.N. 32k of 1961, and W.N.L.N.3OI4. of 
1962 respectively.
where the marriage has existed for five years , 
or more ; N2£).
In the hulk of the Region, however, the Bye-Lav# do not 
apply at the moment; and in these places, as in the Eastern 
Region to the extent indicated, the amount of hride price 
recoverable is determined by the number of children born 
of the marriage as well as the duration thereof.
There are no statutory provisions regulating the 
time wHthin which a deserting (or deserted) wife and/or 
her family should repay the bride price to her husband. 
Neither is there any statute law which provides that some 
repayment must be made. The customary courts or other 
tribunals trying the case have a free hand, therefore, 
in deciding how soon after separation the repayment shall 
be made. Es.ch case is determined on its merits. But the 
modern rule may be said to be as follows. Where the se­
paration is due to the culpable act or omission of the 
husband, he has no right to recover the bride price or any 
part thereof unless and until a re-marriage has been ar­
ranged by or for the wife. Where, on the other hand, the 
separation is caused by the culpable act or omission of the 
wife or her family, repayment becomes due and enforceable 
on demand.^
6. for the customary law, old and modern, see: -'fforde, Efik 
traders of Old Calabar, p.lU; Simmons, loc.cit., p.165; 
Porde, Carriage and the Family among the Yako. p.53 f f•; 
Forde, irDouble descent among the Yako!f, loc.cit.» p.325;
(c) On custody of children.
Jurisdiction and law applicable* I’he current
practice is that questions relating to the custody of
children are adjudicated upon by the superior courts in
accordance with ‘'English*1 law where such children are born
of a Christian marriage, and by the customary courts in
6aaccordance with customary law in all other cases. This, 
on the face of it, is also the law; but the matter is not 
entirely free from doubt. It is true that s.13 of the High 
Court Law of the Eastern Region and the proviso to s.9(1) 
of the High court Law of the Western Region each provides 
that the High Court shall not have original jurisdiction 
in matters relating to the family status, guardianship etc. 
of children where the customary courts have jurisdiction.
It is also true that these Regional High Court Laws and that 
of Lagos provide for the application in these courts of the 
"law and practice for the time being in force in England1 
- including of course the law relating to the award of 
custody to one or the other of the parents - in all matri­
monial causes, over which they have jurisdiction, as we 
have seen. Similarly, s#7 of the Infants Law of the Western 
Region provides that Part III of that Law which deals with 
the custody of children on divorce (among other matters)
Footnote 6 continued •••••
Ellis, p.186; Leith-Ross, p.103; Kasunmu, pp.155-156; 
Basden, Among the Ibos, pp.76-77; Basden, Niger Ibos, 
p.2^0; Forde and ^ones, p.18; Meek, Law and aithority, 
p.281; Esenwa, p.75*
6a. See, e.g., Omodion v. Fasoro and Ibeji (i960) w.R.N.L.R. i
shall not apply to children subject to customary law on 
the subject; while the Carriage, ^ivorce and Custody of 
Children Adoptive Bye-LawS Order of that Region lays down 
rules for the award of custody by customary Courts. ‘Oie 
implication in all this would seem to be that questions re 
lating to the custody of children of a customary marriage 
should be decided by Customary Courts applying customary 
law, and those relating to the custody of children of a 
Christian marriage should be determined by the High Court 
applying the current law of England.
But it is also a fact that s.22, s.12 and s.27 
of the High ^ourt Laws of the Hastern Region, the western 
Region and Lagos respectively provide that the High Court 
,Jshall observe and enforce the observance customary law 
wherever applicable, and "shall not deprive any person of 
the benefit of such” law, and that customary law 11 shall be 
deemed applicable in any civil cause or matter1', v/here the 
parties thereto are Nigerians. It is a moat point, to 
say the least, whether the statutory provisions discussed 
in the last paragraph above are sufficiently clear and un­
ambiguous to be regarded as effectively depriving any Ni­
gerian of the right to have the custody of himself or of 
his child determined by his local customary law by reason 
only that the child in question was born of a Christian 
marriage. This is another aspect of the law which badly
needs clarification by the legislature; for such an important 
question should not be left to speculation among lawyers 
or presumption by the courts, as it is at the moment*"^
(i) Under customary law.
The general rule under customary law is that the 
right to the custody of children whose parents are divorced 
or separated belongs to the father, whatever the reason for 
the divorce or separation and whether the said father was 
the innocent or the guilty party* If, however, any of the 
children is too young to be separated from his mother, the 
latter is entitled to keep him until he is obld enough for
o
such separation, when the father may then demand him hack.
7« It may be objected with some justification that since the 
question of children's custody is decided during divorce 
proceedings and at the same time as the decree of disse- 
lution is pronounced, all these doubts and queries are of 
no more than academic interest, I’o this the answer is
(a) that the q uestion of custody may, and not Infrequently 
does, arise as a result of a voluntary separation and long 
before any divorce petitions are presented to the courts;
(b) that, as in iunachree v. I aria ((1923) k N.L.R.99) al­
ready discussed, the parties to a dispute over a child's 
custody may not be the child’s parents themselves, one or 
both of whom may have died, but his maternal and paternal 
grandparental families;
(c) that the question of custody may only have arisen after 
a marriage has been dissolved as where, for example, un­
known to a man, his child was en ventre sa mere at the time 
the divorce decree was pronounced; and"Td) that even if 
the question of divorce has to be decided with reference
to the law of England in a given case, it does not neces­
sarily follow that custody rights too should be determined 
with reference to that law; to hold that it shall be so 
determined would, in our submission, be to revert to the 
now discredited theory that once a person contracts a 
Christian marriage or is a child of such marriage, all his 
personal lav/ rights ipso facto fall outside the pale of 
customary law for all purposes.
8. Cf. on YORUBA law: Ellis, op.cit.» 186; Folarin, op.cit,
p.32.On ITBEKIRI law: Omoneukanrin, op. cit., p.i+o. On  ^
the EKOI: Forde, “Double descent among the ^ako", loc. cit.ru
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Even among the matrilineal societies of ^ koi,^even in the ■
case of children of " small dowry" marriages among the I jaw,
the custody of children belongs to their father if for any
9
reason the marriage is terminated* Thisnappears odd, in 
view of the fact that as already indicated elsewhere, children 
are "affiliated" to the family of theirnmaternal relations 
and not to that of their father in such cases. The explana­
tion for this is perhaps that a father is entitled'to the 
custody and control of his children all during his life 
time, and that it is only after his deatli that they can 
elect to go over to their maternal relations if they so 
desire•
The customary lav/ is now subject, in those places' 
where the Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children Adoptive 
Bye-Laws Order, 1958, of the western Region is in force, 
to the rule that in making an order for the custody and 
upbringing of a child in any proceedings the court shall 
always act on the principle that "the interest and welfare
"TOof the child fchall be the first and paramount consideration.-^
footnote 8 continued ...
D.325; Partridge, Cross ^iver natives, p.256; On IBIBIO 
law: Eorde and j^ones, op.cit., p.77* On IJAW law: Talbot,
Peoples of southern Nigeria, Vol.Ill, p. -^39; Talbot,
Tribes of the Niger belta, p.218. On IBO law: Basden,
Niger Ibos/ p.2i|0. Also generally, Elias, op.cit., p.297* 
Talbot*s statement that children 11 almost invariably go 
with" their mother "if she leaves her husband*' (In the. 
shadow of the bush, p.97) was probably intended to refer 
to children too young to be separated from their mother.
9. See under EKOI and IJAW in note 8 supra, for references.
10. S.lU(l).
11. On some of the implications of this clause, see (ii) 
below.
(i±) Under the general law.
In cases governed by the general ("English’*) law, 
the basic rule is that referred to in the last paragraph 
above, viz. that the welfare of the child shall be the de­
ciding factor in making any orders regarding his custody.
The old common law rule that a father’s right to his child’s 
custody was absolute - so absolute indeed that he could
lawfully claim from his wife the custody of a child at the 
12
breast - is no longer good law. Section 12 of the Infants
Law of the We stern Region ^  provides, inter alia, that the
High Court shall make such orders regarding the custody of,
*
and the right of access of the parents to, a child as it 
thinks fit on the application of either parent and having 
regard to the child’s welfare. S.15 provides that an 
agreement in a separation deed shall not be void by reason 
only that it contains a provision to the effect that the 
husband shall give up his right to the custody and control 
of a child of the marriage in favour of the child’s mother. 
But the most detailed and felicitous provision is in s.2l+ 
which reads as follows:-
’'Where in any proceeding before any court the custody 
or upbringing of a child ... is in question, the C0urt 
in deciding that question, shall regard the welfare
12. Eor the rule at common law, see R.v. pe Hanneville 
(180k) 5 East 221. Also, Bromley, pp.303“4»
13. Cap.i+9 o f the 1959 Revision.
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of the child as the first and paramount consideration, 
and shall not take into consideration whether fro$ any 
other point of view the claim of the father, or any 
right at Gommon law possessed by the father, in respect 
of eueh custody, up-bringing ... is superior to that 
of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior 
to that of the father.1'
These provisions in the Infants Law of the Western Region 
have done little more than assemble for easy reference the 
provisions of the Custody of Infants Act, 1873* the Guardian­
ship 6f Infants Act, 1886, and the Custody of Children Act, 
1891* (all of them Acts of the imperial parliament which 
almost certainly apply in Lagos and the ^astern Region as 
statutes of general application which were in force in 
England on the first day of January, 1900) as well as the 
provisions of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1923 (also 
of England) which will or v/ill not apply to Lagos and the 
Eastern Region according as the question of custody and 
guardianship of children is or is not regarded by the courts 
as an aspect of "matrimonial causes or matter".
The guiding principle then is the welfare of the 
child whose custody and upbringing are in question. Among 
the factors which the courts take into consideration in 
assessing a child*s welfare are (a) his physical well-being, 
having regard to his age and general state of health;
(b) his educational requirements - religious as well as
secular - considered in the light of each parent’s reli-
1Ugious conviction or absence of it, and the comparative 
abilities of the parents to provide him with the appropriate 
form and standard of education suitable for his station in 
life; (c) the need for brothers and sisters to be brought 
up together wherever and erhanever possible; (d) whether or 
not the child would be in "moral danger" of any kind if in 
the custody of one or the other of the parents, having re­
gard to the character, mode of life, trade or profession
of each parent; (e) the wishes of the parents, especially
15that of the innocent party to : divorce proceedings; and
16(f) the wishes of the child himself, to some extent. So 
great is the store set by the courts on this principle that 
they will refuse to enforce an agreement in a separation 
deed whereby custody is given to a parent, if the agreement 
is not considered to be for the benefit or in the best 
interest of the child himself.
1L. Re Besant (1879) H  ch.D.508.
15. uole v."~"Cole (1941) 16 R.L.R.9# per Butler Lloyd, J.
16. Cf. Fitzgibbon, L.j# in Re O’Hara 119001 2 I.R.232, 
at p.2if0.
17- Re Besant. ante. ^ee also the proviso to s.2 of the 
Custody of Infants Act, 1873* of England.
18. Ror a detailed treatment of the whole subject, see 
Bromley, on.cit., pp.303-325* espe 303-313* 318-325*
B. DEATH
E f f e c t  o f  d e a th  o f  a s p o u s e .
The death of the wife terminates a marriage 
completely and for all purposes. It also abrogates all 
the usual customary rights and obligations which exist 
between the families of the two spouses by virtue of the 
marriage.
|he death of the husband, on the other hand, does
not necessarily terminate the marriage; more accurately,
perhaps, a husband’s death does not terminate the customary
law status of his wife as a married woman. This is not, as
is sometimes said, because there is the levirate anywhere
in southern Nigeria; for, in our submission, there is no
such institution there, at all events in modern family law.
(Por-de’s statement that "The levirate is as foreign to the
Yako as is the sororate"^ is true of all societies in
southern Nigeria.) It is rather because if a "widow" does
not re-marry within her deceased husband’s family - and she
has complete freedom of choice in the matter today, whatever
the position in the traditional society - and for so long
as she is not married to any other person, then firtyfe- ahe
remains a member of that family to the same extent and for
practically the same purposes as she was in her husband’s
1. Marriage and the family among the Yako in south-eastern 
Nigeria, p*71; see also, ibid.. n.59~
life-time; secondly, any children she might bear after 
the husband’s death are legitimate, being the legal children 
of the said husband - whoever the natural father of such 
children, and even if they were conceived after the death 
of their legal fatlier as here described; thirdly, she re­
tains her rights and interests in the matrimonial home as 
against her husband’s heir or heirs, even if she has no 
inheritance rights in the estate, and whether or not she has 
any children surviving; and fourthly, even where she and 
her husband lived abroad all during their married life, 
so that they had nothing that could be called their matri­
monial home in the husband’s native village or town, a 
$idow has a right, a propos her late husband’s family, to 
be given land out of the family property (if any) on which 
to build a home and grow her crops for ordinary domestic 
(not commerical) purposes - the grant usually being said 
to be made in her husband’s name where she has no male 
children, and in her children’s name where she has them.
Some positive act (which in most places is now no more than 
a mere formality, and in some merely consists in a refund 
of the bride price) is required to bring the marriage.to a
final end and to terminate the married status of the woman 
3
coneerned.
2. On the effect of a husband’s death on the marriage gene­
rally, see ^orde and Jones, op.cit., p.77; Egharevba, 
op.cit., p#76; coker, op.cit., esp. pp.287-88; Kasunmu, 
op.cit., p.lia. ^‘or a different view, see Williamson, 
loc.cit., p.55> and florde, Marriage and the family among 
the Yako ...., p.60.
3* See under "Widow inheritance” below.
make any difference
The death of a. /wife,, may or may not to. the
legal capacity of the surviving husband"tojeontract a seoond 
marriage, depending partly on the type of marriage which is 
now dissolved by the wife’s death and partly on the type 
of second marriage contemplated. Since a customary mar­
riage does not affect a man’s legal capacity to contract 
another customary marriage concurrently, the death of a 
customary law wife does not make any difference to her hus­
band’s capacity to contract any number of other customary 
marriages at will. But, since in view of the provisions 
of s.33(l) of the Marriage Act, a man cannot contract a 
Christian marriage during the currency of this customary 
marriage with another woman, the death of an only customary 
law wife leaves the husband free to contract a Christian 
marriage with a woman of his choice. Conversely, because 
s.35 of the same Act declares that any person who is mar­
ried under the Act or whose marriage is declared valid by 
the Act shall be incapable of marrying any other person 
(than the current spouse) under customary law, the death of 
a Christian wife has a liberating effect on a man who wishes 
to take a customary law wife (or of course another Christian 
wife) •
As far as women are concerned, every lawful marriage 
is an absolute bar on any other marriage during the sub­
sistence of the current marriage: nowhere in souther Nigeria
is polyandry lawful. Besides, since as already indicated, 
the death of a customary law husband does not necessarily 
dissolve a woman’s marriage to him, it follows that a 
husband’s death does not of itself affect the wife’s lack 
of capacity to marry. (As we have seen, a woman who re­
marries outside her late husband’s family before her custo­
mary lav/ marriage with her deceased husband has been formal 
ly dissolved ia regarded as no more than a mistress to the 
second man; all the children of the second association 
belong in law to the deceased husband and his family).
On the other hand, a Christian marriage is automatically 
dissolved by the death of either spouse. 1'herefore, the 
widow of this type of marriage is free to marry any other 
person of her choice in accordance v/ith the requirements 
of either the general law or of customary law. ^hat the ef 
feet of a husband’s death would be on the legal capacity 
of a widow v/ho v/as married to the same person by both custo 
mary law and Christian rites is not clear. (It has been 
suggested already that the two conflicting viev/s on the mat 
ter, viz. (a) that the two marriages are independent of 
each other for all purposes so that the dissolution of 
one does not affect the existence of the other, and (b) 
that the customary marriage merges with the Christian mar­
riage - whatever the order in which they were contracted - 
so that the dissolution of the Christian marriage means
the simultaneous dissolution of the customary one, are 
both plausible in their different ways and must await the 
verdict of the courts.)
"Widow inheritance1 •
It is a view widely held that in the traditional 
society a woman was inherited as a form of property by 
her husband’s sons or other heirs, with the one exception 
that no son could inherit his own mother. How far, if at 
all, this view ever represented the law - as opposed to 
popular but non-obligatory practice dictated by the exi­
gencies of life in societies with no insurance policies and 
no homes for old and disabled people - of any societies in 
southern Nigeria, it is now perhaps impossible to say with 
any degree of certainty. But one finds it difficult to see 
how in a society in which women were never completely re­
moved from membership of their maiden families by the fact 
of their marriage away therefrom; where parents and guardians 
retained sufficient control over their, daughters or wards 
as the case may be to be able to bring their marriage to 
an end by recalling them because, for instance, their 
husbands had not fulfilled part of their customary obliga­
tions to the said parents or guardian; where divorce could 
be obtained virtually by unilateral action, either by re­
turning the bride price to a husband who only grudgingly 
accepts! it or by paying the money into court in the
circumstances already discussed; and where a wife had a 
right during her husband’s life time to leave him with or 
without cause given (as we have seen) and refuse to go back
to the matrimonial home in sp ite of threats or entreaties -
one finds it difficult to see how in these places and 
circumstances the same women could he siad to fall for dis­
tribution as pieces of property at the death of their husbards 
But whatever the law in the past, the legal po­
sition at the present moment is that a woman whose husband 
has just died can (after the lapse of the mourning period 
prescribed by local usage) elect either to remain attached 
to her husband’s family or to go back to her maiden family
or else to find her way into one of the big cities. If
she decides to stay on in the late husband’s family, she 
may either (a) marry one of the members thereof selected 
according to the local rules of practice on the matter or 
as arranged by mutual agreement among the family members as 
interested parties, or (b) remain on her own and ’'for her 
husband” (as it is popularly expressed), raising children 
to his name wherever possible. The right to stay on in 
the family is not dependent on the question whether or not 
the woman concerned has any children surviving, ^he has 
this right even if she has never had any children, and even 
if she is now too old to hope for the birth of any
children.^
1. On the question of “widow inheritance", see: Basden,
Among the Ibos p.80; Basden, Niger Ibos. p.100;
Borde and ^ones, p«21; Meek, Lav/ and authority, ♦ ♦, 
p.28L; Esenwa, P»7U; fl'albot, bribes of the Niger 
Delta, p.218 ff; Talbot, Peoples of southern Nigeria,Vol*
III, p*678; Borde, "Double descent among the Yako", 
loc«cit«, p .32-k; Ajisafe. pp.81+-85; Ward, Marriage 
among the Yoruba, p. 18; Folarin, pp*iqlq—i+5; Bradbury 
and 111oyd, p • b l ; p*80; Egharevba, p«76; Omoneukanrin,
p.UU, p.7U; In re Arrboru.ia (19U9) 19 N*L*R. 33; 0Oker, 
p.38; Johnson, p.H5j Ellis,p.183; Kasunmu, p. 11+2; 
Thomas, "Marriage and legal customs of the L^o-speaking 
peoples" loc.cit. f p*95*
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